
























107 Variations on the Unexpected
3Dedication and Prelude 
To Raine Daston
In his essay “Of Travel,” Francis Bacon recommends that diaries be 
used to register the things “to be seen and observed.” Upon returning 
home, the traveler should not entirely leave the visited countries, but 
maintain a correspondence with those she met, and let her experi-
ence appear in discourse rather than in “apparel or gesture.” Your 
itineraries through a vast expanse of the globe of knowledge seem to 
illustrate Bacon’s recommendations, and have inspired many to em-
bark on the exploration of other regions—some adjacent, some dis-
tant from the ones you began to clear. Yet not all have journeyed as 
well equipped as you with notebooks, nor assembled them into a 
trove apt to become, as Bacon put it, “a good key” to inquiry. As you 
begin new travels, you may add the present collection to yours, and 
adopt the individual booklets as amicable companions on the plane 
or the U-Bahn. Upon wishing you, on behalf of all its contributors, 
Gute Reise! and Bon voyage!, let us tell you something about its gen-
esis and intention.
Science depends on the unexpected. Yet surprise and its role in 
the process of scientific knowledge-making has hitherto received lit-
tle attention, let alone systematic investigation. If such a study ex-
isted, it would no doubt have been produced in your Department at 
the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. The topic is a 
seamless match with your interest in examining ideals and practices 
of scientific and cultural rationality—ideals and practices often so 
fundamental that they appear to transcend history or are overlooked 
altogether. It is also an endeavor too broad and diverse for a single 
scholar to pursue, and you would undoubtedly have approached it by 
joining forces with others. Guided by a vision of collective empiri-
cism and nurtured by the joy of collaborating, you have both re-
searched and practiced forms of intellectual cooperation. Working 
groups and their edited books have become a hallmark of the Depart-
ment’s achievements. We have all experienced the recipe: bring to-
gether the right mixture of people and themes, in constantly fresh 
combinations, add a few audacious questions, and set in motion a 
series of unforeseen and highly productive encounters that generate 
unexpected findings, long-standing friendships, and a vast interdisci-
plinary network of like-minded scholars. 
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spontaneous yet reflexive confidence that the pursuit and growth 
of knowledge does not lead to melancholy world-weariness, but to 
 ever-new and pleasurable sources of admiratio.
The result of our collective endeavor is presented here in alpha-
betical order by authors’ last name, the texts themselves ranging, 
randomly, from “A Family Conversation” to “Zufallsfunde.” As in the 
Encyclopédie, the arbitrariness of that order is meant to suggest the 
impermanence of systems and the frailty of methodical arrange-
ments, while evoking unforeseen depths, unusual convergences, 
 unexpected companions, and the indefinite and surprising ramifica-
tions of the ways of human understanding. The occasion seemed to 
lend itself less to purely erudite disquisitions than to a self-conscious 
epistemic and emotional exercise in friendship and gratitude. It is 
offered in that spirit, as a readable work to be dipped into for spells 
of browsing, and as a handy edition fitting in any pocket, tailored to 
your specific needs and practices of being on the go. May this collec-
tion be an enduring source of enjoyable surprise!
Barcelona, Berlin, London, November 2018
Mechthild Fend, Anke te Heesen, Christine von Oertzen,  
Fernando Vidal 
It is this network of varied sensibilities that we mobilized for a col-
lective work on surprise and the history of knowledge, drawing on 
the Department’s characteristic outlook and the creativity of those 
who have supported and shaped it over the past twenty-five years. It 
was impossible for us to include each and every scholar in residence 
during the Department’s existence. In order to keep the project man-
ageable, we had to restrict ourselves to inviting those who had been 
its members or guests for at least two years, or had been centrally 
involved in one of its working groups. 
The response to our call was enthusiastic. As the papers came 
streaming in, we became increasingly excited. We realized that the 
synergies created by this project testify to the gratefulness that lives 
on within a vibrant scholarly community, and convey something of 
the intellectual and affective dispositions that sustained the life of 
your Department.
We envisaged a cornucopia of short texts crossing epochal and 
disciplinary boundaries. The contributors were asked to engage with 
surprise as a basic component of seeking, constructing, and experi-
encing knowledge of the world. The 107 pieces in this volume look at 
surprise as a historical category, as a staged performance or sponta-
neous reaction, or as part of a personal experience during scholarly 
endeavors. They mobilize different genres—from the erudite to the 
autobiographical, from the essayistic to the poetic and pictorial. 
Taken together, they engage with and build upon your work, fore-
grounding an epistemic category closely related to wonder. 
Wonder, however, involves a paradox: it is the beginning of in-
quiry, but that very inquiry puts an end to it. Wonder is thus “a ba-
rometer of ignorance.” The present collection of texts nuances, per-
haps even contradicts, the observation that “The more we know, the 
less we wonder.” For all those acquainted with you can attest to your 
permanent sense of wonder, your capacity to be surprised, and your 
ability to turn that emotion into productive accomplishments for the 
dignity and advancement of learning. Never blasée, you have shared 
the curiosity of junior and senior scholars alike, encouraging them to 
pursue the paths this dubious passion opens toward its apparent 
end. Such an attitude embodies a manner of being in the world, a 
Christa Donner, The Two-Handed Question, 2018, collage. Based on sketches 
drawn during  Deptartment II’s colloquium in fall 2015. Courtesy of the artist.
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Erratum 
John Carson’s essay was inadvertently omitted in the printed version of this book.  
It was added without page numbers to this pdf. We sincerely apologize to the author.
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Hooks, Nets, and Links
Gadi Algazi
Within three days in February 1953, some 6,000 new immigrants were 
evicted from a transit camp near Israel’s eastern border. Inhabitants 
of the camp, most of them Iraqi Jews who had arrived in Israel since 
1951, had been involved in collective protests against unbearable liv-
ing conditions, discrimination, and political control by the bigwigs 
of the neighboring town, Kfar-Saba. The sudden dismantlement of 
the camp and their dispersal into seven different transit camps, 
where conditions were even worse, was mainly intended to put an 
end to those protests. The eviction was carried out by military and 
police forces in a secret operation that took three days. Officially, 
nothing had happened. News reports were withheld by military cen-
sorship and most of the relevant dossiers have not yet been declassi-
fied. In the following years, however, references to the event gradu-
ally made it into the press. I turned to the newspapers.
How should one go about seeking clues to a non-event? Digitized 
newspapers invite you to search for single terms or combinations, 
but it is almost impossible to take in a whole page at a glance and 
skim for relevant headlines. What should I be looking for? Times, 
places, and personal names turn out to be the most useful hooks for 
sifting through unstructured, heterogeneous material. Once you 
catch sight of a person, a significant date, a promising site, you fol-
low them. What else was that person doing? With whom or what was 
she or he associated? If a name works like a fishing-hook, temporal 
and spatial proximity are a net thrown into the sea of digitized texts: 
What else was happening there and then? 
What emerges is a provisional map of possible links, their nature 
initially obscure. This low form of historical inquiry assumes that 
social, temporal, and spatial proximity matter and works mainly 
through contiguity, but seems to eschew schemes of interpretation. 
Once you have a hunch about underlying relations, chains of cau-
sality, or supra-local links, you might stretch your field of inquiry 
backward and forward in time or broaden it to other places or in-
stitutions. But first you cast your net as wide as possible. This does 
not even amount to following the actors, because at this stage, you 
don’t know who they are. In some respects, it is not so different from 
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shacks attached to local councils—the seeds for a number of future 
poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of Israeli towns. Newspapers 
prove more rewarding. Their reports often preserve the informal, 
popular designation of an officially abolished camp, allowing me to 
locate it with some precision. On the other hand, they hardly men-
tion women activists. People’s names are also in flux. In the Hebrew 
press, immigrants’ names—and Arab names more generally—are 
constantly misspelled, shifting from one report to the next and occa-
sionally making it impossible to locate people. Jewish immigrants 
assumed newfangled “Israeli” names or kept switching between dif-
ferent ones.3 All this has to do with the combined effects of immigra-
tion and colonization. Typographic conventions fluctuate, too: in the 
1950s, Hebrew newspapers used three different sorts of hyphens and 
at least two styles of quotations marks. This type of search is difficult 
in the absence of uniform designations, stable linguistic and typo-
graphic codes, a bounded and stable social landscape.
Times are no less tricky. How far into the past should you cast 
your net? What kind of temporal proximity is likely to generate rele-
vant clues? Most of the immigrants evicted had arrived no more than 
three years earlier; this stakes out a rough and ready limit. But how 
far back should you go to inquire about the local elites that presided 
over the operation, their politics and alliances? Does the definition of 
proximity depend on the shape and dimensions of “what happened?” 
It’s difficult to delimit temporal proximity in advance, without for-
mulating hypotheses. 
With digitized collections, however, you are tempted to throw a 
tried-and-tested hook beyond reasonable limits, just to see what 
 happens—something unthinkable when systematically skimming 
through newspaper issues one by one. Mine was a simple hook, the 
name of one of the transit camps where the evicted found them-
selves. The name reappears eleven years later. In 1964, a twenty-six-
year-old radical journalist covering labor and social affairs meets 
people living in shacks under threat of imminent eviction at the pe-
3 Shemesh himself used the Arabic form of his name, Shammash, in a letter to the editor 
of an Arabic newspaper: Al-Ittihad, March 6, 1953 [Arabic].
working in archives, only that the page or the newspaper edition is a 
relatively random bundle of information brought together as news-
worthy.
Following every newspaper item mentioning Kfar-Saba in the 
year after the eviction, I come across a report about a former camp 
resident, Ephraim Shemesh, who tried to take up residence in the 
town nine months later. He was prevented from doing so by the 
mayor: The camp dismantled, he wanted no more communist trou-
blemakers. This throws precious light on the reasons behind the se-
cret operation, turning an outlier into a limit case for a more com-
mon pattern of political screening. I take that back to the archive. 
There, the mayor mentions one of the main protest ringleaders, a 
“most dangerous instigator,” who is now trying to move back into 
town.1 Could it be Shemesh? Now I find a report about Shemesh open-
ing a public meeting just three weeks before the eviction.2 I follow 
the thread of his name and find him two years later, residing in a 
settlement next to Kfar-Saba. It is reported that he was fired after 
publicly confronting a speaker for the ruling party. He started a sit-in 
at the labor exchange office to get his job back. This yields a clear 
sense of his political affiliation and local notoriety. Three years later, 
I find him filing a petition to the Supreme Court. By now, he is resi-
dent in Kfar-Saba and successfully challenges the local water utility 
company. The identity of his lawyer suggests that Shemesh may have 
moved to the moderate left.
The transit camp and the town prove good hooks to start with. To 
follow the evicted immigrants, I then look for every news item about 
the places they were sent. Are the nameless immigrants who pro-
tested against unemployment in one such camp the same as the ones 
evicted in 1953? If so, dispersal did not completely suppress their re-
belliousness.
In state archives, such camps often vanish from view upon their 
“suppression,” which often meant nothing more than the replace-
ment of tent compounds under government care with wooden 
1 Kfar-Saba Labor Council, March 9, 1953: Lavon Archive, iv-250-38-70.
2 Kol ha-‘Am, January 4, 1953 [Hebrew].
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riphery of a town. They bear the scars of a previous eviction, and tell 
him that back in 1952—they get the year wrong—they were evicted 
under a false pretext from a transit camp near Kfar-Saba. This is the 
most vivid piece of written evidence about the event, reported by its 
victims eleven years after the fact. The journalist signed with his pen 
name, but I immediately recognize him.4 I ask him for more details. 
He reads the clipping with moderate interest: No, there were so many 
stories he covered; he does not remember it. “How have you come 
across this one?” he asks me, “Is this something you’re now working 
on?”




The Second International Congress of the History of Science and 
Tech nology, held in London in July 1931, is remembered for the sur-
prise appearance of a delegation from the Soviet Union. More un-
expected still was the depiction of the relationship of science and 
history that one of the Soviet delegates, physicist-historian Boris 
 Hessen, articulated in his paper. Hessen ventured to “present a radi-
cally different view of Newton and his work,” contrasting a familiar 
image of Newton as a lonely genius “divorced from life” to the one in 
which Newton “in the fullest sense of the word was in the center of 
the physical and technical problems and interests of his time.” 1 Some 
of Hessen’s readers were taken aback—disconcerted, bewildered, or 
bemused—while others found his ideas eye-opening and ground-
breaking. Hessen’s paper has had a lasting impact on the history 
of social constructivist thought in science studies and the history of 
science. His intervention and its context have been comprehensively 
analyzed, yet little reflection has been given to the heuristic device 
of surprise—making familiar things strange and unfamiliar—that 
Hessen used to great effect. Whatever Hessen’s own methodological 
premises were, he expressed quite consistently a methodological 
stance that had gained ascendancy in the first decades of the twen-
tieth century within Russian-Soviet human sciences. The complex 
genealogy of surprise as a heuristic device might itself be surprising 
for historians of science today.
The motley crew of literary scholars, artists, and linguists known 
as the Russian Formalists had labeled their method estrangement or 
defamiliarisation (“ostranenie” in Russian, derivative of “strannyi”—
meaning “strange”). Estrangement snatches ordinary things from the 
context of their familiar associations and makes them look unfamil-
iar and “strange,” as if seen for the first time. Most ambitiously, they 
sought to use art to surprise and shock us into confronting an often 
senseless reality, redefining our relations with the everyday world. 
As Viktor Shklovsky famously put it, “the device of art is to make ob-
jects ‘unfamiliar,’” to describe or represent the world in an unusual or 
1 Boris Hessen, “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s ‘Principia’,” in The Social 
and Economic Roots of the Scientific Revolution: Texts by Boris Hessen and Henryk 
Grossmann, ed. Gideon Freudenthal and Peter McLaughlin (Heidelberg: 2009), 41–101.
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from the so-called native’s point of view. Just as an anthropologist 
first comes to a foreign culture as a stranger, they pretended to be 
strangers to experimental culture. “Playing the stranger” was the 
heuristic device they endorsed in order to de-familiarize an activity 
the participants take for granted, to “query its taken-for-granted 
framework” and “to move away from self-evidence.” 4
In searching for allies in their project of questioning the “self- 
evident,” scholars usually point to Anglo-American cultural studies. 
Indeed, the lessons of cultural anthropologists such as Clifford 
Geertz, who described the scholar’s “encounter with his object of 
study” as “the journey into another world, a magical realm full of 
surprises,” 5 were not lost on historians of science in the wake of 
Kuhn. The anthropological focus on the localness of knowledge 
 practices, rather than on the “universality” of knowledge, resonated 
with the post-Kuhnian turn in the history of science to local prac-
tices and the cultures of science. Be it a study of witchcraft among 
the Azande or the cultural history of objectivity and rationality, this 
“journey into another world” revealed the meanings of things within 
the context in which they were produced. The results of defamiliariz-
ing the obvious and self-evident were often surprising to the histori-
ans themselves. Once defamiliarized and placed in historical context, 
the seemingly timeless and ahistorical objectivity “came to seem at 
once stranger—more specific, less obvious, more recently histori-
cal—and deeper ... than we had ever suspected.” 6
“Estrangement”—making the familiar unfamiliar and strange—
has become a central methodological strategy in science studies and 
the cultural history of science. As a heuristic device, “estrangement” 
has a strange genealogy indeed. If nothing else, it links together Boris 
Hessen, the Russian Formalists, Clifford Geertz, the authors of The 
 Leviathan and the Air-Pump, and the authors of Objectivity in an 
 improbable, yet not entirely surprising, genealogy.
4 Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle,  
and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: 1985), 6.
5 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: 1973), 347.
6 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: 2007), 10.
surprising way, and thus to “make it strange.” He takes examples 
from Lev Tolstoy’s novels to illustrate the device of estrangement. 
Tolstoy, Shklovsky wrote, “makes the familiar seem strange by not 
naming the familiar object. He describes an object as if he were see-
ing it for the first time, an event as if it were happening for the first 
time.” For example, in War and Peace, Tolstoy describes an opera as 
“painted cardboard and oddly dressed men and women who moved, 
spoke, and sang strangely in a patch of blazing light.” Or, in “The 
 Resurrection,” Tolstoy substitutes prosaic expressions for religious 
terms and words common to the dogmas and rituals of the church. 
As a result, Tolstoy “presented as strange and monstrous what [peo-
ple of his time] accepted as sacred.” Tolstoy, Shklovsky argued, “uses 
this technique of ‘defamiliarization’ constantly.” 2 The parallels be-
tween this philological discussion and Hessen’s discussion of New-
ton are un mistakable, in spite of all the differences in their position 
in  Soviet society and the apparent absence of direct contact. 
The Russian Formalists’ technique of ostranenie is remarkably 
resonant with the ontology developed by science studies scholars 
and post-Kuhnian historians of science. Inaugurating the whole 
new  genre of laboratory studies, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar 
 approached scientists in the contemporary laboratory setting of the 
Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, as members of “a strange tribe 
who spend the greatest part of their day coding, marking, altering, 
correcting, reading, and writing” and whose strange practices could 
only be understood “without recourse to the explanatory concepts of 
the inhabitants themselves.” 3 Latour and Woolgar labeled their meth-
odological stance an “anthropological strangeness.” Steven Shapin 
and Simon Schaffer have put this ontology to work in historiographic 
practice. The authors of Leviathan and the Air-Pump approached the 
experimental culture of seventeenth-century England as an anthro-
pologist would approach a foreign culture, trying to understand it 
2 Viktor Borisovich Shklovsky, “Iskusstvo kak priem,” in O teorii prozy (Moscow: 1925), 
7–20; English translation: Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Literary Theory: 
 An  Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden, MA: 1998), 15–21.
3 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts 
(Princeton, NJ: 1986), 40–41.
2322
Maria Avxentevskaya | A Matter of Skill
A Matter of Skill
Maria Avxentevskaya
Ha. interject. [ha, Latin.]: An expression of wonder, surprise, sudden 
question, or sudden exertion.1
The historical typologies of surprise include Aristotelian and Platonic 
interpretations, the casting of surprise as an emotional response and 
as a sense-making process. Considering it in the spirit of Plato’s 
ἐξαίφνης , a sudden flash of cognitive illumination displaying things 
in a new light, we will zoom in on the vocabulary of amazement in 
the early modern British history of knowledge. This discursive lens 
can help us to observe how speaking about the marvelous invoked 
nuanced responses to epistemic anomalies.
In the early seventeenth century, “surprise” in common usage in-
dicated an ambiguous action. The etymology of the verb, ultimately 
from Latin superprehendere, meaning “seize, catch,” contributed to 
its mixed connotations: most often it implied “to interrupt an ac-
tivity”—something not necessarily pleasing for those surprised. 
Whereas “surprise” resembled a lightning strike of new awareness, 
“wonder” referred to a more continuous encounter with the new, one 
also linked with a state of being baffled or taking a naive delight in 
magic tricks. Didactic arguments often cited “wonder” as part of the 
withering negation, “no wonder that.”
The epistemic role of amazement can be described in terms of 
stasis—a rhetorical technique best understood through analogy with 
physical movement. Stasis is the cessation of a motion due to a sud-
den noticing of conflicting stimuli to move in different directions. In 
rhetoric, this means pausing the discourse to ruminate on the possi-
ble unfolding of argumentative paths because one’s attention has 
been arrested by a new object. The procedure of stasis departs from a 
surprise and continues with wondering—asking questions about 
new phenomena to appropriate them into a tentative narrative, 
which is a logically neutral way to explore novel grounds without 
disturbing established beliefs.2
1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London: 1755), 954. 
2 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, trans. Harold Edgeworth Butler (Cambridge, MA: 1922), 
Book III, 5:80–81. 
Early modern natural philosophy conceptualized wonderment by 
amalgamating its colloquial connotations with the legacy of classical 
rhetoric. Bacon’s Advancement of Learning (1605) famously charac-
terized wonder as both “broken knowledge” and “the seed of knowl-
edge.” 3 The ostensible discrepancy between breaking and planting is 
resolved in Bacon’s explanation of how “aphorisms, representing 
a knowledge broken, do invite me to inquire further.” 4 This insight 
is  exemplified in his Novum Organum (1620), where the “broken 
knowledge” articulated in aphorisms induces a stasis-like disposi-
tion to pause the argument and examine the emerging discursive 
paths. Experimental philosophy redefined surprise as a noble state of 
mind and a precursor to making sense of puzzling phenomena. 
But how should attention be attuned to the right cues for sur-
prise? Which seeds will sprout into illuminating new ontologies? 
How could the mind, wrestling with the dialectics of case and series 
in the practices of collecting, adopt a nuanced treatment of irregu-
larities in observation, thought, and action? 
Early discourses of the mind deemed some surprises to be more 
surprising than others because they signaled anomalies that were 
harder to explain. Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), 
which privileged “it is a wonder” statements, discerned such perplex-
ing deviations from regular oddities. For example, although madness 
is a mysterious malady in itself, what is “more to be wondered at” is 
that “it takes every other, and sometimes every third in a lineal de-
scent.” 5 The pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems (3rd c. BCE–
6th c. AD) already discriminated between the degrees of learned won-
derment: one could equally marvel at natural causes and human 
τέχνη appeared to contravene the laws of nature, but the most won-
drous were things that paradoxically embraced opposites.6 
John Wilkins’s Mathematical Magick (1648) followed the recep-
tion of the Aristotelian corpus in cultivating a sense of surprise. 
3 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning (London: 1605), Book I, I, 3. 
4 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, Book II, XVII, 7. 
5 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (Oxford: 1628), Books I, II, VI. 
6 Aristotle, Minor Works, ed. W. S. Hett (Cambridge, MA: 1936), 330–331, 333. 
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How I Found the Dogs
Monika Baár
Berlin, April 2008.
10 p.m., Tegel Airport. I board the night flight of the (now defunct) 
Hungarian Airlines, traveling from Berlin to Budapest. The journey 
isn’t long, under two hours. Some passengers are sleeping; others are 
staring at their phones. I have more than enough reading material for 
even a transatlantic journey: New York Review of Books, Der Spiegel, 
two novels. Somehow, tonight, none of these appear as attractive as 
they do on other occasions. Perhaps I should try to sleep? It doesn’t 
work. Spontaneously, I reach for the in-flight magazine. It’s some-
thing I rarely do: I have little interest in advertisements; I have heard 
the safety instructions many times. Leafing through, I stumble on a 
short piece, just two paragraphs: “This month we are celebrating the 
international day of guide dogs for the blind.” Guide dogs have been 
used since ancient times, explains the text, but their professional 
training started in Germany after the First World War to support the 
many young, blind veterans who wanted to be able to return to work 
and live independently. Little do I know that this in-flight magazine 
story will become my next research topic.
Groningen, late night, 2009.
Haphazard googling leads me to the work of Rudolphina Menzel 
(1891–1973), outstanding canine scientist. Among other contributions, 
she was the author of groundbreaking research on the developmen-
tal phases of puppies. I become interested in her life. Born into a lib-
eral Jewish family in Austria, she studied at Vienna University and 
then researched, bred, and trained dogs. A Zionist, she gave her dogs 
Hebrew names and taught them to respond to Hebrew commands. 
Following the Anschluss, at the very last minute, she managed to 
leave Austria with her husband. This unlikely escape was thanks to a 
local SS member who warned them about the imminent danger and 
helped them to leave. There was a reason for his kindness. Earlier, he 
had received the gift of a dog from Rudolphina, a striking manifesta-
tion of solidarity across the deepest divides. The Menzels then settled 
in Palestine and Rudolphina created an infrastructure for the train-
ing of working dogs in Israel: guide dogs for the blind, mine detection 
dogs, security dogs. But she encountered a problem which she solved; 
 Although his early writings reiterated surprise’s contemporary con-
notation of equivocality, Wilkin’s vernacular treatise on popular me-
chanics makes even more noticeable the semantic twist of emanci-
pating and objectifying wonder. He brings the practical art of mixed 
mathe matics into the pantheon of the liberal arts, which also liber-
ates the artificial wonders that are crafted without magic. Most of 
the marvels he mentions are fabled mechanical contrivances involv-
ing  kinetic extremes: exceptionally swift, slow, and powerful motion, 
 extraordinary imitations of living bodies or natural sounds, and 
movement with no apparent cause. However, artificial wonders excel 
due to their “compendious” configuration: the most wondrous in-
ventions of mechanical art are useful for a “multitude and variety 
of   services” but at the same time are “regular, simple, and per spi c-
uous, like the apprehensions of a distinct and thoroughly informed 
judgement.” 7 Wilkins’s  recipe for the right wonderment involves 
compounds of paradoxical opposites—the principle of composition 
endorsed by all the liberal arts. 
In spite of enthusiastic disclaimers, early modern natural philos-
ophy benefited from rhetorical ornamentum in the sense of both “ap-
paratus” and “embellishment.” In Wilkins’s view, what equated me-
chanics with other liberal arts was their shared capacity to adorn by 
ingeniously implanting coherence into the copious mass of parts and 
details. All liberal arts refine the skill of pausing in surprise to regard 
things in their various congruities. Long before Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement, classical rhetoric shaped the aesthetics of wonder in 
pushing the limits of the possible for human knowledge and crafts-
manship. In early modern England, this agenda was promoted by the 
recently established Royal Society of London. Its first apologist, 
Thomas Sprat, working under Wilkins’s close supervision, claimed to 
foresee the “wonderful model” of future science, which he was deter-
mined to convey, even though, at times, it would inevitably be disfig-
ured by unskilful hands.8
7 John Wilkins, Mathematical Magick, or the Wonders that May Be Performed by 
 Mechanical Geometry (London: 1648), 169; also: 9–10, as quoted below. 
8 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society (London, UK: 1667), 60–61. 
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him. The letter continues with a technical discussion in which he 
accepts some of the criticism leveled by Rudolphina at this theory of 
dog conditioning. And then, the letter falls again onto the floor, this 
time from my hands. I pick it up, put it back into the dossier, and si-
lently ask  Rudolphina, and Ivan Pavlov for forgiveness for having 
been handling their correspondence so clumsily.
the “imported” European dogs couldn’t cope with the climate and 
the local parasites, and so she located a semi-feral type of dog used by 
the Bedouins and domesticated it. Indeed, the new breed turned out 
to be much better suited to the local environment. She called it the 
Canaan dog, and it became the “national breed” of Israel. To this day, 
Canaan dogs are often photographed with the Israeli flag in the back-
ground. 
Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, April 2010.
“Could you please write your name in the registration book?” asks a 
friendly old lady as I enter the premises of the Central Zionist Ar-
chives. A rather strange situation, the likes of which I have not expe-
rienced since my childhood. Then there was no shame in not being 
able to write my name. But in my late thirties it is an entirely differ-
ent feeling. Later that day, I ask a friend to teach me to write my 
name with Hebrew characters, and I suddenly realize how conven-
ient it is to be left-handed in this new situation. The archivists are 
not particularly friendly; one of them is smoking in the little room 
behind the counter. This is a first: Smoking in the archives! Where all 
the unique and irreplaceable documents of many of the “founding 
fathers” of the country are being held! I wait at the counter and fi-
nally the requested dossiers are handed over to me. Some contain 
only a single sheet; others are very bulky. All are rather dusty, and I 
get the impression that no one has looked at them since they were 
delivered to the archives after Menzel’s death. The material is a mis-
cellany: assessment sheets testing the capabilities of dogs for various 
working functions, manuscripts of articles, press clippings showing 
American youth visiting the guide dog training premises in the con-
text of a bar mitzvah project, postcards sent to friends, a draft of a 
film script. Most of these items are crowded into one big paper box, 
and as I am trying to sort them out, a handwritten letter falls out of 
the box onto the floor. Picking it up, I notice that it is written in Ger-
man. The author of the letter thanks the Menzels for the invitation to 
visit them in Israel, which he regretfully cannot accept because of 
his old age and fail ing health. He would, however, very gladly wel-
come the Menzels in St. Petersburg if they were interested in visiting 
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Zadig et la sarigue de Cuvier
Bruno Belhoste
La reine de Babylone a perdu sa chienne.
 –  Jeune homme, n’avez-vous point vu le chien de la reine ?
 –  C’est une chienne et non un chien, répond Zadig, une épagneule 
très petite. Elle a mis depuis peu à bas, elle boîte d’un pied et elle 
a des oreilles très longues.
 –  Vous l’avez vue ? 
 –  Non, et je n’ai jamais su que la reine avait une chienne.
Zadig est condamné. Mais voilà que la chienne est retrouvée et il doit 
s’expliquer:
 – J’ai vu sur le sable les traces d’un animal, et j’ai jugé que c’étaient 
celles d’un petit chien. Des sillons m’ont fait connaître que c’était 
une chienne dont les mamelles pendaient, et qu’ainsi elle avait 
des petits. D’autres traces m’ont appris qu’elle avait les oreilles 
très longues ; et, comme le sable était moins creusé par une patte 
que par les trois autres, j’ai compris que la chienne était un peu 
boiteuse.
La méthode de Zadig racontée par Voltaire est celle des traces. Cuvier 
prétendra la remplacer par une autre, qu’il élève au rang d’un prin-
cipe : celui de la corrélation des formes. Pour illustrer son principe, 
Voltaire a écrit un conte. Pour démontrer le sien, Cuvier nous offrira 
une surprise : le récit de la sarigue. 
Les ouvriers des carrières de Montmartre ont apporté au savant 
un bloc de gypse fendu en deux morceaux, laissant apparaître, quand 
on les sépare, la double trace d’un petit animal: sur la partie supé-
rieure la tête, tournée du côté gauche, le corps et la queue  ; sur la 
partie inférieure, ébréchée, seulement quelques os. Il s’agit d’iden-
tifier l’espèce. 
Cuvier commence par examiner les mâchoires et la dentition. 
L’empreinte de la partie gauche de la mandibule montre qu’il s’agit 
d’un carnassier. Creusant dans la pierre pour dégager la partie droite, 
Cuvier trouve quatre molaires en bas et quatre en haut, ainsi qu’une 
canine. Cette partie lui rappelle celle d’un animal fossile décrit par 
Delamétherie, qui y a vu une chauve-souris, mais cette fois le sque-
lette est bien celui d’un quadrupède. La position du condyle, note-t-il, 
est plutôt celle d’un insectivore. Il pense d’abord à un hérisson. Sou-
dain, en creusant plus profond, apparaît l’élément décisif : la largeur 
de l’apophyse coronoïde, caractéristique des didelphes. Un dernier 
détail vient confirmer l’hypothèse: le pli intérieur de la branche mon-
tante, invisible sur la partie gauche, ressemble exactement à celui 
d’un didelphe du genre sarigue. L’examen des molaires, avec leurs 
trois petites pointes, renforce une conviction déjà faite: l’animal est 
une sarigue.
La sarigue est un petit marsupial d’Amérique. Que vient-elle faire 
à Paris? Le géologue Faujas de Saint-Fond a déjà attaqué Cuvier pour 
avoir identifié dans un fossile les restes d’un tapir. Puisque la faune 
du Nouveau Monde et celle de l’Ancien sont entièrement distinctes, 
comme l’a montré Buffon, il ne peut y avoir de tapirs en France, qu’ils 
soient fossiles ou vivants. D’ailleurs, soutient Faujas, tout chez Cu-
vier est faux: le tapir, mais aussi les prétendus animaux disparus qui 
se sont multipliés sous sa plume: le mammouth, le mastodonte, le 
mégathérium, le paléothérium, etc. Ces reconstitutions ne sont que 
le fruit d’une imagination fertile.
La sarigue de Montmartre est pour Cuvier une aubaine. Avec elle, 
il entend bien répondre à Faujas et le terrasser définitivement : oui, 
des animaux d’Amérique ont vécu dans le passé à Paris ; oui, certaines 
espèces d’animaux sont aujourd’hui éteintes; oui, le scénario des 
Epoques de la Nature de Buffon n’est qu’un roman; oui, la méthode de 
reconstitution des fossiles fondée sur l’anatomie comparée, et plus 
particulièrement sur le principe de la corrélation des formes, est cer-
taine, contrairement aux «édifices fantastiques» des théories de la 
Terre, que Cuvier méprise et dont Faujas est le champion attardé. 
« Le vrai cachet d’une théorie est sans contredit la faculté qu’elle 
donne de prévoir les phénomènes ». Pour cela, Cuvier réunit quelques 
confrères qui seront ses spectateurs. Il grattera devant eux le mor-
ceau inférieur, à hauteur du bassin de l’animal. Vous y verrez deux os 
spéciaux qui soutiennent la poche marsupiale, annonce-t-il, preuve 
irréfutable que cet animal fossile est semblable aux animaux du 
 Nouveau monde. Cuvier dégage délicatement la pierre et voilà qu’il 
triomphe: les deux os apparaissent, comme il l’avait prévu. Mais, 
s’il  s’agit d’un marsupial, est-il d’Amérique ou d’Australie? Cuvier, 
grattant encore la pierre, trouve la réponse définitive. Sur le membre 
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 inférieur, le pouce est plus long que les autres doigts : c’est bel et bien 
une sarigue ! 
Le récit de la sarigue est entré dans la légende de la paléonto-
logie. C’est le principe de corrélation des formes mis à la portée des 
enfants. Comme Cuvier l’écrit lui-même,
aujourd’hui quelqu’un qui voit seulement la piste d’un pied four-
chu peut en conclure que l’animal qui a laissé cette empreinte 
ruminait  ; et cette conclusion est tout aussi certaine qu’aucune 
autre en physique ou en morale. Cette seule piste donne donc 
à  celui qui l’observe et la forme des dents, et la forme des mâ-
choires, et la forme des vertèbres, et la forme de tous les os des 
jambes, des cuisses, des épaules et du bassin de l’animal qui vient 
de passer. C’est une marque plus sûre que toutes celles de Zadig.
Pourtant, en 1880, dans un article ironique, Thomas Huxley est re-
venu sur ce principe. Il note que Cuvier n’a rien fait d’autre, en iden-
tifiant la sarigue, que n’avait fait Zadig avec la chienne. Son raisonne-
ment est purement inductif et analogique : nul principe nécessaire, 
nul «  science presque géométrique  », ainsi que Cuvier l’affirme en 
conclusion de son article, mais seulement des traces et des indices. 
D’ailleurs, cette fameuse expérience réalisée publiquement a-t-elle 
vraiment eu lieu ? Sans doute. Pourtant, il reste un fait surprenant : 
en dehors du récit de Cuvier lui-même, nous n’en avons ni indication, 
ni témoignage. Cuvier est un très grand naturaliste. C’est aussi, il faut 
l’avouer, un grand illusionniste !
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The Wolf Around the Bend
Etienne S. Benson
The wolf tracks appeared after a mid-May snowfall, running along a 
gravel bar in the river just in front of Adolph Murie’s cabin in Mount 
McKinley National Park. Upstream, Murie knew, there was no prey to 
attract a wolf’s attention at this season, so the most likely explana-
tion was a den with pups. He followed the tracks for about a mile 
until they led away from the river and up a bluff. There, he later re-
called, “I surprised myself and a black wolf, a male.” 1 The wolf fled to 
a nearby ravine, where Murie could hear him howling and barking as 
he searched for the den. 
Murie’s 1961 account of his years of field research in McKinley, 
A Naturalist in Alaska, is full of such unexpected encounters. Murie is 
surprised by wolves, wolves are surprised by Murie, squirrels are sur-
prised by foxes, bears are surprised by other bears. Predators and prey 
alike are wary and alert, but surprises are nonetheless frequent, and 
occasionally fatal. Sometimes one party has the jump on the other, 
but often the surprise is mutual. Two animals, one of whom may be 
human, share a moment of shock, wondering what happens next.
Murie first arrived in McKinley—since renamed Denali—in the 
summer of 1939, on assignment from the National Park Service to de-
termine whether wolves threatened the survival of the park’s popu-
lation of Dall sheep. His study and the recommendations he drew 
from it loom large in the history of the US park system, helping as 
they did to bring a long-standing policy of predator eradication to an 
end.2 Over the following two decades, Murie continued to revisit 
Alaska, steadily widening the scope of his observations to encompass 
the park’s moose, caribou, bears, foxes, squirrels, voles, ravens, ptar-
migans, cranes, gulls, weasels, and wolverines. 
When necessary, Murie was capable of characterizing wildlife in 
the quantitative terms of population ecology, but his favored form of 
evidence was the telling anecdote. It was his stories more than his 
statistics that convinced conservationists that wolves helped to 
maintain nature’s balance by eliminating the weak, the old, and the 
1 Adolph Murie, A Naturalist in Alaska (New York: 1961), 199.
2 Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New Haven, CT: 
2009), 158–160.
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jolt. The expectation of solitude required for this kind of surprise is, 
in Murie’s view, something that can be found only in the wilderness. 
In the city or on the farm, cross-species encounters are either absent 
or too predictable to generate the surprises that will deepen 
understanding.
If Murie believed that the value of wilderness came largely from 
the opportunities it provided for solitude and surprise, then it is 
clear why he was opposed to the electronic surveillance techniques 
that were being introduced to the parks around the time he was 
 writing A Naturalist in Alaska. The problem with radiocollars and 
similar devices was not simply the intrusion of technology into what 
Murie saw as the last remaining enclaves of pristine North American 
wilderness, but also their impact on the equal-opportunity economy 
of surprise, in which a fox in hot pursuit of a ground squirrel could be 
startled by a ptarmigan bursting out of the underbrush, or a scientist 
could stumble into the path of a wolf hurrying home.7 From Murie’s 
perspective, radiotracking looked like a means of monopolizing sur-
prise, and as such it undermined one of the values that made wilder-
ness worth preserving in the first place.
There is nothing innocuous about surprise; to find out that the 
world is other than expected is often to discover that it holds unfore-
seen hazards. While wolves posed little threat to Murie, bears could 
do serious damage, and they were a source of real and constant anx-
iety. Murie, too, was hardly harmless to all the creatures he met. On 
that late-spring day in 1940, after chasing away the black wolf’s mate, 
Murie crept into the den and used a willow branch to drag out three 
of the whimpering pups, one of whom he took back to camp “for 
closer observation and acquaintance.” 8 Stealing the pup left Murie 
with a lingering sense of guilt, but that, too, was part and parcel of 
the wilderness economy of surprise. His aim was not innocence but 
rather openness to other lives and other minds beyond the human 
—minds that were, like his own, sometimes surprised, sometimes 
surprising, and sometimes both at once. 
7 Murie, Naturalist in Alaska, 156.
8 Murie, Naturalist in Alaska, 200.
diseased. This storytelling approach was atypical for field biologists 
of Murie’s generation, and even more so for the generation that 
 followed him, who instead sought to solidify their status as scientific 
experts by adopting self-consciously “objective” methods—that is, 
methods that were quantitative, instrument-based, and avoided all 
talk of intentions or emotions.3 Murie’s methods, in contrast, harked 
back to Ernest Thompson Seton and other early-twentieth-century 
tellers of anthropomorphic animal stories.4
Some of Murie’s favorite animal stories concerned moments of 
surprise. Punctuating his accounts of animal behavior and ecology, 
they distilled long hours of mostly uneventful observation into ex-
citing instants of discovery. These tales also gave him an opportunity 
to communicate some of his most deeply held values. For Murie, ex-
plaining the behavior of wild animals was not enough; he wanted to 
understand them, which he believed could only be done by treating 
them as sentient individuals rather than as unfeeling automata or 
aggregate populations.5 As his older brother Olaus Murie noted, “true 
basic research” for Adolph meant “establishing an intimate relation-
ship with the creatures that reveals their motivation in all they do.” 6 
Surprising encounters, in this context, were signs of intimacy and 
steps toward understanding. 
If surprise arises from a violated expectation, then the expecta-
tion that is violated most often in the pages of A Naturalist in Alaska 
is that of solitude. The particularities of animal behavior sometimes 
elicit Murie’s astonishment, but it is often merely the unexpected 
presence of an animal that catches him off guard. The same holds 
true for the animals he observes. A ground squirrel might suspect 
that there are foxes nearby, but the sight of a particular fox peering 
into the mouth of her burrow at this very moment still provides a 
3 Gregg Mitman, “When Nature Is the Zoo: Vision and Power in the Art and Science of 
Natural History,” Science in the Field, special issue, Osiris 11 (1996): 117–143.
4 Ralph H. Lutts, The Nature Fakers: Wildlife, Science and Sentiment (Charlottesville, VA: 
2001); Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, eds., Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives 
on Anthropomorphism (New York: 2005).
5 Eileen Crist, “Naturalists’ Portrayals of Animal Life: Engaging the Verstehen Approach,” 
Social Studies of Science 26, no. 4 (1996): 799–838.
6 Olaus J. Murie, “Foreword,” in Murie, Naturalist in Alaska, xi–xii, on xii.
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Random Numbers For and Before 
 Computers
Dan Bouk
Demographers in the early 1940s studying the “social and psycholog-
ical factors affecting fertility” among white, native-born American 
couples completed a series of extensive interviews and punched the 
responses onto paper tabulating cards. Their worries about the pecu-
liarities of small samples led them to interview disproportionate 
numbers in some classes of respondents, such as those who said they 
“planned” their families and yet still had many children. But that fix 
created a different problem: their final paper cards underrepresented 
more typical classes.1 A solution lay between the pale-blue, heavy- 
paper covers of a small booklet—not in its few pages of text, but 
rather in its 26 pages, each covered top to bottom by nonsensical 
strings of printed digits numbering 41,600 in all.2 
The booklet promised a surprise on every page—no, a surprise 
with every digit. Its author, L. H. C. Tippett, worked in Karl Pearson’s 
Department of Applied Statistics at University College, London, 
where he had been employing a traditional technique for coming up 
with random numbers to test some statistical theories. He filled a bag 
with paper “tickets,” each bearing a different number. Then he drew 
tickets from the bag. Other researchers at the time drew balls from 
urns or picked from shuffled cards. They had adopted the techniques 
of gamblers and priests to serve science. Balls, lots, tickets, or cards 
that had once been plucked by those seeking the thrill of uncertainty 
or some hint of the will of God became for statisticians machines for 
manufacturing statistically reliable surprises. Mathematical statisti-
cians wanted a string of numbers that could not be explained by any 
logic or structure. They wanted to be sure that no one could predict 
what the next number in each string would be.
Tippett’s research demanded thousands of numbers, and he could 
not manage the process with his paper tickets. (One imagines the pa-
per cuts.) Karl Pearson suggested he abandon the tickets, noting in a 
preface, “In short, ticket and cards, balls and beads fail in large scale 
1 P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, “Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility:  
V. The Sampling Plan, Selection, and the Representativeness of Couples in the Inflated 
Sample,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 24, no. 1 (January 1946): 49–93.
2 L. H. C. Tippett, “Random Sampling Numbers,” Tracts for Computers 15 (1927).
random sampling tests; it is as difficult to get artificially true random 
samples as it is to sample effectively a cargo of coal or of barley.” 3 
Tippett visited the library of the Statistics Department instead.
Flipping through volumes of U.K. census data, he judged that the 
areas of each parish presented random patterns of digits. Years later 
he turned census figures into random numbers: “In order to avoid 
pos sible biases due to such factors as rounding, I discarded the first 
two and last two digits of each area, and copied down all the remain-
ing digits, more or less in the order in which they appeared in the 
returns.” 4 Future users could read the digits left to right, or in reverse, 
or by columns, or along diagonals to generate the greatest number of 
random strings possible.
Today the production of random numbers begins with an algo-
rithm and relies on the power of the computer to generate surprise, 
to simulate with code the absence of logic and purpose. Tippett’s 
story refigures randomness as a quality to be sought among the de-
bris left behind by the “avalanche of printed numbers.” 5 It reminds 
us that statistics was, quite often, a science of the archives.6 And the 
computers in this case were not the generators of these numbers but 
their audience. 
Pearson’s Department of Applied Statistics began publishing 
Tracts for Computers after it “carried out a great deal of computing 
work of one kind or another bearing on special war problems of a 
physical character” during WWI.7 The tracts offered the growing 
ranks of human computers a de facto textbook and brought into 
wider circulation the sort of tables that were essential to speeding 
calculations for complex problems: tables that included Tippett’s 
 random sampling numbers. Audiences appear to have been greedy 
3 Tippett, “Random Sampling Numbers,” iii.
4 Tippett, “Letters to the Editor: The Genesis of Random Numbers,”  
American Statistician 19, no. 1 (February 1965): 16.
5 Ian Hacking, “Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers,”  
Humanities in Society 5, nos. 3 & 4 (1982): 279–295.
6 Lorraine Daston, “The Sciences of the Archive,” Osiris 27, no. 1 (2012): 156–187.
7 Prefatory note to Eleanor Pairman, “Tables of the Digamma and Trigamma Functions,” 
Tracts for Computers 1 (1919).
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for these new resources: in the New York Public Library’s copy of 
 Tippett’s numbers, the tables have been cut out, as were those in a 
similar, later tract.
Following Tippett’s library discovery, other researchers tied to 
Pearson’s lab through the global networks traced by its journal Bio­
metrika began using his tables to test theories or design experiments. 
Over the next two decades, Tippett’s tables spawned new tables of 
statistical derivates in Kolkata and Uppsala. Those who used them 
also frequently took the opportunity to test the numbers for random-
ness and found them suitable for drawing small samples and gener-
ally devoid of any “systemization,” as a researcher at the Mayo Clinic 
concluded after making extensive tabulations from cards punched 
with the numbers—cards he used to randomize treatments in a 
study. Only the scale of the series presented a lasting problem: re-
searchers needed more random numbers for larger-scale research.8
Back in Indianapolis, the researchers also punched Tippett’s 
numbers into paper cards. They used the numbers to select 44 cas es 
of “fecund childless couples” to duplicate and 161 cases of “fecund 
couples with one live birth” to duplicate plus 21 to copy two times 
over. By these duplications, the researchers applied the appropriate 
weightings to each group for the final statistical analysis. Which 
cards should be duplicated? Thanks to Tippett’s summer in the li-
brary, the answer came as a surprise.
8 K. Raghavan Nair, “On Tippetts ‘Random Sampling Numbers,’” Sankhya¯: The Indian 
 Journal of Statistics 4, no. 1 (1938): 65–72; Herman Wold, “Random Normal Deviates:  
25,000 Items Compiled from Tract No. XXIV (M. G. Kendall and B. Babington Smith’s Tables 
of Random Sampling Numbers),” Tracts for Computers 25 (1948): iv–vi; Robert Gage, 
 “Contents of Tippett’s ‘Random Sampling Numbers,’” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 38, no. 222 (1943): 223–227.
« Ce sentiment vif de plaisir ... »
Marie-Noëlle Bourguet
À l’automne 1796, lors d’une course minéralogique dans le massif du 
Fichtelgebirge, Alexander von Humboldt voit sa boussole s’affoler 
soudain à l’approche d’un amas de serpentine verte, très pure  : la 
roche semble dotée d’une polarité magnétique si puissante qu’elle a, 
à plusieurs mètres de distance, « détourn[é] l’aiguille aimantée de sa 
position naturelle  ». Le voyageur raconte avoir éprouvé devant ce 
phénomène intempestif un vif sentiment de plaisir  : le trouble dé-
clenché par « la vue d’un phénomène nouveau » est pour lui un appel 
à ouvrir l’enquête. Dès ce moment, bientôt encouragé par le physi-
cien et navigateur Jean-Charles de Borda qui lui conseille d’emporter 
au Nouveau Monde une boussole d’inclinaison, Humboldt fait de 
l’étude du géomagnétisme, phénomène dont la nature est alors mal 
identifiée, un objet de tous ses voyages : « Observons ; recueillons des 
faits indubitables ; c’est seulement ainsi que les théories physiques 
s’établiront sur des bases solides 1. » 
S’inscrivant dans la longue tradition qui, depuis Platon et Aris-
tote, fait de la capacité humaine à admirer et à s’étonner le principe 
même de la connaissance, Humboldt reconnaît ainsi une portée heu-
ristique à l’émotion que suscite la vue d’un phénomène inhabituel, 
extraordinaire. Symptôme d’un décalage, sinon d’une rupture, entre 
le savoir acquis, qui fonde l’attente, et l’observation d’un fait inat-
tendu, insolite, la surprise est loin d’être une sensation passive, im-
posée de l’extérieur : elle excite chez le voyageur curiosité, question-
nement, attention. À ce titre, au travers d’expressions qui disent 
l’étonnement, la surprise, l’émerveillement même – en allemand, Er­
staunen, Überraschung, Verwunderung –, cette notion occupe dans 
l’écriture narrative de Humboldt une place cruciale, essentielle à 
l’évocation de l’activité de connaissance.
Cependant, la réaction face à l’imprévu ou à l’inconnu est loin 
d’être un sentiment univoque : à preuve, la variété des situations qui 
provoquent l’étonnement du voyageur au moment de son arrivée au 
Nouveau Monde en juillet 1799, et qui correspondent à des configura-
tions cognitives très diverses. Le voici, alors qu’il vient de mettre le 
1 Alexandre de Humboldt, “Sur les polarités magnétiques d’une montagne de serpentine,” 
Bibliothèque britannique 5 (1797): 376–388.
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pied sur le continent, près de Cumaná. Confronté à la nouveauté ra-
dicale de la faune et de la flore américaines, il tente de décrire à son 
frère Wilhelm l’expérience esthétique qu’a provoquée cette ren-
contre, la soudaine perte de repères, l’intense plaisir ressenti : « Nous 
nous promenons jusqu’à présent comme des fous […]. On rejette tou-
jours un objet pour en saisir un autre. Bonpland assure qu’il perdra 
la si les merveilles ne cessent pas bientôt 2. » Submergés par l’émotion 
face à l’exubérance de la nature tropicale, les deux compagnons se 
trouvent dans un état d’égarement et de sidération, incapables d’au-
cune opération de connaissance. L’émerveillement et la désorienta-
tion restent une source d’excitation, de jubilation même  ; mais ces 
sensations, cantonnées dans le registre émotionnel et esthétique, 
échappent sur le moment à toute analyse rationnelle. 
Peu après, dans les mêmes lieux, c’est une impression en complet 
contraste que suscite chez Humboldt la vue, non de la végétation 
cette fois, mais des masses rocheuses qui apparaissent à nu près de la 
côte. Ici, la nature et l’orientation des strates lui paraissent d’emblée 
familières, éveillant obscurément la réminiscence de choses déjà 
vues par-delà l’océan. La sensation reste celle de l’étonnement, mais 
le mécanisme épistémique qui la sous-tend n’est pas celui d’une rup-
ture. Il est au contraire de l’ordre de la reconnaissance, qui permet 
d’établir des liens, de comparer, d’élaborer :
Lorsqu’à la fin d’une longue navigation, après avoir passé d’un 
océan à l’autre, l’habitant du nord aborde à une côte lointaine, il 
est surpris de trouver, au milieu d’une foule de productions in-
connues, ces strates d’ardoise, de schiste micacé et de porphyre 
trapéen, qui forment les côtes arides de l’ancien continent […]. 
Partout il reconnaît, et non sans une certaine émotion, au milieu 
d’un nouveau monde, les roches de son pays natal 3.
Là où l’étrangeté du monde végétal et animal laisse le voyageur 
d’abord stupéfié, parce qu’elle paraît excéder toute possibilité de rap-
2 Alexandre de Humboldt, Lettres américaines d’Alexandre de Humboldt, ed. E. T. Hamy 
(Paris: 1905), 27.
3 Alexandre de Humboldt, Vues des Cordillères et monumens des peuples indigènes de 
l’Amérique (Paris: [1810]–1813), 1:122. 
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prochement, le sol américain le surprend agréablement en offrant 
d’emblée des points de repère, des indices qui éveillent le souvenir, 
permettent le raisonnement, conduisent à la généralisation savante : 
au regard du géognoste, ces rochers attestent l’unité des phénomènes 
géologiques et l’universalité des lois qui, d’une rive à l’autre de 
l’océan, régissent la physique du globe terrestre.
Entre ces deux extrêmes – expérience du choc émotionnel face 
à  la nouveauté de la nature américaine, sentiment de familiarité 
devant la structure de la terre –, tous les registres possibles de la sur-
prise ont accompagné Humboldt au long de son voyage, forgeant le 
ressort psychologique et la dynamique de sa quête. Un demi-siècle 
plus tard, faisant retour sur son expérience, le vieil homme devait 
s’inquiéter à l’idée que puisse un jour s’épuiser, sous l’effet des avan-
cées de la science mesureuse et quantificatrice dont il s’était fait 
l’apôtre, le «  charme de la nouveauté et de la surprise  » dont son 
voyage avait été empreint.
Notre siècle, plus investigateur et maître d’un plus riche fonds 
d’idées, a trouvé une compensation à la perte des jouissances que 
faisait éprouver autrefois aux spectateurs surpris la masse impo-
sante des phénomènes de la nature. […] Cette conquête des temps 
modernes a pour garant l’observation de plus en plus pénétrante 
qui s’applique au jeu régulier des forces de la nature 4.
Son inquiétude est bientôt levée, cependant, par la seule énumé-
ration des champs d’exploration nouveaux ouverts à la science  de 
son temps  : électromagnétisme, polarisation de la lumière, physio-
logie des organismes vivants, etc. Face au « vaste ensemble de mer-
veilles qui se déroulent à nos regards comme un monde nouveau 
dont nous touchons à peine le seuil », l’enchantement et la surprise 
n’étaient pas près de disparaître de l’expérience des savants.
4 Alexandre de Humboldt, Cosmos. Essai d’une description physique du monde, trans. 
Charles Galusky (Paris: 1855–1859), 2:328–329.
42 43
Martin Brody | Fiat Lux
Fiat Lux
Martin Brody
As the orchestra evaporates into silence, a bassoon farts, loud and 
low. The music glides along serenely while the performers execute a 
slow-motion exodus. A recapitulation proudly appears in the wrong 
key, sowing confusion. A fortissimo chord crashes into a pianissimo 
cadence. The violins stop dead in the middle of a peppy fanfare to fix 
their sour lowest string. They appear to be protesting a newfangled 
technology, the wire-wound, gut G string.
Franz Joseph Haydn’s symphonic pranks weigh heavily in the 
history of European concert music. As many have noted, the master’s 
penchant for comic surprises augured the ascendance of a newly 
 efficient apparatus, the orchestra, performing in a new environment, 
the public concert. Rendered by a large ensemble populated by sea-
soned performers, the slapstick effect of a loud sound in a soft pas-
sage could have the semiotic density of an omen—as Emily Dolan 
has put it, “an aural promise of the orchestra’s potential … signal[ing] 
to the listener that the entire movement plays with the idea of the 
orchestra.” 1 Haydn’s idea, however, was more than sonic. Whether 
subtle or slapstick, collective or individual, orchestral mischief was 
an expression of the will, and it seemed to emanate from the instru-
ments themselves. Orchestral mischief thus could mirror an unruly 
audience, spoofing its flatulence, loud noises, and unpredictable fits.
No misdeed, however, was left unassimilated in the musical 
 order. Haydn’s maverick pranks also created a compact between com-
poser and listener, who, as Scott Burnham proposes, is “in effect both 
straight man and insider, progressing from someone who is joshed to 
someone who gets the joke.” The musical joke enfranchised a dis-
tractible audience, enforcing keen attentiveness to a relentless argu-
ment of organized sounds that subsume all anomalies. As Burnham 
suggests, Haydn’s surprises spark a “shock of recognition [that] is no 
vertiginous glimpse into a solipsistic abyss but rather a surging con-
firmation of the self-transcending dimension of self-consciousness. 
[B]ecause Haydn always eventually fulfills the underlying proto-
cols of his musical language … his style can be playful without being 
1 Emily Dolan, “The Work of the Orchestra in Haydn’s Creation,” 19th Century Music 34, 
no. 1 (summer 2010): 3–38, on 11.
 iconoclastic, witty without being subversive. Haydn’s playful disrup-
tions ultimately confirm the sovereignty of Reason.” 2
Miming a rowdy audience with sonic jokes while taming it with 
a wordless affirmation of Reason is the hallmark of surprise in 
Haydn’s last 12 symphonies. The jokes come fast and furious in these 
“London” Symphonies, but they are fully sublimated, absorbed into 
the form. No one theatrically walks offstage mid-movement or makes 
a game of retuning an instrument. Surprise, when intricately woven 
into the warp and woof of a maximally dynamic structure, is apothe-
osized as the source of invention and the touchstone of contingent 
forms that appear and evaporate in real time.
Haydn’s most stunning musical surprise, the “fiat” chord that oc-
curs when God calls forth light in The Creation, was, however, no 
joke, and it reminds us that the composer was never altogether mod-
ern. In a program note on The Creation, music critic Donald Frances 
Tovey called the question by insinuating the story of Haydn’s visit to 
the astronomers William and Caroline Herschel into the lore of the 
oratorio. The composer traveled to Slough to see the Herschels and 
their telescope on June 15, 1792, shortly after the completion of the 
triumphant performances of the first six London Symphonies. The 
occasion inspired Tovey to consider Haydn’s interest in rendering the 
music of the cosmos as a scientific affair. “The chaos [Haydn] intends 
to represent,” Tovey wrote, “is no mere state of disorder and confu-
sion. He has a remarkably consistent notion of it, which harmonizes 
well enough with the Biblical account of the Creation; not less well 
with the classical notions of Chaos, whether in Hesiod or Ovid; but 
most closely with the Nebular Hypothesis of Kant and Laplace, which 
almost certainly attracted Haydn’s attention.” 3
As usual, Tovey’s comments provoke close listening, here by rais-
ing the question of a composer’s interest in cosmogony. “Being an 
artist,” he wryly proposed, “Haydn represents Chaos in a thinkable 
aspect.” In elaborating, however, he suggested that The Creation’s 
2 Scott Burnham, “Haydn and Humor,” in The Cambridge Companion to Haydn,  
ed. Caryl Clark (Cambridge, New York: 2005), 59–76, on 75.
3 Donald Frances Tovey, Essays in Musical Analysis (Oxford: 1937), 5:114–46, on 114–115.
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Antonio Tempesta, “The End of Chaos.” Etching from the series Ovid’s Metamorphoses, 
1606. The Elisha Whittelsey Collection and Fund, 1951. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
New York.
mighty opening downbeat evokes something beyond human thought. 
“Here is your infinite empty space.” The first thinkable event in this 
universe is a resounding measuring stick that subdivides a silent uni-
verse into zones defined by 2:1 frequency ratios. The ensuing motives, 
modulations, and chromatic harmony that compose the nebulae in 
this not-quite-empty space are made of pitches that subdivide oc-
taves into 12 equal half steps, with the relationship between two 
proximate notes defined by a complex frequency ratio 12√2 ≈ 1.059463:1. 
Equal temperament, facilitated by modern instrument design, mi-
grated on many fronts from theory to practice during Haydn’s career. 
It reigns in glorious imperfection in his representation of chaos. The 
sustained dissonances and chromatic motives that coalesce in the 
latter phases of the formation of the universe, before God’s fiat, un-
cannily anticipate the music of the future: the leitmotivs and chro-
matic harmony of Wagner and even the atonality of Schoenberg and 
Webern, in which interval patterns uninformed by the possibility of 
ideal consonance govern musical order. 
God, it seems, wanted something more: just intonation, transcen-
dent consonance. As William Gardiner aptly described it in 1911, “At 
the fiat, ‘Let there be light!’, the instruments are unmuted, and the 
audience is lost in the refulgence of harmony.” 4 God’s surprise is no 
more or less than a loud, long, C major triad. Pure consonance is 
 unburdened for a few precious seconds from thinkable musical prin-
ciples: norms of harmony and counterpoint and the musical jokes 
that affirm them. In representing the primordial chaos on the far side 
of divine light, Haydn anticipated negative dialectics. For the pious 
composer, however, the possibility of divine perfection appeared in 
the guise of a stunning shock of Admiratio, the precondition and sine 
qua non of Enlightenment liberalism’s surprising jokes. 
4 William Gardiner, “Defence of Modern Music,” Monthly Magazine (March 1811): 134.
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Joan Cadden
An informal survey of nonspecialists reveals that the most obvious 
point of intersection between “surprise” and “ancient science” is the 
“Eureka!” of Archimedes, or rather the exclamation point integral to 
his utterance. But, setting aside the lack of such punctuation in an-
cient Greek, the association fails. According to Vitruvius (De architec­
tura, IX, Preface, 10), from whom we have received the apocryphal 
story, what the ancient mathematician was expressing when he 
 devised a way to evaluate the purity of a golden crown was not 
 surprise but joy (gaudio), however absent that emotion may be in 
this eighteenth-century image.
Furthermore, whatever his subjective experience, Archimedes 
both was and presented himself as a master of complex methods, in 
whose hands the subject matter of mathematics is familiar territory.
Aristotle’s confident control of natural philosophy was similar, 
and it derived from his dual view of his subject matter. In the context 
of his teleological perspective, the coherence of the natural world 
was axiomatic. Only if napping through his lectures on the heavens 
would one have found oneself taken aback by the philosopher’s 
 conclusions. In contrast, the phenomena of the sublunary world he 
described in Meteorology or the works on animals, not to speak of 
the collection of unanswered questions contained in the Problemata, 
might seem to offer many opportunities for surprise. Yet precisely 
because they were, by their very status, subject to necessity, acci-
dent, and chance, Aristotle had no commitment to their regularity, 
much less predictability. He was unsurprised by phenomena and the 
ways in which they could be understood, because he viewed the nat-
ural world as ordered and purposeful at one level, prolific and unfet-
tered at another. The former might elicit admiration; the latter, low 
expectations. Neither was disconcerting.
Where, if anywhere, did surprise fit in Aristotle’s thinking? An-
swering entails philological choices, in order to avoid terms such as 
θαυμάξω, whose meanings center around “wonder,” a distinct do-
main into which only angels fear not to tread, and the history of 
which could fill a volume, were anyone willing to undertake such a 
daunting task. Verbs with the root “strike” (πλήσσω), notably ἐκπλήσσω 
and καταπλήσσω, sometimes tinged with alarm, are at least quantita-
tively distinguished from wonder. Aristotle himself reports that peo-
ple  often regard “amazement” or “stupefaction” (ἔκπληξιν) as “exces-
sive wonder” (ὑπερβολὴν θαυμασιότητος) (Top. IV.5, 126b14-25). Indeed, 
he persistently associates surprise with both weakness and excess, 
that is, deviation from an ideal mean.
As a mental or emotional state, surprise interested Aristotle in 
moral and rhetorical contexts. People who were easily rattled lacked 
moderation. Any emotion, he explained in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
admits of excesses that keep people from achieving an appropriate 
equilibrium. Thus, neither those who are shocked by nothing nor 
those who are shocked by everything are capable of an appropriate 
modesty and sense of shame (EN II.7, 1108a34; see also: EE II.3, 1221a1 
and III.7, 1233b28). If the habitus of being unduly struck by things 
bars one from fulfilling moral and social ideals, it also—indeed con-
sequently—makes one a mediocre audience for serious art. The ca-
tharsis that a tragedy should produce requires the spectator to expe-
rience fear or pity, but, as Aristotle observes in the Rhetoric, those 
who jump every time someone says “boo” (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) are too 
Gian-Maria Mazzuchelli Bresciano (1705–1765), Notizie istoriche e critiche intorno alla vita, 
alle inventioni, ed agli scritti di Archimede siracusano (Brescia: 1737), title page. Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek München, 1054717 4 A.gr.b. 149, title page, urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10215513-6.
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 focused on their own situations to be susceptible to pity, while the 
overly brave or reckless are taken aback by nothing. (Rhet. II.6, 
1385b29-34).
Surprise can have a positive function, but even when it does, its 
causes and effects reveal why Aristotle excludes it from the experi-
ence of the philosopher. In tragedy the mechanisms of catharsis may 
be served by the shock of recognition at an unwitting act. Sopho-
cles’s Oedipus provides his example of a discovery that astounds the 
audience (Poet. XIV, 1454a4: ἡ ἀναγνώρισις ἐκπληκτικόν). In order to 
 advance the goal of producing wonder, it is permissible for art to 
make a work more astonishing (ἐκπληκτικώτερον) by deviating from 
the truth, something that is not permissible in politics (Poet. XXV, 
1460b13-25). In such cases, the author, by the use of rhetorical devices, 
may produce surprise in the audience, in whom it gives rise to emo-
tional and ethical effects. Sometimes these are negative, as when an 
orator gives the false impression of speaking the truth, stupefying 
(καταπλήττουσι) listeners with empty sounds (Rhet. III.7, 1408a20-25). 
But even if they are positive, the cause is not the truth and the effect 
is not knowledge. Surprise is thus dissociated from science.
In fact, surprise may be a reaction that separates the sheep from 
the goats, the connoisseur of nature from its mere audience. In that 
spirit, the first-century BCE Aristotelian De mundo expresses pity for 
small-minded people who are overawed (ἐκπεπληγμένους) by ordinary 
things like a cave or a mountain (DM I, 391a24). Aristotle himself 
seems to have been amused by those who failed to appreciate the 
abundance of variety in the natural world. Historia animalium men-
tions the enormous range in the size of internal organs within a spe-
cies, apparent in sacrificial victims. He cites the island of Naxos, 
where “nearly all quadrupeds [have] such a large [gallbladder] that 
foreigners are shocked [ἐκπλήττεσθαι] when offering a sacrifice, sup-
posing it is their own personal omen, but it is its nature” (HA I.17, 
496b26-29).
Archimedes may have aimed to create a sense of surprise in his read-
ers by the use of elaborate stylistic strategies.1 Aristotle had no such 
aim, although—indeed because—he recognized the rhetorical and 
psychological mechanisms involved. Neither admitted to having 
been caught off guard himself. Over the years, nature continued to 
deliver her surprises to nonscientists—consider the courtly recipi-
ents of electrical shocks. But the romance of the astonished scientist 
became hard to resist. By the time of the engraving, 1737, being 
caught off guard had changed valence and function. Both the philos-
opher and his audience look surprised, if for different reasons, and 
one could substitute Galvani with his frog for Archimedes with his 
crown. Bonnet was taken aback, even shocked, to discover that the 
puceron he had been observing was a pucerone. In addition, how-
ever, the emotion that disciplined attentiveness produced in Bonnet 
was, by his own account, delight—perhaps akin to the joy that disci-
plined reasoning had produced in Archimedes.2
1 Reviel Netz, Ludic Proof: Greek Mathematics and the Alexandrian Aesthetic  
(Cambridge, UK: 2009), 66–114.
2 Lorraine Daston, “Attention and the Values of Nature in the Enlightenment,” in  
The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal (Chicago: 2004), 
110–111; Lorraine Daston, Eine kurze Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Aufmerksam­
keit (Munich: 2000), 34–35.
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Robert Plot, L. L. D., F. R. S., first curator of the Ashmolean, secretary of 
the Royal Society, Oxford professor of Chymistry, antiquarian, natu-
ralist, and writer, grew up in Kent, where he heard a strange story that 
had been going around for generations: the story of a dream dreamed 
in 1586 by Sir Henry Wotton’s father Thomas, an estate manager in 
Boughton Malherbe, Kent, while Henry was a student at Oxford. 
Plot owed the genre he is sometimes credited with inventing, the 
“natural history” of British places, to William Lambard, author of 
the Perambulation of Kent (1576)—dedicated to the Kentish dreamer 
Thomas Wotton! Plot’s contributions, natural histories of Oxfordshire 
(1677) and Staffordshire (1686), aimed to initiate a series describing 
in its natural entirety each county of England and Wales. In 1674 he 
had published a template for inquiries, inviting “the Ingenious of 
each County in my Travels” to contribute “informations”—preferably 
“strange”—in writing.
Enquiries was revised in 1679 and 1693, but queries for the cate-
gory “men and women” barely changed. In 1679, in a world without 
anthropology, sociology, or psychology, it asked, in sum,
Know you of any strange accidents that have befallen Men or 
Women? Of any prodigious births, numerous Off­springs, Hermo­
phrodites [sic] ? Men or Women extreamly alike? of prodigious 
memories? Of extraordinary stature, either in excess or defect? of 
any that have strange antipathies to meat, drinks, animals, &c? 
of unusual fastings, sleep, dreams that have strangely come to 
pass? of Men of extream age, of sudden deaths? or of any reputed 
dead that have strangely come to life again? Know you of any-
thing remarkable that attends a Family in their lives, or death? 
Are there any ancient Sepulchers hereabout of Men of Gigantick 
stature, Roman Generals, or others of ancient times? Has there 
ever been any certain apparitions hereabout? Know you of any 
strange customs now in use in this place? or any strange confu­
sions in consanguinity or affinity?
After 1674 he deleted “Know you of any Monstrous creatures to be 
seen in this Countreye?” Subsequent travels may have disappointed 
him (or he had not encountered the legless skink of Hampshire).
The Natural History of Oxford­shire, following an account of a mad-
dened squad of Poltergeister attacking Puritan Commissioners who 
set up a canteen in the former “King’s Bedchamber” at Woodstock’s 
manor house, relates a dream of Wotton’s that solved a crime.
Thomas Wotton, a little before his death dreamed, that the Uni-
versity treasury was robbed by Towns-men and poor Scholars, 
and that the number was five. And being that day to write to his 
Son Henry … at Oxford, he thought it worth so much pains, as by 
a Postscript in his Letter, to make a slight enquiry of it. The Letter 
(which was writ out of Kent, and dated three days before) came to 
his Sons hands the very morning after the night in which the 
robbery was committed; and when the University and City were 
both in a perplext Inquest of the Thieves, then did Mr. Wotton 
show his Fathers Letter, by which such light was given of this 
work of darkness, that the five guilty persons were presently dis-
covered, and apprehended.1
Although police still “solve” crimes by means of dreams and ESP, that 
is because the police are not interested in reason: their value is effec-
tiveness. Are they surprised when dreams locate bodies?
A still stranger surprise lurks in the writing. Plot introduces 
the  dream (itself a “work of darkness”) as “a remarkable Dream of 
Thomas Wotton Esq; … whose dreams did usually prove true. The 
dream, ‘tis true, of which I am now writing, was had at Bocton in 
Kent, but the most important concern of it relating to Oxford, I 
thought fit rather of the two to place it here”. This conundrum—the 
proper bibliographical location, among Plot’s Baconian histories, of a 
Kentish dream with consequences for the Oxford constabulary and 
“five guilty persons”—shocked me into a series of questions I have 
pursued ever since (starting at MPI’s Abteilung II). What is a pro-
phetic dream, that a Professor of Chemistry and Secretary of the 
Royal Society could see it as part of the “natural history” of anywhere, 
1 Robert Plott, The Natural History of Oxford­shire: Being an Essay Toward the Natural 
History of England (1676), 210-211. The following quotation is taken from the same 
source.
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“with rocks, and stones, and trees”? What is natural history, that this 
dream belongs to it? What is a place, that it could be hard to say 
whether its presence in a dream or the location of the dreamer’s body 
determines it? Is a place in a book, is Oxford­shire a book? What is 
thought, if a dream can do its work so easily? What is sight, if a dream 
can do its work in the dark? What is inquiry, if a dream can do it in 
our sleep? What are facts, when a dream knows them and the police 
do not? What is distance (whatever place is!) if a dream can cross it 
instantaneously? What is a County, if the categorical identity of a 
dream depends upon it? How is it different from a Book about one? 
Why does this dream “fit” better in Oxford­shire than in Kent?
I have no room to answer these questions. The work of many is 
necessary to arrive at a moment of structural understanding or famil-
iarity that comprehends the phenomena together, in a flash of in-
sight. But we share many of these questions with Plot himself. If 
wonder is, as Plot’s hero Bacon claimed, “broken knowledge,” then 
for all our nanotechnology, neuroscience, and driverless cars, we are 
broken still. In fact, scientists like it that way. Without the shocking 
pleasure of surprise (shared with travelers and aficionados of profes-
sional magic), it’s just another useful job. The alchemist Plot has dis-
covered the collective nature of his work but does not mean to give 
up its private aesthetic thrill.
All people are desired, to whom these Articles of Enquiry shall 
come, maturely to deliberat [sic] each particular, and to answer 
as many of them as they can, … and to have their Answers written 
in a Paper apart, to lie ready against the Undertaker of this 
 Design shall call for them, in case they should then be absent 
from home; for which all persons shall receive due acknowledge­
ments … ; and if they shall communicat [sic] any secret, shall be 




“Admirose un portugués 
de ver que en su tierna infancia 
todos los niños en Francia 
sabían hablar francés. 
“Arte diabólica es”, 
dijo, torciendo el mostacho, 
“que para hablar en gabacho 
un fidalgo en Portugal 
llega a viejo y lo habla mal; 
y aquí, lo parla un muchacho.”
Moratín, “Saber sin estudiar” (ca. 1870).
This satirical epigram by Nicolás Fernández de Moratín (1737–1780) 
tells the story of a Portuguese gentleman who, traveling to France, 
admires the “diabolic trick” by which even children speak better 
French than he can after years of intense study. Here, surprise is an 
amusing measure of ignorance: the joke is on the one who is sur­
prised. The term surprise, likely of military provenance, compares a 
knowing subject to an ignorant one and gives the former strategic 
advantage; to be taken by surprise is etymologically coincident with 
the Latin prehendere. This version of surprise has also been implied 
by standard ways of writing the history of scientific error.
This is true for popularizers of science. Take for instance Benito 
Jerónimo Feijoo (1676–1764), who tells the same story as Moratín in 
the context of a series of pedagogical tales.1 He conceived these tales 
as tools against ignorance and false wit, from which came “so many 
miracles, apparitions of death, ghosts and elves, so many portents of 
magic and so many wonders of nature. Hoping to become admirable, 
people invent prodigious things, and vulgar people believe the most 
extraordinary things to be ordinary.” 2 Feijoo’s program was one of 
disenchantment, and this required ridiculing vulgar surprise and 
awe through reasonable explanation. 
1 A story he attributed to Antoine Le Métel d’Ouville, etc. 
2 “Chistes de N,” Teatro crítico universal 6 (1734).
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And it was also true for early philosophers. According to both Plato 
and Aristotle, astonishment and wonder were nothing less than the 
source of all philosophical investigation. But the intended outcome 
of those investigations was precisely the erasure of wonder: a sat­
isfied curiosity might be wise, but it is no longer curious. For St. Au­
gustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, the gulf between 
ignorance and wisdom was the unbridgeable distance between our 
knowledge and God’s. Wonder inhabited that gap. Such understand­
ings of wonder would make the history of knowledge into the his­
tory of the elimination of surprise, gauging the ignorance of previous 
generations by recounting how former marvels became explained 
and normalized through the discovery of hitherto hidden causes. 
Is that all there is to wonder? On the contrary, historians of sci­
ence have worked hard to reenchant the past. Discussing Wonder, a 
book in which Philip Fisher challenges Descartes’s unsurprising pro­
gram, Raine Daston asks incredulously, “[Does] one man’s wonder 
become another man’s raised eyebrow?” As she has shown in other 
places, the more phenomena were explained by the sciences and the 
more wonders were normalized, the more exceptions appeared call­
ing for an explanation. Tighter rules lead to the proliferation of 
exceptions. 
What does all this have to do with mutating oceans? Well, scien­
tists, including oceanographers, have also used surprising surprises 
to legitimize their new approaches. In 1992, oceanographer Carl 
Wunsch suggested shifting paradigms: “Why does the oceanographic 
literature have so many papers expressing surprise when some 
 element of the circulation appears to be changing. … [E]xpressions 
of  surprise ought to be reserved for a determination that some­
thing  has  not changed over some time interval.” Wunsch’s paper, 
 “Decade­to­Century Changes in the Ocean Circulation,” appeared in 
Oceanography as a manifesto for increasing the scale of physical 
oceanography. Zooming out from giving attention to local fluctua­
tions to a global and longue durée–oriented perspective, Wunsch 
 argued, would reveal that ocean currents and circulation were con­
stantly changing in response to climatic changes and other factors.
The stakes of scale were simultaneously epistemological and on­
tological. Because of difficulties in observing the oceans and the scar­
city of data, physical oceanographers had “resorted to treating data 
taken over many years and decades as though it were simultane­
ous,”  losing “sight of the fact that a steady­state ocean had been 
 assumed and not demonstrated.” Throughout the twentieth century, 
observers of ocean dynamics had mathematized the relationships 
 between oceanic physical quantities (such as temperature and sa­
linity). Scientists from Albert Defant (1884–1974) to Henry Stommel 
(1920–1992) sought to develop laws and theories of circulation that 
would help them in mapping and explaining the movement of water 
masses and in differentiating local contingent flows from fixed sys­
tems and patterns. 
But the natural sciences seem to be becoming increasingly his­
torical. As Norton Wise and others have argued, they aim at explain­
ing no longer through laws but rather by narrating change. Similarly, 
a historical ocean requires not observation and deduction but moni-
toring and tracking. Wunsch was one of the main scientists in charge 
of designing the World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE). The 
WOCE was a huge transnational project that deployed instruments 
from thermometers to satellites to measure variables like tempera­
ture and salinity across the world throughout an entire year. Given 
the necessary investments, it was unthinkable to sustain research 
for longer, but Wunsch hoped similar efforts could be carried out in 
This image depicting the current  
El Niño condition in the Pacific 
Ocean was created with data collec­
ted by the U.S./European Ocean Sur­
face Topography Mission on the 
Jason­2  satellite during a 10­day 
period around  January 30, 2010.  
Courtesy NASA/JPL­Caltech, Ocean 
Surface Topo graphy Team.
A Psychologist is Amazed
John Carson
The modern scientific article is not notorious for its displays of af-
fect. The format of such articles is designed to eliminate the subjec-
tive and personal: methods, procedures, results, conclusions, all pre-
sented in a form of scientific plain-speak. Indeed, as Lorraine Daston 
and Peter Galison, among others, have demonstrated, by the nine-
teenth century most western scientists were embracing a form of 
objectivity that idealized the mechanical production of data, with 
scientists positioned as modest witnesses, reporting without embel-
lishing or distorting.1
I highlight the affectlessness of the modern scientific paper in 
order to underscore an unusual feature of the way in which psy-
chologist Henry H. Goddard discussed his “discovery” and adoption 
of the 1908 Binet-Simon Intelligence scale.2 In 1906, Goddard was ap-
pointed psychologist at the New Jersey Training School for Feeble-
minded Girls and Boys in Vineland and tasked with conducting re-
search on feeblemindedness, particularly its accurate diagnosis. 
Alerted in 1908 to Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon’s 1905 publication 
of a new way to assess intellectual ability, their intelligence scale, 
Goddard soon thereafter began experimenting with it. However, he 
found the scale of only limited value and responded skeptically to 
the 1908 revision, reporting later, in 1916: “It seemed impossible to 
grade intelligence in that way. It was too easy, too simple.”3 Goddard 
put the revision aside and only some weeks later “decided to give it a 
fair trial.” 
There is no contemporaneous account of Goddard’s reaction to 
his experience with the scale. What we do have is a series of retro-
spective remarks starting in 1910 and continuing until at least 1923. 
In each, Goddard portrays himself as having been “amazed” by the 
1908 scale and what it could accomplish. “No one can use the tests on 
any fair number of children,” he explained in a 1910 article, “without 
1 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: 2007).
2 On Goddard, see Leila Zenderland, Measuring Minds: Henry Herbert Goddard and the  
Origins of American Intelligence Testing (Cambridge: 2001).
3 Henry H. Goddard, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon,  
The Devel opment of Intelligence in School Children, trans. Elizabeth S. Kite  
(Baltimore: 1916), 5–6.
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the mid-term future—he hoped by 2041. The possibility of compari-
son would then allow for historicity. WOCE developed an “observa-
tional strategy” to produce data usable by future ocean scientists: the 
historical sciences are necessarily archival. 
How to interpret, then, the surprising surprises that populate 
the history of science? In Kuhnian terms, they could be the product 
of shifting gestalts, a symptom of the incommensurability that se-
parates two different worldviews. In this circumstance, Feijoo and 
 Mo ratín chose laughter, the easy way out. And yet, the turn to a 
 mutable ocean was not a history of paradigm incommensurability. 
WOCE explicitly aimed at rendering global and local scales commen-
surable and gave new meaning to local variations. Rather than a his-
tory of incommunicable images or of ever-increasing scales and glo-
balization, presenting the amazement of one’s predecessors as 
indicative of their ignorance implies a history of epistemology full of 
oscillations and complex integrations. The discovery of the cycle of 
water seemed to throw Heraclitus and his view of change over-
board—by enabling us to swim twice in the same ever-returning 
river. However, it turns out now that we imagine ourselves swim-
ming in an ever-changing ocean. Parmenides and his unchanging 
eternity are the losers. And who knows what comes next? 
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becoming convinced that … the tests do come amazingly near what 
we feel to be the truth in regard to the mental status of any child 
tested.”4 A year later Goddard lauded the tests for “their amazing 
 accuracy,” and in a 1916 account described himself as “surprised.”5 
Finally, in a 1923 letter to Kimball Young Goddard explained: “When I 
read Binet’s ‘Measuring Scale,’ I rejected it as too formal and exact. 
I thought ‘mind’ could not be measured in that way. … [However] the 
more I used it the more amazed I was at its accuracy.”6
Whatever Goddard’s initial reaction may have been, what did it 
mean to invoke the language of amazement in these various reports 
recounting his first experiences with the scale? Typically, when 
 Goddard remarked on his astonishment, he did so in the context of 
the close correspondence he discovered between the test results and 
the assessments arrived at by the staff at Vineland. A critical chal-
lenge facing the first generation of mental testing practitioners was 
dem onstrating that their tests “worked.”7 This was no easy task, as 
there was no agreed upon alternative system for scientifically as-
sessing intelligence. The fallback was to rely on human judgment, 
gained on the basis of extensive experience with the individuals at 
issue, and to match that to the performance of the instrument. 
 Goddard claimed just such a correlation between the Binet results 
and “Institution experience.” While he could have simply pre sent-
ed   this match between the two forms of assessment without fur-
ther  comment, Goddard instead included allusions to his affective 
response. I would like to suggest they served at least two functions. 
First, “amazement” helped Goddard make an epistemic claim that 
something new and of consequence had occurred. The instrument in 
Goddard’s hands allowed scientists to do something heretofore not 
possible: assess intelligence directly and accurately. This was, for 
4 Henry H. Goddard, “Four Hundred Feeble-Minded Children Classified by the Binet 
Method,”  Pedagogical Seminary 17 (1910): 387–397, on 389.
5 Henry H. Goddard, The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale for Intelligence (Vineland: 1911); and 
 Goddard, “Editor’s Introduction,” 5.
6 Kimball Young, “History of Mental Testing,” Pedagogical Seminary 31 (1923):  
1–48, on 35.
7 See John Carson, The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the 
French and American Republics, 1750–1940 (Princeton: 2007), 177–183.
 Goddard, unexpected—a deviation from the way in which human 
mentality had been understood (“I thought ‘mind’ could not be mea-
sured in that way”). He tried the scale out only because he hoped it 
would be of some pragmatic value in classifying Vineland residents. 
“Amazement” helped to mark the novelty of what the scale was actu-
ally able to accomplish; moreover, it may also have suggested that 
there was an element of the uncanny. How could a psychological 
 instrument do what had before required long experience and expert 
judgment? The mechanical amazed at the same time as it threatened 
the very expertise that had given it birth, a doubleness that may 
have  haunted many of those who embraced mechanical forms of 
objectivity.
Second, “amazement” was also a moral claim, in this case about 
Goddard himself. Goddard the scientist had to appear sober and up-
right, immune to the temptation to announce something extraordi-
nary in order to enhance his reputation. Representing himself as as-
tonished allowed Goddard to underscore his modesty, that he was 
simply revealing and reporting what was really there and was as sur-
prised as anyone else. This may have been particularly important for 
the Binet scale results where, as Goddard makes clear, the experience 
of administering the tests constituted a critical part of the process of 
becoming convinced by them. “The more I used it,” Goddard wrote 
Young, “the more amazed I was at its accuracy.”8 Experience is not 
something easily transferred; trusting someone else’s experience re-
quires trusting that they were the right sort of person to have the 
experience and report it faithfully. Thus, Goddard’s oft-repeated 
self-report that he was amazed may have helped bring attention not 
only to what he found, but also to his own persona as someone with 
the right demeanor to find it. 
I do not want to hang too much on Goddard’s reports of amaze-
ment. Doubtless psychologists would have found his results of inter-
est whether or not he reported his surprise at what the new instru-
ment could accomplish. But I do think his desire to include such 
remarks illuminates something important about the role of affect in 
8 Young, “History of Mental Testing,” 35.
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scientific practice. Here, amazement and surprise help remind us of 
the deep entanglements of the moral and natural orders in the doing, 




1984 marqua un tournant dans l’histoire de la documentation avec 
laquelle nous étudions les mathématiques en Chine ancienne. Au­
paravant, l’ouverture de tombes scellées dans les derniers siècles 
avant notre ère avait exhumé de véritables « bibliothèques ». Cet hi­
ver­là, les archéologues découvrirent, dans l’ensemble de manuscrits 
que recelait la tombe 247 à Zhangjiashan, probablement fermée vers 
186 avant notre ère, un texte mathématique. Les plus vieux manus­
crits mathématiques connus jusqu’alors provenaient de la cache de 
Dunhuang, murée vers l’an 1000, tandis que les livres les plus anciens 
au texte desquels nous pouvions remonter par des arguments indi­
rects dataient, eux, au mieux, du Ier siècle avant notre ère. La décou­
verte d’Écrits sur les procédures mathématiques représentait donc 
un  événement majeur, qui éclairait des siècles sur lesquels nous ne 
savions rien.
Comme d’autres manuscrits funéraires, son texte était consigné 
sur 190 lattes de bambou. Il avait un titre et comportait de sections 
clairement identifiables, débutant chacune par un en­tête. Bref, tout 
conférait à l’objet les traits d’un ouvrage. C’est à ce titre qu’on l’édita 
et le commenta. Puisque c’était un livre, présumait­on, l’objet avait 
donc été copié sur un autre manuscrit. L’hypothèse s’imposait d’au­
tant plus facilement que certaines marges inférieures comportaient 
des signatures, précisant parfois que les signataires avaient «  déjà 
vérifié le texte ». Les premiers travaux philologiques prirent donc les 
erreurs comme de fautes de copistes. Les historiens des mathéma­
tiques virent, eux, dans le manuscrit, l’un des ouvrages sur la base 
desquels le canon Les Neuf Chapitres sur les procédures mathéma-
tiques avait été compilé au premier siècle. Ils concentrèrent donc 
leurs efforts sur la relation entre ces deux écrits.
Les hasards des séminaires firent qu’un jour Daniel Morgan me 
posa une question ô combien pertinente : pourquoi trouve­t­on des 
erreurs dans des sections d’Écrits portant la signature de correcteurs 
anciens ? Clairement, un texte mathématique donne prise à l’identi­
fication des erreurs de façon spécifique et leur analyse constitue un 
puissant moyen pour étudier les modalités de production d’un écrit. 
C’est dans cette perspective que Daniel et moi, conjuguant les compé­
tences de l’étude des manuscrits et de l’histoire des mathématiques, 
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décidâmes d’examiner systématiquement les erreurs que contenu 
comme phrasé d’Écrits permettaient de déceler. Il fallait, pour cela, 
reprendre au début le déchiffrement du manuscrit, pour éviter d’at­
tribuer nos erreurs de lecture aux scribes anciens.
Un matin, Daniel me confia sa perplexité. Son réexamen montrait 
que le document avait été écrit par deux mains différentes. Dans cer­
taines sections comme « Réduire la largeur », qui occupait les lattes 
164 à 181, ces deux mains alternaient même l’une l’autre y compris au 
milieu d’une phrase. Sur l’écran qui figurait une dizaine de lattes, 
 Daniel traça la ligne invisible où la première main s’effaçait au pro­
fit la seconde. « Vois­tu où tu mets le doigt ? », m’exclamai­je. La sec­
tion « Réduire la largeur » se composait de paragraphes de longueurs 
différentes, mais à la structure répétitive. Il me sauta donc aux yeux 
que si le tracé de la ligne invisible paraissait aléatoire, le passage de 
relais se produisait toujours au même endroit de la procédure mathé­
matique, répétée, dans les divers paragraphes, sur des valeurs numé­
riques différentes. 
Le dessin des caractères invitait à distinguer formellement, dans 
chaque paragraphe, deux zones de texte, qui, d’un paragraphe à 
l’autre, s’avéraient être les mêmes au regard du sens mathématique. 
Progressivement, d’autres différences se manifestèrent entre les 
deux parties ainsi distinguées. En effet, Écrits comporte des tables 
numériques, systématiquement consignées sous la forme de listes de 
clauses séparées les unes des autres par des signes de ponctuation. 
En gros, dans chaque paragraphe de « Réduire la largeur », la première 
main n’écrivait que la partie tabulaire du texte, tandis que la seconde 
n’inscrivait que du texte continu relatif aux calculs effectués. La pre­
mière main rédigeait de façon complète tandis que la seconde ab­
régeait toujours. L’opposition formelle entre les deux zones coïnci­
dait donc avec des différences de contenu aussi bien que d’expression 
mathématiques, que, dans le même temps, elle exhaussait.
L’ensemble des traits matériels de ces lattes imposait de revoir 
notre interprétation du sens et de la nature du document : contraire­
ment à ce que les exégètes y avaient lu, nous n’avions pas affaire à un 
exposé mathématique, mais à des notes produites dans un contexte 
d’apprentissage, où la première main paraissait guider la seconde. 
Les calculs que cette seconde main rapportait de façon abrégée 
n’étaient pas copiés d’un autre document, mais reportaient les résul­
tats d’opérations qui venaient d’être effectuées à titre d’exercice. Au 
lieu d’omissions de copistes, nous lisions désormais des notes pro­
duites en apprenant. Bref, la forme des caractères nous avait mis sur 
la voie d’une nouvelle interprétation du sens du texte et des moda­
lités de sa production. 
Le document trahissait donc des interactions entre divers ac­
teurs. C’est également la conclusion que nous dûmes tirer, pour de 
tout autres raisons, de l’examen conjoint de la section « Inscrire de 
façon erronée sur un certificat  ». M’appuyant sur des règles philo­
logiques classiques, j’avais cru pouvoir conclure, de la répétition 
 erronée de trente caractères, à une erreur de copie. Mais les traces 
 matérielles imposèrent là aussi une réinterprétation radicale du 
 scénario qui avait produit ces lattes. En demandant : « que font ces 
points ici ? », Daniel décilla mes yeux sur le point que comportait la 
marge inférieure de la première latte – où figuraient les caractères 
répétés sur la deuxième latte. Qui plus est, un autre point était ap­
posé, à l’endroit où la copie avait omis un caractère essentiel. Les édi­
tions signalaient ces marques, sans y chercher un sens. De fait, un 
autre caractère, moins essentiel, avait été sauté en amont. Or, si la 
deuxième latte répétait le texte erroné, cette seconde copie, prati­
quée à partir du caractère placé immédiatement avant la première 
omission, restituait les deux caractères manquants. 
Dans les deux cas, les points signalaient des erreurs, tout juste 
celles que j’avais décelées. Une présence les avait apposés, et, par ré­
action, le scribe avait répété la copie pour la corriger. La corrélation 
des marques et de la répétition montrait que la reprise des caractères 
illustrait un mode de correction d’erreurs, dans un espace où scribe 
en cours d’apprentissage et auteur de points interagissaient. Or 
c’était, dans ce cas, la première main, et non pas la deuxième, qui 
avait formé les caractères d’« Inscrire de façon erronée sur un certi­
ficat ». Marques et écritures trahissaient donc un monde de plus en 
plus peuplé d’individus, dont il nous fallait lire les identités dans les 
traces. Leurs interactions avaient façonné tant le texte que l’appa­
rence d’Écrits.
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De plus, si c’était apparemment par copie qu’« Inscrire de façon erro­
née sur un certificat » avait été produite avant d’être insérée dans 
Écrits, l’acte textuel qui avait présidé à la réalisation écrite de « Ré­
duire la largeur » semblait différent. Au total, les diverses sections 
paraissaient donc avoir été le fruit d’opérations scripturales variées. 
L’hypothèse qu’Écrits était un ouvrage composé de sections sem­
blables succombait sous les témoignages de ces traces. Il fallait inter­
préter plus localement, en lisant tout à la fois les mots et la matière. 
Deux mains. Deux points. Et l’interprétation bascule.
Les écrits anciens se lisent le plus souvent dans des éditions mo­
dernes, qui ont gommé traces de mains et autres marques. Que reste­
t­il du sens des textes ?
Priestley, Providence, and Prophecy
John R. R. Christie
“I hardly know of any experiment that is more likely to amaze and 
surprise than this is,” wrote Priestley, concerning the counterintui­
tive diminution of volume occurrent on mixing nitrous and atmos­
pheric air, his foundational eudiometric experiment.1 He character­
ized the earlier, famous Leyden vial experiment in comparable terms, 
“to this day, justly viewed with astonishment by the most profound 
electricians.” 2 His paradigm of such unexpected events was the res­
urrection of Christ, whose unquestionable death and resurrection 
were in addition “peculiarly favourable to the design of pro vidence.” 3 
Priestley’s epistemic grasp of such events was indeed providentialist, 
an aspect of his attempt to detect God’s “different footsteps,” not the 
legible forms of divine creation in the space of nature, rather the less 
discernible traces of the deity’s action in the temporality of human 
history.4 
Varying degrees of providentialism were not unusual in eigh­
teenth­century historiography. Less usual was Priestley’s insistence 
upon the actions of particular providence, not merely the general 
or ordinary providence of divine administration but the purposive 
providential attention to particular events, their historical sequence, 
and their consequence. Within these, recent scientific development 
received specific emphasis, the “amazing improvements in natural 
knowledge which have been made within the last century … [by 
which] there appears to me a very particular providence in the con­
currence of those circumstances which have produced so great a 
change.” Primary examples were “the most unexpected revolutions … 
as in the history of electricity, and now in the discoveries relating to 
air,” the results, that is, of both his own and his friend Benjamin 
Franklin’s  scientific research. 
These, then, were signs of the times, but to describe such times 
as Priestley understood them requires further elucidation. More re­
1 Joseph Priestley, Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air (London: 1775), 
355.
2 Joseph Priestley, The History and Present State of Electricity (London: 1767), 85.
3 Joseph Priestley, A General History of the Christian Church, to the Fall of the Western 
Empire (Birmingham, UK: 1790), 24–25.
4 Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History, and General Policy (Birmingham, UK: 1787), 452–453.
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markable than his distinctive providentialism was Priestley’s perva­
sive hermeneutic devotion to biblical prophecy and its significance 
with respect to a rapidly approaching millennium. These preoccupa­
tions appear both early and late in his publications and correspon­
dence, from his teaching at Warrington’s Dissenting Academy, later 
published as the Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, through 
his major work Corruptions of Christianity, and on to his Hackney 
Fast­Day Sermons and Hackney Farewell Address of the 1790s, as well 
as in many other works, including those of a specifically scientific 
nature. Current progress in knowledge “will put an end to all undue 
and usurped authority in the business of religion, as well as of sci­
ence,” the final ruin of “corrupt establishments” will be complete and 
glorious, “And the English hierarchy … has equal reason to tremble 
even at an air pump, or an electrical machine.” 5 The trembling hier­
arch in question was not the unnerved Court aristocrat but rather 
the mitred bishop of the politically established Anglican Church. 
Such writings did not hesitate in striking an authentically apoc­
alyptic tone, first of all technically, to do with biblical prophecy and 
its interpretation in the context of contemporary history: “the grad­
ual diffusion of intellectual light … is a promise of … the fulfilment of 
prophecies which announce a state of great and permanent felicity 
of the latter days of the world.” 6 They were also apocalyptic in the 
term’s further conventional connotation, of the violent and calami­
tous nature of the oncoming change of the world. “We may say that 
the plan of this divine drama is opening more and more, the grand 
catastrophe growing nearer and nearer.” 7 He anticipated “the fall 
of civil powers,” a “calamitous time” before the inauguration of the 
millennium: “May the kingdom of God, and of Christ … truly and fully 
come, though all the kingdoms of the world be removed, in order to 
make way for it.” 8
5 Priestley, Experiments, xxiii, xxv, xxiii.
6 Joseph Priestley, A General History of the Christian Church, from the Fall of the Western 
Empire to the Present Time (Northumberland, PA: 1802), xvii. 
7 Priestley, Lectures, 452.
8 Joseph Priestley, An History of the Corruptions of Christianity (Birmingham, UK: 1782),  
483–484.
The accelerated pace of scientific progress, typified by unexpected, 
fundamental discoveries whose historical significance was specified 
by Priestley’s profoundly religious epistemics of amazement, was 
thus not simply a providential matter. These signs were portents, 
designating the contemporary period as a providentially designed 
path to the prophesied catastrophes that would precede Christ’s re­
turn and a general resurrection, followed by a millennium devoted to 
true religion and the further pursuit of the truths of natural knowl­
edge, a pursuit, Priestley believed, in which his resurrected being 
would participate.
Now, Priestley and his fellow Rational Dissenters are with some 
regularity assimilated into the historiography of the Enlightenment 
in Britain, although such work can tend either to marginalize or ig­
nore  the numerous apocalyptic and millennial expressions of his 
thought.9 He was undoubtedly a progressivist and a perfectibilist 
and thought himself an active participant in an enlightened age. Yet 
this light, this scientific progress, and its telos in a millennially per­
fected human nature was no bland expression of religiosity, for it 
was scripturally founded and prophetically motivated. As such, it is 
very far from the irreligious Enlightenment of Voltaire or Diderot, 
of Hume or Gibbon, the latter even suggesting the attention of the 
civil magistracy to Priestley’s writings. These might indeed be said to 
contain elements of the religious enthusiasm, superstition, and fa­
naticism the irreligious strove to extirpate. It may then be the case 
that Priestley’s amazement is, or ought to be, accompanied by this 
surprise to the historiography of the Enlightenment. There would be 
a disconcertingly steep historiographical admission price to pay, 
were conventional interpretive practice to include Priestley’s apoca­
lyptic  Enlightenment within its analysis.
9 See, e. g., Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World 
 (London: 2000); Knud Haakonsen, ed., Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: 1996).
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“I am an Axolotl”
Angela N. H. Creager
I rarely read something strange, even startling, in twentieth­century 
biology. But a 1924 passage by Herbert Spencer Jennings, on the met­
amorphosis of a Mexican salamander, left me incredulous.1 These 
aquatic salamanders, he claimed, reproduced true to form in captiv­
ity and could do so indefinitely. Their traits were even inherited in 
Mendelian fashion. However, when placed in drier conditions, the 
salamanders changed dramatically. Their bodies became smaller and 
less flat, the gills disappeared, and the animals moved onto land 
where they breathed air. They reproduced in captivity, but their tad­
poles grew up to leave the water, maturing to live on land. The terres­
trial variant also exhibited patterns of Mendelian inheritance. As Jen­
nings observed, “Here we have two extremely different sets of 
inherited characters; which one shall appear is determined by the 
environmental character under which the organism develops. Both 
sets are hereditary characters; both sets are environmental charac­
ters.” So perfectly Lamarckian the giraffe might be jealous.
I teach Jennings’s “Heredity and Environment” in my history of 
biology class. It is a valuable statement by a geneticist in response to 
the misleading simplifications of popular eugenics. He famously as­
serts, “Nothing can be more certain than that hundreds of genes are 
required to make a mind—even a feeble mind.” One year a student 
asked me about the Mexican salamander. I tracked it down, expect­
ing to turn up Jennings’s erroneous source. Instead, I discovered his 
description to be accurate and its transformation widely docu­
mented. Not only that. The axolotl (as it is called) is a popular pet and 
an important model organism—studied by biologists since the late 
nineteenth century because of its phenomenal ability to regenerate 
body parts as well as transform type. The salamander graces the 
cover of Stephen Jay Gould’s Ontogeny and Phylogeny, an exemplar 
of neoteny, the persistence of juvenile traits in adult form.2 Verging 
on extinction in the wild due to pollution and invasive species in its 
1 H. S. Jennings, “Heredity and Environment,” Scientific Monthly 19 (1924): 225–238,  
all following quotations from 229–234.
2 Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge, MA: 1977).
A captive axolotl with leucistic coloring. The normal color of axolotls in the wild is dark. 
Axolotls bred in captivity come in four colors, but this pink­skinned coloring is especially 
popular (at least based on photographs), perhaps due to the humanoid appearance. 
© Amandasofiarana, Wikimedia Commons, CC­BY­SA­4.0.
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two native lakes, the axolotl survives in captivity.3 In the last two 
decades, its artificial existence as a species has become a cautionary 
tale about environmental degradation.
Ambystoma mexicanum, as the species is now known, was part 
of the diet of Mexican Indians for thousands of years. The animal was 
called axolotl for the Aztec god Xolotl, perhaps contributing to the 
mythology of this shape­shifting deity. Europeans learned of the axo­
lotl after Cortés’s troops reached Mexico City, in codices by Spanish 
friars, and a 1615 natural history by Francisco Ximénez.4 Alexander 
von Humboldt sketched the axolotl on his South American travels at 
the turn of the nineteenth century, publishing his description and 
drawings in 1806.5 Georges Cuvier obtained preserved axolotls (and 
other Mexican salamanders) from Humboldt. Among other species of 
Amphibia, an adult form existed that was entirely air­breathing. But 
no adult terrestrial form of the axolotl was known. Cuvier argued the 
axolotl must be the larva for an unidentified species.6 
In 1863, General Forey of the French Expeditionary Forces in 
 Mexico sent 33 black and one white axolotl to the Jardin zoologi que 
d’acclimatation in Paris. Six of these salamanders were given to Au­
guste Duméril, professor of ichthyology and herpetology at Muséum 
d’histoire naturelle. Duméril successfully bred the salamanders in 
captivity. In 1866 there were already 800 progeny. That same year he 
acquired a rare white axolotl from Léon­Eugène  Méhédin. Duméril 
provided axolotls to individuals and institutions who requested 
3 Erik Vance, “Biology’s Beloved Amphibian—the Axolotl—Is Racing Towards Extinction,” 
Nature 551 (2017): 286–289.
4 Hobart M. Smith, “Discovery of the Axolotl and Its Early History in Biological Research,” 
in Developmental Biology of the Axolotl, ed. John B. Armstrong and George M. Malacinski 
(Oxford: 1989), 3–12.
5 Alexander von Humboldt, Beobachtungen aus der Zoologie und vergleichenden 
 Anatomie gesammelt auf einer Reise nach den Tropen-Ländern des neuen Kontinents,  
in den Jahren 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, und 1804 von Al. von Humboldt und 
A. Bonpland (Tübingen: 1806).
6 Christian Reiß, Lennart Olsson, and Uwe Hoßfeld, “The History of the Oldest Self­ 
Sustaining Laboratory Animal: 150 Years of Axolotl Research,” Journal of Experimental 
 Zoology 324B (2015): 393–404. All following quotations refer to this entry.
them, even shipping them by train. Consequently, his initial set of 
seven became the stock for hundreds of thousands of axolotls found 
across Europe by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
It was Duméril who first witnessed the metamorphosis of the 
gilled, aquatic form into the land­based form. The terrestrial am­
phibian, previously identified as a different species, also bred true to 
type in captivity. Duméril’s 1865 observation of the transformation 
was met with skepticism and inspired renowned biologists, such as 
August Weissmann, to study the axolotls directly. By 1870, the year 
Duméril died, the biological explanation of the axolotl’s transfor­
mation remained unknown, but its reality was unquestioned. The 
salamanders were thriving in European zoos, laboratories, and re­
sidences. As Christian Reiß, Lennart Olsson, and Uwe Hoßfeld ob­
serve, the emergence of aquaria as a new zoological infrastructure 
for science and recreation was crucial to the flourishing of axolotls in 
captivity. Axolotls were, in fact, the first exotic animals bred in 
aquaria.
Axolotls are haunting, beguiling creatures. The pale pink skin 
and fleshy faces of some make them look strangely humanoid. Count­
less artists have portrayed them, often as monsters or hybrids.7 They 
are symbols of metamorphosis in literature, most famously in Julio 
Cortázar’s 1956 short story “Axolotl.” 8 The tale is set at the Jardin des 
Plantes in Paris, early in spring after a wintry Lent. The narrator 
 visits the aquarium and becomes obsessed with the axolotls. He re­
turns day after day, transfixed in front of the glass, and then, at some 
point, is transformed: “Now I am an axolotl.” (Kafka, meet magic real­
ism.) From the other side of the glass, the narrator consoles himself 
with the hope that the visitor will “write a story about us.” I would 
add, one that is as wonderful and sad as the axolotl’s history.
7 Gerardo Villadelángel Viñas, ed., Axolotiada: Vida y mito de un anfibio mexicano  
(México, DF: 2011).






Directly ahead, the ground was indeed completely flat; to right and 
left, at the limits of the floodlit area, the rising curve could just be 
detected. They might have been walking along a very wide, shallow 
valley; it was quite impossible to believe that they were really crawl-
ing along the inside of a huge cylinder, and that beyond this little 
oasis of light the land rose up to meet—no, to become—the sky.1
An unidentified object enters our solar system. Soon it transpires 
that the object is a perfect cylinder—54 km long, 20 km in diameter— 
and it’s heading straight for the sun. This is Arthur C. Clarke’s 1973 
novel Rendezvous with Rama. What follows is a lean and gradual 
 unfolding of what lies within that alien cylinder—the Rama of the 
title: a world turned outside in, with a cylindrical sea that arches 
above the explorers’ heads, possible cities dotted around the inner 
circumference and artificial light provided by three linear suns, em­
bedded in giant trenches in the walls. Yet Rama the unfamiliar has 
strangely familiar undertones.
I first read the book more than 20 years ago, but Rama’s “climate”, 
if you will, has stayed with me, with its peculiar quality of light, ideas 
of interiority, inversion, and strangeness—not of haunting but of 
wonder. The theme of encounters between the “natural” and “tech­
nological,” “human” and “non­human,” where surprising intersecting 
patterns between the two are made visible, is something I continue 
to explore through my work today.
1 Clarke Arthur C., Rendezvous with Rama (1973).
Spheres. Video stills 
from a single channel 
video with sound, 
 duration 22 mins.  
Rohini Devasher, 2016. 
Site
A site will never be what you expected. Neither will your reaction to 
the site be what was expected. The landscape, weather, your tools; 
the camera, audio recorder, sketchbook: all function differently. Cir­
cumstances come together to force you to do what you can under a 
very specific set of circumstances. Once you have collected and 
 recorded what you “could,” you make something of this collection, 
not of what you thought you might collect. You begin to speculate, to 
create fictions. My visit to the Mount Aso caldera during a 2014 trip 
to  Japan was one such experience. Arriving there, within throwing 
distance of the most incredible active volcano, I realized I had forgot­
ten the tripod camera mounting plate. As a consequence, I had to 
shoot all the footage with the camera on the ground. The result was a 
fascinating juxtaposition of foreground and background that would 
perhaps not have been possible with a tripod.
Spheres, a video­ and drawing­based work, is the closest I have 
come to capturing or expressing the “climate” I associate with 
Clarke’s book. The work lies somewhere between reality and fiction. 
The raw material or video footage was shot on site at the Caldera. But 
in the work, it is reimagined so that we seem to be looking inside 
some form of hollowed out space; a sphere? We see a volcanic cinder 
cone crater, which stands as a sentinel of past upheaval; we see mist, 
cloud and fog, a distant horizon, an atmosphere. A sun, possibly arti­
ficial, simulates a daylight cycle, illuminating and obscuring the 
landscape by turns—a recognizable pattern in an otherwise strange 
but not entirely alien landscape. The landscape, because of its scale, 
provides an almost mythic realization of oneself within an environ­
ment. Eventually, the film will be projected onto a wall drawing, 
where video and drawn marks will interact in unexpected ways and 
complete the work.
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For me, surprise has come to be a crucial part of the site, as an acti­
vator, or catalyst. When applied as a mode or methodology within art, 
surprise allows you to explore something new. It opens up a space for 
the investigation of something unfamiliar rather than, necessarily, a 
moment of acquiring knowledge. 
Strange­ing
Spheres explores the interconnectedness of our relationship to the 
planet and offers a perspective that may be useful to our imagina­
tion of our future in both shaping and living within it. The work be­
comes a proposition, both geographic and metaphoric, of an attempt 
to  imply the unobservable on the basis of what can be observed. 
The images conjured are a species of “chimera.” They are one thing, 
standing in for something else, pushing the limits of the known and 
the imagined.
What is that moment when the unexpected comes in and forc es 
you to pay attention? Turning something on its head, asking the 
ques tion “what if!” offers the possibility of chance and the equally 
real possibility of disappointment, and when it walks the line of the 
uncanny, it can change how we see the world.
Studies on creative problem solving have shown that one way of 
gaining new perspectives on a problem is to juxtapose it with some­
thing completely unrelated, thereby making the familiar ... strange.2 
I like the analogy of a mirror in this context, not just because it refer­
ences both the telescope and the microscope but also because when 
you mirror something, it is reversed, and very often that reversal is 
enough to make something familiar very strange.
Strange­ing then becomes a strategy for encountering, observing, 
and finally recording both environment and experience, while walk­
ing a fine line between wonder and the uncanny.
2 Bipin Indurkhya, Metaphor and Cognition: An Interactionist Approach, Studies in 




Rien ne semble plus étranger à la statistique que l’imprévu. Celle-là 
est la science de la régularité, de la répétition, de la liste, alors que 
celui-ci est surprise, inattendu, singularité. Pourtant, que serait un 
 imprévu s’il ne contrastait sur un fond de régularités ? Symétrique-
ment, la régularité n’émerge-t elle pas d’événements qui, initiale-
ment, étaient chacun surprenant  ? Il serait donc bien trop simple, 
voire erroné, de limiter le lien entre statistique et imprévu à leur mu-
tuelle exclusion. Ils se rapportent l’un à l’autre selon des modalités 
bien plus riches. 
Les statisticiens sont à la recherche de régularités pour quanti-
fier le monde. Par exemple, ils recherchent des registres (comme ceux 
de l’état civil) dont chaque ligne répète méthodiquement la précé-
dente. Ils cherchent aussi des cartes géographiques dessinant des 
zones de taille comparable dans lesquelles ils envoient des enquê-
teurs. Ils cherchent tous les supports réguliers, répétitifs, grâce aux-
quels ils peuvent concrètement dénombrer des individus. 
Mais la régularité est dans les listes, pas dans l’activité de re-
cherche de ces listes, pour laquelle l’imprévu joue bien souvent un 
rôle capital. Ainsi, au début du XXème siècle, le Ministère de l’agricul-
ture des Etats-Unis (USDA) avait organisé un réseau d’enquêteurs 
sur tout le territoire, un dans chaque état, chargé d’établir les statis-
tiques de production des principales cultures. Verne Church, le res-
ponsable du Michigan, remarqua tout de suite l’importance locale 
du … cornichon, pourtant négligé par les statistiques fédérales. Il vou-
lut abso lument démontrer le poids économique de cette culture. 
C’est alors que la chance lui sourit. En voyage dans un train, il rencon-
tra par hasard un représentant de commerce en sel qui, gracieuse-
ment, lui « a donné la liste complète des usines » de conditionnement 
du noble cornichon local ! Cette précieuse liste constituait le support 
matériel parfait pour compter le condiment. Ainsi, la statistique re-
pose certes sur des répétitions, mais ces dernières surgissent volon-
tiers de façon  imprévue 1. 
1 Emmanuel Didier, En quoi consiste l’Amérique ? Les statistiques, le New Deal et la 
 démocratie, (Paris : 2009).
78 79
Emmanuel Didier | Quantification et imprévuEmmanuel Didier | Quantification et imprévu
C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle il ne faut pas croire à l’image 
du statisticien rond de cuir, bêtes et terne que la comédie du XIXème 
siècle leur a construit 2. Au contraire, les bons statisticiens sont rusés 
et malins car ils apprennent à susciter leur bonne étoile. 
Si l’imprévu est un ingrédient, souvent inaperçu, entrant dans la 
méthode de production des statistiques, il arrive aussi souvent qu’il 
en soit l’objet. Ainsi, c’est pour se donner une certaine maîtrise sur les 
jeux de hasards et pour répartir les paiements, que les Lumières ont 
utilisé les probabilités 3. Mais lorsque les statistiques ont cherché à 
comprendre l’imprévu, celui-ci consistait plus souvent en accidents 
néfastes. Ainsi, l’Etat providence constitué au début du XXème siècle 
est entré en lutte contre la maladie, l’accident au travail, la mort, que 
chacun connait mais sans savoir ni quand, ni comment ils vont frap-
per. Les actuaires, ces statisticiens spécialisés dans l’assurance, ont 
su produire des tables qui agrégeaient ces occurrences pour une po-
pulation totale, ce qui fît apparaître leur régularité. Ce fut en rappor-
tant les occurrences à une population et non à un individu, que les 
statisticiens ont trouvé des répétitions, grâce auxquelles les gouver-
nements ont pu en répartir le coût parmi les assurés 4.
Puis au début des années 1980, alors que l’Etat providence était 
de plus en plus affaibli, de nombreux gouvernement l’ont peu à peu 
transformé en Etat sécuritaire 5. Les sombres surprises visées alors 
étaient les crimes et les délits subis au quotidien par la population. 
Pour en capturer les régularités, les statisticiens n’ont pas utilisé les 
méthodes actuarielles mais les registres administratifs de la police 
d’une part, et les enquêtes auprès des victimes de l’autre. Ils ont ainsi 
montré la régularité géographique et temporelle de la délinquance, 
qui a permis aux gouvernements de repenser et de mieux manager 
l’action policière. 
2 Bernard Ycart, “1827 : la mode de la statistique en France,” Histoire & mesure 31, no. 1 
(2016): 161–194.
3 Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ : 1988).
4 François Ewald, L’Etat Providence (Paris : 1986).
5 Philippe Robert, Le citoyen, le crime et l’état (Genève : 1999).
Press representatives waiting for the crop report release.  
Courtesy of USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service.
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Verwunderungszeichen
Matthias Dörries
Punctuation marks have their own history. In their disputes with 
scholastics, Italian humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries revised punctuation, desiring to render texts more intelligible by 
progressively indicating and codifying their rhythms and logical re-
lationships. Punctuation marks shaped sentences and articulated 
writing; they signaled delays and pauses; they invited the reader to a 
brief moment of review and afterthought. The new signum admira­
tionis, or punctus admirativus, or punctus exclamativus demanded 
the reader’s attention and focus. It corresponded in speech to a rising 
voice, to a brief textual fissure, to the Augenblick the speaker shares 
with the listener, before turning to something new. It was the rhetor-
ical equivalent of the fermata on a closing chord in music. It left time 
for thought and admiration, for emotions and reflection, and for 
 expectation.
Originally, the punctus admirativus existed in several versions, 
different from today’s exclamation mark. However, the printers of 
the late sixteenth century soon chose the now-familiar typograph-
ical sign. For sixteenth and seventeenth century German gram mar-
ians, the new sign voiced the optative, and more importantly Ver­
wunderung, hence the early preference for the term Verwunde­
rungszeichen over Ausrufungs zeichen.1 Exclamation marks entered 
literary texts. In the Shakespeare First Folio of 1623, they accompany 
Othello’s increasing agitation. Exclamation marks covered a spec-
trum of emotions, from astonishment to fear, as noted in Diderot and 
d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. The point exclamatif expressed not only 
“la surprise” but also “la terreur, ou quelque autre sentiment affec-
tueux, comme de tendresse, de pitié, &c.” In German literature, 
Goethe’s Werther embraced the exclamation mark (now called the 
Ausrufungszeichen).
During the nineteenth century, the exclamation mark refined lit-
erary style, energized political and philosophical agitation, and stan-
dardized mathematical notation. Heinrich von Kleist used it spar-
ingly but to great effect; his distinctive punctuation gave his texts 
1 Johannes Müller, “Übersicht über die Geschichte der Interpunktion,” in Quellenschriften 
und Geschichte des deutschsprachlichen Unterrichtes (Gotha: 1882), 279–297.
Ainsi, les statistiques prennent-elles pour objet des imprévus, sou-
vent néfastes. Elles doivent alors trouver la perspective selon la-
quelle il leur apparaît que ces aléas, loin de la stupeur ou de l’ébahis-
sement, sont aussi des événements qui se répètent et peuvent ainsi 
être gouvernés. Pour chaque type d’imprévu, une méthode statistique 
doit cependant être inventée qui lui corresponde au mieux 6. A la 
santé publique, les statistiques actuarielles, à l’insécurité, les don-
nées de police. Imprévus et méthode s’expriment mutuellement, et 
différemment au cours du temps.
Pour finir, insistons sur le fait que la statistique peut même parti-
ciper à produire de l’imprévu. A la bourse, par exemple, la divulgation 
des indicateurs a des effets spéculatifs immédiats sur les cours. La 
statistique essaye ainsi elle-même de contrôler les imprévus qu’elle 
provoque. Les fonctionnaires de l’USDA, toujours eux, avaient mis en 
place pendant tout le XXème siècle un processus de révélation des 
indicateurs très impressionnant. Les journalistes intéressés par les 
chiffres étaient convoquées au ministère, placés derrière une ligne 
tracée au sol et de l’autre côté de laquelle se trouvaient les rapports 
statistiques. A exactement 15 h 00, un fonctionnaire tirait au pistolet 
le départ de la course à la donnée ! Tout le monde avait ainsi la sur-
prise de découvrir les résultats au même moment. 
Malgré les apparences, la statistique connait donc très bien l’im-
prévu. Elle le fait entrer dans sa composition, elle le prend pour objet, 
elle peut même le produire. C’est cela qui en fait une discipline si 
étonnamment vivante !
6 Alain Desrosières, La politique des grands nombres : histoire de la raison statistique 
(Paris : 2000).
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his open  letter to the French president, published in the newspaper 
l’Aurore under the headline “J’Accuse…!,” printed in massive, bold let-
ters (figure ).
Nineteenth-century scientists, on the other hand, had so little 
use for the exclamation mark that when a mathematician from Stras-
bourg, Christian Kramp, suggested in 1808 the sign “!” for factorial 
operations, he very much displeased the British mathematician Au-
gustus De Morgan, who complained of the “barbarism” of introduc-
ing new signs drawn from common language in mathematics. The 
exclamation mark, he quipped, had “the appearance of expressing 
surprise and admiration that 2, 3, 4, & c. should be found in mathemat-
ical  results.” 4 Scientific writing should not be contaminated by spo-
ken language; it should be free of the subjective and devoid of the 
emotion that impeded scientific objectivity. Using the vulgar excla-
mation mark in publication would undermine the skeptical reader’s 
trust in the scientific argument.
Cultural differences in uses of the exclamation mark have per-
sisted during the last two centuries. English and French speakers are 
still surprised by the ubiquity of exclamation marks in German, rang-
ing from letter greetings to warning signs of all kinds. In German, the 
exclamation mark rather fesselt die Aufmerksamkeit of the reader, 
whereas in English, it often signals a vulgar attention-grab by the 
writer. The keyboards of German typewriters seem to have intro-
duced an individual key for the exclamation mark much earlier than 
English or American ones. The philosopher Theodor W. Adorno de-
plored the expressionists’ overuse of exclamation marks and com-
pared them to the multiple zeros of worthless German bills during 
the inflation of the 1920s. For him, as for many English and Ameri-
can  critics, the sign had lost its power and authority and become 
 dilettantish. Still, for Adorno, punctuation could polish a writer’s 
style when care and restraint guided the transgression of ortho-
graphic rules. There was room for subjectivity amid all conventions: 
the rules of punctuation would not always square with the subjec-
4 Augustus De Morgan, “Symbols and Notation,” in Penny Cyclopædia (London: 1842), 
23:444.
melody, rhythm, and drama. The exclamation mark was also mo-
bilized against an increasingly codified, regulated, and docile lan-
guage by novelists and even by some philologists. Heinrich Heine, 
during the Restoration period, rebelled against the grammatical 
norms and conventions of his day with his punctuation and short er 
sentences. The scholar Olaf Briese aptly sums up Heine’s style: 
“Schrift wird der  Tendenz nach atemlos. Verschriftlichte Sprache. 
Kunstvoll – kunstlos, mittelbar – unmittelbar.” 2 Friedrich Nietzsche 
mocked the impoverished academic writing of his time and advo-
cated a return to great style, to the origins of language in the spoken 
word, to sound and rhythm, firmly anchored in action and life, in 
space and time. For  Nietzsche, a text should not only be read; it 
should be experienced and excite—like music. The reader should be 
bodily moved when reading.3 The physiognomy of the text, the graph-
ical rhythm, mattered—with the exclamation mark echoing the fin-
ger raised for  attention. Later, in fin-de-siècle France, the writer Émile 
Zola took the exclamation mark to new political and moral heights in 
2 Olaf Briese, “Auslassungszeichen. Interpunktionsregime bei Heinrich Heine,” in 
 Auslassungen. Leerstellen als Movens der Kulturwissenschaft, ed. Natascha Adamowsky 
and Peter Matussek (Würzburg: 2004), 218.
3 Heinz Schlaffer, Das entfesselte Wort. Nietzsches Stil und seine Folgen (Munich: 2007), 
29–38. 
The headline of the French newspaper L’Aurore, January 13, 1898.
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Über Fundrecht
Anna Echterhölter 
Chronometrisch versiegelte Schlösser, Luftkammern in den Metall-
wänden, die vor Sprengung schützen: In der Ära des Bankdepot-Fachs 
experimentiert man 1910 mit allem, was kostbare Dinge vor uner-
wünschtem Zugriff zu sichern verspricht. Selbst in diesen ausge-
zeichneten Räumen jedoch ist das Finden nicht ausgeschlossen. 
Denn nicht wenige dieser Tresore verwaisen, wie der langjährige 
 Depothüter einer New Yorker Bank sich erinnert.1 Öffnet man die 
Kammern nach festgelegtem Protokoll, treten Seltenheiten zu Tage: 
herrenlose Sachen. Oftmals liegt ihr Wert im Auge des Betrachters. Es 
finden sich Locken, hämische Kommentare über die Nachwelt und 
Souvenirs – aber auch Schmuck, Geld und Testamente. Ist ein letzter 
Wille fehlerhaft aufgesetzt, fallen selbst in Anwesenheit der Erben 
alle Güter durch die engen Maschen des Besitzrechts in eine unmög-
liche Position. Den Findern jedoch gehört hier nichts. 
Außerhalb der doppelt verstärkten Metallkammern – dieser Ge-
bäude im Gebäude – sind dem possessiven Blick und dem besitz-
ergreifenden Sehen ebenfalls enge Grenzen gesetzt. Das Fundrecht 
gibt sich sperrig. Es ist vor wie nach der Kodifizierung „bunt“, wie 
Ernst Eckstein konstatiert.2 In der Tat: Was mit einer Entdeckung 
 geschieht, kann von ihrer Position auf der Vertikalen abhängen. Liegt 
etwas tiefer als eine Pflugschar unter der Erde, entscheidet der 
 Sachsenspiegel zugunsten des Königs. Selbst Landbesitzer können 
demnach nur Oberflächliches behalten. Sie können es allerdings 
auch dann behalten, wenn andere auf ihrem Land fündig werden. 
Denn insbesondere in Preußen durchkreuzt der Staat die ingeniösen 
Blicke der Finder. Alles wird dem Souverän zuerkannt: verlassene 
 unbewegliche Dinge, die unterirdischen Schätze der Natur, Gegen-
stände, die „noch keines Menschen Eigenthume gewesen sind“, 
 nutzbare Tiere, die in Freiheit leben und erblose Verlassenschaften, 
wo bei die „bloße Unfähigkeit oder Unwürdigkeit“ der Erben nicht 
1 John P. Carter, In the Cave of Aladdin: A Little Narrative of the Safe Deposit Vault (New 
York: 1911). My thanks go to Atiba Pertilla for surprising me with this source.
2 Ernst Eckstein, „Das Schatz- und Fundregal und seine Entwicklung in den deutschen 
Rechten,“ Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichte 31, nos. 1–4 
 (December 1910): 193–244.
tive needs of logic and expression. For Adorno, the logical  positivists 
were doomed to fail in their effort to replace stylish melodic prose 
with short protocol sentences.5 
Computer technology has raised the exclamation mark again in a 
culture of rapidly exchanged messages that often add signs to make 
explicit the writer’s intentions and emotions. Exclamation marks are 
ubiquitous in electronic messages; emoticons like :o to express sur-
prise are tongue-in-cheek uses of dull punctuation signs and letters. 
Finally, more recently, emoji (a loan word derived from the Japanese 
e 絵, picture, and moji 文字, character), as  for “surprised,” have in-
filtrated word processors, new hybrid signs with both ideographic 
and linguistic meaning. These recent developments bespeak as much 
the fleeting character of instantaneous writing as the relentless 
search for original ways to overcome physical distance, to preserve 
the virtues and affections of direct personal interaction in writing.
5 Theodore W. Adorno, “Satzzeichen,” in Noten zur Literatur (Frankfurt: 2002), 170.
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derlohn nicht kennt. Gezähmte Tiere gehen deshalb früher in den 
Besitz über als undomestizierte. 
Selbst die angeblichen Rechtsbräuche in „Übersee“ – die im Auf-
trag des Berliner Reichskolonialamts anhand des Kohler’schen Frage-
bogens gesammelt und von landlos gewordenen Verwaltungseliten 
später kodifiziert werden – bilden ein Echo dieser Problematik ab. 
Bienenhonig wird unterschiedlich angeeignet, je nachdem auf wes-
sen Land und in wessen Korb er von den Insekten zusammengetra-
gen wurde. In Ostafrika sind kleine Objekte am Weg auf „Hölzchen zu 
stecken“, bis der Eigentümer sie zurücknimmt.6 Gesehene und ge-
jagte Tiere gehören dem Jäger ganz, nicht jedoch, wenn jemand auf 
eigenem Grund ein Tier mit geliehenem Pulver erlegt. In diesem Fall 
kann der Pulvergeber Ansprüche geltend machen. Oftmals sind 
Dinge, die bereits gefunden wurden, mit Grasbüscheln oder Palm-
wedeln markiert. Selbst Riffe und Gräber können von Tabuzeichen 
geschützt sein:
[Ein] 5–8 cm langes Holzstäbchen wird geschnitzt, so daß es an 
beiden Seiten die Form eines Haifisches bekommt. Leise werden 
einige geheimnisvolle Worte an das Bild gemurmelt und dasselbe 
dann in der Nähe des betreffenden Eigentums aufgehängt. An 
Stelle des Holzbildes werden auch zusammengeflochtene Blätter, 
die die Form eines Rachens oder Mundes bekommen, aufgehängt.
Dies erinnert an die Schürfzeichen der Bergleute, welche die Blicke 
der anderen Suchenden von ihrem Revier ablenken sollen. Ohnedies 
steht der Verdacht im Raum, dass das Fundrecht nicht von verlore-
nen Dingen und verschollenen Personen handelt; nicht von den vom 
Wind herbeigetragenen oder vom Meer fortgespülten Strandgütern, 
ja, nicht einmal in erster Linie von den antiken Schätzen im engeren 
Sinne. Vielmehr steht zu befürchten, dass es der Bergbau ist, der die 
Rechte der Finder verzerrt.7 Auch zukünftige Zufallsfunde dürfen 
6 Erich Schultz-Ewerth et al., Hgg., Das Eingeborenenrecht. Sitten und Gewohnheitsrechte 
der Eingeborenen der ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien in Afrika und in der Südsee 
(Stuttgart: 1929–1930), 1:239; für das folgende Zitat im selben Absatz, 1:518.
7 Eduard Gans, „Bemerkungen zur Lehre vom Schatz,“ Jahrbücher für die preußische 
Gesetzgebung, Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsverwaltung 31, nos. 61/62 (1828): 3–11.
hinreicht, um die Inbesitznahme durch den Staat zu begründen – wie 
das Allgemeine Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten 1794 festsetzt.3
Auf öffentlichem Boden bestehen nur Teilauflagen: Ein Fund auf 
einer Böschung kann der Gemeinde gehören, die diese Böschung 
 unterhält. Der Finder einer Sache hat die Hälfte an die Armenkasse 
abzugeben. Findet man hingegen einen Schatz auf fremdem Boden, 
so erwirbt ausgerechnet derjenige Anspruch auf die Hälfte des 
 Wertes, der nicht die Absicht hatte, etwas zu finden. Ausschließlich 
dort, wo ein Schatz durch Zufall in den Blick fällt, kann sich Teil-
besitz  konstituieren. Suchende gehen grundsätzlich leer aus. Schlim-
mer noch, wer seinem Glück auf die Sprünge hilft, Experimente an-
stellt und sich mit übernatürlichen Kräften verbündet, hat stets das 
Nach sehen: 
Wer zur Nachsuchung von Schätzen vermeintlicher Zauber-
mittel, durch Geisterbannen, Citiren der Verstorbnen, oder  andrer 
dergleichen Gaukeleyen, es sey aus Betrug oder Aberglauben, 
sich bedient; der verliert, außer der sonst schon verwirkten 
Strafe, sein Anrecht auf einen etwa zufälliger Weise wirklich ge-
fundenen Schatz.4
Carl von Savigny (1803) und Berthold Delbrück (1859) stärken die Posi-
tion, dass das zufällige Sehen Eigentum herzustellen vermag. Theo-
dor Gimmerthal ist anderer Auffassung. Neben dem „totalen Mangel 
von egoistischem Interesse“ begründet er Rechte des Finders mit 
dem drohenden Zerfall der Sache.5 Die Existenz des fremden Eigen-
tums muss auf dem Spiel gestanden haben, sonst lassen sich die 
 engen Bande zwischen der verlorenen Sache und ihrem ursprüng-
lichen Besitzer nicht lösen – wie im römischen Recht, das einen Fin-
3 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (PrALR), Theil II., Tit. XVI,  
Abschnitt II, § 1–18.
4 PrALR, Theil II. Tit. XX. Abschnitt VI. § 82, § 86.
5 Theodor Gimmerthal, „Vom Finden verlorener, derelinquirter und herrenloser Sachen,“ 
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 52, no. 2 (1869): 521–551; Nils Hansen, „Strandrecht und 
Strandraub – Bemerkungen zu einem Gewohnheitsrecht an den schleswig-holsteini-
schen Küsten,“ Kieler Blätter zur Volkskunde no. 33 (2001): 51–78.
8988
Anna Echterhölter  | Über Fundrecht
nicht einfach einbehalten werden, wie Überlegungen zu submarinen 
oder intergalaktischen Dingen bestätigen, etwa die Abkommen der 
„International Seabed Autority“ oder das „Agreement Governing Na-
tural Resource Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies“.
* * *
Nachdenklich kehre ich aus der Universitätsverwaltung an den Platz 
in einem Berliner Rara-Lesesaal zurück. Im Stapel der unterschrie-
benen Formulare regelt eines die Besitzrechte der Universität an 
 allen meinen zukünftigen Funden. Mein Auge streift über die Kanten 
eines Druckbogens, der seit 146 Jahren nicht aufgeschnitten wurde. 
Wenige wollten sehen, was Anton Menge auf 600 Seiten an „Preu-
ßischen Spinnen I.–XI.“ beobachtet hat.8 Hartnäckig beliefert er das 
Journal der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft in Danzig mit verschwen-
derischen Details immer neuer Borsten- und Gliederkonstellationen. 
Mein doppelt verlorenes Sehen – das eine längst vergangene Pos-
session für Spinnentiere bisher ergebnislos mustert – ist kaum merk-
lich neu erfunden: Wenn auch Anton Menge zeitlebens wie besessen 
beobachtet, ohne jemals besitzen zu wollen, kann ich mir ganz sicher 
sein: Meine Suche steht seit wenigen Minuten auf einem anderen 
Blatt.
8 Anton Menge, „Preussische Spinnen. I.–XI.,“ Schriften der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft 
in Danzig (Danzig: 1866–1878). 
Random Enough to Trust
Paul Erickson
Dr. Strangelove: Of course, the whole point of a Doomsday Machine 
is lost if you keep it a secret! Why didn’t you tell the world, eh?
Ambassador de Sadesky: It was to be announced at the Party 
 Congress on Monday. As you know, the Premier loves surprises. 
Perhaps humans are not so good at surprises. The Soviet premier’s 
unfortunately timed announcement of the Doomsday Machine rep-
resented one possible way they could go wrong. As the nuclear strat-
egists of the 1960s knew so well, the entire point of a threat is to in-
duce change in your adversary’s perceived incentives. Your adversary 
had to believe the threat; and to believe, he had to know. A threat 
could leave something to chance: as Thomas Schelling would point 
out, an element of uncertainty could be essential to turning an in-
credible threat in to a credible one. Or, as game theorists might sug-
gest, the deliberate introduction of chance via some existential roll 
of the dice could blind an adversary to the specifics of your plan of 
action. But either way, the chance in question had to be a calculated 
chance—one honed with such mathematical precision that it seem-
ingly left nothing important to chance at all. The truly spontaneous 
element, the “human factor,” or the unaccountable vanity of world 
leaders had to be systematically removed from the social and tech-
nological systems of Dr. Strangelove’s age if they were to keep the 
world safe. 
This last claim was our central argument in How Reason Almost 
Lost Its Mind (2013)—and fittingly, from an early date, the computer-
ized random number generator emerged as one of the enduring 
 ta l ismans of that project. Such a device’s seeming ability to recon-
cile randomness with rule-bound, computerized algorithms perfectly 
cap tured the Cold War style of rationality whose ramifications we 
sought to trace. 
As Dan Bouk shows in his essay in this volume, there had been 
both supply of and demand for tables of random numbers prior to 
World War II in connection with problems of random sampling. The 
advent of digital computing dramatically increased both in the years 
following the war. A crucial spur to postwar demand was, of course, 
the use of random numbers in computer programs that simulated the 
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and objective randomizer. The solution was precisely to reintroduce 
the human element into our randomizing system. That human ele-
ment came in the form of a small child charged with the task of 
choosing a positive integer at random and pressing the randomizing 
button on the spreadsheet the requisite number of times. The child 
duly chose the number seven.
How random was this choice? In the mystic numerology of 
 twentieth century psychology, seven looms large. George A. Miller, 
working at Harvard’s Psycho-Acoustic Laboratory on behalf of the 
US Navy, reflected on this fact in his classic 1956 article, “The Magical 
Number 7, Plus or Minus 2.” Synthesizing results from a wide range of 
studies, Miller remarked on how frequently seven represented a fun-
damental limit on human information-processing capacities. Briefly 
flash less than seven dots of light on a screen, and humans invariably 
get the number right; flash more than that, and they guess, usually 
incorrectly. Miller ultimately concluded that while seven’s recur-
rence was suggestive, it might simply be a coincidence. Even so, his 
brand of information-theory-influenced cognitive psychology turned 
the randomizing capabilities of humans into a topic of inquiry from 
the 1950s onward. If the tone of this literature is any guide, humans 
are not particularly good randomizers, whether our randomization 
strategy involves flipping coins or simply naming sequences of digits 
off the tops of our heads. Yet, as von Neumann would point out in 
his musings on randomization algorithms, there is no such thing as 
a random digit: there are only methods for producing randomness. 
Even if it did not reduce randomness to rules, our method—algo-
rithm plus child—was hopefully random enough to trust.
progress of chain reactions inside different possible nuclear weapon 
configurations: the “Monte Carlo method,” pioneered by Stanislaw 
Ulam and others. One such Monte Carlo simulation, described in a 
1947 report by the polymathic John von Neumann and run on Prince-
ton’s ENIAC computer, utilized at least three 8-digit random numbers 
each time it recalculated the path of a neutron through a bomb as-
sembly. The first “shake” (10−8 seconds) of the simulation would have 
required at least 300 such random numbers. A Nagasaki-sized bomb 
might last 50-odd shakes.1
Even in those early days, collections of random digits were wide-
ly available. The 1927 tables of L. H. C. Tippett provided over 40,000 
such numbers; by 1939, Kendall and Babington-Smith’s Tables of Ran­
dom Sampling Numbers would provide an additional 100,000; and 
 finally, by the later 1940s, the RAND Corporation would produce far 
more, all laboriously checked for randomness and conveniently re-
corded on punched cards. However, even feeding these cards into an 
electronic computer exacted a significant cost in terms of time. As 
von Neumann would explain in a 1948 letter, it took the ENIAC some 
600 ms to read a punch card but only 3 ms to multiply two 10-digit 
numbers together. Hence, he sought to have the computer generate 
sequences of “good enough” random numbers via a comparatively 
fast algorithm that involved squaring an 8-digit number and extract-
ing the middle 8 digits of the resulting 16-digit number.2
Our working group of six coauthors for How Reason Almost Lost 
Its Mind employed such a randomization algorithm, implemented 
via a few lines of visual basic code inserted into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet, to help choose the order for our names on the cover of 
the book. Yet we didn’t trust the computer alone. Perhaps it was due 
to a healthy skepticism of our Cold War rationalists’ pretentions to 
algorithmic rationality. Or perhaps it was that, being the product of a 
specific programmer (me), the program was not a suitably impersonal 
1 It is difficult to estimate, even roughly, how many random numbers would be required 
since it depended on the configuration of the bomb under consideration. See “Actual 
Running of the Monte Carlo Problems on the ENIAC” in John von Neumann Papers,  
Box 12, Folder 5, “Computers: ENIAC: Monte Carlo Method” (Library of Congress). 
2 Miklós Rédei, ed., John von Neumann: Selected Letters (Providence, RI: 2005), 142.
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Strange Tales from a Glass Building 
Fa-ti Fan
1.
The mountains look like an upturned, wounded hand, its gnarled fin-
gers pointing slightly inward. Together, they dominate the southern 
corner of an island shaped like a yam. The area is sparsely populated 
and largely cut off from the outside world. But occasionally a traveler 
treks through the tall grass and dense woods and hurries on to one of 
the inns along the path around the mountains. 
The sun is setting. The young man pushes forward, fighting the 
overgrown thorny brushes and tall grass that flank the narrow path. 
He is new to this island. He has been sent to the remote place to serve 
as the local magistrate, a post that has been left unfilled for three 
years. Scrambling downhill, he stumbles over a tree root. He picks 
himself up, mumbling a curse. And just then he hears the calls. They 
are floating over from a distance, across the field of waving grass. He 
can’t see who is calling. He can’t tell if it is a man or a woman. Maybe 
it is a child? The words become clear. “Where have you come from? 
Where are you going?” 
When a traveler walks by, the serpent calls out and asks, Where have 
you come from and where are you going? Only these two questions 
are clearly audible, and the voice carries the accent of someone who 
hails from the central states. Those who don’t know better and an­
swer will be followed by the snake, even if they go for tens of li. When 
the snake arrives, the smell of its foul odor wraps around trees. It 
breaks into the room and swallows the traveler who answered its 
calls earlier. (Inventory of Snakes, Qing dynasty)
2.
The wind knifes through his tattered heavy coat. He bends down to 
deflect the slashes and cuts. He breathes hard, seized by a spell of 
dizziness. He tries to balance himself on his gloved, frostbitten hands. 
He knows he cannot stop. Still water freezes. 
Only a week ago, five of them crowded into a pile and took a 
group photo. The youngest two crouched down in the front, and the 
others lined up in the back with their arms over each other’s shoul-
ders, their smiles visible behind their wiry beards. 
They unfolded a large map, on which a well-marked red trail snaked 
through the void. 
That was so long ago. Four lives ago. 
He is thirsty, with millions of acres of solid water around him. He 
is but a speck in a vast white desert, devoid of any possibility of com-
ing across a cactus or a palm tree. He reaches the edge of a ravine. 
Crawling slowly over, he looks down. 
A large patch of shaggy grey on a wall of glistening ice catches his 
eye. Is it moving?
In the north, there is a thick layer of ice. It spreads out 10,000 li and 
measures one thousand feet deep. Underneath, there are giant 
plant­eating rats. They weigh ten thousand catties each. Their flesh 
can be made into dried meat, a few bites of which will warm one up. 
Their skin can be used to make drums, the sound of which can be 
heard one thousand li away. Their hair reaches eight feet long and 
can be used for bedding, which keeps one warm. (Book of Marvels 
and Wonders, attributed to the Han dynasty)
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After the genre of “records of strange occurrences” (zhiyi or zhiguai), 
a genre that often contained elements of surprise, wonder, marvel, 
and horror. Written under a large tree in front of a French bakery, 
with an occasional leaf drifting by and a sparrow pecking at my 
strawberry tart. 
3.
“Look! A woolly mammoth!” A little girl points to a large stuffed ani-
mal towering over rows of fluffy, colorful tigers, pandas, seals, and 
bunnies. Her father, a bespectacled Asian man with odd resem blanc es 
to an older Queen Victoria, picks up the Ice Age character and hands 
it over to the girl.
4.
She smiles, returning the book she was leafing through to the shelf 
and heading out of the store, her blue Camper shoes matching her 
eyes. She loves the walk across the park, along the gentle bends of the 
river. The afternoon sun reflects off the rippling water, like an invi-
sible dragonfly dipping its tail and leaving a trail of dancing circles 
of light.
She walks up a bridge and stops to see two ducks gliding by. The 
spire of a distant church pierces through the sea of treetops. A boy 
with a baseball cap leans against a tree on the riverbank, a fishing 
rod next to him. A large leaf flutters down and rests on his shoulder. 
One day, with a few guests, Wen Hui watched people fishing on the 
river. Suddenly one of the fishermen jumped onto the shore and 
started running like crazy. Mr. Wen asked him what was wrong. The 
man couldn’t say a word but pointed at his own back. When Mr. Wen 
looked closely, he saw something like a yellow leaf, about one foot 
long and with eyes all over it. It had attached itself so firmly to the 
man that it was not possible to remove it. Mr. Wen instructed a 
 servant to burn it until it loosened its grip and fell off. In each of 
its many eyes, there were teeth like nails. The fisherman lost several 
liters of blood and died. (Miscellaneous Morsels of Youyang, Tang dy-
nasty)
The boy stands up, stretches, and gathers his fishing rod and bucket. 
He looks up. She waves at him from the sun-gilt bridge. He smiles and 
waves back, “Hi, Mom!” 
They’ll walk home together. 
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Humanities in Conflict Zones
Rivka Feldhay
For me, surprise is the “vanishing point of desire.” 1 Obviously, I have 
not invented this elusive definition. In fact, the more I reflect upon it, 
the more ungraspable the concept becomes. On the one hand are the 
dark shadows of das Unheimliche, Freud’s description of the bizarre 
feeling of déjà vu, and on the other, the Latin origin stupendus, mean-
ing astonishment or amazement at some wonder. Moving between 
these is so precarious that at any moment one might be left with a 
big hole in the heart. The point of all this is to suggest that often we 
are caught off guard by something that has, in fact, been ingrained in 
us all along but escaped articulation or conscious awareness. 
And so I have decided to let surprise reveal itself between two 
forms of expression. The first is the text offered below, in which I re-
flect on the scholarly activities I have been involved with in recent 
years together with a wonderful group of Israeli and Palestinian 
scholars at Tel Aviv University. This text is the result of a process that 
led us to an unexpected formulation about the inherently conflictual 
nature of the humanities. The second is a short film depicting our 
attempt to share something of scholarship in the humanities with 
Palestinian high school students. The result is a kind of transforma-
tive experience that seemed to come unexpectedly both to them and 
also to us, the organizers.
* * *
What is the relationship between “the humanities” and “conflict”? It 
seems to me that there are two ways to approach this question. One 
is to differentiate between the humanities as a field of knowledge 
and conflict as a condition of sociopolitical reality. Taking such an 
approach, the question arises: How do the humanities operate in and 
through conflicts taking place in the “real world”? Yet another way 
to approach the question is to adopt an inner gaze that recognizes 
the conflictual history of the humanities themselves, and ultimately 
faces up to that heritage. 
The claim implicit in the latter approach is that those fields of 
scholarship that deal with human beings, their faculties (especially, 
1 Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious,” in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. D. K. Keenan (Albany: 2004).
100 101
Rivka Feldhay | Humanities in Conflict ZonesRivka Feldhay | Humanities in Conflict Zones
spirit of enlightenment. Thus, the battle is not simply epistemic: it is 
always-already political. Ultimately, there is always a conflict over 
who has the authority to give an account about the human world or 
to interpret it. Is authority held by scientists? Historians? Literary 
scholars, sociologists, jurists, theologians? And, what are the ade-
quate tools for performing this job? Mathematical equations? Statis-
tical probabilities? Literary interpretation?
The peculiar conflicts of the humanities relate to the nonneces-
sity, contingency, and indeterminacy of the human condition, which 
generate contradictions between the quest for theoretical and epi-
ste mic certainty and the need to accommodate local human per spec-
tives. These tensions are connected to the status of inter pretation as 
a method of attaching meaning, to the representative  capacity of 
facts (or lack thereof), and to the inherently reflexive  nature of the 
humanities.
To repeat, what is at stake is not only the relationship of scholar-
ship in the humanities to the surrounding world, or its relationship 
with other fields of knowledge, but also the problem of contradictory 
quests within the humanities. That is to say, the central concern is 
the conflict between our idealistic yearning for the purity of knowl-
edge and objectivity on the one hand and our desire for subjectivity 
and identity on the other. Such inner divisions, I am however argu-
ing, are a source of strength and not weakness. For it is from this 
place of inner division—let me call it an inner wound—that critique 
of our flawed reality emerges and normative claims can be articu-
lated.
* * *
Here is a short film that illustrates our space of freedom, as scholars 
of the humanities, to transform tension into a bond among young 
people in Israel/Palestine.2 Don’t their eyes really embody the tran-
sient experience of surprise? 
2 insaan—Arabic Humanities Network, “Humanities in Conflict Zones—St. Josef Seminar,” 
YouTube video, 13:05, posted by “insaan —Arabic Humanities Network,” August 21, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q01D64Y7KE8.
but not only, language), the kind of knowledge they produce, their 
sociability, their norms, and their identities are always-already tak-
ing place in conflict zones. Formulated somewhat differently: con­
flict is the existential mode of being of the humanities. Any attempt 
to  completely disengage the “world of knowledge” and the “real 
world” is not only an abstraction but also an illusion in the same way 
that any reduction of the “real world” to the “world of knowledge” is 
also an illusion. And so our task is always dual. We must both under-
stand how humanistic bodies of knowledge are “in the world”—
which is always conflictual, and perhaps even more so in our pres-
ent—while also learning how the “real” world always informs the 
making of knowledge of and about that world. Our actions are highly 
dependent upon our worlds of knowledge and our worlds of knowl-
edge are always embedded in the “real” world. 
Humanists—those who study human beings and human forms of 
life—have always been involved in some form of conflict; sometimes 
it emerges from within their own communities, sometimes from out-
side of them with rivals coming both from non humanistic fields and 
from competing conceptions of human activity. To give just a few 
examples: Plato wanted to banish poets from his ideal city. Medieval 
universities distinguished the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) 
from scientiae (epistemic knowledge). Renaissance humanists bit-
terly fought scholastic philosophers for institutional academic dom-
inance. In 1959, C. P. Snow delivered his well-known speech at Cam-
bridge in which he claimed Western society was split between the 
culture of science and that of the humanities. 
On yet another level, conflicts between the humanities and the 
environment within which those disciplines operate have always 
been simultaneously epistemic and political. At the epistemic level, 
we can mention the desire to try and purify the human experience 
of  the world from any personal (subjective) elements by reducing 
that experience to facts deemed to be objective representations. Con-
comitantly, such attempts express a quest to cleanse language of any 
subjective elements so that scientists’ representations are able to 
perfectly mirror the world. These qualities of “true science” are also 
taken to be moral virtues, expressing good judgment, fairness, and a 
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Mechanical serendipity could bring about a new age of surprise. But 
perhaps the ubiquity of the lucky find will blunt its force. I suggested 
above that, by definition, research leaves very little space for genu-
ine surprise because it expects the unpredictable. The new tools to 
quickly access a wide range of heterogeneous sources might prolifer-
ate petty surprises but make genuine surprise even rarer.
Through the Bog 
Sebastian Felten
Surprise means that our idea of the world is inadequate; this is why 
researchers rejoice in it. Scientists set up experimental systems not 
to prove their hypotheses but to generate novelty; scholars query 
their corpus only to be led astray by the unusual find. For historians, 
the unexpected in the archive can feel like a resounding veto of their 
sources, sweeping aside their armchair speculations. This jolting mo-
ment of recognition, that reality turns out to be utterly different 
than previously thought, promises to unlock superior knowledge.
Researchers like surprise not only because it propels their quest 
for knowledge. It also helps them justify the erratic course of their 
work that is sometimes difficult to convey to outsiders. Why fund 
open-ended research? Tales about unexpected windfalls can help 
 argue that case. The list of useful things that are the purported result 
of serendipity is long and adequately incoherent: X-rays and Viagra, 
gunpowder and saccharine, Post-it notes and penicillin, dynamite, 
cornflakes, and, of course, America. Tales of serendipity in forewords, 
editorials, and memoirs can help carve out a space for research to 
follow its own rules; they are often told with an eye to outside audi-
ences who might suspect idling in the ivory tower.
But storytelling aside, does surprise have a place in the realm of 
research? In the fable that Horace Walpole famously stumbled upon, 
the three princes of Serendip went on a journey in unknown lands 
only after a long education. Their wits were whetted to engage with 
twists of all sorts. Like them, researchers embark on the journey into 
the unknown with a ready and flexible mind. They aim a shifting 
battery of methods at a moving target. Researchers thus hedge sur-
prise and harness it. By doing so they might dampen its effect. Can 
someone feel genuine surprise if they went out to look for it? 
This question may become more acute as computers emerge as 
serendipity machines (not my term) in many aspects of our lives, 
 research included. Algorithms roam gargantuan databases without 
knowing what to look for, baffling scientists and companies with 
what they find. Mechanical serendipity has slipped into the routines 
even of humanists who avow the traditional close reading of small 
samples. Aggregators like Google Books, JSTOR, and Europeana work 
to this effect.
Switbert Lobisser, ex libris for the mining official Alois Wölwich, woodcut, 1941, 9.4 × 6.6 cm. 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Vienna, E-20021.
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Raising Eyebrows
Mechthild Fend
It is hard to look surprised when you are actually bored. I imagine 
that this must have been a challenge for the models posing for the 
tête d’expression at the Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture 
in Paris. They sat—holding and recomposing a facial expression 
during the two- or three-hour sessions—in front of a group of art 
 students doing their best to draw the visible signs of a particular 
 passion. The exercise had been introduced in the mid-eighteenth 
 century after the Comte de Caylus, the antiquarian and amateur, 
lamented the lack of facial expression in painting. Determined to 
remedy the problem, he donated money for an annual competition 
for the best expressive head. Along with the new assignment, an-
other novelty entered the art institution: female models. Life mo dels 
serving for the study of the nude were, at the time, always male, as 
this exercise, which was the pinnacle of academic training, centered 
on the idea of an implicitly male, universal body.
Potential concerns about propriety should not have been an is-
sue for the tête d’expression as the models remained dressed with 
only their countenance exposed. Still, the presence of women in the 
almost exclusively male institution (the number of female artist 
members was restricted to four at a time) caused some moral unease. 
Rather than opting for actresses, experts in the simulation of pas-
sions, Caylus advised the choice of honest and modest women with 
no such professional experience as models to facilitate the natural 
rendering of emotions.1 His fellow academy members, the artists ac-
tually in charge of organizing the competition, agreed that the mod-
els should be young and, ideally, female, their expressions showing 
more subtlety and purity than faces furrowed by age and life ex-
perience. They cautioned, however, that it might be difficult to get 
1 Anne-Claude de Caylus, “De l’étude de la tête en particulier,” in Les Conférences de 
l’Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture, tome VI (1752–1792), ed. Jacqueline 
 Lichtenstein and Christian Michel (Paris: 2007–2012), 2:565–569. See also Thomas Kirchner, 
L’expression des passions. Ausdruck als Darstellungsproblem in der französischen  
Kunst und Kunsttheorie des 17. und 18. Jahrhundersts (Mainz: 1991), 196–200.
Why this may be so will become clearer by analogy with the business 
that is evoked by the metaphor of data or text mining. In mining lore, 
only the first veins are discovered unexpectedly. Bohemian cartmen 
ploughing through the wilderness, an Andean shepherd looking for 
his llama—engrossed in other activities, they come upon precious 
ores by accident. These are mere myths, to be sure, but they capture 
something about what people must have felt when they wandered in 
a barren landscape and came across a trove of possibility.
But this wondrous moment passes quickly. Soon adventurers ar-
rive on the scene, already calculating for profit, soon followed by en-
gineers and bureaucrats, who plan and predict. Happy accidents still 
happen. In fact, they become more numerous as the mines expand. 
Yet now these odd finds are greeted with relief rather than surprise. 
As loss and gain cancel each other out and risks evaporate, the heart 
rates drop. The adventure of mining a mysterious underground be-
comes compatible with papershuffling and clean shirts.
Heterogeneous data, easily and abundantly available, confronts 
historians with the diversity of the past more starkly than before. 
Because access to these aggregates is only partially curated—or not 
curated at all—conversing with algorithms produces surprising re-
sults—almost so often that they are anticipated. More than once, I’ve 
found myself disappointed by sensible results when hoping for odd 
ones. Serendipity machines evoke a quick and telematic harvest, a 
bounding increase of knowledge without getting our boots dirty. But 
the proliferation of petty surprises might mean that, perhaps more 
than before, one needs to “read and reread, trudging forward dog-
gedly through this bog, without a breath of fresh air unless the wind 
picks up. And sometimes it does, often at the moment you least ex-
pect it.” 1 This message from old hands to young ones might continue 
to hold. March long through barren land; look for the unexpected. 
What an enjoyable double bind.
1 Arlette Farge, The Allure of the Archives, trans. Thomas Scott-Railton  
(New Haven, CT: 2013), 62.
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simple.” The trouble seems to be that in the initial moment of 
étonnement, nobody can anticipate what happens next. Le Brun ex-
plains that astonishment is an excess of admiration, in which the 
person experiencing it initially doesn’t know whether the “object is 
appropriate or not.” 4 
There is also a distinction between étonnement and surprise: the 
former is potentially shattering, the latter uplifting. In fact, when 
mouvements composés were posed for the tête d’expression exer-
cise, astonishment was typically paired with fear or terror and sur-
prise with joy. Mixed feelings were, it seems, the academy’s attempt 
to manage the unforeseen. After all, the exercise was meant to inform 
4 Le Brun in Montague, The Expression of the Passions, 113.
hold of decent young women, available for the task. Filles publiques 
had to be avoided at all costs in order to keep students from “danger-
ous knowledge.” 2
Ever since its founding, the expression of passions had been a 
major concern for the Académie royale. The painter Charles le Brun, a 
key figure in the establishment of the institution, had attempted to 
organize the visual representation of the passions as part of his 
 efforts to bring intellectual rigor into the teaching of art. In his influ-
ential 1668 lecture regarding the expression des passions, Le  Brun 
elaborated on the various simple and mixed passions as well as their 
manifestation in the facial features of humans. In conjunction with 
this, he produced a series of drawings that demonstrated the visual 
alphabet of the passions. They condensed the emoting countenance 
to shorthand, the traces of which we can still see in today’s emojis. 
Raised eyebrows, wide open eyes, and a gaping mouth were and 
are  the visual signs of “astonishment.” Le Brun agreed with René 
 Descartes and his Les Passions des l’âme (1649) that the soul resides 
in the brain.3 The artist was more interested in the physical manifes-
tation and visual expression of the passions though, and he stressed 
the significance of the eyebrows in the communication of feelings; 
because they are so close to the brain, these hairy lines trimming the 
forehead were chief indicators of the passions and played a crucial 
role in his emotional alphabet. 
As we have learned from Lorraine Daston, emotional dispo-
sitions  like “wonder,” “curiosity,” and “surprise” were key both in 
the  seventeenth-century nomenclature of the passions and in ap-
proach es to the natural world. Le Brun included étonnement among 
the simple passions, and yet he struggled with it as might be sug-
gested by the fact that he struck out the word “simple” in the in-
scription for his drawing. It reads “Etonnement simple Mouvement 
2 Charles-Nicholas Cochin, “Propositions et reflexions concernantes le prix fondé par 
 Monsieur le Comte de Caylus, pour l’étude des têtes, et de l’expression,” in Kirchner, 
 Ausdruck, 374.
3 Jennifer Montagu, The Expression of the Passions. The Origin and Influence of Charles 
Le Brun’s Conférence sur l’expression générale et particulière (New Haven, CT, & London: 
1994), 17–18.
Jean-Baptiste Regnault, “Tête de jeune fille, la surprise melée de joie,” Concours de la tête 
d’expression, 1776. Pastel on paper, 37 x 30 cm. École nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts, 
Paris. Photo: Beaux-Arts de Paris, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais.
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history painting—highly valued as the most prestigious painterly 
genre. In a historical painting, a figure or narrative was meant not 
to be frozen in a flash of bewilderment but caught in what Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing would later call “a fruitful moment”—a transi tory 
instant that allowed the viewer to imagine the progress of a  storyline.
The Académie Royale held the competition for the prix d’expres­
sion almost every year between 1759 and 1790; female models were 
used in most cases. Étonnement was only posed for once, and sur­
prise melée de joie three times, making it the single-most studied 
passion.5 One of the outcomes was Jean-Baptiste Regnault’s prize- 
winning drawing showing the head of a woman with loose hair and 
a strange headscarf (figure). Caylus had suggested that the model 
should wear her hair in a natural and picturesque manner, without 
any “ornement moderne sur la tête” and without a fichu that would 
prevent the student from properly rendering the transition from 
head to neck.6 In Regnault’s drawing, the headscarf serves to frame 
the face and to focus on the expression, accentuated by the slight 
opening of the mouth—the codified expression of surprise.
But the head breached the framework of Le Brun’s diagram matic 
drawings, which were deemed too formulaic by the mid-eighteenth 
century. The eyebrows are not even lifted, and drawn from a slightly 
oblique angle, the head seems to have turned, suggesting a reaction 
to something happening to the woman’s left. From the corner of her 
eye, the young woman is looking straight at the viewer. If the draw-
ing was indeed made d’après nature, she would have met the eyes 
of the artist while he was trying to catch her expression. Her pose 
perhaps transformed into an actual glance, an unexpected moment 
in the academic exercise. The drawing seems to register that the 
model, while mimicking the passion, suddenly felt it for real and be-
came conscious of the relationship between pose and experience. 
Maybe her eyebrows dropped in that instant of self-awareness, just 
as those of the artist rose.
5 See the list in Kirchner, Ausdruck, 372–373.
6 Conférences, tome VI, 2:567.
A Family Conversation
Erna Fiorentini with Vincenzo Fiorentini
Time and again, I have reflected on processes of discovery. One day I 
heard an interview with a condensed-matter physicist who spoke 
about “having been surprised” by a material that combined seem-
ingly incompatible properties.1 That physicist happened to be my 
brother, Vincenzo. What a wonderful opportunity, I thought, to pur-
sue the making of knowledge in a discipline far from my own, the 
history of art and images (though I had previously trained in crystal-
lography and geochemistry). I wanted to distill the nature of the sur-
prise Vincenzo had experienced, and I asked him about it: “Si parva 
licet componere magnis ...” he objected modestly when I opened the 
conversation with examples from the history of physics. 
“Look,” I said, “I want to think about this question to honor 
 Lorraine Daston, who taught me that there is no high or low in things 
or in the methods of looking at them; what counts is not valuing 
achievements but asking how and why they come into being.” Once I 
put it that way, Vincenzo agreed to continue the conversation. “You 
study the theory of condensed matter,” I started, a little bit skeptical. 
“It sounds like a contradiction. How do you work in this gap between 
actual physical material and abstract assumptions about how it 
might behave?” As I had expected, Vincenzo’s answer was incorpo-
real at first. 
“We do computer simulations, on ‘virtual’ matter. If you were a 
cynic you might say none of the stuff we study actually exists.” But 
then, suddenly, after an in-depth description of the path from the 
abstract problem of fermions in an external potential to its most 
 arcane computational aspects, Vincenzo touched earth. “Based on 
these first principles, we reify. Our virtual sandbox is a real physical 
system that we observe and manipulate—structure, components, 
 external conditions—and, for all practical purposes, there are an 
 infinite number of states transforming into one another from which 
you can predict properties that are experimentally testable—and 
 often tested successfully.” 
1 Alessio Filippetti, Vincenzo Fiorentini, Francesco Ricci, Pietro Delugas & Jorge Íñiguez, 
“Prediction of a Native Ferroelectric Metal,” Nature Communications 7 (2016): 1–7.
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I wondered whether and why he would look for any particular possi-
ble incarnation from among this infinity of possible kinds of matter. 
“Yes, if we work with experimentalists, who want help and have 
questions. But as theorists, we are not necessarily after something 
specific. There’s no need for precise expectations that may or may 
not be fulfilled: that’s the fun part, I guess.”
I pushed further. “But how do you start studying one particular 
problem then, like that conjunction of incompatible properties you 
have predicted for your material?” I was eager to unveil a deliberate 
decision or a definite assumption as the origin of discovery and to 
take fortuitousness out of the equation. 
He replied, “It is curiosity that mostly spins new problems out of 
old ones. That new result was an aside to other problems we had 
worked on involving materials with a certain layered structure— 
you know, looking, thinking, and fiddling with them, mixing in one 
species or another, say, or playing with the number of layers.” As 
my  brother talked, I saw him as a child combining the pieces of a 
Meccano set. “We draw from experience and intuition, which is fine 
as far as it goes. But Nature has its own evil ways,” he added som-
berly, “and as you proceed, step by step, you ask new questions and 
invent new ways to answer them.” I silently thought a concept like 
“operational creativity” would characterize that process. “Moreover,” 
Vincenzo reflected, “at the intersection of different fields you tend to 
build a repertoire of ideas that more specialized people may not 
have. Sometimes insights from unrelated sources condense into 
clues.” I considered that this was not surprise but rather a redirec­
tion of attention. Surely, it probably only works if you are open to 
reflection about what you have observed, beyond the standard paths. 
Or perhaps if you are the sort of person disposed to discovery. Vin-
cenzo confirmed my conjecture: “The idea of a material with both 
ferroelectric and metallic qualities, which we have now discovered, 
had been suggested decades ago in a paper with a somewhat tongue-
in-cheek title: Ferroelectric metals? Among colleagues we jokingly 
renamed it “Starry-eyed Unicorns in Condensed Matter?” I didn’t get 
the joke. He explained that, in general, ordered dipoles and abundant 
mobile charge cannot coexist, as the latter would kill the former— 
therefore, a few spin-doctored press releases aside, no one really 
talked seriously about “ferroelectric metals” outside scare quotes.
It seemed that people had been obstinately blind. “Is this lack of 
interest the reason why no one discovered ferroelectric metals until 
now? If you managed to see what no one else could see, what has 
been your secret?”
Vincenzo joked, “A serious stroke of luck.” Then, more seriously: 
“When we found polar symmetry (the first necessary but not suffi-
cient ingredient of ferroelectricity) in a metal, we were only mildly 
surprised but became hugely curious about an unexpected possibil-
ity. And so, we pressed on.” 
I interrupted. “So is this a particular form of surprise, a meta-sur-
prise, as it were? One that keeps you asking, beyond complacency?” 
“Yes,” Vincenzo agreed, “giving up was now out of the question. 
And we were rewarded, not to mention flabbergasted: the ‘impossi-
ble’ property—polarization, the other key ingredient—turned out to 
be computable and potentially measurable.” 
“What was the impact? Were there follow-up experiments?”
“Not many,” he grinned. “Everybody is too busy or cash-strapped 
to risk taking up a potential dead end. At conferences, most people 
don’t seem to get it, and I understand their puzzlement.” Look at that, 
I thought, even astonishment doesn’t always manage to get beyond 
the conventional explanations. In Vincenzo’s own discovery story, 
there was no trace of serendipity, no simple stumbling upon the un-
expected, no unintended insight. His strategy was to keep his eyes 
open, take notice, recombine, and freshly direct attention.
“You immerse yourself in the interesting and the beautiful,” 
 Vincenzo said. “Like when you are dazed by a mountain wall with 
an elegant route offering itself, looking fresh and untouched: you go 
 forward, hoping to discover a new view.” I thought about how reward-
ing it would be if the alluring path were to keep its promise. “Quite 
so” he concluded, “provided you don’t find pitons and fixed ropes 
along the way.” That, I reflected, would be an entirely different kind 
of surprise in the process of discovery. What a wonderful opportu-
nity for further family conversations!
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historical analysis proceeds in a strategically planned manner, in 
particular in the systematic search for pertinent sources. Quellen­
beherrschung, the mastery of sources, is a recurrent topos of praise 
in academic reviews, and such mastery seems contradicted by chance 
and surprise encounters. This is, of course, a paradox: no researcher 
can ever be sure to have read all the relevant sources for a given re-
search question. The possibility, however unlikely, that addi tion al 
material might surface somewhere can never be ruled out and is 
in fact constituent of historical research. But by claiming “mastery 
of  sources,” a researcher asserts at least that nothing of  major im-
portance is yet likely to be found. Such mastery, in a professional 
 academic setting, supposedly does not rely on chance and other 
 contingencies.4 
Whether or not chance is acceptable as a propagator of knowl-
edge in the humanities depends not least on how chance actually 
happened. “The question is how ‘chance’ is understood,” one German 
historian blessed with making sensational findings wrote.5 She 
stressed that in her case “chance” resulted from “systematic re-
search.” She found things that no one thought existed—things no 
one had thought to look for—but she did not find them in happen-
stance ways. This is usually still considered the via regia of historical 
research. Moreover, the researcher must not stop with his chance 
finding. A surprising and unexpected piece of evidence may initiate 
a  new direction of research, but, as Koepp wrote, once the initial 
 finding has occurred, all further research must shed the impression 
of coincidence. Systematic research is required to tame the impact 
of chance for the professional habitus of historians.
Historians are generally not too enthusiastic about acknowledg-
ing the impact of chance on their work. If stories about what actually 
4 Amateurs are often more able to acknowledge chance as a key driving motor of histori-
cal inquiry. Several genealogical associations, for instance, maintain websites dedicated 
explicitly to the collecting and making available of Zufallsfunde; see http://www.zufalls-
funde.net and https://www.familia-austria.at/index.php/datensammlungen/zufalls-
funde.
5 Cornelia Jabs, “Ein Zufallsfund? Der besondere Weg zu den Kurras-Akten,” Deutsch­




It is a familiar scenario: A researcher walks into an archive or a li-
brary, planning to study a number of sources. The scholar begins 
reading but soon is distracted. The documents in front of him con-
tain what he has been looking for, but not only this. He finds other 
texts that captivate his attention and distract him from his original 
research agenda. Or he finds curious, important, and unexpected in-
formation relating to what might become new and future projects. 
Since the Renaissance, many scholars have told versions of this story. 
Historians, in particular, have often come across important materials 
in more or less happenstance ways. “In reality it must be admitted 
that this kind of research needs at least as much good luck (bonheur) 
as systematic knowledge (science),” one French antiquarian commen-
ted in 1677.1 Another historically minded amateur agreed about 100 
years later in 1783, noting that he had found relevant materials by 
“lucky chance.” 2
Around 1900, German academics coined the term Zufallsfund 
(chance finding). However the term, while precise, also carried an 
aura of apology and ambivalence. In one typical instance, the arche-
ologist Friedrich Koepp (1860–1944) wrote about the work of  Ulrich 
Koehler (1838–1903), a prominent editor of Greek inscrip tions:  “The 
value of his publication is not diminished by pointing out that it was 
initiated by a gift of chance, the fragment of an inscription detected 
only a year before: what could have remained simply a Zufallsfund 
for others was turned into a proper intellectual pos session by inten-
sive work in this case.” 3 Even in the hands of a  res pec ted scholar, the 
use of Zufallsfund required qualification and  justification. 
This ambivalence has remained. History as an academic discipline 
and the historian’s professional persona rely on the assumption that 
1 Ménestrier to de Grossi, in Paul Allut, Recherches sur la vie et les œuvres du P. Claude­ 
François Menestrier de la Compagnie de Jésus (Lyon: 1856), 344–345. 
2 René de Laigue, “Le livre de raison de Jehan de la Fruglaye, seigneur de la Villaubaust,” 
Bulletin archéologique de l’Association bretonne 20 (1901): 109: “heureux hazard.”
3 Friedrich Koepp, “Ulrich Koehler (1838–1903),” Biographisches Jahrbuch für Altertums­
kunde 29 (1906): 17: “Es tut dem Verdienst dieses Werks keinen Abbruch, wenn man  
es hervorhebt, daß den Anstoß dazu und seinen Kern sozusagen eine Gunst des Zufalls 
gegeben hat, jenes im Jahr zuvor erst gefundene Bruchstück der Quotenlisten: was 
einem anderen ein Zufallsfund geblieben wäre, das hatte hier eindringende Arbeit zum 
wohlverdienten Besitz gemacht.”
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happened in the process of finding the sources that build historical 
narratives are told, they are usually either relegated to prefaces or 
kept apart entirely in letters or memoirs. Hiding the contingencies of 
research might be an understandable rhetorical strategy—particu-
larly for junior members of the republic of letters—to protect publi-
cations against becoming easy targets for critical commentary. For at 
least three reasons, we might want to allow for a more open acknowl-
edgment of the contingencies of fact-finding procedures in archives 
and libraries.
First, usually scholars in the humanities today combine research 
with teaching. As pedagogues, we should consider it one of our re-
sponsibilities to acquaint junior scholars with the contingent nature 
of knowledge-making. Surely students will learn a lot by simply 
 observing the habits and practices around them as they are slowly 
socialized into the broader community of scholars. But familiarizing 
novices with the accidental and unpredictable nature of scholarly 
progress should perhaps go beyond anecdotal evidence and learning 
by doing. 
This pedagogy of chance should highlight the connection be-
tween unplannable realities and systematic work. Reading sources 
can be a test of patience, indeed a feat of endurance. And yet, while 
turning page after page of often boring texts, historians must retain 
a high degree of alertness. They must notice things that are “interest-
ing,” though outside the current scope of research. To do this, schol-
ars must be taught to expect the unexpected and to organize and 
manage their findings, especially those without immediate use. 
Second, the digital age provides new stimulus for thinking about 
chance findings. Most scholars now make use of the various search 
engines available in the digital realm. But the results of full-text 
searches frequently resemble Zufallsfunde: they yield single items, 
largely devoid of context. What to do with them and how to build 
professionally valid scholarship on such accidental find ings should 
be of paramount importance in our methodological re flections.
Third, most historians nowadays share an understanding that histor-
ical knowledge is never simply “found” or “there” but neces sarily 
“constructed” or “made.” However, the practices of constructing not 
only historiographical narratives but historiography’s empirical ba-
sis should be highlighted. Careful assessments of the realities of re-
search should be added to ongoing critical discussions about histo-
riographical narratives and popular historical imagination to round 
out our understanding of the constructed nature of history. In the 
long process of knowledge-making, Zufallsfunde should figure prom-
inently in such an assessment.
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In Praise of the Counterintuitive 
Yulia Frumer
Defiance of expectation and learning are intimately intertwined. Hu-
mans form models based on learned categories and feel surprise 
upon realizing that their experience does not align with those ex-
pectations. The sense of surprise, therefore, is a sign that learned 
 categories need to be revisited, revised, and refined, priming the 
mind for further learning. Psychologists have determined that 
11-month-olds learn more when the learning experience is preceded 
by an event that they did not anticipate.1 In the history of science 
and technology, too, the arising of the unexpected is a sure sign 
that  there is something intriguing going on and that learning is 
about to happen. 
My own research path has been paved with the unanticipated. In 
my work on the history of Japanese technology, one of my greatest 
joys has been to find an idiosyncratic object. If there is anything 
that dealing with Japanese scientific instruments has taught me, it is 
that whenever I feel that an object or a practice is “bizarre,” I should 
reexamine my own assumptions about what is “normal.” Perhaps I 
am the weird one! Or, perhaps what I assumed to be “common sense” 
is not, in fact, all that common. The feeling of unanticipated in con-
gruency alerts me to the fact that there are things I take for granted 
because they are deeply engrained in my own culture, and in other 
historical realities there might be another “common sense” that is 
different from mine.
My first memorable scholarly astonishment was learning about 
Japanese clocks from the Tokugawa period. I was stunned to discover 
that the length of hours measured by these clocks was not predeter-
mined and equal, as in the clocks I know, but varied according to the 
seasons. It sounded like both a technological impossibility and a rec-
ipe for endless missed meetings. In order to explain the apparent 
anomalies of Japanese clocks, I decided, I had to explore them further. 
This led me to realize how many assumptions about timekeeping, 
clocks, hours, and time I myself took for granted. For example, I as-
sumed that an “hour” is defined by its length. I assumed that the only 
1 Aimee Stahl and Lisa Feigenson, “Expectancy Violations Promote Learning in Young 
 Children,” Cognition 163 (June 2017): 1–14.
relevant criterion for time measurement is the degree of precision. 
That an equal-hour system (“our” system) is essential for the func-
tioning of large social structures. That each hour digit has to have a 
determined location on a dial, so that even when digits are not writ-
ten one can still know the time by looking at the position of the 
hands. My surprise, however, led me to learn that social coordination 
depends not on a technological system but on an agreement. That 
people can schedule meetings, plan ahead, work overtime, and be 
punctual regardless of the timekeeping system they use. That there 
are numerous ways of looking at a clock and learning what time it is. 
And I also learned that the uniformity of our own time keeping sys-
tem conceals the fact that when we say that we “measure time,” we 
actually mean different things, depending on the situation. “Time,” I 
discovered, was a proxy for something else—distance traveled, mo-
tion of the stars, level of hunger, work left to do, nostalgia, chemical 
processes, and much more.2 
If Japanese clocks challenged my assumptions about the nature 
of time, another Tokugawa-period device defied my assumptions 
about space. This device was a compass in which directions were 
 reversed so that east was placed where I expected to see west. This 
seemed to contradict everything I knew about spatial orientation. 
Exploring the actual use of reverse compasses, however, I discovered 
that they show the world from the eye-level point of view, always 
indicating the direction the user is facing. The source of my con-
fusion was not so much the device itself as the assumption that 
 compasses show us a physical reality that is independent of us and 
that using a compass requires imagining looking at oneself from 
above. “Space” too was a concept that should not have been taken 
for granted.
Another surprise allowed me an insight into a process of knowl-
edge transfer. I was reading notes taken by the chief Tokugawa as-
tronomer, Takahashi Yoshitoki, who in the early years of the nine-
teenth century was making his way through a Dutch translation of 
J. J. Lalande’s Astronomie. On one page, Yoshitoki drew a diagram and 
2 Yulia Frumer, Making Time (Chicago: 2018).
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clearly labeled it “based on fig. 222 of § 2686, vol. 3, page 383.” However, 
when I checked the relevant figure in Astronomie, I was surprised to 
see that the diagram did not look anything like the one Yoshitoki 
drew. My surprise was amplified by the fact that Yoshitoki knew very 
little Dutch; in numerous places throughout his notes, he indicated 
that because he could not read the text, he was interpreting the dia-
grams alone. Trying to understand how Yoshitoki got from the origi-
nal to the picture he actually drew revealed that he was not learning 
from translation (as one might assume), but the other way around: he 
was only able to offer a kind of translation following an internal pro-
cess of interpretation and learning.3
For me, surprise is not only beneficial but also fun. And I have 
been further delighted to discover that it is, in fact, structurally fun. 
When we look at the cognitive processes that result in a feeling of 
surprise, we discover that they are intriguingly (should I say “surpris-
ingly”?) similar to those involved in creation of humorous effect. 
 Humor, theorists say, relies on incongruities.4 We find something 
funny when there is an apparent contradiction between categories, 
and we “get the joke” when we find a way to resolve this incongruity. 
In other words, we perceive something as funny when we find a way 
to make sense out of apparent nonsense. The learning process that 
follows a surprise is just like that: we are astonished by incongruities 
and find a way to reconcile them. We tackle the thing that affronts 
our common sense and find a resolution. No wonder the process 
brings us so much joy.
3 Yulia Frumer, “Before Words: Reading Western Astronomical Texts in Early Nineteenth- 
Century Japan,” Annals of Science 73, no. 2 (2016): 170–194.
4 Jerry Suls, “Cognitive Processes in Humor Appreciation,” in Handbook of Humor 
 Research, ed. Paul McGhee and Jeffrey Goldstein (New York: 1983), 39–58; Thomas Schultz, 
“A Cognitive–Developmental Analysis of Humor,” in Humor and Laughter: Theory, 
 Research and Applications, ed. Tony Chapman and Hugh Foot (New York: 1976), 12–13.
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A Fluid Ship and a Bloody Bowl
Claire Gantet
On the January 27, 1785, Madame de Montesson, the wife of the first 
Prince of the Blood, invited Armand Marie Jacques de Chastenet, mar-
quis de Puységur, to her mansion together with her personal surgeon, 
Claude-Louis Berthollet, to prove the reality of magnetic somnambu-
lism. While Puységur, an artillery officer from the most illustrious of 
French nobility, was still only partly convinced of the value of Franz 
Anton Mesmer’s teachings, his brother, a navy officer, had persuaded 
so many sailors of the effectiveness and utility of animal magnetism 
that his whole ship had become a tremendous baquet, sailing on a 
sea of magnetic fluid. Magnetic spasms had replaced seasickness, 
and all the sailors obeyed the orders of their therapist- officer. Yet fan-
tastic stories and accusations of charlatanism were exactly what 
Puységur, a man of the Enlightenment, wanted to avoid. Defining 
himself as a scientist and man of reason, assisted by an approved 
physician, and following the methods of academic medicine, he re-
corded each treatment with mention of date, name, age, sickness and 
its duration, and the final result, giving them the status of facts he 
soon published.
In his first work, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire et à l’établisse­
ment du magnétisme animal, published in 1785, Puységur prefaced 
the account of his encounter with Madame de Montesson (initially 
called Mme de *** but identified by name in the 1820 edition) with a 
statement of his discovery of the power of magnetism. While he was 
trying his hand at a Mesmerian experience without any instruments, 
he unexpectedly and unwittingly happened to put his valet Victor 
in a state of lucidity without awareness. This had happened a year 
prior at Puységur’s estate, Buzancy, on May 8, 1784. Victor not only 
spoke in this condition but also answered his master’s questions, 
suddenly remembering very old events, detailing his own therapy, 
and proving to be more intelligent than in waking life. Victor was 
literally surprised since, according to what would have been the un-
derstanding of his contemporaries, “surprise” referred to a sort of 
Defining facts and producing proof of somnambulism: Victor bleeding into a bowl in 
 attendance of Puységur and Madame de Montesson. Louis Figuier, Les Mystères de la 
science moderne, vol. 2, Aujourd'hui (Paris: 1880), 353, plate 45.
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partial paralysis and meditation in a dreamlike state. As Grimm’s 
 dictionary put it, “ein gedankenvolles sinnen und träumen.” 1 
Puységur’s healing method, based on inducing an artificial state 
of calm sleepwalking, contrasted sharply with the violent crises that 
Mesmer advocated and which had quickly attracted much public 
 attention. To avoid the charge of quackery, Puységur offered to treat 
everyone for free: loads of soldiers, Freemasons (among whom were 
a considerable number of military officers), and ordinary men and 
women gathered around the tree he had magnetized.
Puységur brought Victor, who had fallen on his head and was suf-
fering from headaches, to Madame de Montesson’s mansion. Once 
magnetized, the valet predicted that his recovery would occur on the 
following Saturday between noon and 1 p.m., following a nosebleed 
in the right nostril. At the predetermined time, the magnetized valet 
was put on the floor, his face above a bowl. He began to bleed slightly 
from the right nostril and spat blood into the bowl. Puységur stood 
up, faced the patient, and leaned close to him, establishing intimate 
privacy in the space between them. All he knew was that the success 
of his therapy depended on will, belief, and con fidence. Yet Madame 
de Montesson, as a proponent of the “severe  sciences,” which were 
dominated by the physical and mathematical disciplines then gain-
ing ground, distrusted the scene and requested a secret moment with 
the valet in which she unsuccessfully tried to open his eyes. A few 
days later, again in state of somnambulism, Victor disclosed their dis-
cussion to Puységur and told him, “Il est malheureux pour moi d’être 
votre sujet d’expérience.”
At the outset, Puységur had been astonished by his discovery, 
which had at once enthralled and disconcerted him. As a man of the 
Enlightenment, he did not want to go beyond surprise. He particu-
larly rejected contemporary mystical, miraculous, spiritual, sympa-
thetic, and imaginary explanations of somnambulism. The “invisible 
agent” was not a psychological spirit or virtue but a physical fluid: 
1 Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, “Staunen,” vol. 17 (Stutt-
gart: 1919), col. 1176–1192, on 1177, with reference to Albrecht von Haller’s poem “Doris” 
(1730). The entry “Überraschung,” vol. 23 (Stuttgart: 1936), col. 456–458, emphasizes the 
sudden state of uncertainty.
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Shock Generator
Cathy Gere
In 1961, Yale psychologist Stanley Milgram crafted an answer to the 
period’s most pressing question: What had turned orderly bourgeois 
Germans into genocidal psychopaths? Located on a dramaturgical 
spectrum somewhere between the Eichmann Trial and Candid Cam­
era, Milgram’s “Obedience to Authority” experiment revealed a uni-
versal human tendency to defer to authority, even at the cost of basic 
decency, a “prepotent impulse, overriding training in ethics, sym-
pathy and moral conduct.” 1 Milgram claimed that he had isolated a 
crucial element of the psychology of fascism and reproduced it in 
ordinary Americans.
Before embarking on the procedure, Milgram administered a 
ques tionnaire to 14 Yale seniors, asking them to predict what per-
centage of the unwitting research subjects would go all the way to 
“Very Severe Shock.” The most pessimistic prognostication was 3 per-
cent. The actual figure was close to 65 percent. Not only did the result 
confound the expectations of his surveyed students, Milgram ex-
plained, but it also shocked the laboratory personnel observing the 
experiment through a two-way mirror. In deadpan prose, Milgram 
also conveyed his own surprise at what he witnessed: “Subjects often 
expressed deep disapproval of shocking a man in the face of his ob-
jections, and others denounced it as stupid and senseless. Yet the ma-
jority complied with the experimental commands.”
The unexpectedness of the result in Milgram’s “Obedience to 
 Authority” experiment was carefully staged in order to serve two im-
portant functions. First, it operated as a certificate of authenticity. 
The behavior of the subjects could not be the product of confirma-
tion bias; after all, it completely failed to conform to the experiment-
er’s expectations (a rather woozy social-scientific variation on the 
theme of mechanical objectivity). Second, it served to underscore the 
softheaded American innocence that Milgram had set out to shatter. 
Over the course of the decade, Milgram’s insistence on the substan-
tial overlaps between American democracy and German  fascism 
gained in force and persuasiveness, becoming a truism in radical cir-
1 This and the following quotation are from Stanley Milgram, “Behavioral Study of 
 Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371 and 376.
surprise was the expression of an epistemic bodily affect. Since ab-
normal phenomena were, for Puységur, simply facts yet to be ex-
plained, evidence had to be obtained less through a theoretical 
framework than, as in physics, by increasing the number of success-
ful iterations of the experiment. The truth of treatment by somnam-
bulism was clear for all who had eyes to see, compelling belief as 
 irresistibly as a mathematical demonstration. The sensory evidence 
of the spectacular phenomenon of somnambulism was attested to in 
a range of publications containing witness statements of the sort 
normally seen in court cases; Puységur even asked his patients to 
notarize a treatment certificate. The public, rather than learned phy-
sicians, were expected to decide in favor of somnambulism—some-
thing that went against the spirit of the rising science sévère. 2
The staging at Madame de Montesson’s mansion was all the more 
surprising in that all the protagonists were frustrated: the lady, who 
did not want to see the therapy; Puysegur, whose evidence the public 
did not believe; and Victor, who was disregarded by all. In the salon, 
Puységur, in influencing Victor, and Victor, in grotesquely bleeding 
into a bowl on the floor, had not followed the scientific, moral, or so-
cial rules of medical evidence. Even Madame de Montesson did not 
bring Puységur’s contradictions to light: Was somnambulism the 
 effect of a physical, universal, and pure fluid, or of human will? She 
disqualified the evidence but could not disprove the experiment. For 
Puységur, facts were neither pure nor outside the observer but, in the 
patient’s sentiment intime, embodied in the relationship between 
magnetizer and patient. Both Madame de Montesson and Puységur 
conducted therapeutic conversations with Victor, but by concluding 
“il est malheureux pour moi d’être votre sujet d’expérience,” Victor 
had the last word. He not only suggested the difficulty of defining 
facts and producing proof in the realm of mental life but also brought 
into question the very possibility that experiment could answer such 
questions. All before psychology as science even existed.
2 Bruno Belhoste, Paris savant. Parcours et rencontres au temps des Lumières (Paris: 2011).
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liturgy, who aborts the series at 150 volts and “seems in no way intim-
idated by the experimenter’s status but rather treats him as a dull 
technician.” About the theology that inspired this subject to disobey 
orders, Milgram is contemptuous, dismissing it as “the substi tution 
of good—that is, divine—authority for bad.” Next is a 35-year-old 
 African American drill press operator, who executes the grim task 
right to the end, with “a sad, dejected expression,” and whose obedi-
ence Milgram ascribes to “total faith in the experimenter.”
The only character whom Milgram seems to admire is the fourth 
subject in the series, a Dutch engineer, who emigrated to the United 
States after the Second World War. Aborting the experiment at 255 
volts, the Dutchman cries out, “I came here to help on my own free 
will. I thought I could help in a research project. But if I have to hurt 
somebody to do that … I can’t continue.” Afterward, in the debriefing, 
he sets the theme of unexpectedness on its head, expressing “sur-
prise at  the underestimation of obedience by the psychiatrists. He 
said on the basis of his experience in Nazi-occupied Europe, he would 
predict a high level of compliance to orders.”
The Obedience to Authority experiment was Milgram’s version of 
Sylvia Plath’s “Daddy” poem of almost exactly the same date: “I have 
always been scared of you, / With your Luftwaffe, your gobbledygoo. 
/ And your neat mustache / And your Aryan eye, bright blue.” 3 In ex-
posing the banality of American evil, Milgram wanted to turn his 
 naive compatriots into world-weary Europeans, like the Dutch engi-
neer, whose experience in Nazi-occupied territory had given him 
 insight into the infinite capacity of ordinary people to defer to evil. 
 After the experiment was over, the Dutchman sealed his place in 
 Milgram’s estimation by writing to the lab asking if he could work 
there: “Although I am … employed in engineering, I have become con-
vinced that the social sciences and especially psychology, are much 
more important in today’s world.”
3 Sylvia Plath, “Daddy,” in Ariel: The Restored Edition (New York: 2018), 75.
cles after the escalation of the American war in Indochina. The 
scorching critique so neatly anticipated by the “Obedience to 
 Authority” experiment is summed up on the cover of Telford Taylor’s 
1967 lament Nuremberg and Vietnam, which features an image of the 
Stars and Stripes stamped with a swastika.
Milgram published his long-awaited book Obedience to Author­
ity in 1974, the year of Nixon’s resignation and the end of the “long 
sixties.” In it, he devoted a short chapter to the question of “expected 
behavior.” 
Should there be a disparity between what people expect and 
what actually occurs, we are left with the interesting problem of 
accounting for the gap. For the expectations then come to have 
the character of an illusion, and we must ask whether such an 
illusion is a chance expression of ignorance or performs some 
definite function in social life. 2 
By this time, Milgram’s method for surveying expectations had a 
twist: now respondents were asked what they thought they them-
selves would do under the conditions of the experiment. The selected 
answers are reminiscent of any survey of American  undergraduates 
today asking what they would have done in Nazi Germany: “I can’t 
stand to see people suffer. If the learner wanted to get out, I would 
free him so as not to make him suffer pain.” 
A riveting chapter follows, describing the behavior of a small 
 selection of individuals under the most disturbing variation of the 
experiment, in which the subjects were seated next to their supposed 
victims and had to force their hands onto a metal plate in order to 
administer the shocks. The cast of characters is arranged for maxi-
mum drama: the first is a 37-year-old Italian American welder, with 
“a rough-hewn face,” who goes all the way to the end of the shock 
series: “The scene is brutal and depressing: his hard impassive face 
showing total indifference as he subdues the screaming learner and 
gives him shocks.” The next subject is a professor of Old Testament 
2 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority, an Experimental View (New York: 2009), 27–31. 
All further references in this essay are to the same passage of this volume.
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Opening an issue of Civiltà delle Macchine (published by Finmeccan-
ica and IRI), one found pages and pages of advertising, but there were 
no advertisements at all in Esso Rivista (Standard Oil) or in Il Gatto 
Selvatico (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi and Agip), which were aimed 
mainly at each company’s own employees. All the editorial teams, 
however, initiated discussions of advertising with journalists and 
other experts who presented historical surveys on the theme; they 
included Carlo Balestra in Il Gatto Selvatico in December 1955, Achille 
Perilli in Esso Rivista in early 1957, and Renato Giani in Civiltà delle 
Macchine in the summer of the same year. 
The discourse on advertising was supplemented by advertising 
images with an illustrative and explanatory function. In the publica-
tions that otherwise carried no advertising at all, these images were 
taken from the campaigns of their parent companies: Agip’s fantasti-
cal flame-breathing dog with six legs for Il Gatto Selvatico and for 
Esso Rivista the photograph of an elegant couple, out at night, stroll-
ing past an oil refinery. The latter magazine reported on the major 
campaign launched by the company in 1956 with the slogan “ESSO 
RESEARCH works wonders with oil” (note the assonance and alliter-
ation). In Perilli’s words, this was about “recalling the countless uses 
of oil and its derivatives in contemporary life,” including nylon, the 
material for the elegant woman’s red evening dress. “Wonderful new 
fibers that oil helped make,” ran the photograph’s subheading; Perilli 
explains that its advertising mechanism was “to make readers curi-
ous and draw them into reading the text, from which they would re-
alize, with amazement, how oil is actually the subject of the photo-
graph. Thus the advertising trap will be elegantly sprung.”
The magazines were playing with the expectations of readers 
who must have understood their connection with industry but who 
were also looking for scientific and cultural entertainment from 
 publications that presented themselves as nonspecialist. From their 
 titles, illustrated covers, frequently glossy paper, and numerous 
 pictures, Civiltà delle Macchine, Esso Rivista, Il Gatto Selvatico, 
 Illu strato Fiat, and Rivista Shell Italiana resembled the illustrated 
magazines of the 1950s that were popular in Italy as elsewhere. The 
periodicals published by industrial conglomerates reviewed the in-
The Economic Miracle
Donatella Germanese
“Our view is that advertising ought to surprise and even mystify, and 
should engage people’s imagination more than their reasoning.” This 
was the manifesto-style declaration that appeared in the Italian busi-
ness magazine Civiltà delle Macchine in July 1954. During the 1950s, 
public relations departments in the larger Italian corporations used 
contributions by specialists from a very wide range of disciplines 
in company magazines that circulated both among their own staffs 
and outside the factories. These publications became testing grounds 
for the blend of technical, scientific, artistic, and sometimes philo-
sophical topics. The promotion of industrial products included the 
popularization of science and technology, while the fine arts were 
required to assist by providing an additional cognitive and affective 
dimension. 
This was not just about selling things but about engaging the 
population, educating people, and turning them into active parti-
cipants in Italy’s social and economic recovery. While business mag-
azines in the early postwar period emphasized the great strides made 
by Italy’s reconstruction, after 1950 the range of things that evoked 
surprise was extended: they enthusiastically presented a variety of 
technological innovations, scientific discoveries new and old, and 
works by both professional artists and amateurs. The intersections 
and overlaps between different spheres were often highlighted.
The topos of wonder is implicit in the concept of “the economic 
miracle,” the expression used for the economic expansion in the 
1950s and early 1960s in West Germany, Italy, and Japan, the principal 
countries defeated in World War II, whose rapid recovery was indeed 
seen as “miraculous.” “Economic miracle,” Wirtschaftswunder, mira­
colo economico: the development of this label, applied retrospec-
tively to a phenomenon perceived as astonishing, can be related to 
the multifaceted public discourse around the wonders of new indus-
trial methods, their large-scale use, and the progress they delivered 
to society in general. The features of these fables can be delineated 
from a close examination of the magazines produced by Italian in-
dustry during the period 1949–1959; technology clearly proves to be 
the queen of surprise, followed by the fine arts, and then advertising. 
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ventions of the past, present, and future, from the wheel to the mis-
sile, ancient handmade artifacts to synthetic fibers, the dam to the 
atomic pile, the telescope to the unmanned satellite, the steam en-
gine to the petrol engine, the earliest to the latest drilling techniques 
for finding oil, and the simplest tools to automation in industrial pro-
duction, computation, translation, and robotics. Confronted by so 
many discoveries and inventions, all—the factoryworker and the sci-
entist, the poet and the painter—might experience wonder. 
In showcasing various creations, the aim was to construct con-
sensus: to consolidate the social fabric at the levels of both the 
 company and the nation, with a Western perspective during the Cold 
War era. A part was also played by strangers to the world of produc-
tion, such as the artists invited into workplaces who then told the 
public about industrial activity in a manner exotic enough to inter-
est readers without overwhelming them; according to Renato Giani, 
writing in the first issue of Civiltà delle Macchine for 1958, they were 
“gifted with that kind of marvelous outsider’s eye whereby things 
seem surprising and novel, and are surrounded by an aura of mystery 
and miracle.”
While medieval wonders were symbolic of wealth and power, the 
many wonders extolled by Italian company magazines in the 1950s 
needed to draw a veil over power relationships while emphasizing 
the democratic aspect of universal benefit in the spirit of general 
progress. This position changed notably during the next decade, 
when criticisms of uneven development started to emerge even in 
the industrial magazines. However, the effectiveness of the surprise 
mechanism itself seemed to be fading, as can be discerned from a 
piece by Giuseppe Dal Monte in the October 1958 issue of Illustrato 
Fiat: “All these discoveries, which yesterday seemed like figments of 
the imagination but today are in use and may lead to further develop-
ments, have now accustomed us all, whether dunces or scientists, to 
not being surprised by anything.” 
Translated by Stuart Oglethorpe
Esso Rivista 9, no. 1 (1957): 18.
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Glücklicher Zufall
Hannah Ginsborg
In a famous remark from the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant men-
tions two things that fill the mind with “ever new and increasing 
awe and wonder”: “the starry heavens above me and the moral law 
within me” (5:161).1 That remark is quoted toward the end of the fas-
cinating history of wonder and curiosity which Raine, together with 
her coauthor Katharine Park, narrate in their 1998 book Wonders and 
the Order of Nature. Their point is to underscore a shift in the object 
of the emotion of wonder that came about with the Enlightenment. 
The proper object of wonder is no longer the anomalous, the surpris-
ing, the unexpected—the “wonder” of the Wunderkammer—but 
rather its opposite: the immutable regularity of the universal laws of 
nature, associated, for Kant, with the absolute authority of the moral 
law. 
Is the experience of wonder, for Kant, definitively dissociated 
from that of surprise, of our response to the unexpected? I would like 
to complement Raine’s invocation of Kant by suggesting that Kant 
does allow for wonder as a reaction to the unexpected, although in a 
way compatible with the idea that it responds to the lawfulness of 
nature rather than to the apparently anomalous. The wonder I have 
in mind is described in the Critique of Judgment, where Kant has us 
reflect on the relation between nature’s empirical laws—the ones we 
discover through observation and experiment—and our own cogni-
tive capacities. What turns out to be unexpected, in this reflection, is 
that nature’s empirical laws are such as to allow us to come to know 
them. There is nothing surprising about our capacity to know the a 
priori synthetic laws Kant identifies in the Critique of Pure Reason—
for example, that substance is permanent or that every event has a 
cause—since these laws, like those of arithmetic and geometry, orig-
inate in our own cognitive faculties. But, Kant reminds us, these tran-
scendental laws do not imply that “nature is a system comprehensi-
ble by the human cognitive capacity through empirical laws”: they 
leave open the possibility that the diversity of natural forms and cor-
1 References to Kant cite volume and page number of Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schrif­
ten, 29 vols., vol. 1–22 ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 23 ed. Deutsche 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 24–29 ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu 
Göttingen (Berlin: 1900–).
responding empirical laws could be “infinitely great,” presenting us 
with “a crude chaotic aggregate without the slightest trace of a sys-
tem” (20:209). That nature is, instead, comprehensible to us and in-
deed allows of being systematized by us in a thoroughgoing way, is 
entirely contingent—so much so that when we discover systematic 
unity among empirical laws of nature, it is like a “happy accident 
[glücklicher Zufall] favouring our intention” (5:184). The discovery 
that two or more apparently heterogeneous laws can be unified un-
der a single principle yields “a very remarkable pleasure, often even 
a wonder [Bewunderung] which does not cease even when we are 
already sufficiently familiar with its object” (5:187). This is indeed 
close to the idea of wonder at the regularity of nature, but it includes 
an element of surprise. What we wonder at is not that nature is in-
trinsically regular but that it is regular in a way that we can compre­
hend—something that, given the independence of empirical nature 
from human cognitive faculties, we have no right to expect. 
The wonder Kant describes here is linked with a different kind of 
wonder or admiration, that associated with pleasure in the beauti-
ful. Like the first, it involves surprise. There are no rules for determin-
ing whether or not something is beautiful and thus no way that we 
could predict from the description of a beautiful object that we will 
find it beautiful (5:284–286). Like nature’s comprehensibility to us, the 
beauty of objects we encounter can be regarded as a gift, a way in 
which nature favors us (5:380). Kant holds that the capacity to experi-
ence beauty is a condition of knowledge, so the fact that we are able 
in principle to feel pleasure in the beautiful is no more contingent 
than our capacity in principle to bring objects under concepts and to 
organize those concepts under higher concepts. What is contingent 
is the fact that objects exist that awaken this capacity. We could per-
fectly well conceive of a world without a single beautiful object, just 
as we can conceive of a world in which our capacities to conceptual-
ize and systematize nature are constantly frustrated. 
Is Kant—the prototypical philosopher of the Enlightenment—
willing to settle for this radical contingency at the heart of his philo-
sophical system? On the one hand, he does, in typical Kantian fash-
ion, discipline it by making it the object of an a priori principle: the 
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“But Most by Numbers Judge …” 1
Catherine Goldstein
The epitome of mathematical surprise is perhaps John McKay’s ob-
servation in 1978 that 196883 + 1 = 196884. Note that 196735 + 1 = 196736 
would not have done the trick. To become a surprise, the six-digit 
number on the right-hand side of the equation had to be associated 
with a well-known complex function, that on the left-hand side with 
an important finite group. Groups are perhaps the simplest mathe-
matical structures used to encapsulate symmetries, from those of 
geometrical figures to those of roots of equations to those of move-
ments of particles in physics. The classification of finite groups occu-
pied dozens of mathematicians and thousands of pages in the twen-
tieth century and involved constructions that amazed even the 
specialists of the field; John Conway, for instance, significantly de-
scribed one of them in these terms: “In 1964, Zvonimir Janko gave us 
the first of a list of surprises, by announcing the discovery of a new 
simple group of order 175560, which at that time seemed quite a large 
number.” 2 
The “large number” 175560 here is the order, that is the number of 
elements, in the group; we knew of groups of any order (for instance, 
the group of symmetries of the vertices of a regular polygon with any 
number of sides), but this new group did not belong to any well-
known families and was simple, that is, indecomposable into other 
smaller groups. Since 1964, a handful of other new simple groups 
have been brought to light and their classification completed. The 
largest one has 246 · 320 · 59 · 76 · 112 · 133 · 17 · 19 · 23 · 29 · 31 · 41 · 47 · 59 · 71 
elements (a 54-digit number) and is known by the nickname “The 
Monster.” To help understand such large structures, mathematicians 
represented them in various ways: in particular The Monster can be 
represented as the set of symmetries of a 196883-dimensional space. 
And here is our 196883. 
As for the 196884, it appears totally independently, as one of the 
first coefficients of the Fourier development of the so-called j-func-
tion, a function introduced by Felix Klein in the nineteenth century 
1 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (London: 1711), 21.
2 John Conway, “Monsters and Moonshine,” Mathematical Intelligencer 2 (1980): 165–171, 
on 165.
principle of nature’s purposiveness for our cognitive faculties. We 
have to presuppose a mutual fit between nature and our cognitive 
faculties as a condition of being able to bring the natural world un-
der empirical concepts, and so of cognizing it empirically. On the 
other hand, unlike the synthetic a priori principles of the Critique 
of  Pure Reason, the principle of nature’s purposiveness is not one 
which we know to obtain. We have to proceed in our cognitive activ-
ity on the assumption that nature is going to favor our attempts to 
understand it, but we have no objective reasons for taking this as-
sumption to be true or even probable. The fact that we cannot seek 
empirical understanding of nature without assuming it to be empiri-
cally comprehensible by us does not take away from the contingency 
of that comprehensibility. This contingency might be seen as a source 
of extreme anxiety. What if nature’s comprehensibility fails from one 
moment to the next, leaving us cognitively adrift in a sea of alien 
phenomena? But Kant emphasizes instead the positive aspect of the 
contingency, as a source of pleasurable wonder: both at nature’s un-
expectedly satisfying our desire to understand it and at the unantic-
ipated beauty that we encounter both in the products of human art 
and in nature itself.
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to classify curves. It has been studied intensively ever since, both by 
function theorists and algebraic geometers. But the great sensation 
was not due to a simple numerical coincidence; who would have 
cared if the respective numbers had been the commonplace 5 and 6, 
or even 12 and 13? The mere size of the number 196883 involves a 
quality of individuality; that its six digits unexpectedly appear all 
together in far-distant areas did not look like a coincidence, and the 
size of 196883 was decisive in convincing several mathematicians 
that a hitherto undetected connection was indeed at work.
That large numbers can create astonishment is not particular 
to recent times. In 1643, Pierre Fermat wrote to Marin Mersenne, 
“Vous vous étonnerez bien davantage si je vous dis de plus que 
toutes [c]es questions sont possibles et que j’ai découvert leur solu-
tion,” 3 and then proceeded to exhibit 4687298610289, 4565486027761, 
1061652293520 as the three sides of a right-angled triangle having a 
square as its largest side and also a square as the sum of its two small-
est sides. How large must a number be to be a scientific surprise? 
Large is of course a subjective idea, but the point here is that the size 
itself is what explicitly mattered to provoke awe. 
In this sense, large numbers are everywhere in the works and 
correspondence of Marin Mersenne’s circle. Mersenne marveled at 
the 40320 songs constructed with only eight notes and at the words 
constructed with 22 letters or more: “ici l’esprit joue avec l’infini et 
par là ‘l’homme s’assujettit le Ciel et la terre par la force de son enten-
dement.’” 4 It is remarkable that the actual numbering of the pos-
sibilities—what Gaston Bachelard would see as the beginning of the 
scientific mind—did not decrease Mersenne’s feeling of marvel and 
surprise but gave substance to it, freed it. The number of words with 
30 consonants and 20 vowels, in an imaginary language constructed 
3 Pierre Fermat, Œuvres complètes, ed. Charles Henry and Paul Tannery (Paris: 1894), 2:260.
4 Ernest Coumet, “Mersenne: Dictions nouvelles à l’infini,” XVIIe siècle 109 (1975) in  Œuvres 
d’Ernest Coumet, tome 1, ed. Thierry Martin and Sophie Roux (Besançon: 2016), 337. The 
inner quotation comes from Marin Mersenne, L’impiété des déistes, athées et libertins 
de ce temps… (Paris: 1624), 1:110.
with 19 consonants and 10 vowels, is thus said to be “prodigieuse-
ment grand, car il contient 73 caractères.” 5
But the effect of large numbers also lies in the display of mastery 
they imply. In the early seventeenth century, one would need to 
have, for instance, an intimate knowledge of numbers to recognize 
1803601800 as the product of 2 (2 · 3 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 13)2, which is the exact 
shape required to be a certain number of times the hypotenuse of a 
right-angled triangle with given properties.6 Or, as in the Fermat 
 example above, it proves that talent and an authentic method, not 
pure trial and error, are in action here and responsible for finding the 
(10-digit) smallest solution to a problem.7 The surprise here is caused 
not so much by the enormity of the world but by the mathemati-
cian’s talent.
In other circumstances, however, smallness can be the key to the 
surprise. Let us think of the principle known as John Dalton’s “law of 
multiple proportions”: when two elements form several compounds, 
the ratios of the masses of the second element that combines with a 
fixed mass of the first element can always be expressed as small inte-
gers. With a very similar argument, René Hauÿ tried to defend his 
position on calcite against that of William Hyde Wollaston: “les me-
sures [de Wollaston] ne peuvent être rigoureuses,” he writes, because 
“les rapports qui en dérivent seront représentés par de grands nom-
bres.” 8 Large numbers here would not have been significant because 
any real number can be approximated as closely as desired by frac-
tions with large enough numerators and denominators. In natural 
phenomena, small often warrants the integer nature of the numbers 
5 Quoted in Coumet, “Mersenne: Dictions nouvelles à l’infini,” 336.
6 Catherine Goldstein, “1 803 601 800: de l’art des nombres à l’analyse, une autre voie?,”  
in Aventures de l’analyse. Mélanges en l’honneur de Christian Gilain, ed. Suzanne Féry 
(Nancy: 2012), 41–57, on 50.
7 Catherine Goldstein, “Routine Controversies: Mathematical Challenges in Mersenne’s 
Correspondence,” Revue d’histoire des sciences 66, no. 2 (2013): 249–273, on 258–262.
8 Bernard Maitte, “Haüy et la cristallographie,” in L’École normale de l’an III, vol. 3,  
Leçons de physique, de chimie et d’histoire naturelle, ed. Étienne Guyon (Paris: 2006), 
19–22, on 22.
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involved, which in turn suggests that structural properties (atoms 
for instance) are at play.9
Surprise is a cognitive emotion par excellence, writes Nathalie 
Mauriac Dyer.10 As for integers, the variety of the surprises they en-
capsulate, “un bouquet varié de plusieurs fleurs de couleur et odeur 
différentes,” is perhaps what is the most surprising for the histori-
an.11
9 But not only there: the same issue appears in generalizations of the relation between 
The Monster and the j-function, where linear combinations with small coefficients of 
the data linked with groups appear as coefficients in the development of special func-
tions.
10 Nathalie Mauriac Dyer, “Poétique de la surprise: Aristote et Proust,” Item (online) 
March 6, 2007: http://www.item.ens.fr/articles-en-ligne/poetique-de-la-surprise-aristote- 
et-proust.
11 This quotation, from the conferences of the Théophraste Renaudot’s Bureau d’Adresse, is 
mentioned in Simone Mazauric, Savoirs et philosophie à Paris dans la première moitié 





It’s a pretty good joke the first time you hear it. I was 12 when I saw 
it in the form of a one-panel cartoon. Two scientists were standing 
before a large white board. (I could tell they were scientists because 
there were some beakers on the table, some math was scrawled 
around the board, and their coats were white.) Among the formulae 
on the board, there was a box with a number in its upper right-hand 
corner and some symbols in the center, something like “!?!??!” One of 
the scientists had turned to the other and said, “I’ve done it, Jones: 
I’ve found the element of surprise!” You get the joke, such as it is. In 
the realm of geeky science jokes it isn’t bad, and it has been redis-
covered (or simply plagiarized, but I expect not) dozens of times. The 
charm wears off.
Now let me suggest one of those things that make academics no 
fun at parties: let’s dig a bit deeper into the joke. This move is a slant-
wise tribute to Robert Darnton’s classic 1984 collection The Great Cat 
Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, especially 
the title essay. Darnton provided an account of a printer’s shop in 
Paris where the apprentices had rounded up the stray cats and hung 
them en masse. To them, this was hilarious—to us, rather less so. 
Darnton’s brief for the cultural historian was to make sense of the 
joke, to elucidate why this slaughter would have struck these Pari-
sians not only as thinkable but as a knee-slapper.
At first blush, our case does not seem an especially appropriate 
opportunity to undertake a similar inquiry. There is no moment of 
puzzlement: the joke’s funny enough. We even know why it is funny: 
the cartoonist has juxtaposed a common expression “the element of 
surprise” with the periodic table. That table classifies elements, and 
new elements would necessarily belong on it. The humor trades on 
the double meaning of “element” in English.
But there is something more to be said—two things, actually: one 
about the periodic table and one about the word “element.” The joke 
does not just present a lump of metal and describe it as the “element 
of surprise”; it creates a box that looks like a position in the periodic 
system of chemical elements, like the one in every chemistry class-
room you have ever been in. In each of the many incarnations litter-
ing the Internet, we have all the trappings, such as a chemical sym-
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thing with atomic weight 12 exists and fits in this slot. For Mende-
leev, the only property an “element” had was atomic weight (today, 
we say the property is more accurately atomic number). The periodic 
table classifies elements, but chemists work in laboratories with 
 basic substances. This essential distinction differentiates how Men-
deleev thought of elements from how Antoine Lavoisier did in the 
late eighteenth century. Lavoisier spoke of basic substances.
Ironically, Lavoisier’s extremely influential 1789 textbook was 
translated into English the following year by Robert Kerr as Elements 
of Chemistry. In the original, it was Traité élémentaire de chimie— 
an elementary treatise of chemistry. Kerr was the one who changed 
the adjective to a noun, making Lavoisier’s title seem like a pun. That 
is the final point about the double entendre nerdy joke about “the 
element of surprise”: it only really works in English. Sure, by now 
you can find élément de surprise or Element der Überraschung or 
even элемент удивления, but these are importations from the En-
glish. The expression—and the joke implied by it—work in transla-
tion because of the prior anglicization of global science that has 
taken place in the past several decades. That is something of a sur-
prise, but it isn’t much of a joke.
bol, an atomic number, and typically also an atomic weight: for 
example, “Ah!” (number 104, weight 213—by number this would be 
rutherfordium, but the weight is far too light, more in the vicinity 
of astatine or radon), “Oh” (dubbed “alarmose”—the name of a sugar 
and not an element, but why be pedantic?—atomic number 231, 
which is obscenely beyond the limits of any table, and the number 
41.903, just above the relatively light calcium), and the rakish “Wtf” 
(atomic number 122, a plausible future transuranic, with an equally 
plausible weight of 317.4498, endowed with a few too many signi-
ficant figures). The range of silliness points to something about how 
people understand periodic tables as emblems of science. Their “sci-
entificity” is concentrated in the Helvetica font and some compan-
ion numbers, not in the relationships revealed by their placement in 
an array. This is how we end up with periodic tables of beer, of fruits 
and nuts, of desserts … In this context, the element of surprise is not 
terribly surprising.
There is a more interesting historical point if we concentrate on 
the fact that this is an element of surprise. The word has a rather in-
triguing chemical history. In antiquity, when atomism was a rela-
tively fringe doctrine, the word “element” was not associated with 
the substances of matter. The most famous book of that period (in-
deed of all time) with the word in the title was penned by Euclid, and 
his elements were foundational notions from which one could build 
a glorious geometrical edifice. The Latinized Greek term became 
more common to distinguish substances in the early modern era,  al-
though, of course, plenty of vagueness and metaphor still surrounded 
its textual usage.
By the mid-nineteenth century, conceptual clarity about the 
tech nical meaning of “element” in English, French, German, and Rus-
sian lay at the root of the reasoning of chemists about the classifica-
tion of inorganic substances and was particularly important for 
 Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev, whose 1869 version of the periodic sys-
tem is the pedigreed ancestor of today’s wall charts. What precisely 
do we mean, Mendeleev mused, when we say “carbon” belongs right 
there on a periodic table? We don’t mean graphite or diamond, even 
though those things are pure carbon; what we mean is that some-
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“The egg is a metaphor for surprise” was the tagline of a propo sal for 
a huge “media environment” titled The Egg, designed by performance 
artist Wolf Vostell. A pioneer of the Fluxus movement in postwar Ger-
many, Vostell planned to exhibit his installation at documenta 6 in 
the summer of 1977. The idea was to place a military airplane, a NATO 
Starfighter, on the roof of the Fridericianum, documenta’s main ex-
hibit building. The airplane would be inhabited by an ant colony and 
connected by a tube to a room inside the main building so that, 
Vostell explained, “the ants can wander back and forth.” The room 
would be filled knee-high with water, and the wreckage of airplanes 
would float on its surface. Visitors would wade through the dark 
 water while watching footage of airplane crashes on TV screens. For 
Vostell, this was nothing less than the “bodily experience of in-
formation.” 
Apart from a critique of the Cold War arms race, The Egg ad-
dressed social dimensions of science and technology. While wading 
through the dark water, a German visitor was likely to remember 
 November 20, 1974, when a Lufthansa jumbo crashed during take-off 
in Nairobi, killing 59 passengers. So there was something sar castic 
about the subtitle of Vostell’s proposal, especially if you consider that 
he was born in 1932 and had experienced the Second World War 
 firsthand: “The airplane is the egg in the hands of the sky.” 1 Along 
with his proposal, Vostell constructed several object box versions of 
The Egg.
Vostell’s proposal also referred to science and technology in 
terms of consumer culture. In 1974, the Italian food manufacturer 
Ferrero had launched Kinder Sorpresa, Kinder Surprise, the famous 
chocolate egg that contains a toy inside. Created by product designer 
William Salice, it commercialized the idea of construction models 
that dated back to early twentieth-century hands-on education in 
1 All quotes are from Harald Kimpel and Eckhart Gillen, UTOPIEdocumenta: Unrealized 
Projects from the History of the World Art Exhibition (Vienna: 2015), 86–93.
Wolf Vostell’s object box on The Egg, 1977. In UTOPIEdocumenta: Unrealized Projects  
from the History of the World Art Exhibition, ed. Harald Kimpel and Eckhard Gillen  
(Vienna: 2015), 98.
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drawn on a specific form of knowledge: hands-on; eggish, if you will. 
They called their simple shacks “construction as original experience” 
(Urerfahrung). Following their intuition and emotions, the builders 
were like little children that made sketches on paper, unaffected by 
rationality. It was a little bit like Kinder Sorpresa: “Reasoning with 
their hands and inspired by the materials of the forest, the builders 
translate their unconscious idea of home into a constructed form.” 2 
In other words, in the heart of a highly managed airport region, the 
Darmstadt students spotted a representative of new epistemology. 
Like the bricoleur of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the shack builders per-
formed a sort of knowledge that was wild, hands-on, and environ-
mental, relying as it did only on materials readily available.
The years 1977 and 1981 were crucial for those in the humanities 
who particularly cared about new epistemologies. In California, for 
instance, laboratory studies emerged with a hands-on approach to 
rationality that was typical for that time (and has remained so since). 
The scientists in Karin Knorr-Cetina’s The Manufacture of Knowledge 
(1981) acted no longer like the epistemic engineers of the Cold War 
years but rather like the bricoleur or the “tinkerer” (François Jacob), 
who constantly adapted to and chose from the material “environ-
ment” of the laboratory. According to Latour and Woolgar’s Labora-
tory Life (1979), these “working environments” were inhabited by a 
plethora of writing and other sense-making technologies. Vostell’s 
The Egg aimed to dismantle such technoscientific environments; 
the protesters had a similar ambition. A local politician from the con-
servative party intervened, and the installation never materialized 
(Vostell suspected censorship). The shack village was cleared in No-
vember 1981. Interestingly, Vostell’s didactic goals were somewhat 
old-fashioned. The Egg, he wrote, should produce a “surprise for hu-
mans.” Exactly at this point we find a cryptic addendum in his pro-
posal, written in parentheses. Just two words: “(help—deconstruc-
tion).”
2 Ulrich Cremer, Bauen als Urerfahrung: dargestellt am Beispiel des Hüttendorfes gegen 
die Startbahn West (Munich: 1982), 8, 88.
engineering (the predecessor of LEGO). Kinder Sorpresa pointed to a 
long-standing epistemic association between eggs and surprises. For 
centuries, eggs had been a symbol of invention and discovery in 
West ern culture, equally referring to biological fertility, intellectual 
mystery, and artistic creativity. Think of the Easter egg and Colum-
bus’s egg, but also of eggs in the history of science, Swammerdam’s 
“ovism” in eighteenth-century debates about reproduction, for in-
stance, or the rush for bird eggs in nineteenth-century natural his-
tory, as manifested in “oology,” a subfield of ornithology. Thanks to 
the success of Kinder Sorpresa, egg-related surprises became ordi-
nary events, whether around the kitchen table or in the back seat of 
the minivan. All of which is to say, the egg-surprise connection had 
had a global renaissance by the mid-1970s, and Vostell’s installations 
displayed the results of smashing a handful of Kinder Surprise eggs 
and then trying to glue them back together again. 
Darmstadt—Frankfurt—San Diego 
Four years after Vostell’s proposal, in the summer of 1981, a group of 
architecture students from the Technical University of Darmstadt 
spent several months in the Frankfurt City Forest. Guided by their 
professor, Helmut Striffler, they studied and documented a site that 
had made it into national and international news: a makeshift vil-
lage, set up by local protesters to prevent the Frankfurt Airport from 
building a new runway that was to be called “Startbahn West.” As the 
protesters saw it, the extension of the airport was another step to-
ward the complete destruction of the living space of the region. This 
destruction was already manifested in pollution caused by traffic, 
the chemical and nuclear industries, and of course aviation (the noise 
of airplanes evolved into a nightmare for city planners at that time). 
The protest against the runway was pivotal for the rise of the Green 
Party in Germany; the architects, however, were only marginally in-
terested in politics. Mostly, they were interested in the temporary 
dwellings built by the protesters. 
In their eyes, the protesters had unconsciously created timeless 
“archetypes.” According to the architects, the protestor-builders had 
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überhaupt aus jener Zeit. Man sieht sofort, dass sie wie andere Por-
trätaufnahmen als Visitenkarten gedruckt wurden und somit für Fa-
milienmitglieder oder Freunde bestimmt waren. Aber auch wenn sie 
nicht für eine breitere Öffentlichkeit, geschweige denn für eine Pub-
likation gedacht waren, stellen sie doch einen Bruch mit der bürger-
lichen Konvention des Porträts dar und markieren gleichzeitig einen 
süffisanten visuellen Kommentar zur damaligen Konjunktur von 
Physiognomik und Mimik. Einerseits passten starke Affektäußerun-
gen und Fotografie im bürgerlichen Wertehaushalt nicht zusammen, 
denn die Menschen ließen sich in aller Regel so abbilden, wie sie von 
ihren Zeitgenossen und der Nachwelt gesehen werden wollten: wür-
dig, aufrecht und ganz bei sich selbst. Unbeherrschtes Lachen, ag-
Purkyneˇ, affektiv
Michael Hagner
Im ersten Band des Encyclopädischen Wörterbuchs der medicini-
schen Wissenschaften von 1828 bezeichnet Jan Evangelista Purkyneˇ 
den „Affect“ als eine „Erregung des Gemüths, wodurch die Besin-
nung und Freiheit der Person aus ihrer normalen Fassung gebracht, 
und die Thatkraft zu unwillkührlichen Äußerungen hingerissen 
wird“. Neben sechs einander entgegengesetzten Affekten (Lust und 
Schmerz, Mut und Furcht, Begehren und Abscheu) wird noch ein 
 siebenter aufgeführt: der Wissensaffekt. Purkyneˇ versteht darunter 
eine Bewegung des Gemüts, mittels derer der Wissenstrieb seine Be-
dürfnisse befriedigt. Der Wissensaffekt artikuliert sich in positiven 
Äußerungen wie Bewunderung, Glauben oder Überzeugung, negati-
ven wie Unglauben, Misstrauen oder Verbot, und schließlich solchen, 
die zwischen den beiden Polen hin und her schwanken. Dazu zählen 
Zweifel, Fragen, Wahrscheinlichkeitsannahmen, Überlegung, Erfah-
rung und Forschung, Erfindung und Entdeckung, Untersuchung und 
Überraschung – allesamt Affektäußerungen, die auch für die Wissen-
schaften von genuiner Wichtigkeit sind.
Purkyneˇs Einführung der Wissensaffekte ist ein Versprechen, das 
er nicht weiter eingelöst hat. Eine genauere Ausarbeitung der episte-
mischen Leidenschaften im Rahmen der physiologischen Psycholo-
gie hat er nicht vorgenommen. In den Notizen für eine Psychologie-
vorlesung, die Purkyneˇ an der Universität Breslau hielt, ist von den 
sechs oben aufgeführten Affekten die Rede, vom Wissensaffekt nicht 
mehr. Der vermutlich von ihm geprägte Begriff verschwindet, wie so 
viele Begriffe, die nicht gezündet haben und unterhalb des Radars 
der Begriffsgeschichte liegen. Man könnte es mit diesem kleinen Ab-
stecher in die Sphären der kognitiven Leidenschaften bewenden las-
sen, wenn nicht der böhmische Physiologe im Alter, viele Jahrzehnte 
nach seinem Enzyklopädie-Artikel, noch einmal auf die Affekte im 
Allgemeinen und den Wissensaffekt im Besonderen zurückgekom-
men wäre – nun aber nicht mehr in schriftlicher Form, sondern im 
Medium der Fotografie. 
Von Purkyneˇ existieren einige fotografische Porträts, die sich 
ganz in den bürgerlichen Konventionen der Mitte des 19. Jahrhun-
derts bewegen. Hingegen gehören die hier abgebildeten sechs Selbst-
porträts aus der Zeit um 1860 zu den ungewöhnlichsten Fotografien 
Jan Evangelista Purkyneˇ, physiognomische Studien, ca. 1860–1862, 
 carte-de-visite,  Albuminabzug von Jindrıˇch Eckert (?), 1869. Privatsammlung, 
www.scheufler.cz.
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Zusammenstellung nicht auf Purkyn  selbst zurückgeht, fällt auf, 
dass nur die vier äußeren Bilder in die typische Ikonografie und Be-
schreibung der Gemütsäußerungen passen, wie sie etwa auch in Dar-
wins Werk zu finden sind: Übellaunigkeit (oben links), Lachen (oben 
rechts), Verachtung (unten links) und Abscheu (unten rechts). 
Was aber ist mit den beiden erstaunlichen Bildern in der Mitte? 
In keiner einzigen fotografischen Abbildung bei Duchenne oder Dar-
win spielt der Zeigefinger eine Rolle, hier wird er zum wichtigsten 
Körperteil. Sich mit dem Zeigefinger an die Schläfe oder Stirn zu tip-
pen, hieß damals wie heute, zumindest in der deutschsprachigen 
Welt: Du hast einen Vogel, oder, in der abgeschwächten Variante: 
Denk nochmal nach! Eine Geste, die dem Gegenüber so offensichtlich 
am Verstand kratzt, ist in der Bildwelt des 19. Jahrhundert verständ-
licherweise eine Seltenheit. Wenn Purkyneˇ mit entschiedenem Blick 
und andeutungsweise gespitzten Lippen den Vogel zeigt, so ist die 
Geste unmissverständlich: Der Verstand des Adressaten muss nach-
bessern. Korrespondierend dazu ist auch das darunterliegende Bild 
zu verstehen: Wiederum ist der Kopf nach links geneigt, der Blick 
freundlich-belehrend, der Zeigefinger nach oben gestreckt. Die Geste 
könnte gutmütige, großväterliche Ermahnung bedeuten oder die Auf-
forderung, nun besonders gut aufzupassen. 
Sozusagen durch die Hintertür ist Purkyneˇ wieder in die Welt der 
Wissensaffekte zurückgekehrt. Hatte er in seinem Enzyklopädie-Arti-
kel die negierende Seite des Affekts als Unglauben, Misstrauen oder 
Infragestellen beschrieben, so genügt ihm jetzt eine einfache Geste, 
um diese Negation auf den Punkt zu bringen. Und hatte er die Mitteil-
samkeit des Wissensaffekts als „Lehrtrieb“ bezeichnet, mit dem Wis-
sen oder Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, so reduziert 
sich das im Bild auf die Geste des erhobenen Zeigefingers. 
Verstehen wir diese beiden Gesten als hintersinnige Visualisie-
rung epistemischer Leidenschaften, die ihren eigenen Anspruch mit 
einem Augenzwinkern vortragen, so bleibt noch zu konstatieren, 
dass es von der dritten Haltung des Wissensaffekts – das Schwanken 
zwischen einer affirmativen und einer zweifelnden Haltung – keine 
bildliche Überlieferung gibt. Vielleicht ist die Fotografie verloren ge-
gangen oder noch nicht in den Archiven entdeckt worden, oder 
gressive oder ängstliche Gesichtszüge kamen in dieser von Selbstbe-
herrschung diktierten Bildwelt nicht vor, und allenfalls Kindern, 
Geisteskranken und Schauspielern wurden solche Gemütsbewegun-
gen zugestanden. Andererseits gab es ein starkes wissenschaftliches 
Interesse an Mimik und Physiognomik, das Lavater auf die Spur ge-
bracht hatte und mit der Einführung der Fotografie auf eine neue 
Stufe gehoben wurde. Grimassenschneiden für die Wissenschaften 
war jedoch nichts, für das sich die Wissenschaftler hergegeben hätten. 
Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne de Boulogne beispielsweise nahm 
für seine berühmten Stimulationsversuche einzelner Gesichtsmus-
keln einen alten Mann als Versuchsperson, dessen schmales  Gesicht 
mit gegerbt wirkender Haut ein ideales Untersuchungsfeld für die 
elektrophysiologische Affektenlehre darstellte. Charles Darwin wie-
derum integrierte in seine Expression of the Emotions  Foto grafien 
von Kleinkindern, jungen Mädchen und dem tapferen alten Mann 
von Duchenne. Unvorstellbar, dass sich Darwin oder  Duchenne mit 
affektgeladener Mimik vor die Kamera begeben hätten, um an sich 
selbst deren Mechanismen zu demonstrieren. Immerhin finden sich 
in Darwins Buch einige Selbstporträts des Fotografen Oscar Gustave 
Rejlander, der seine mimisch-gestischen Fähigkeiten und seine Lust 
am fotografischen Experiment nutzte, um den Ausdruck von Ab-
scheu, Hilflosigkeit und Schrecken darzustellen. Trotz dieser kleinen 
fotografischen Subversion gilt, dass die Heroik des Selbstexperi-
ments Halt machte vor dem Fotoapparat, sofern dieser die öffentli-
che persona des Wissenschaftlers, die zunehmend durch Fotografien 
geprägt war, in Frage stellte. 
Purkyneˇs Selbstporträts zeigen, dass er über solche Konventio-
nen zumindest im privaten Raum anders dachte. Nicht, dass sich der 
über 70-jährige Physiologe noch einmal in die aktuellen Diskussio-
nen um die Affekte einschalten wollte. Doch vielleicht kannte er Du-
chennes 1862 veröffentlichten Atlas, denn die Fotografien entstan-
den ungefähr zu dieser Zeit. Jedenfalls nahm er den Faden einer 
fotografischen Repräsentation der Affektäußerungen auf. Anders als 
Duchenne interessierte Purkyneˇ sich jedoch nicht für eine vermeint-
lich unverfälschte Natur, sondern inszenierte sich selbst in verschie-
denen affektiven Zuständen. Betrachtet man die sechs Bilder, deren 
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Purkyneˇ wollte ein solches Bild der Einbildungskraft seiner Nach-
welt überlassen. Wer weiß das schon? Zweifellos beweisen die Selbst-
porträts, dass die Fotografie auch ohne besonderen technischen Auf-
wand Neues, Überraschendes, Subversives hervorbringen kann. Vor 
allem aber wird der Wissenschaft ihr eigener Wissenstrieb vorgehal-
ten. Allein die unvorstellbare Vorstellung, Duchenne oder Darwin 
wären ihre eigenen Versuchspersonen gewesen, die sich in affektiver 
Bewegung fotografieren lassen, hätte manches humanwissenschaft-
liche Gesicht menschlicher aussehen lassen. 
Beauty, Being, Bicycle
Anke te Heesen
Der Leserichtung folgend sehen wir in der ersten Reihe Angel, Animal 
und Aristocracy. Die zweite Reihe beginnt mit Family, geht über zu 
Fate, Form und God, um mit Life, Logic und Love zu schließen. Sie 
wird fortgesetzt mit Man, Math und Matter, und endet via Quantity 
und Revolution in Wisdom und World. Diese Schlagworte finden sich 
auf einer Doppelseite des LIFE Magazins vom Januar 1948, erkennbar 
in der unteren Bildebene als eingesteckte und nummerierte Reiter in 
umfangreichen Karteikästen. Insgesamt sind 102 Begriffe aufgestellt, 
die durch zwei weitere Ordnungssysteme flankiert werden. Oberhalb 
des Schilderwalds sitzen und stehen, im mimetischen Nachvollzug 
der Kartei, 24 Frauen und Männer. Kaum ein Lächeln huscht über ihre 
Gesichter. In ihrer Mitte wächst ein Regal mit Büchern hervor. Diese 
zunächst unscheinbare, aber zentrale Säule wird vorne durch zwei 
einsam stehende Männer ergänzt. Sie kontrollieren den Eingang in 
die Fotografie wie den Zugang zu den Kästen und Personen.
Was Mortimer Adler und William Gorman wie Torwächter einge-
schlossen halten, ist die materielle und personelle Grundlage vieler 
Jahre Arbeit, in der die ihrer Überzeugung nach wichtigsten Bücher 
der Welt von dem hier abgebildeten Mitarbeiterstab indexalisiert, 
 exzerpiert und zusammengestellt wurden. „The exhausted-look ing 
people grouped about the books and files above have just finished a 
monumental intellectual task. […] They have come up with the thesis 
that the basis of Western culture is the 102 great ideas displayed 
above.“ 1 Im Verlauf der 1940er Jahre hatte der Präsident und spätere 
Kanzler der University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins mit dem Philo-
sophen und Autor populärer Schriften Mortimer Adler an einem 
 Ka non der wichtigsten Bücher der sogenannten westlichen Welt ge-
arbeitet. Als Grundlage einer humanistischen Bildung und Wie der-
belebung der freien Künste im Dienste der amerikanischen Demokra-
tie, wurden so über 400 Werke ausschließlich männlicher Autoren 
zusammengestellt, übersetzt und in einheitlichen Bänden herausge-
geben. „The Great Books of the Western World“ erschienen 1952 und 
wurden als Teil der Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., ebenfalls unter 
1 „The 102 Great Ideas: Scholars Complete a Monumental Catalog,“ LIFE 24, no. 4  
(January 26, 1948): 92–102.
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zu erkunden: Frau Freud hat für diesen Tag eine weiße Bluse anzogen 
und lächelt sogar in die Kamera. Auch Thomas von Aquins Lippen 
umspielt ein feines Lächeln, während Kant ganz unsere Erwartung 
an aufrechter Haltung und gebotenem Ernst erfüllt. Ist der Blick ein-
mal geschärft für dieses Beziehungsgefüge zwischen den Personen, 
werden der Untergrund der soliden Kartei und die aufrechten Bücher 
in einen leichten Tremor versetzt: Könnte Frau Freud im Flirt mit 
Aristoteles vielleicht ein Fehler mit ihrem Stichwort Lan guage unter-
laufen sein? War Aristoteles nach einer schnellen Fahrradfahrt er-
hitzt im Büro angekommen und hatte im Furor dem Begriff Happi-
ness zu viele Belegstellen zugeordnet (was ihn immer noch 
beschäftigt und deshalb düster blicken lässt)? Und welche Blüten 
hatte die Bildung von Herr Kant getrieben, der durch die Koch bücher 
des Südens bestens gewappnet erschien für die herkulische Aufgabe 
der Geschmacksbildung? Und dann Thomas von Aquin: Er könnte 
im Verlauf der letzten Jahre gemeinsame Sache mit Frau  Goethe ge-
macht haben; womöglich hatten sie liebestrunken Textstellen am 
laufenden Band angestrichen, an Nachmittagen auf der Rennbahn 
diskutiert und am nächsten Morgen in die Kartei eingefügt? 
Liegt unter der schwarz-weißen Bildoberfläche der vergeistigten 
Ideen die Unberechenbarkeit des Lebens? Vielleicht war sie einfach 
nur für die Dauer eines Moments in den Bildhintergrund gerutscht. 
Denn dort, zunächst unbeachtet, bewegen sich weitere Personen, auf 
die Wand aufgetragene Figuren, die alle nach links zu streben schei-
nen. Ein den Raum umschließendes Fries tritt hinter Thomas von 
Aquin und den anderen Größen der letzten Reihe hervor: Rührige Ge-
stalten, die ihre Hände erheben, sich wendende Köpfe, tanzende und 
prozessierende Männer wie Frauen. Es handelt sich um das 1918 ge-
schaffene Wandgemälde „The Masque of Youth“ der Künstlerin Jessie 
Arms Botke, einer Spezialistin für Wandteppichentwürfe und Wand-
bilder. Die Prozession allegorischer Figuren sollte an den zum 25-jäh-
rigen Bestehens der Universität veranstalteten Festumzug erinnern: 
Die personifizierte Alma Mater und der Geist der gotischen Architek-
tur, die Jugend der Bildungseinrichtung und die Wellen des Michigan 
der Ägide Hutchins, in einem feierlichen Akt der Öffentlichkeit über-
geben. Ihnen war ein zweibändiges „Synopticon“ vorangestellt, das 
als ein Führer durch den Inhalt der 443 Werke aus Literatur, Wissen-
schaft und Philosophie von der Antike bis in das 20. Jahrhundert 
 dienen sollte. Entstanden war so ein Bildungskondensat der Nach-
kriegszeit, das nur verschlagwortet werden musste, um zugänglich 
zu sein.2 Man hatte ein solides Fundament für ein sich selbst unter-
richtendes Volk schaffen wollen, aber entstanden war ein unlesbares 
Vademecum, ein „antidote to pleasure“.3
Genau davon berichtet die Momentaufnahme des LIFE-Fotogra-
fen, die den vorläufigen Abschluss der Arbeit der „indexer“ festhält, 
„whose job it was to read and reread two or three authors apiece 
 until they knew them perfectly.“ Man hatte alle Kästen über den 
Campus geschleppt, war in den dritten Stock eines der akademischen 
Bildung von Frauen gewidmeten Gebäudes (der „Ida Noyes Hall“) ge-
stiegen, wo Personen wie Materialien Aufstellung fanden. Die Gruppe 
war wahrscheinlich den Anweisungen des Fotografen gefolgt, hatte 
die Arme verschränkt, das Haar gerichtet, um gottergeben auf das 
Blitzlicht zu warten. Doch dann nimmt das zum Bild gefrorene 
 „heavy reading“ eine unerwartete Wendung, denn, so liest man unter 
der Fotografie: „After a couple of years the indexers began to think 
like their authors and even to assume their names. From her window 
every morning Mrs. Freud (seated, front left, above) would wave to 
Aristotle (front, fifth from left) as he bicycled to work. Near her would 
sit St. Thomas Aquinas (rear, fifth from left), who liked to work 
36  hours at a stretch and relax by playing the horses. Kant (rear, 
 ex treme right) was a man who had written his college thesis on 
‘Misspellings in Old Southern Cookbooks.’“ Das ins Bild gesetzte Wis-
sensmonument der 102 Schlagworte ist wohl doch nicht ganz so zu -
geknöpft zu verstehen. Der Betrachter beginnt die Fotografie erneut 
2 Mortimer J. Adler und William Gorman, Hgg., The Great Ideas. A Synopticon of Great 
Books of the Western World (Chicago, London, Toronto: 1952); Vgl. dazu ausführlicher  
Tim Lacy, The Dream of a Democratic Culture: Mortimer J. Adler and the Great Books 
Idea (New York: 2013).
3 James Campbell, „Heavy Reading,“ New York Times, Sunday Book Review, November 14, 
2008, 18, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/books/review/Campbell-t.html.
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Sees.4 Oberhalb von Immanuel Kant schreiten persische Tänzer, rechts 
von Thomas von Aquin treten Teilnehmer der olympischen Spiele ins 
Bild und links streben Bauern und Tänzer der Alma Mater entgegen. 
Musik, Schauspiel, Sport und Tanz, kurz, das Gegenstück zum Maschi-
nenwerk der logischen Ideen. Die präraffaelitisch anmutenden Per-
sonifikationen des Frieses treffen auf die wiedergeborenen großen 
Denker in den abgezirkelten Reihen vor ihnen. Aus der „Masque of 
Youth“ war eine Quelle der ewigen Jugend geworden. Aristoteles hätte 
sich sein Fahrrad schnappen und den Umzug begleiten können. Und 
Frau Freud ist im Begriff, sich mit ihrer schönsten Bluse den ebenfalls 
hell gekleideten Olympioniken in der Friesmitte zuzuwenden. 
Von der Frühzeit der Bildung im Hintergrund, über die Vergegen-
wärtigung durch die Personen im Mittelgrund, hin zu dem für die 
Ewigkeit konzipierten weißen Papier im Vordergrund war ein kon-
densiertes Programm der liberal arts education in Szene gesetzt und 
in der Ida Noyes Hall 1948 uraufgeführt worden. Das Maskenspiel der 
Jugend und die Ideen der Denker waren lebendiger, als ihnen von 
den flankierenden Wächtern zugestanden wird. Hinter den ernsten 
Gesichtern der Gruppe ist mehr zu erahnen als die Instantkörnung 
des auf Information reduzierten Wissens. Die großen Bücher der Welt 
können auch anders gelesen werden.





“Smaismrmilmepoetaleumibunenugttauiras”: such was the August 
surprise Galileo Galilei launched in a letter-writing blitz just a few 
months after stunning the astronomical world in 1610 with his 
“starry message” about towering lunar mountains, old constellations 
studded with new stars, and as many moons circling Jupiter as there 
were Medici sons. Johannes Kepler quickly set about reordering Gali-
leo’s “transposed letters,” announcing a month later that the Italian 
had discovered two moons around Mars as well.1 Or had he? Bene-
detto Castelli and the Jesuits at the Collegio Romano were among 
those who puzzled over the encoded missive—Galileo’s special way 
of keeping his friends close and (potential) patrons and rivals closer—
but we know that at least a few were surprised again when Galileo 
revealed his breaking news later that fall: neither Martian moons as 
Kepler had surmised, nor shadows on the sun as Thomas Harriot had 
guessed, but a tripled Saturn as seen through the telescope.2 Kepler 
published Galileo’s solution for the Saturnine puzzle together with a 
new Galilean anagram, this time set in a natural language: “Haec 
 immatura a me jam frustra leguntur oy.” In the end, though, it was 
Kepler who “read” Galileo’s latest news “in vain.” Venus’s phases 
were at issue, not a red spot on Jupiter.3 
Credit and priority motivated early modern encoding of astro-
nomical news, as both codemakers and would-be codebreakers un-
derstood.4 Scholars enciphered their discoveries to prove prior 
knowledge of what might later become contested intellectual capi-
tal, as did Christiaan Huygens in 1655 with an anagram encom-
passing  a verse from Ovid: “admovere ocvlis distantia sidera 
nostris, vvvvvvvc ccrrhnbqx.” John Wallis quickly replied with a 
1 Johannes Kepler, Narratio (Frankfurt: 1611), *3 verso: “Salue vmbistineum geminatum 
Martia proles.”
2 Eileen Reeves, “Something of a Cypher: Galileo’s Anagrams,” in Tintenfass und Teleskop: 
Galileo Galilei im Schnittpunkt wissenschaftlicher, literarischer und visueller Kulturen 
im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. Andrea Albrecht, Giovanna Cordibella, and Volker R. Remmert 
(Berlin, Boston: 2014), 15–31.
3 Johannes Kepler, “Praefatio,” in Dioptrice (Augsburg: 1611), 15–16, 18, 20–22.
4 Robert Iliffe, “‘In the Warehouse’: Privacy, Property and Priority in the Early Royal Soci-
ety,” History of Science 30 (1992): 29–68; Mario Biagioli, “From Ciphers to Confidentiality: 
Secrecy, Openness and Priority in Science,” British Journal for the History of Science 45, 
no. 2 (2012): 213–233.
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lengthy anagram that happened to use all the letters in Huygens’s. 
After receiving Huygens’s plaintext, Wallis unveiled the solution to 
his own cipher, which seemed to secure English priority in discover-
ing the period of Saturn’s moon. Early modern cryptography was 
both a matter of state and of mathematics, and Wallis, a master of 
both, had deliberately constructed an anagram that allowed for 
whatever solution Huygens might eventually disclose for his own.5 
This was no mere prank at Huygens’s expense but a pointed comment 
on the multivalency of such ciphers and their utility in addressing 
priority claims.6
Early modern astronomical surprise was a staged enterprise. Gal-
ileo wrote in plain language of Saturn’s three-bodied appearance and, 
lest there be any misunderstanding, drew a diagram for the benefit of 
his current patron, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, while holding other 
correspondents in anagrammatic suspense.7 Undaunted by Wallis’ 
sciphered riposte, Huygens produced yet another, this time rear-
ranging all the letters of the plaintext message in alphabetical 
order— “aaaaaaacccccdeeeeeghiiiiiiillllmmnnnnnnnnnooooppqrrstt
tttuuuuu”—and sending it to the press.8 Huygens eventually dis-
closed its meaning (Saturn is surrounded by a ring inclined to the 
ecliptic) but only in stages, managing its impact through a print and 
manuscript campaign culminating in the lavishly illustrated 1659 
Systema Saturnium dedicated to Leopold de’ Medici.9
* Encoding surprise, early modern style, it stands in sharp con-
trast with the methods and motives of astronomers who, centuries 
later, sought immediacy in telegraphed astronomical news as a so-
lution to the problems of awarding credit and coordinating labor 
within an internationalist astronomical community. Intelligibility, 
5 See Christiaan Huygens, Oeuvres complètes de Christiaan Huygens  
(The Hague:  1888–1950), 1:332–338, 392, 396, 401–403, and 2:305–306.
6 Iliffe, “Warehouse,” 35–36; cf. Claude E. Shannon, “Communication Theory of Secrecy 
 Systems,” Bell System Technical Journal 28, no. 4 (1949): 657–658.
7 Antonio Favaro et al., eds., Le opere di Galileo Galilei (Florence: 1890–1909), 10:409–410.
8 Christiaan Huygens, De Saturni lvnâ observation nova, in Huygens, Oeuvres complètes, 
15:177.
9 Nicole Howard, “Rings and Anagrams: Huygens’s System of Saturn,” Papers of the 
 Bibliographical Society of America 98, no. 4 (2004): 477–510.
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however, proved more elusive.10 First published in 1881 and often re­
vised, the Science Observer Code for the “telegraphic transmission of 
astronomical data” substituted dictionary words in place of numer­
als and common astronomical phrases. The resulting codebook—well 
over 200 pages long—replaced “December 22” with “unexpert,” 
“South preceding” with “unhelpful,” and “Dreyer’s Supplement to 
Herschel’s General Catalogue of Nebulae” with “unheated.” Promo­
ted by the Harvard College Observatory in 1906, Willard P. Gerrish’s 
telegraphic code relied instead on printed forms, a few additional 
syntactic rules, and a system of two­letter monosyllables for express­
ing numerals: “Memorizing the words “badefigoku, amenipotux, vy” 
(12345, 67890; “vy” had a variety of meanings) will give command of 
the code at all times.” 11 In 1931, the International Astronomical 
Union’s Central Bureau for Astronomical Telegrams sent out a cir­
cular acknowledging receipt of the missive “Buskin Ryves mipalone 
fodaship stop babble mofament fofimate fatilege honu rant,” but 
bluntly noted, “The telegram is given in a Code unknown here.” 12 Like 
the eponymous discoverer of comet Ryves, early modern astrono­
mers were frustrated by undecoded scientific news. Yet they knew its 
value in orchestrating scientific surprise. 
10 Franciszek Karlin´ski, “Schreiben des Herrn Prof. Karlinski, Directors der Sternwarte  
in Krakau, an den Herausgeber,” Astronomische Nachrichten 66, no. 2 (1866): column 31 
(no. 1562).
11 Seth Carlo Chandler and John Ritchie, The Science Observer Code ([Boston]: 1888); 
 Harvard College Observatory and Willard P. Gerrish, Telegraphic Cipher Code: Gerrish 
System (Cambridge, MA: 1906), 9.
12 Elis Strömgren, Bureau central astronomique de l’Union astronomique international 
(Observatoire de Copenhague), circular no. 331 (August 15, 1931), accessed September 29, 
2018, http://www.cbat.eps.harvard.edu/iauc/00300/00331.html. For Ryves’s code, see 
Edward S. Holden, “A Cipher­Code for Astronomical Messages,” Publications of the Astro-
nomical Society of the Pacific 8, no. 49 (1896): 109–133.
Sur
Surprise begins with
behind smoke, screens, or simple darkness,
precisely because we
the world around us. 
surprise may awaken in us
the apparent enjoyment we at times derive from surprise. 
this enjoyment reveals a challenge for our 
the very limitation of 
the finitude of knowing 




the unidirectionality of time. Thrown irreversibly toward a future shrouded
we establish a horizon of anticipation. Any given surprise thus only truly occurs once, 
are always already only partially apprehending
As a result,
a certain wistfulness towards its own Einmaligkeit—toward the unrepeatability of 
The desire to somehow preserve
practice of writing. Against 
surprise’s unrepeatability, can we craft texts that play on the 
such that every rereading produces surprise?
for writing, a writing which in place of communicating knowledge, dares the reader
If every rereading is to produce surprise, then different parts should at every moment remain
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The paper materiality of anticipation. Excerpts from a play produced at the Théâtre de 
l’ambigu comique (Paris), ca. 1780–81, using a system of folding paper flaps to simulate  
the unfolding of stage actions. Source: Le Sérail à l’écran: petite pièce turque en I. acte, 
representée au Théâtre de l’ambigu comique (Paris: 1785). Theater Collection, Houghton 
Library, Harvard University.
Re
Books may be used to amplify
a place imperceptible—from the page to which one has yet to turn,
such that when reading, we
the text around us.
reading is often fraught with
the observation that books, in some fundamental way, were designed for hiding. 
the very materiality of books signal their ambivalent
the obscuring fold and the uncut leaf— in simple barriers to
by refusing easy access, by deferring the act of knowing over space and time, a book
It is perhaps in this sense that books should serve as a metaphor 
to stand on a page’s edge, awaiting the turn to come.
book.
In March of 2016, from far beyond my horizon of 
anticipation, I found myself surprised by an e-mail 
signed “Lorraine Daston.” It was the first occasion 
for any direct communication between us —my 
first real interaction with the individual behind 
what had always been a near mythic name—and all 
the more shocking, as it contained within it news 
that she was offering me a postdoctoral fellowship 
in her department at the Max Planck Institute for 
the History of Science.
More than two years have now passed, and during 
these years, I cannot claim to have surprised Raine 
with any of my accomplishments, though she has 
never ceased to surprise me with her insights. Yet, 
for those such as myself less capable of these 
insights, another kind of surprise is still attainable. 
It is attainable in the manipulation of the space of 
page against the unrepeatability of time, such that 
each act of reading may find a new point of 
departure and follow a different trajectory—a 
different combination of lines, a different order of 
paragraphs, a different configuration of what is, at 
any moment, hidden and revealed.   
This is possible in text, in ways impossible in life. 
As Department II reaches one end, I would thus 
like to believe that it still survives in this book.  
I hope that for you, Raine, and you, reader 
unknown, this text and the others that stand beside 
it remain open always to reading and rereading,
presenting ever the possibility of surprise.
Prise
the condition of hiddenness. From
something seizes us,  
are always already only partially apprehending
Little surprise is it, then, that
anxiety. More surprising, rather, is
For
relation to knowledge. We take delight in
our senses. We recognize, if only tacitly, that
also enables the deepest of pleasures.
for epistemology. All humans by nature desire, too, 
An indication of this is the delight we take in the
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difficulty of conceiving what is not measurable, of Achilles, of the 
Tortoise, and of both being victims of mathematical sophistry. Only 
at this point does Bergson offer the thought that had been, for him, 
the beginning of everything. This is how he puts it.
Ce qui prouve bien que l’intervalle de durée lui-même ne compte 
pas au point de vue de la science, c’est que, si tous les mouve-
ments de l’univers se produisaient deux ou trois fois plus vite, il 
n’y aurait rien à modifier ni à nos formules, ni aux nombres que 
nous y faisons entrer. La conscience aurait une impression indé-
finissable et en quelque sorte qualitative de ce changement, mais 
il n’y paraîtrait pas en dehors d’elle, puisque le même nombre de 
simultanéités se produirait encore dans l’espace.4
If Bergson had not told James how he had experienced this idea—if 
James had not pressed him for “adventures”—we might never have 
known that observing this had completely bowled him over. The 
thought is practically smuggled in: that dispassionate beginning—“Ce 
qui prouve”—muffles the shock of it, almost as though Bergson 
wanted to preserve the reader from the astonishment that it had 
given him.
And it is as though his own surprise might be too undignified to 
reveal in a work of philosophy. The word surprendre once had a mar-
tial sense, meaning sudden capture, being overtaken and taken pris-
oner, the consequence of a ruinous oversight; it is a word that, to be 
deployed to philosophical advantage, must be reserved for very par-
ticular occasions, moments of dire epistemological necessity. For the 
effect is detonation, and the philosopher must be willing to risk his 
own sovereignty with it. This was how Descartes described his pre-
dicament after being raided by his own doubt: “comme si tout à coup 
j’étais tombé dans une eau très profonde, je suis tellement surpris, 
que je ne puis ni asseurer mes pieds dans le fond, ni nager pour me 
soutenir au dessus.” 5
4 Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Paris: 1889), 87–88.
5 René Descartes, Méditations, Œuvres de Descartes t. 9-1, ed. Charles Adam and  
Paul Tannery (Paris: 1982 [1897–1913]), 18. Spelling modernized.
Philosophical Dignity
Lily Huang
By his own account, the philosophy for which Henri Bergson became 
known began in astonishment. In 1903, Bergson gave this origin story 
to Giovanni Papini for a feature in Papini’s new pragmatist journal, 
Leonardo. Bergson told Papini that, when he began his doctoral the-
sis, he set out to do not psychology or metaphysics but philosophy of 
science. The thesis was to be a conceptual study of mechanics: “C’est 
ainsi que je fus conduit à m’occuper de l’idée de temps. Je m’aperçus, 
non sans surprise, qu’il n’est jamais question de durée  proprement 
dite en mécanique, ni même en physique, et que le ‘temps’ dont on y 
parle est tout autre chose.” 1 The story of this epi phany was more dra-
matic when Bergson told it later to William James—in part because 
James had asked for drama. James was about to deliver a Hibbert lec-
ture on Bergson’s philosophy and needed a sketch of Bergson’s life. 
“Any remarkable adventures, romantic or  heroic, as well as philo-
sophic, in which you have taken part (!), etc., etc.,” James wrote from 
Oxford. “Details help interest!” 2 Bergson replied that the one remark-
able event in his life had been the realization that changed his doc-
toral thesis. 
Ce fut l’analyse de la notion de temps … qui bouleversa toutes 
mes idées. Je m’aperçus, à mon grand étonnement, que le temps 
scientifique ne dure pas, qu’il n’y aurait rien à changer à notre 
connaissance scientifique des choses si la totalité du réel était 
déployée tout d’un coup dans l’instantané, et que la science posi-
tive consiste essentiellement dans l’élimination de la durée.3
In the work itself, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 
this insight appears about midway through. Bergson helpfully gave 
James the page references. The discussion of scientific time comes 
after a long critique of the idea of intensity, after a critique of num-
ber, of the perception of space, of the nature of measurement, of the 
1 Bergson, letter to Papini, October 21, 1903, in Henri Bergson, Correspondances,  
ed. André Robinet (Paris: 2002), 91.
2 James, letter to Bergson, May 8, 1908, quoted in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought  
and  Character of William James (Boston: 1935), 2:622.
3 Bergson, letter to James, May 9, 1908, in Henri Bergson, Mélanges (Paris: 1972), 766.  
Bergson’s emphasis.
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Trautonium
Myles W. Jackson
The 1920s was a fascinating decade for Berliners. In the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, it seemed unfathomable that the 
city would soon become the world’s third-largest municipality. De -
spite the immediate political and economic turmoil, there was cause 
for optimism. The Bauhaus, originally located in Weimar and later 
resituated in nearby Dessau and Berlin, was establishing itself as the 
leading German school of architecture and design. German  cinema 
was flourishing, featuring what would become classics, such  as 
 Dr. Marbuse, der Spieler and Metropolis, both directed by Fritz Lang. 
Berthold Brecht and Kurt Weill were entertaining the theatergoing 
throngs with rather poignant political morals, while similar mes-
sages from the pen of journalist and cultural critic Walter Benjamin 
could be read in the city’s newspapers. The capital could boast that it 
was the home of some of the world’s leading scientists, including the 
likes of Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Max von Laue,  Gustav Hertz, Otto 
Heinrich Warburg, and Fritz Haber. 
German radio was beginning to fill the airways with news and 
music. With this period of renewed industrialization and cultural, 
technological, and scientific achievements, a group of applied physi-
cists, physiologists, engineers, musicians, and composers were tin-
kering away, inventing new musical instruments and genres. The 
technical expertise of radio engineers, who were contributing to the 
burgeoning form of communication, combined with the musical ex-
pertise present in the Berlin Hochschule für Musik (Conservatoire) 
and the financial backing of German companies and the Prussian 
Ministry of Science, Art, and Popular Education, enabled the produc-
tion of a new electric musical instrument, the trautonium, which 
could be used for microtonal pieces and could mimic the timbre 
of numerous, more traditional instruments. In 1928, the Prussian 
Ministry for Science decided to address the issue of increasing the 
colla borations between musicians and engineers by creating the 
Rundfunkversuchsstelle within the Hochschule für Musik. Their so-
lution proved to be extremely successful.
Radio and the research of applied, technical physicists, however, 
are not the only contexts in which we need to situate electric music 
in Germany during the late 1920s and 1930s. Also critical was the 
It was not one of those times for Bergson. He was 26 years old and in 
need of a doctorate; it served him better not to show his own aston-
ishment. “Ce qui prouve” made the argument without the backstory. 
And in this Bergson acted much like philosophers past and present, 
who, when not writing in a confessional mode, prefer to appear as 
clear-eyed councilmen who anticipate everything and keep their as-
tonishment hidden. 
Does this mean that a philosopher’s surprise is but a rare disclo-
sure and that we readers would never detect it, if not for William 
James helpfully bobbing here and there?
With Bergson, no. For there is a form of expression that trafficks 
in the unexpected, that has surprise built into it like the charge added 
to a currency conversion: find it, give it its due, and see how a philos-
ophy itself betrays a philosopher’s astonishment. Aristotle wrote of 
metaphor that it conveys “liveliness … and by the further power of 
surprising the hearer.” 6 I think a metaphor also records the surprise 
of the writer, for this is the experience that prompts metaphor mak-
ing. That distance between the ordinary and the unexpected that the 
reader, in a metaphor, finds reduced to the width of a wire is a dis-
tance that the writer, too, first tumbles over. 
Bergson realized that time as it appeared in scientific calcula-
tions was only a placeholder. Time was really a medium of its own. Its 
closest likeness was water, but upon scrutiny Bergson’s time resem-
bles no actual body of water. For it moves least at the surface, most at 
depth—a property not of water but of the particular vessel Bergson 
chose to contain it. Bergson’s time is a medium that resides in the 
mind. At its surface, floating “comme des feuilles mortes sur l’eau 
d’un étang,” are our clear and distinct thoughts.7 At depth, it is the 
mind in motion, whose every change changes the whole. Minds laden 
with time, time borne through the world by people: this was his dig-
nified way of transmuting astonishment into philosophy, however 
undignified it would be for science.
6 Rh. 3.11.1412a18 in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle  
(Princeton: 1984), 2:2253.
7 Bergson, Essai, 102.
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music, claiming it was a musical genre showcasing German inven tors 
playing classic works on new musical instruments. Sadly, the hope of 
a number of composers, many of whom became enemies of the Reich, 
including Hindemith and Schoenberg, that these instruments would 
produce unique tones and inspire compositions involving the new 
theories of atonality and serialism never came to fruition.
After the war, Sala continually worked on improvements to the 
trautonium. In 1952 he finished his Mixtur-Trautonium, which was 
used in a number of Hollywood motion pictures, including most fa-
mously Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds, in which Sala’s instrument 
 created the sounds of the screeching birds and the flapping of their 
wings. He went on to enjoy an extremely successful career as an elec-
tronic music composer for numerous films in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Trautwein, on the other hand, was far less successful. 
 Having been a member of the Nazi Party, he had difficulty finding 
postwar employment. In the end, he struck up an ephemeral collabo-
ration with Cologne’s Studio für elektronische Musik, building a 
melochord, which was a version of his earlier trautonium. It was 
used in a number of the Studio’s early musical pieces, including Her-
bert Eimert and Robert Beyer’s Klangstudie I and II of 1952.4
In short, electrical engineers, physicists, and physiologists work-
ing on the synthesis and broadcasting of speech and music provided 
musicians with the long-coveted ability to generate new tones. Elec-
trical engineers spoke of how science and technology enabled an aes-
thetic of precision that was part and parcel of the new music of the 
age. While music, engineering, and science were by now clearly sep-
arate professions and domains of knowledge—certainly more so 
than they had been a century earlier—the boundaries between them 
were still at times porous as collaborations flourished, and they 
sought each other out to create new musical instruments, sounds, 
and aesthetics.
4 Herbert Eimert, “Herbert Eimert – Klangstudie I (1952),” YouTube video, 3:53, posted by 
Sebastian H. M. Murdock, November 10, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLSZ-
3cTI-6Y; Herbert Eimert, “Herbert Eimert: Klangstudie II (1952),” YouTube video, 4:30, 
 posted by TheWelleszCompany, March 24, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTS-
ed3Ybzhg.
 research by physiologists into analyzing and synthesizing human 
sounds, particularly vowels and their corresponding formants,  using 
gramophones. It was also a period of a new aesthetic, Neue Sachlich-
keit, exemplified by avant-garde composers such as Paul Hindemith, 
Igor Stravinsky, and Arnold Schoenberg, who were trying to push the 
envelope of what constituted music and in essence saw themselves 
as following the calling of Ferruccio Busoni in 1907 to create a new 
form of music based on, among other things, atonality. It was an 
 aesthetic of “absolute clarity,” “perfected handiwork,” “playful in-
souciance,” “formal consolidation,” and “‘objective’ forming” that 
 distanced itself from emotional expression. The trautonium, it turns 
out, can be used as a heuristic tool to trace the contours of various 
disciplines, such as physics, electrical engineering, radio engineer-
ing, physiology, and musical aesthetics, which were actively coming 
together and cross-fertilizing in Berlin with funding from the Prus-
sian government and German electrical companies during the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
The initial trautonium was built in the Rundfunkversuchstelle 
by physicist and electrical engineer Friedrich Trautwein and the 
 musician Oskar Sala in 1930.1 It underwent various transformations 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, including the Volkstrautonium, built 
in 1932 with the generous funding of Telefunken.2 During the 1930s, 
Sala, who spent 10 semesters studying the natural sciences at the 
Universität Berlin, constructed the Rundfunktrautonium and its por-
table counterpart, the Konzerttrautonium, with which he toured Ger-
many and its occupied territories during the Third Reich.3 The  Nazis 
in general, and Joseph Goebbels in particular, welcomed and actively 
supported the new genre of electric (later electronic) music. Rather 
than considering it entartete Kunst, the Nazis encouraged electric 
1 “Oskar Sala – Trautonium Rundfunkversuchsstelle Berlin 1930,” YouTube video, 0:49,  
posted by “Trautonist,” April 19, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrAcSxlpJgk.
2 “Telefunken Trautonium Volkstrautonium 1933,” YouTube video, 1:37, posted by 
 “Trautonist,” June 14, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOB6A26tfVY&t=14s.
3 “Electrische piano: Trautonium (1941),” YouTube video, 2:21, posted by “Nederlands Insti-
tuut voor Beeld en Geluid,” October 16, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQ4w-
Gucalpc.
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What Leniarrd said next, however, suggested an uncanny possibility. 
Not only did different “winds” vary among themselves, one from an-
other, but particular instances of each differed as well. There was no 
absolute Tarasq-al. Think of a fugue without the main theme, he said: 
its contrapuntal melodies would imitate a nonexistent template. But 
without a main theme, I said, would there not be a pos sibility—an 
absurdity—of a “wind” appearing only once, blowing only  once in 
the whole course of known history? Perhaps, he nodded. And if so, did 
he think such a wind would have a name? Should it have a name? 
Our conversation would have remained forgotten had it not been 
for a meeting titled “Wind und Wetter: Die Ikonologie der Atmo-
sphäre” organized at the Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz in 
2006. My talk was on the “hidden” history of European tornadoes. In 
the pre paration, however, I stumbled upon Richard Bentley’s Remark 
upon a Late Discourse of Free-Thinking (1725) in which he engages in 
a discussion of the theological meaning of the wind Euroclydon. The 
term appears in Acts 27, where Luke names Euroclydon as the cause 
of the storm that led to the terrible but ultimately miraculous wreck 
of St. Paul’s ship on the ancient Melita. What vexed Bentley was that 
Euroclydon was a hápax legómenon: a word which occurs only once 
in a language or a corpus. 
But Bentley’s theory had suffered a blow in John Brekell’s Euro-
clydon or the Dangers of the Sea (1744). Luke knew better than to 
misspell the name of a wind, argued Brekkel. Stunningly, Brekell 
then argued that Luke intended “Euroclydon” to be a hápax. In so 
doing, he was identifying the wind as a providential agent in a theo-
dicy that required the deliverance of all 276 passengers on board the 
doomed Alexandrian freighter. This was no less than establishing 
that the storm, the shipwreck, and Paul’s actions created a monu-
mental hápax historicon that led to “the greatest moral revolution 
the world ever saw,” as the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine put it in 
1859. Whether Brekell entertained the possibility that the hápax 
legómenon referred to a hápax phenomenon remains moot. 
Days before the Florence meeting I dropped a line to Ati Leniarrd: 
“Dear Ati, Just a quick note before I go off to a conference on wind 
and weather. I’ve recently dug out something that goes back to our 
Thinking Winds with Leniarrd
Vladimir Jankovic´
Seneca was probably the first meteorologist. I don’t think he’d be dis-
pleased with this designation, applied to the select few interested in 
the most aleatory of things, meteora. The cryptic, inflammatory claim 
that “wind is fluent air” opens Book Five of Seneca’s Naturales quaes-
tiones. That Nero’s Cordovan advisor would consider it important to 
open a work with a sentence that—to our ears—appears to be  as 
plain as indisputable signals either a discerning genius or an icono-
clast armed against a vulgar error. An error the nature of which, at 
the time of my first reading, I knew nothing. 
It took seven years before I discovered the likely explanation in, 
of all places, Israel’s Negev desert. Following a visit to the Blaustein 
Institutes for Desert Research, our host invited us to dinner at the 
home of her colleague, ethnologist and aridista Atonos (Ati) Leniarrd. 
Leniarrd’s reputation rested on two books: Faraway Places (1979) and 
Plants of Truth (1987). Both books challenged accepted views of tradi-
tional environmental knowledge. I had read neither. 
Following dinner, our group sipping wild mint tea as the desert 
landscape assumed an ochre tint before the sunset, Leniarrd, in half-
voice, casually remarked about the breeze that had just twisted the 
smoke of the dying coals: “We have been seeing less and less of this 
one in recent years,” he said. “It’s called Tarasq-al. People fear it may 
disappear. The Al-Tarabin tribes don’t mention it anymore, and the 
Al-Tayaha have not it seen in 60 moons. Some think it’s changed into 
majha, a dawn breath, detectable by feathers only.” A colleague asked 
how a wind could disappear. It’s not a wind, Leniarrd answered. He 
was speaking of Tarasq-al, not of a wind. 
“Look at the smoke,” he said, “only a Tarasq-al can make it move 
this way.” When we pushed him to speak further, we learned that 
Tarasq-al was not only a matter of the weather but a name for a state 
of things that can be understood only through the traces of its pres-
ence: herbs smelling stronger, consonants sounding harsher, hills 
seeming closer, echoes not returning, children running restless, scor-
pions hiding in the Pistacia bushes. None of this would happen 
during Sharqi, Khamsin, or Simoom (the last so dry, it stops newborn 
babies from crying). 
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conversation about Tarasq-al. You will remember the possibility that 
in the vast spaces of time there could indeed be a ‘wind’ so unique as 
to have a singular appearance, a nonce wind, a wind of such pro-
found consequence that it could come only once in the course of his-
tory and subsequently even be known as such! I might have some-
thing to report on that matter, but let me see if there’s any feedback 
from the meeting.”
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What Is It That Lastingly  
Steals Your Mind?
Sonam Kachru
Consider an abstract object. It is made with language, though it can 
exist at several scales, from individual phonemes to entire chapters. 
This object collocates or rearranges several beautiful or uncanny or 
marvelous things in a novel way, so as to promote a particular aes-
thetic response, a distinctive and distinctively pleasurable experien-
tial texture of responsiveness to the heterogeneous world brought 
into view by a work of art. Such textual objects are everywhere in 
South Asia, where surprise and wonder can be found not only as clas-
sifiable psychological or existential phenomena to which we are sus-
ceptible: wonder in South Asia can involve the creation of textual 
objects that seek to keep in view not particular bits of the world so 
much as ways of having a world in view.
Such wonder as these abstract textual objects exemplify does not 
typically involve curiosity, being rather more closely related to de-
sire and its satisfactions. When strangeness or the uncanny are 
counted among the possible moods sustained by such objects, they 
do not serve as goads to inquiry. The Buddhist poet As´vaghos.a (fl. first 
to second century CE), the first poet in Sanskrit whose work has come 
down to us, offers us a metapoetic contrast to help with this. Con-
trast Siddha¯rtha’s thought-inducing shock at what the world showed 
him of himself with the effect on his family of a story of his depar-
ture. This version is narrated by a character in As´vaghos.a’s Life of the 
Buddha, and though we do not hear it in its entirety, we may gather 
that it echoes but does not repeat As´vaghos.a’s own narration of the 
event. Of the story within the story, we are told that it is constituted 
of many uncanny marvels and that it promotes the reoccupation of 
grief by wonder (vismaya).1 For As´vaghos.a, however, the uncanny of-
fers only a momentary suspension of one’s psychological life. This 
semblance of being drawn out of oneself ought to be contrasted with 
Siddha¯rtha’s own existential shock and variety of wondering steps 
into analytic inquiry: the former, concealing the world in a variety of 
shared aesthetic responsiveness, only perpetuates the undertow of 
1 Verse 8.50 in As´vaghos.a, Life of the Buddha, trans. Patrick Olivelle (New York: 2008), 227.
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But that paradox can be softened by noting that the expectation that 
inquiry bottomed out in wonder serves as a criterion for orienting 
oneself successfully in thought to the world. What I mean is this: that 
the mirabilia that can be found to dot the romances of poets and (on 
occasion) the exempla of the proofs of philosophers in South Asia 
might not be token instances of irrationality, the breaking off of 
thought, but part of a tissue of shared conventions and sensibilities 
that transmute the skeptic’s dogged questioning into the satisfaction 
of knowing that reality, if it is to be worth the name, still exceeds the 
grasp of any final conceptual vocabulary.
The lives of wonder in South Asia have yet to find their biogra-
pher. But let’s close with that which has pleasantly surprised me, a 
philosopher’s take on the wonder of public events of revelatory sig-
nificance, or pratiha¯ra, in South Asian Buddhism. “Miracle” is the 
usual translation, but the instances of pratiha¯ra do not correspond 
especially well either to the private medieval experience of grace or 
to the new variety of evidence of the senses Lorraine Daston has 
taught us to find in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European lit-
erature on prodigies and miracles. The pratiha¯ra is a kind of public 
achievement of salience and significance, testimony to the power 
and worth of the one who brings it about, but not for that an event 
that stands as evidence for a proposition. It is an accomplishment 
that effects something in the world, valued for its ability to capture 
and reorient the minds and hearts of those who witness it. Now Vasu-
bandhu for one asks, What is the greatest miracle for which we praise 
the Buddha? His answer, offered once at the beginning of his magis-
terial Treasury of Metaphysics and once again toward its close, is 
this: we praise the Buddha for the pedagogical miracle that is his use 
of  arguments in conversation. Why? Because a mind changed by ar-
gument, unlike a mind stunned by coercive displays of power and 
 magical ability, is a mind lastingly altered. A miracle we take for 
granted, then, though no wonder, thought Vasubandhu, is more wor-
thy of praise. 
our infelicitous cognitive and affective norms. The latter breaks 
things open. 
Does wonder mark a beginning to thought or an (sometimes dead) 
end? Is it correlated with doubt and cognitive unease or with some 
variety of intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction? As´vaghos.a’s (ironic) 
suspicion of aesthetic moods notwithstanding, the evidence of Bud-
dhist philosophers themselves is intriguing. They can recruit the 
rhetoric of wonder not at the beginning of inquiry but at its edges, 
when a limit to analysis or persuasion has been reached. Thus Vasu-
bandhu, the philosopher from Peshawar (fl. late fourth to early fifth 
century CE), concludes his (to my mind, self-consciously inconclu-
sive) analysis of mirror images—are they or are they not a variety of 
visible stuff on, or in, the surfaces of mirrors?—with an exclamation 
of wonder: “Indeed, one just can’t think of all that phenomena are 
capable of!” 2 Such examples used by philosophers like Vasubandhu 
do not only exemplify the wondrous. They clarify for us what wonder 
can be. That mirrors “respond” to the presence of objects by mirror-
ing them, that magnets attract iron, or that “moonstones” liquefy in 
moonlight can illustrate this general sense of wonder: it marks our 
responsiveness to the responsiveness of phenomena in the world to 
one another.
Vasubandhu’s concluding exclamation is no lament. It is a confir-
mation of a long-held expectation regarding what the world is really 
like; so too is the use of the mirabilia invoked by the Compendium of 
the Maha¯ya¯na 8.17, such as the gem that can illuminate a place with 
all manner of light and so fulfill everyone’s wishes or the musical 
instruments of the gods, which respond with exactly the right sounds 
corresponding to the (secret) desires of those present.3 These, used as 
proof that responsive activity without intention or calculation is 
possible, appeal to shared norms regarding the intelligibility of the 
world, paradoxically perhaps, invoking natural phenomena that ex-
ceed any natural account on offer. 
2 Abhidharmakos´abha¯s.yam of Vasubandhu, Tibetan Sanskrit Works 8, ed. Prahlad 
 Pradhan, K. P. (Patna: 1975), 121. 
3 Étienne Lamotte, Maha¯ya¯nasam. graha. La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asan·ga, vol. 2, 
Translation and Commentary (Louvain: 1938–1939).
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 justified its own conservatism. In ways that I couldn’t appreciate at 
the time, Schmidt also prefigured my current interest in long-range 
comparative linguistics. He emphasized deep history—“the time fac-
tor,” as he called it—allowing connections to be drawn between spa-
tially discontinuous groups. Fast-forward to Ed Vadja’s 2010 proposal 
of The Dene-Yeniseian Connection, linking Alaskan languages to a 
mostly extinct family based in central Siberia. Describing core com-
mitments of the culture historical school, Schmidt wrote, “it does, of 
course, recognize but few culture circles for the beginning, which go 
back to the oldest one.” 2 Was that a whisper of Proto-World? Suffice it 
to say, the independent study was, eventually, absorbing despite the 
initial flush of embarrassment. 
It was only after arriving at the MPI that I started thinking seri-
ously about what it might mean to study the history of my mother’s 
chosen discipline. In Berlin, I enjoyed talking with other members of 
Department II who found themselves—always partly accidentally, it 
seemed—tracking the imprints of their parents’ lives in science. We 
talked about how to seriously interrogate figures who might have 
stopped by for family picnics when we were children; what memo-
ries to trust and which ones to question; how to negotiate areas of 
tension between our own narratives and those put forward by our 
mothers and fathers. The last question is one that I continue to mull 
over daily.
I had always explained my interest in linguistics on methodolog-
ical and historiographic grounds. Methodologically, I was intrigued 
by a number of parallels with evolutionary biology; historiographi-
cally, I thought the instability of linguistic research might highlight 
the importance of a contextual definition of science. With the charac-
teristic defensiveness of a graduate student, this latter investment in 
the organization of knowledge grew to outsized proportions. It took 
a long time to realize that my preoccupation had much to do with the 
personal—and explicitly feminist—transition my mother had under-
gone in her own career as a student of language.
2 Wilhelm Schmidt, The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology: The Scientific Approach 
to the Racial Question, trans. S. A. Sieber (New York: 1939), 60.
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It was my third year in graduate school, and I was digging in to a his-
tory minor with an independent study on the intellectual history of 
German anthropology. Rudy Koshar was advising the project, and 
 following the swerve in his own research program to issues of poli-
tical theology, I was casting about for a focus that would allow me 
to digest a lot of literature on exchanges between secular and reli-
gious commitments. I was intrigued by the work of Wilhelm Schmidt, 
SVD (1868–1954)—known to me at the time as the founder of Anthro-
pos and the author of a curiously late book (1937) on the rudiments of 
the “cultural-historical” approach to ethnology.1 Here was a self-
trained institutionalizer, an apologist wielding “scientific” methods, 
and a diffusionist thinker curiously out of step with his time. It 
seemed likely that he would open a number of doors, and I wanted 
to learn more. 
It didn’t take long—a quick Google search, really—to discover 
that Schmidt was also the author of the first European study of Mon-
Khmer (known today as Austroasiatic), an ethnolinguistic grouping 
at the heart of a debate that had structured my own mother’s re-
search since the early 1980s. Surprise! Like generations of linguists 
before, my mother has assembled historical linguistic evidence with 
bearing on the question of the Austroasiatic Urheimat and, more 
 specifically, its relationship to the homeland of a smaller language 
family, Hmong-Mien. At the moment when I was supposed to be turn-
ing toward a dissertation—the biggest independent undertaking I 
could imagine at that point—it seemed that there was no escaping 
the family business. Was I doomed to perpetually reinvent the 
wheel … and what would Kulturkreis theorists say if I did? 
This focus on Schmidt gave me an excuse to read Bastian, Ratzel, 
Graebner and a raft of contemporary scholarship that subsequently 
informed my dissertation project. But Schmidt was fascinating in his 
own right as well: here was the exception that proved the ruling 
fieldwork imperative in early-twentieth-century anthropology, an 
armchair missionary, a proponent of an ethnological theory that 
1 Wilhelm Schmidt, Handbuch der Methode der kulturhistorischen Ethnologie (Münster, 
Westfalen: 1937). 
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Ein Affe ist ein Affe, ist ein Affe? 
Doris Kaufmann
Der Artist Fritz Roth hatte starke Bedenken. Es war eine Sache, die 
Bewegungsabläufe von Menschenaffen gründlich studiert zu haben 
und so das Publikum bei den abendlichen Auftritten als „King Kong“ 
am Hochseil unter der Zirkuskuppel erfolgreich täuschen zu können, 
aber in einem Affenkostüm realen Schimpansen im Münchener Zoo 
Auge in Auge gegenüberzutreten, war eine andere Sache. Galten diese 
Affen doch in der Verteidigung ihres Reviers gegen fremde Artgenos-
sen als äußerst aggressiv und kampfbereit. Warum sich der Artist 
ebenso wie der Hellabrunner Zoodirektor und der zuständige Tier-
pfleger schließlich auf diese Begegnung einließen, kann nur vermu-
tet werden, lässt sich jedoch als deutliches Zeichen für eine zeit-
genössische Popularität der (Tier-)Verhaltensforschung1 lesen.
Unsere Geschichte ist angesiedelt in den späten 1950er Jahren, 
im golden age dieses Wissensfeldes zwischen Zoologie, Biologie und 
Psychologie, für das Namen wie Konrad Lorenz und Bernhard 
 Grzimek standen. Die Verhaltensforschung Lorenzscher Prägung mit 
ihrem methodischen Kernstück der beschreibenden Beobachtung 
sprach Amateur-BeobachterInnen von Haustieren und freileben-
den  Vögeln an und verzichtete auf eine pointierte Abgrenzung 
 zwischen TierliebhaberInnen und WissenschaftlerInnen. Das große 
öffentliche Interesse, „den Tieren auf (die) Spur“ 2 zu kommen, beflü-
gelte nicht nur den Tier(sach)buchmarkt der 1950 und 1960er Jahre, 
sondern stieß auch Tierbeobachtungsversuche außerhalb des wis-
senschaftlichen Raums an. So war der Initiator des Begegnungs- 
Szenariums von „King-Kong“ mit den Hellabrunner Schimpansen der 
bekannte Kriegs- und Nachkriegs-Fotograf und Bildberichterstatter 
Gerhard Gronefeld,3 der die Arbeiten von Lorenz und seinen Mitarbei-
terInnen seit Beginn der 1950er Jahre fotografisch festhielt und in der 
illustrierten Massenpresse verbreitete. Hinter seiner Versuchsanord-
nung stand die Frage, ob die Menschenaffen den Affenmenschen als 
1 Umfassend Richard W. Burkhardt, Patterns of Behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, 
and the Founding of Ethology (Chicago/London: 2005).
2 Hilde Barisch, Den Tieren auf der Spur. Die Geheimnisse der Tierwelt erzählt von den 
bekanntesten Verhaltensforschern (Würzburg: 1975).
3 Siehe Winfried Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte kurz belichtet, Photoreportagen von 
 Gerhard Gronefeld 1937–1965. Ausstellungskatalog des DHM Berlin (Berlin: 1991).
A onetime English major, my mom was teaching ESL at Senn High 
School on the North Side of Chicago around the time I was born. She 
liked her coworkers and felt sufficiently compelled by the service as-
pect of what she was doing to don a pink collar and board the Green 
Line from Oak Park to Edgewater five days a week. But eventually, 
she came to realize that the job was unfulfilling. “Science,” as I al-
ways heard her tell it, set her free. For the first time it allowed her to 
be a disembodied mind hunting down the truth of how it (language) 
actually was. This is not to say that social roles completely fell away 
in the process: she passed over an opportunity to specialize in Mayan 
hieroglyphs to work on the phonology of white Hmong instead, as 
this could be studied with a local refugee population in Chicago and 
she did not want to uproot me so young. 
The shift from English to linguistics was enormously important 
for my mother—an example that taught me to indulge the kind of 
curiosity that led me to consider the work of Wilhelm Schmidt in the 
first place. More than that, I am so grateful to be a part of a discipline 
with such inspiring women leads. It all allowed me to grow up with 
the luxurious delusion that being a female academic didn’t matter. 
Now I am trying to recover all the ways in which it does.
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brach an dieser Stelle das Experiment ab und forderte den Artisten 
auf, den Maskenkopf abzunehmen. Mit Erleichterung und Freude 
 reagierten alle Schimpansen auf den Anblick des Menschen, unter-
suchten und umarmten ihn anschließend ausgiebig. Diese Stim-
mung  schlug allerdings in ihr Gegenteil um, als der Artist seinen 
Affen kopf wieder aufsetzte und so erneut Fluchtbewegungen der 
Schimpansen hervorrief.4 
Es ist verständlich, dass der Fotoreporter Gronefeld die Origina-
lität seines Affenversuchs in Hellabrunn in seinen Veröffentlichun-
gen für ein breites Lesepublikum hervorhob. Er folgte jedoch mit sei-
nem Versuchsaufbau den Arbeiten des Veterinärmediziners und 
Verhaltensforschers Bernhard Grzimek, der die Frage, an welchen 
sensorischen Merkmalen und Eigenschaften Tiere ihre Artgenossen 
erkennen, mit dem Einsatz von Attrappen zu beantworten versuchte. 
Bereits in den frühen 1940er Jahren hatte Grzimek eine größere 
 Anzahl Pferde und zwanzig Jahre später wildlebende Zebras und 
 andere Wildtiere mit plastischen Nachbildungen und Flächenbildern 
ihrer Artgenossen konfrontiert und seine Forschungsergebnisse 
breit publiziert.5
Doch letztlich interessierte sich Gronefeld – wie vermutlich vie le 
seiner Leserinnen und Leser – nicht für detaillierte ethologische 
Fach fragen, sondern für „das Menschliche im Tier“. So erinnerte er 
sich am Ende seiner kleinen Affenerzählung an seine Kindheit und 
an den Weihnachtsmann, der unter seiner Maske furchtbare Drohun-
gen aussprach, die ihn zum verzweifelten Heulen trieben. Zwar beru-
higte er sich, als der Großvater die Maske abnahm, um dann wieder 
loszuschreien, als dieser sie erneut aufsetzte. Er glaubte, den Schim-
pansen ging es mit dem King-Kong nicht anders, obwohl sie doch ge-
sehen hatten, dass unter der Maske ein Mensch steckte.6
4 Gerhard Gronefeld, „Der Affenmensch und die Menschenaffen,“ in Verstehen wir die 
Tiere? Bildberichte aus der modernen Tierforschung (Braunschweig: 1963), 37–42,  
Fotos 29–34; erstmals abgedruckt in Weltbild 18 (1959).
5 Bernhard Grzimek, Und immer wieder Pferde (München: 1977), dort alle Angaben seiner 
einschlägigen Fachveröffentlichungen; für eine breitere Leserschaft zu diesem Thema 
siehe Grzimek, Grzimek unter Afrikas Tieren (1959); und Auch Nashörner gehören allen 
Menschen (1962).
6 Gronefeld, „Der Affenmensch,“ 42. 
einen der ihren erkennen und wenn ja, dann mit den zu erwartenden 
Konsequenzen reagieren würden. Zur Vorsicht wurden die erwachse-
nen Schimpansenmänner weggesperrt. Allein fünf jugendliche Affen 
begleitet von ihrem vertrauten Pfleger sahen sich im Tierpark- 
Freigehege mit dem hereinhopsenden verkleideten Artisten kon-
frontiert. Zur Überraschung der Zaungäste reagierten sie wie das 
 Kinopublikum auf den Monsteraffen im zuerst 1933 gezeigten US-
Film King Kong – nämlich mit Erschrecken. Drei junge Schimpansen 
klammerten sich an den Pfleger, zwei flüchteten auf ein Käfigdach. 
Nur eine Äffin näherte sich auf Zureden des Betreuers schließlich 
dem falschen Affen und untersuchte die unbekannte starre Lippen-
partie der Maske, die unbeweglich blieb und keine Auskunft über das 
Befinden geben konnte und damit eine Art-Zugehörigkeit des Gegen-
übers ausschloss. Dies löste erneut große Angst bei ihr aus. Gronefeld 
Eine furchterregende Begegnung. Gerhard Gronefeld, „Der Affenmensch und Menschenaffe 
trauen einander nicht,“ Foto, 1956. Deutsches Historisches Museum, Bildarchiv, 96/771.
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Staat lichen Museen zu Berlin. Um in ein neues Schrank- bzw. Regal-
system zu passen, waren die Kartonunterlagen in ihrer Größe be-
schnitten worden. Einige der Ränder blieben als Überbleibsel dieser 
großen Transformation des Archivs erhalten. Oder die gedruckte Sys-
tematik der Architekturfotografien des in den 1960er Jahren umge-
formten Bildarchivs der Sammlung Fotografie. Deren einstmalige 
Getting One’s Hands Dirty1
Stefanie Klamm
Das Arbeiten in und mit wissenschaftlichen Fotoarchiven konfron-
tiert die Forscherin oft mit erstaunlichen Massen von Bildern eines 
Objektes – seien es Aufnahmen des David von Michelangelo oder der 
Friese des Pergamonaltars – bzw. sehr ähnlicher Bildmotive wie zum 
Beispiel die Hauseingänge kolonialer Bauten an der Ostküste der 
USA. Diese Fotografien, zum Teil aus verschiedenen Zeiten stam-
mend, können dasselbe Artefakt aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln zei-
gen. Sie können aber ebenso unterschiedliche, wenn auch ähnliche 
Objekte aus derselben Perspektive darstellen. Ihre Fülle erzeugt häu-
fig den Eindruck von Gleichförmigkeit, denn die Aufnahmen greifen 
auf standardisierte Ansichten zurück oder lassen durch standardi-
sierende Praktiken im Archiv, wie das Montieren des fotografischen 
Abzugs auf einheitliche Kartons, den Eindruck des Immergleichen 
entstehen. Und manchmal kommt dann sogar ein Gefühl von gähnen-
der Langeweile auf: Was soll ich mit 50 Hauseingängen aus  Salem/
Massachusetts anfangen? 
Schaut man jedoch genauer hin, gibt es in Fotoarchiven immer 
wieder Foto-Objekte, die aus der Reihe tanzen, aus den archiva lischen 
Ordnungen herausfallen, in den Sammlungen teilweise margina li-
siert sind und oftmals gar nicht in deren klassifikatorische Logik auf-
genommen wurden. Die Forscherin entdeckt sie zufällig und zur ei-
genen Überraschung. Sie war nicht nach ihnen auf der Suche, und 
doch entzündet sich plötzlich ein Funken der Aufmerksamkeit an 
ihnen. Das können Foto-Objekte wie bei meiner Projektkollegin 
 Franka Schneider sein, die, zerschnitten nun zu „Papier-Objekte[n]“ 
geworden, als Trennblätter in Ordnern von anderen Archiven fungie-
ren.2 Oder die übrig gebliebenen beschrifteten Schnittränder von 
Foto kartons aus der Sammlung Fotografie der Kunstbibliothek der 
1 „Getting One’s Hands Dirty“ war der programmatische Titel einer Sektion der Tagung 
„Photo-Objects. On the Materiality of Photographs and Photo-Archives in the Humanities 
and Sciences“ unseres Verbundprojektes “Foto-Objekte. Fotografien als (Forschungs-)
Objekte in Archäologie, Ethnologie und Kunstgeschichte“ im Februar 2017 in Florenz 
(http://fotobjekt.hypotheses.org/1479).
2 Dazu siehe Franka Schneider, Julia Bärnighausen, Stefanie Klamm und Petra Wodtke, 
„Die Materialität des ‚punctum‘. Zum Potential ko-laborativer Objekt- und Sammlungs-
analysen in Foto-Archiven“, in Eine Fotografie. Über die transdisziplinären Möglich-
keiten der Bildforschung, hgg. Irene Ziehe und Ulrich Hagele. (Münster: 2017), 217–241, 
hier 224.
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Funktion als Stellvertreter für die Ordnung des Archivs an den 
Regalkompar timenten konnte ich an dem einzigen Exemplar wieder-
erkennen, das sich noch als Trennblatt (sic!) in einem Ordner mit ver-
schiedensten Unterlagen zur Sammlungsgeschichte im Büro der 
Sammlungskuratorin befand. Überhaupt stellte sich das Schneiden, 
zu meiner Überraschung, als eines der wichtigsten Handlungen im 
Fotoarchiv und als wesentlich für viele Transformationen der Samm-
lungen heraus. 
Zum einen sind es Zufallsfunde wie diese, die sich nicht in sorg-
fältig geordneten und systematisch abgelegten Aktenbeständen ei-
ner Sammlung befinden, sondern für die man sich häufig die Hände 
im wörtlichen Sinne schmutzig machen muss. Nur so lassen sich in 
den oft als „Reste,“ „Unsortiertes“ oder „Varia“ titulierten Kisten, 
Schubern und Kästen Objekte finden, die das Verständnis von einer 
Sammlung, von ihrer Ordnung und Geschichte plötzlich verändern. 
Zum anderen entstehen beim gemeinsamen Forschen Aha- 
Momente von großer epistemologischer Bedeutung für das eigene 
Arbeiten. Für meine Kollegin Franka Schneider, eine Europäische 
Ethnologin, bedeutete der Blick auf eine Fotografie im Passepartout 
etwas völlig anderes als für mich. Er war mir wie selbstverständlich 
disziplinär aus vielen Kunst- und Fotografieausstellungen vertraut. 
Einige der von mir analysierten Aufnahmen des amerikanischen 
 Architekturfotografen Frank Cousins waren für die Ausstellung  Ein 
neuer Blick. Architekturfotografie aus den Staatlichen Museen zu 
Berlin, 2010 im Museum für Fotografie gezeigt, passepartouriert wor-
den. Die vielfach beschrifteten, beschnittenen und bestempelten 
Ränder der auf Karton aufgezogenen Fotografien wurden durch das 
Passepartout abgedeckt, und die Aufnahme dann gerahmt an der 
Wand präsentiert. Wieder in der Sammlung zurück verblieben die 
 Foto-Objekte in ihren Passepartouts, die jedoch nicht geschlossen 
montiert worden waren und so weiterhin geöffnet werden können. 
Dies erlaubt den Blick auf die Fotografie in ihrer ursprünglich in der 
Sammlung überlieferten Gestalt. Durch diesen Überlieferungsum-
stand wurde in unserer Forschung die Aufmerksamkeit auf das, was 
das Passepartout bewirkt, gelenkt: Erst das Erstaunen meiner Kolle-
gin über den Effekt des „Auf“–„Zu“ des Passepartouts erlaubte auch 
mir, die wahrnehmungsstrukturierenden Wirkungen dieser Präsen-
tationsform zu sehen: 3 Im geschlossenen Zustand wird der Blick auf 
das Bildmotiv und seine ästhetischen Effekte unter Ausschluss ande-
rer materieller Charakteristiken der Fotografie gelenkt, geöffnet 
weist die Sichtbarkeit der zahlreichen Annotationen auf dem Karton 
der Fotografie auf die Geschichte des Foto-Objektes in der Sammlung 
hin. In beiden Fällen verändern sich der epistemische Status der 
 Fotografie und ihre Funktion.
Es sind gerade diese – häufig überraschenden – Irritationen des 
Forschungsprozesses, die sich für das eigene Arbeiten als äußerst 
produktiv erweisen. Ausgelöst werden können sie durch Kommentie-
rungen des eigenen Blicks aus anderen disziplinären Positionen und 
Traditionen. Vor allem aber sind es auch die Foto-Objekte von den 
„Rändern“ des Archivs, die Dissonanzen erzeugen, Wissensstruktu-
ren offenlegen und damit epistemisch fruchtbar sind. Um überhaupt 
auf diese in den Sammlungen marginalisierten Objekte aufmerksam 
zu werden, muss man sich die Finger schmutzig machen.
3 Schneider et al., „Materialität,“ 230.
Auf–Zu: das passepartourierte Foto-Objekt. Frank Cousins, Boston: Daniel P. Parker’s 
 Mansion, Wandnische, um 1900. Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Kunstbibliothek,  
Foto: Dietmar Katz, 2017. 
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pected attack, substituting the touch of the practitioner and his knife 
for the touch of kin. He called this one of his “good deceptions” (buoni 
inganni).
The theatrics of the vignette might surprise us—attack meta-
phors in modern medicine are more familiar as features of chemical 
therapy, chemotherapy—but they reflected a persistent feature of 
medicine. In Hippocratic and other early medical texts, the techne of 
the practitioner was sometimes figured through the language of ago-
nism: “the agon of the techne,” explains Heinrich von Staden, was 
not only with diseases but also with the patient, with his nature 
(physis).2 This figuration was more widespread than we might think. 
It appealed to Magni and also to the roughly contemporary play-
wright, Ben Jonson. In The Alchemist, Jonson turned to barbering in a 
scene that toyed with the agonistic orientation of techne.3
Face: But, Dol, Prithee go heat a little water quickly; 
Subtle must shave me. All my Captain’s beard 
Must off, to make me appear smooth Jeremy. 
You’ll do it?
Subtle: Yes, I’ll shave you, as well as I can.
Face: And not cut my throat, but trim me?
Subtle: You shall see, sir. 
Face and Subtle have proven themselves to be cutthroats—the word-
play is evident—but the techne of the practitioner (Subtle) is here 
potentially but nevertheless tantalizingly agonistic. Smooth Jeremy 
is not the essential character, hidden just beneath the surface, wait-
ing to be revealed with the help of Subtle’s techne. No, Jeremy, for all 
his smoothness or subtlety, is a more radical transformation of Face, 
and the passage implies that he is born out of an agonistic and antag-
onistic struggle between Subtle and Face, art and nature, techne and 
physis. The heady concoction raises the question of trust, for these 
2 Heinrich von Staden, “Physis and Techne in Greek Medicine,” in The Artificial and the 
Natural: An Evolving Polarity, ed. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and William R. Newman 
(Cambridge, MA and London: 2007), 21–50.
3 Ben Jonson, Ben Jonson’s Plays and Masques, ed. Richard Harp (New York: 2001),  
act 4, scene 7, 128–135.
Good Deceptions
Cynthia Klestinec
If pleasure courted surprise in the eighteenth century, risk married it 
in the prior centuries. And the marriage was full of violence. Readers 
of early modern texts would probably have found William James’s 
sentiment that “it is only by risking our persons from one hour to 
another that we live at all” incoherent in its formulation of what it 
means to live. Death, not life, lay at the doorstep of surprise.
Stories of surprise appear even in the more didactic texts of the 
period, including those of medicine. Take the bloodletting manual of 
the ambitious Roman barber Pietro Paolo Magni. Magni knew that all 
the operations of the barber were “annoying and displeasing to the 
patients.” For his reluctant patients—those noncompliant figures 
who help us to see the bounded nature of medical authority—Magni 
recommended the following: “in a friendly way, say to him [the pa-
tient] that you do not wish in any way to take up the knife but only 
to see the arm, tied with a rag and anointed with oil, where the vein 
would be cut.” Then, tell him, “I do not have the soul to let blood from 
you,” and “with a rested soul [animo riposato],” “with a knife hidden 
in the sleeve of my left arm or in another place, I am able to make the 
operation with quickness [prestezza] and without him seeing it.” 1 
Ouch.
Admittedly the strategy had certain limitations. For starters, it 
couldn’t be used repeatedly on the same patient. It also couldn’t be 
revealed to patients beforehand, and thus we must conclude that 
Magni did not intend the reader to be a patient. This vignette appears 
in a chapter on “wimpy men” (pusillanimi ) and children and is posed 
as a more efficacious procedure than the routine one whereby family 
members had to hold down the limbs of these patients so that the 
barber could cut them. All too frequently, Magni knew from experi-
ence, these patients screamed at the sight of the knife, causing the 
family members to let go of their bodies. To deal with that reaction, 
Magni developed his innovative procedure, the sudden, swift, unex-
1 Pietro Paolo Magni, Discorsi di Pietro Paolo Magni Piacentino intorno al sanguinar i 
corpi humani, il modo di ataccare le sanguisuche e ventose è far frittioni è vesicatorii 
(Rome: 1584), 10.
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characters are engaged, along with a third character named Dol, in a 
joint venture, one brokered on an exceedingly precarious notion of 
trust (that will evaporate in the final scenes of the play). Can Face 
trust Subtle? Or in Face’s words: “And not cut my throat, but trim 
me?” Subtle reminds rather than diminishes the risk that Face, as it 
were, faces: “You shall see.” Trust is a weak antidote to the agonistic 
forces of techne and to the agonistic orientation of the practitioner. 
Such agony was a part of the earliest medical interventions that we 




Tagespolitische Nachrichten kommen und gehen wie das Wetter oder 
die Jahreszeiten. Wir nehmen sie zur Kenntnis oder ignorieren sie 
und denken nur manchmal kurz über ihre Konsequenzen für unser 
Leben nach. Doch hin und wieder geschieht etwas, das plötzlich die 
Zeit still stehen lässt und zugleich merkwürdig beschleunigt. Auf al­
len Kanälen wird nur noch über ein Ereignis berichtet. Wir verfolgen 
die Meldungen wie besessen und wissen doch zugleich, dass wir in 
einer Schleife hängen. Mitteilungen von Terroranschlägen gehören 
in diese Kategorie.
Viele erinnern sich noch genau, wo sie waren, als die Nachricht 
von den Einschlägen der Flugzeuge in das World Trade Center in New 
York am 11. September 2001 eintraf. Man sah die Bilder mit Fassungs­
losigkeit und reagierte wie im Ausnahmezustand. Mit der Zeit jedoch 
wurde deutlich, dass zwar das Attentat an Spektakularität kaum zu 
überbieten war, die Bilder in ihrer Sequenz aber einem hinlänglich 
bekannten Muster folgten, denn weder war das höchstsymbolische 
Anschlagsziel im Herzen einer westlichen Metropole und der Einsatz 
modernster Technologien neu, noch die Tatsache, dass es sich um 
Selbstmordattentate handelte.1
Entsprechend sah man wie immer bei Terroranschlägen seit 
dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts zunächst bestürzende Bilder der Zer­
störung. Doch den Aufnahmen der Verwüstung folgten sogleich An­
sichten, die vor allem den Einsatz von Sicherheitskräften und Ret­
tungshelfern zeigten. Intakte zivile Ordnung und gesellschaftlichen 
Zusammenhalt signalisierten auch die zahlreichen Fotos von über­
lebenden Opfern und ihre Versorgung sowie Szenen, die das kollek­
tive Trauern der Menschen vor Ort und in der Welt zum Ausdruck 
brachten. Weitgehend ausgeblendet blieb hingegen das tatsächliche 
Leid der bei diesem Anschlag qualvoll ums Leben Gekommenen. Die 
New York Times zum Beispiel zeigte am Tag nach dem Anschlag auf 
ihrer Titelseite in Großaufnahme ein Foto der brennenden Hoch­
häuser aus der Ferne, darunter eine Armee von Feuerwehrleuten in 
den Ruinen sowie das Bild einer verletzten Frau in der Fürsorge von 
Sanitätern (Abbildung). Daneben erschien eine Aufnahme vom Pen­
1 Charlotte Klonk, Terror: Wenn Bilder zu Waffen werden (Frankfurt am Main: 2017), 33–93.
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tagon in Washington, auf das fast zeitgleich ein Anschlag verübt 
 worden war. Doch auch hier war der Einschlagsort nur als Sach­
schaden und aus der Distanz zu sehen. Im Kern nichts anderes bo­
ten  die Bildschleifen im Fernsehen, die viele in den Stunden und 
 Tagen nach den Anschlägen wie gebannt verfolgten, obwohl es we­
nig Neues zu sehen gab.
Die Spurensuche nach bildlichen Mustern und ihren Abweichun­
gen gehört zum Kerngeschäft der Kunstgeschichte. Kein Kunstwerk 
entwickelt seine Wirkung im echolosen Raum. Man braucht eine 
 Folie, um Ungewohntes und Überraschendes als solches überhaupt 
erkennen zu können. Bilder vom Terror sind hier keine Ausnahme. 
Das Besondere an den Aufnahmen vom 11. September 2001 war nicht, 
dass sie etwas noch nie zuvor Gesehenes zeigten, sondern dass sie 
in einem zentralen Aspekt vom üblichen Muster abwichen. Was das 
war, hat der Historiker Gerhard Paul treffend auf den Punkt gebracht, 
als er feststellte, dass auffallend viele Bilder in Umlauf  kamen, die 
das Ereignis „in die bekannte Ikonographie des konven tionellen 
 zwischenstaatlichen Krieges“ überführten und so „zugleich den 
 wieder gewonnenen Selbstbehauptungswillen und den patrio­
tischen Siegeswillen der Amerikaner über das unbekannte Böse“ 
symbolisierten.2 Das berühmteste Beispiele dieser Art ist vielleicht 
Thomas E. Franklins Foto von Feuerwehrleuten (Abbildung 2), die be­
reits wenige Stunden nach dem Anschlag eine US­amerikanische 
Flagge auf Ground Zero hissten. Das über Associated Press verbrei­
tete Bild war schon am folgenden Tag auf den Titelseiten zahlreicher 
amerika nischer Zeitungen zu sehen und bald in der ganzen Welt. 
Rasch wurde deutlich, dass es sich hier, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, 
um ein Zitat einer früheren Bildikone aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 
handelte: Joe Rosenthals Aufnahme von US­Soldaten, die am 23. Feb­
ruar 1945 eine Fahne auf der von den Japanern zurückeroberten Pa­
zifikinsel Iwo Jima aufstellten. So wurde früh schon militärisch kon­
notiert und mit Sieg und Niederlage assoziiert, was zunächst vor 
allem eine enorme innenpolitische Herausforderung war.
2 Gerhard Paul, Bilder des Krieges – Krieg der Bilder: Die Visualisierung des modernen 
Krieges (Paderborn: 2004), 448.
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die Anschläge verantwortlich, doch es dauerte nicht lange bevor be­
kannt wurde, dass auffällige Indizien in eine andere Richtung wie­
sen. Ohne klare politische Linie und ohne ein konturiertes Feindbild 
gab es am Ende auch keine einheitliche, identitätsstiftende Narra­
tion wie in New York oder London und somit auch keine einschlägige 
Medienikone. Erst im Vergleich der jeweiligen Bildberichterstattun­
gen kommen entscheidende politische Unterschiede zum Vorschein, 
die gerade wegen des gemeinsamen Rahmens – Ansichten der Zer­
störung, der kollektiven Trauer und der Rettungs­ und Sicherheits­
dienste im Einsatz – im Zuge der jeweiligen Ereignisse nicht wahr­
genommen wurden. 
Bedeutung ist bei Bildern selten offensichtlich, Überraschung ihr 
Geheimnis. Was in der Plötzlichkeit ihres Auftretens unterzugehen 
droht, taucht häufig im Kontext anderer Bilder und als unerwartete, 
manchmal minimale Abweichung von einem Muster wieder auf. Die 
Folie ist historisch gewachsen und formt einen Erwartungshorizont, 
dessen Unterbrechung erst eigentlich Erkenntnis stiftet. Entsprech­
end ist in der Regel nicht der Augenblick der Betrachtung für das Ver­
ständnis ausschlaggebend, sondern der langsame Blick von der Seite 
und aus der Tiefe der Geschichte. Das gilt auch für Bilder des Terrors 
in den westlichen Medien, obwohl oder gerade weil sie uns jedes Mal 
wieder und aufs Neue wie ein Schlag treffen.
Vor dem Hintergrund der langen Tradition von Kriegsbildern, in der 
Gerhard Paul die Fotografie von Franklin verortet, mag diese Form 
der patriotischen Selbstbehauptung vielleicht nicht erstaunlich sein. 
Im Kontext des Terrors aber war sie beispiellos, denn nie zuvor hatte 
Kriegsrhetorik hier in dieser Weise in Wort und Bild eine Rolle ge­
spielt. Auch bei den weiteren Anschlägen von Al Qaida in Europa zu 
Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts gab es keine entsprechenden Reaktio­
nen. In den USA aber wurde nach dem 11. September 2001 durch die 
patriotische Heroisierung der Rettungskräfte der Krieg als Gegen­
schlag vorstellbar und mit der militärischen Intervention in Af­
ghanistan im Herbst 2001 und im Irak 2003 schließlich auch realisiert. 
In Großbritannien hingegen stand nach den U­Bahn­Anschlägen in 
 London vom 7.  Juli 2005 vor allem der Zusammenhalt der Gesell­
schaft  im Mittelpunkt der Selbstbehauptungsbilder. Das Bild, das 
hier zur  Medienikone wurde, zeigte ein Opfer mit Gaze­Maske, dem 
ein  Passant am Ausgang der Station Edgware Road umsorgend zu 
Hilfe gekommen war. Metaphern des Krieges gab es keine, denn im 
Unterschied zu den New Yorker Anschlägen waren die meisten Täter 
Briten, so dass eine militärische Lösung ohnehin nicht in Frage kam. 
In  Spanien wiederum herrschte nach den Bombenexplosionen auf 
 Madrider Bahnhöfen vom 11. März  2004 politische Konfusion. Die 
 Regierung machte zunächst die baskische Terrororganisation ETA für 
Thomas E. Franklin, „Firefighters  Raising the Flag 
at Ground Zero,“ New York, September 11, 2001.  
© The Record (Bergen Co., NJ)/Getty Images.
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It was the English author and Whig politician Horace Walpole (1717–
1797) who invented the term. He introduced it in a letter to his name­
sake and long­term correspondent Horace Mann, dated January 28, 
1754, drawing on his memory of “The Three Princes of Serendip,” a 
me dieval detective story about three princes who hunt down a sto­
len camel (Walpole misremembers it to be a mule). 3 It is key to Wal­
pole’s neologism that throughout the narrative, the princes are keen 
observers and chance upon discoveries of different types, which oc­
cur “by accident and sagacity.” This inspired Walpole to create the 
word “serendipity” to characterize the sort of luck that had just en­
abled him to make a “critical discovery” about the arms of the Capello 
family in an old book on Venetian heraldry.4
It is arguably due to its double nature that academics eventually 
came to find this concept attractive. If serendipity only comes to the 
aid of the knowledgeable, then it allows you to be lucky and to de­
serve being so at the same time. But while the role of chance in re­
search was discussed intensely throughout the nineteenth century, 
the term “serendipity” came to be regularly used in the sciences and 
in writings about science only from the mid­twentieth century on­
ward, which warrants an explanation.5
One reason lies in the traits of the term’s inventor: Walpole made 
a point of stressing that he invested no real work in any of his pur­
suits. For this and other reasons, he did not have a good reputation 
with the early Victorians. It was only in 1833 that his correspondence 
with Horace Mann was first published, and by then a negative pat­
tern of critical reaction to his letters had been established. They were 
at best considered amusing monuments of their author’s wit but, like 
their author more generally, hardly ever taken seriously. It was only 
3 See “A Short History of the Word ‘Serendipity,’” Interesting Literature: A Library of 
Literary Interestingness, last modified January 28, 2015, accessed August 10, 2017,  
https://interestingliterature.com/2015/01/28/a­short­history­of­the­word­serendipity.  
On Walpole’s encounter with the tale, see Robert King Merton and Elinor Barber,  
The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A Study in Sociological Semantics and the 
Sociology of Science (Princeton, NJ: 2004), 1–21.
4 Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, January 28, 1754, in The Yale Edition of Horace 
 Walpole’s Correspondence, ed. W. S. Lewis (New Haven, CT: 1937–1983), 20:407–411.
5 On the entire paragraph, see Merton and Barber, The Travels, 41–46 and ch. 7; on the 
 following paragraph, see chs. 3 and 4.
Urweizen
Fabian Kraemer
On June  18, 1906, a young agronomist and self­fashioned botanist 
with a sturdy physique, the Romanian­born Zionist Aaron Aaronsohn 
(1876–1919), made a surprise discovery. He had returned to the north­
ern part of Galilee earlier that month to search for specimens of a 
plant whose significance for the history of human civilization could 
not be overestimated: Triticum dicoccum var. dicoccoides, or Urwei-
zen, the wild progenitor of cultivated wheat. His attempt to locate it 
in 1904 had failed. And were it not for a group of German botanists 
whom he met in Berlin in 1905 and who had asked him to find the 
plant, he might not have picked up the thread of his quest again.1
But on that particular Monday in June, Aaronsohn happened to 
be preoccupied with a different (albeit related) question. He was in 
the vineyards of the Jewish settlement Rosh Pina trying to prove to 
his travel companion and friend, the agronomist M. Bermann, that 
the area had its origin in the Eocene epoch, when a solitary plant 
growing in the crack of a nummulitic rock caught his attention. It 
was the fabled Urweizen. This finding caused quite a stir both for his­
torical and political reasons since it constituted fresh evidence that 
the cultivation of wheat and other grains originated in the region.2 
Aaronsohn’s account strikes the reader as strangely familiar be­
cause it reiterates a topos: that of the serendipity of the scholar or 
scientist who chances upon something when least expected. Dusty 
drawings by a famous painter found on a cupboard in an otherwise 
well­catalogued collection or an anomaly encountered in experimen­
tation—narratives of serendipitous discovery are legion. But  almost 
200 years elapsed after the inception of the term before it became a 
widespread narrative device and a template for lived experience 
among scientists. Why? 
1 Aaron Aaronsohn, “Über die in Palästina und Syrien wildwachsend aufgefundenen 
Getreidearten,” Verhandlungen der k.k. zoologisch-botanischen Gesellschaft in Wien 59 
(1909): 485–509, on 491–492. See also for the following reference to Urweizen. The author 
extends his heartfelt thanks to Donna Bilak and Dana von Suffrin for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
2 Most recently on Aaronsohn and his discovery see Dana von Suffrin, Pflanzen  
für  Palästina! Otto Warburg und die Naturwissenschaften im Jischuw, 1900–1930  
(PhD. diss., Ludwig­Maximilians­Universität München, 2017). 
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Finally, he left unmentioned that it was not in fact he who first spot­
ted the isolated Urweizen specimen but Bermann. In another article, 
aimed less at his scientific than at his Zionist community, he states, 
“Mister Bermann, whom I made aware of the plant’s characteristics, 
found the plant here [in the vineyards of Rosh Pina; F. K.] first.” 9 
 Aaronsohn had prepped him so well that the latter was sagacious 
enough to find the plant in a model serendipitous situation: when 
neither of them was looking for it.
9 Aaron Aaronsohn, “Die Auffindung des wilden Emmers (Tritium Dicoccum) in Nord­
palaestina (Vorläufige Mitteilung),” Altneuland 3, nos. 7–8 (1906): 213–216, on 214.
around 1870 that critical opinion became more favorable. And this 
also affected the reception of Walpole’s neologism, “serendipity”. It 
was late­Victorian collectors and literary men on the fringes of pro­
fessional academe who started adopting serendipity into their 
 vocabularies—and into their practices, as it were.
But it never ceased to be problematic. Several more decades 
elapsed before scientists followed suit because the concept of “seren­
dipity” seemed too whimsical for professional researchers. Against 
the backdrop of a prevalent empiricist methodology that considers 
discoveries as a key to the progress of science, serendipity needs 
careful policing.6 It is for this reason that many authors who relate 
a case of serendipity of their own stress at the same time that seren­
dipity does not pay surprise visits to just anyone. In the words of 
the microbiologist Salvador E. Luria (1912–1991), serendipity is “the 
chance observation that comes falling on a receptive eye.” 7
Aaronsohn is no exception. The narrative of his unexpected dis­
covery makes up but a short passage in a lengthy article. 
Now, on June 18 I was in the vineyards of the Jewish agricultural 
colony Rosh Pina with my loyal and always helpful friend and 
travel companion M. Bermann to prove to him that the area was 
of Eocene origin, when I noticed a solitary cereal plant in the 
crack of a nummulitic chalk rock. Upon first sight, it looked like a 
type of barley but upon closer inspection it turned out to be a 
Triticum, the rachis of which was brittle and the small spikes of 
which became loose when shaken even very softly.8
The other parts of the text leave no space for doubt about their au­
thor’s learning, his practical ability as a biologist and agronomist, 
and the diligence with which he scoured the region.
6 Cf. Merton and Barber, The Travels, ch. 7; Lorraine Daston, “Are You Having Fun Today? 
Review of The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A Study in Sociological Semantics 
and the Sociology of Science by Robert Merton and Elinor Barber,” London Review of 
Books 26, no. 18 (2004): 29–31.
7 Salvador E. Luria, “The T2 Mystery,” Scientific American 192, no. 4 (1955): 92–98, on 92. 
8 Aaronsohn, “Über die in Palästina und Syrien,” 492; all translations are the author’s.
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E: Auf Folgendes: Es notierte ganz erfahren dereinst Adelard von 
Bath in seinen Fragen zur Natur an seinen Neffen: „Was er­
staunt dich nur an diesem einen Ding so ausgesprochen? Wieso 
bist du so verwundert und warum nur so perplex? […] Deine 
Seele, voll und ganz erfüllt vom Staunen in Ermangelung der 
Kenntnis, wenn sie nun aus großer Ferne voll der Ehrfurcht 
den Effekt aller Objekte untersucht ohne dessen Grund mit zu 
bedenken, hat sie nie sich ihrer Aporie befreit. Doch genau 
schau hin und bedenke die Gegebenheit, schlage Gründe vor; 
und dein Staunen über den Effekt wird sehr schnell weichen.“ 1 
Oh Magister, lehrtest du uns dieser Tage denn nicht ähnlich 
teure Dinge über Aristoteles? Gleich am Anfang seines Buches 
zu der ersten Wissenschaft schrieb der Philosophenkönig, 
dass wir zu Beginn des Wissensweges staunen, und dass dieses 
Staunen unsern Eifer für die Weisheit setzt in Gang. Sowie je­
doch wir um die Gründe der Objekte wissen, erfolgt alsdann, 
was Adelard von Bath an seinen Neffen niederschrieb, und 
 werden wir dann sein ganz ohne admiratio?
A: Ganz Recht hast du mit dieser Frage, eifriger Epimetheus. Doch 
sollst du mitbedenken zweierlei: Vergiss das Ziel des Wissens 
nicht, das ich dich lehrte um die Weihnachtszeit. Vermische 
nicht in deinem Denken die erstgenannte Wissenschaft mit der, 
die ganz und gar die höchste ihrer Zunft darstellt.
E: Beide Dinge steigen derzeit mir nicht in Erinnerung. Aber sehn­
lichst bitt’ ich dich, Magister Albert, lehre mich!
A: Meinetwegen. Zunächst die Konflation, die schwerer wiegt 
als dein Vergessen. Am Anfang jedes Wissensweges steht die 
admiratio. Doch sollst du mitbedenken, dass sie auch an dessen 
1 Adelard von Bath, Conversations with His Nephew: “On the Same and the Different,” 
“Questions on Natural Science,” and “On Birds,” hgg. und übers. C. Burnett mit I. Ronca,  
P. Mantas España, und B. van den Abeele (Cambridge, UK: 1998), 202–204. Meine deutsche 




(Albert dem Großen nachempfunden)
Nach der Komplet im Kölner Chorgestühl saß Albert tief versunken 
ins Gebet.
A: Schwach war meine Einsicht, groß mein Wissensdrang 
Dich, o Herr, zu fassen, dass ich Deiner hab. 
Furchtlos griff ich zu! Deinem Buch des Lebens rang 
Ich durch die Zeiten alle Wahrheit ab.
 
Philosoph bin ich! Von Profession kann 
Ich die Welt erschließen mir in voller Pracht. 
Derbei muten Geistes Grenzen reglos an, 
Deine Dignität entzieht sich meiner Macht.
 
Und doch! Du bist doch Der, Der fügte alle 
Menschenleben nach Seinem Angesicht und  
Zu Sich hin. Auch nach dem Sündenfalle
 
Verloren wie ich war, unfähig jeden  
Wortes und der Vernunft, gabst Du mir Mund 
Und Aug’ Dich zu bestaunen, edensgleich.
Als fast wie aus dem Nichts Epimetheus erschien und sprach ihn an.
E: Mein Magister, großer Albert, bitte lehre auf der Stelle mich  
die Wahrheit! Dieser Tag darf niemals enden ehe du mir nicht 
erhellst die unlösbare Frage, die ich habe.
A: Epimetheus, was auf dieser Welt kann es nur diesmal sein,  
das dich nicht schlafen lässt zu später Stunde?
E: Erinnerst du dich, Albert, großer Wissender, an das, was du uns 
letzten Sommer lehrtest? 
A: Worauf genau beziehst du dich, Epimetheus? 
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Ende steht. Der Unterschied ist der, dass das Objekt ein jeweils 
and’res ist. Fragt der Forscher der Natur nach Pflanzen, Sternen, 
Donnerblitz, ist der erste Grund schlechthin das Objekt des 
strengen Denkers über Gott. Mit dem Wissen, welches anbricht 
bei den Sinnen, ist’s unmöglich Gott zu greifen. Daher bleibt uns 
nur zu staunen über Ihn als Gegenstand, ohnedies wir längst 
erkannten alle Gründe dieser Welt. Mag dies Staunen, welches 
einst in uns entfachte unsern Wissensdrang, auch erloschen 
sein; jenes Staunen über Gott jedoch wird nie vergeh’n. In der 
Tat! Wird nicht die Wissenschaft vom Herrn bestimmt als 
 Forschen, das nur allergrößtes Staunen bringt, und dies noch tut 
ganz ohne Unterlass? Daher hat der Philosoph mit seiner Weis­
heit nicht das letzte Wort. 
E: Diese Worte leuchten ein mir in der Tat, oh Meister Albert.
A:  Voran, voran, Epimetheus! Vergessen lass uns nicht, dass das 
Ziel des Wissens hier liegt im Erwerb des Intellekts. Der 
 Philo sophen alle Großen haben dies durchweg erkannt. Ja, so 
steht fest: Mit jedem Allgemeinbegriff, den wir erworben uns 
vollends, wächst heran ganz unbegrenzt in uns das Licht des 
Intellekts. Es wird stärker jeden Tag, dass wir befreien uns 
vom ratenweisen Denken dieser Welt, und eines Tages bar des 
Zeitverzugs erfassen instantan des Herren Opus, Gottes 
 Meisterstück. Und so gibt es wahrhaft letzter Weisheit keine, 
ohne Eintracht zwischen Platon und beileibe Aristoteles. Alles 
and’re wäre Bruchwerk, Strohhalm, nach­gedacht! Doch das 
Staunen über Gott erreicht auf diese Art des Wissens noch nicht 
seinen letzten Schluss. Ganz im Gegenteil! Denn jener Intellekt, 
der so erworben schaut die Welt, verlangt vielmehr nach Wissen 
uferloser Art – nach Gott allein. Ja, so kann die letzte Lösung 
uns’res Staunens nur ereignen sich in der Vollendung, die die 
höchste Wissenschaft uns weist. 
E: Großer Albert, mein Magister, danke, weiser Mann. Ihr habt mir 
des Intellektes Aug’ geöffnet ganz und gar. Und so kann ich jetzt 
beruhigt das Aug’ des Körpers schließen gehen und begeben 
mich zur Ruh in dieser Nacht.
A: Noch nicht ganz, Epimetheus, nicht bevor du Folgendes be­
denkst.
Da sein Schüler nun der Lösung ward gewahr, bot Albert mahnend 
ihm dies Fazit dar.
Begeh’ den Weg des Staunens und weiche
Niemals davon ab. Erwirb’ der Weisheit
viel, die dir im Hier zum Glück gereiche,
und die dich führend, sanft ins Licht befreit.
Trotz Glanz und menschlicher Vollkommenheit
Wird sich dein Staunen über Gott bewahren,
wirst du im Streben, Sehnen Drang erfahren,
dass Er dir bietet dauerhaft Geleit.
So muss Er letzten Endes dich reißen
Aus der Welt, muss das, was Er verheißen,
dir kundtun klar, befreit. Muss schauen lassen
dich, Sein Sein mentalen Auges fassen.
Zum Hier steht dies in keinerlei Vergleich. 
Bei Ihm, da ist das wahre Himmelreich.2
2 Zentrale Textpassagen zu admiratio finden sich in folgenden Werken von Albertus 
 Magnus: Metaphysica, XI.2.35 (Ed. Colon. XVI/2, 527.52–54); S. Dion. Ep., ep. 7  
(Ed. Colon. XXXVII/2, 505.6–43); S. Eth., X.16 (Ed. Colon. XIV/2, 774.80–775.13); S. theol.,  
I prol. (Ed. Colon. XXXIV/1, 1.5–4.14). Zentrale Passagen zum Ziel der menschlichen 
Erkenntnis und zum Verhältnis der Philosophie zur Theologie finden sich in S. I Lib. 
Sent., I.1 (Ed. Colon. XXIX/1,10–18); De anima, III.3.6–11 (Ed. Colon. VII/1, 214.83–223.38);  
De anima, III.3.13 (226.53–59); Metaphysica, I.1.5 (Ed. Colon. XVI/2, 7.83–8.4); Metaphysica, 
II.2 (93.81–94.6); Metaphysica, XI.3.7 (542.25–29); De intellectu et intelligibili, II.6  
(Ed. Borgnet IX, 513a); S. theol., I prol. (Ed. Colon. XXXIV/1, 3.29–47); S. theol., I.1.1–6 (5–23).
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 Victor Roberts, an Iranian student of E. S. Kennedy at the American 
University of Beirut, published a short note in Isis (48, 428–432), claim­
ing that the lunar theory of a fourteenth­century Damascene astron­
omer, Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir, “is identical with that of Copernicus.” The referee 
reports for this article have disappeared, but surviving correspon­
dence between Kennedy and O. Neugebauer illuminates some of the 
expectations in play.2
In 1954, Kennedy, teaching a history of math class, assigned 
 Roberts to work on Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir’s planetary theory. By December 
1954 the two had “some results to announce … the solar model uses 
an epicycle … my man … is now looking through the manuscript to 
see if any observational data are given justifying the new model.” In 
February 1955: “The enclosed slip of paper [not preserved] gives 
 essentially al­Sha¯t.ir’s lunar model. It is suppo[s]ed to be based on 
observational data the which [sic] he has written up in a previous 
treatise. … I think the former is non­extant, but we must check in 
Brockelman.” Neugebauer replies, “As to ibn al­Sha¯t.ir it seems to me 
you should sent [sic] a short paper about it to the ‘Centaurus.’” No 
mention of Copernicus.
The next month, however, Kennedy began thinking about trans­
mission: “There is no notice we can find of any translation of the 
work ever having been made into Latin or otherwise, and I would be 
surprised to find one.” In April 1955: “We had a quick look at the dia­
grams for the other planets, and all of them have more than the usual 
number of epicycles, hence are not like the Copernican planetary 
models. I think this supports the natural assumption of Copernicus 
having worked out his things in ignorance of Ibn ash­Shatir.” Now 
Copernicus is granted independence.
By August 1955 Roberts had sketched al­Sha¯t.ir’s Saturn model 
and drafted an article on the solar and lunar models that Kennedy 
edited “severely.” Kennedy hopes that Roberts can “get the same ma­
terial for the other planets.” In May 1956 Kennedy reports, “We sent 
off the Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir paper to Isis, … Full title is Roberts, V., ‘The solar 
and lunar theory of Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir.’” Note that the title submitted does 
2 Neugebauer Papers, Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, Box 13.
Peculiar Expectations
Richard L. Kremer
Back in the 1950s, when history of science was a smaller, more famil­
ial discipline, referee reports could be blunt, as when T. S. Kuhn wrote 
Isis editor Harry Woolf, “Harry—you were a bastard to send this to 
me. … I don’t know altogether what to say to you about it. After a good 
deal of wrestling with my soul … I conclude it is a fundamentally silly 
piece. Hanson seems unable to separate his own initial surprise at 
discovering how hard Kepler’s job really was … from his [Hanson’s] 
scholarship.” The paper, “The Copernican Disturbance and the Keple­
rian Revolution,” had been authored by the philosopher of science 
N. R. Hanson. Reading Kepler under the guidance of C. S. Peirce, Han­
son found himself personally amazed at how the astronomer came 
upon the idea of elliptical orbits. The other referees were scarcely 
more temperate. “This paper adds nothing to existing knowledge of 
the subject” (Edward Rosen); “the author’s thesis is not at all novel. … 
I find no information—aside from the errors—which is not common­
place among historians of astronomy” (William Stahlman). Hanson’s 
paper did not appear in Isis (but it did in the JHI).1
That Kuhn in 1959 disparaged surprise as an epistemic tool for 
the historian might seem ironic to readers of the famous opening 
paragraph of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962): “I was a 
graduate student in physics … [when] a fortunate involvement pro­
vided my first exposure to the history of science. To my complete 
 surprise, that exposure to out­of­date scientific theory and practice 
radically undermined some of my basic conceptions about the na­
ture of science.” In this case, Kuhn’s surprise about science’s history 
led him to write one of the classic books of the twentieth century, 
whereas according to the Isis referees, Hanson’s personal surprise 
about that history led to commonplaces not worthy of publication. 
In both cases, however, challenges to initial expectations provoked 
impassioned historical work.
At the same time, several other historians of science announced 
a momentous discovery with no expression of surprise. In 1957, 
1 History of Science Society Papers, Smithsonian Institution Archives, acc. 95–152, box 15.  
I thank Jay Malone, executive director of the History of Science Society, for granting me 
permission to examine these editorial records and Amy Ackerberg­Hastings for help with 
this archival research.
216 217
Richard L. Kremer | Peculiar ExpectationsRichard L. Kremer | Peculiar Expectations
not mention Copernicus. At this point, the Kennedy­Neugebauer cor­
respondence dries up as Kennedy spent a sabbatical year in Prince­
ton with Neugebauer. In the 1957 edition of his The Exact Sciences in 
Antiquity (p. 197), Neugebauer cited Roberts’s forthcoming article and 
announced, without comment, that Copernicus and al­Sha¯t.ir used 
the “same method” for correcting Ptolemy’s lunar model. At some 
Rosen’s referee report, February 28, 1958. See note 1.
point, Roberts’s article acquired its subtitle: “A Pre­Copernican Coper­
nican Model.”
In February 1958, Kennedy and Roberts submitted a second ar­
ticle to Isis (50, 227–235), in which they claimed that the “planetary 
machinery” in Copernicus’s De revolutionibus “show a remarkable 
similarity” to those of Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir. “To assume,” they concluded, 
“that the later astronomer operated in total ignorance of the work 
of his predecessor would be to ask a good deal.” The referee reports 
for this article are extant (figure). The leading Copernicus scholar of 
the 1950s, Edward Rosen, was exceeding terse: “Excellent. I’ve made 
some stylistic suggestions.” Slightly less pithily, medievalist Marshall 
 Claggett wrote, “Looks like an excellent piece of analytical work, but 
rather awkwardly presented.” Neither referee expressed surprise at 
the article’s claim; both worried more about writing style than Coper­
nicus’s originality.
In the late 1950s, Kennedy flipped from the “natural assumption” 
that Copernicus had no knowledge of earlier Arabic astronomy to 
the  opposite view, undoubtedly with nudging from Neugebauer. 
Arguably the leading historian in his generation of the early “exact 
sciences” (Babylonian, Egyptian, Greco­Roman, and Islamic), Neuge­
bauer expected ideas to circulate. In his notorious 1951 jeremiad on 
“the study of wretched subjects,” Neugebauer wrote that “to the 
 historian of science the transmission of ideas is rightly one of his 
most important problems” (Isis 42, 111).3 That Copernicus might have 
 borrowed some mathematics from Ibn al­Sha¯t.ir certainly did not sur­
prise Neugebauer. That it surprises some scholars today shows how 
expectations change. Historians’ surprises tell us little about history, 
much about historians.
3 See also Francesca Rochberg, “The Brown School of the History of Science,” in The Circu-
lation of Astronomical Knowledge in the Ancient World, ed. John M. Steele (Leiden: 2016), 
5–17, on 8.
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B. Harun Küçük
In 1970, economic historian Halil Sahilliog˘lu used the 11­day differ­
ence between the lunar and the solar year as an explanation for the 
financial crises that occurred around 1644 and 1677.1 Such crises 
came as very unpleasant surprises, both to the administrators and 
to those who drew salaries from the treasury, and calendar reform 
was only one of the tools in the administrative arsenal. Both before 
and after calendar reform, the empire turned these hard corners by 
transferring funds from the sultan’s inner treasury to the public trea­
sury. And by the second half of the eighteenth century, when the 1677 
calendar reform was finally made universal beyond financial mat­
ters, the inner treasury had been almost completely drained. 
And so, when in 2016 Saudi Arabia switched from the traditional 
Hijri calendar to the Gregorian calendar in order to cut public spend­
ing, it was not the first time a Muslim state introduced a new tempo­
ral regime of finance. That honor goes to the Ottoman Empire’s 1677 
reform, which switched from the lunar calendar to a luni­solar cal­
endar, with the sun determining the year. As the ruler of a Muslim­ 
agrarian state, the sultan collected taxes according to the seasons 
but paid salaries on a schedule set by the moon, meaning that about 
every 33 years, state expenditures were a full year behind. After the 
reform, the financial officers used the Rumi, or Roman/ Julian calen­
dar, without completely eliminating the Hijri calendar, which contin­
ued to coordinate religious observance. Once, with the help of Istan­
bul’s astrological almanac named for the fifteenth­ century Sufi Sheik 
Vefa, they skipped a whole Hijri year: nothing could be more Otto­
man than relying on saintly charisma to justify tax collection. 
It is hard to lionize tax collectors, but they were certainly among 
the most reasonable individuals in Istanbul, perhaps also the best of 
the city in science and scholarship. Long before the treasury had 
been entirely emptied, bureaucrats were observing financial matters 
with a cool numeracy. In the 1650s, Ottoman historian, geo grapher, 
and accountant Katip Çelebi opined that the state was paying sala­
ries to too many people and that the number of Janissaries on the 
1 Halil Sahilliog˘lu, “Sıvıs¸ Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire,” in Studies in the Economic 
History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. M. A. Cook 
(London: 1970), 230–254.
payroll was unreasonably inflated. Other erudite bureaucrats, such 
as ‘Ayn Ali (fl. 1607) and Hezarfenn Hüseyin (d. 1691?) responded to fi­
nancial woes by sitting down to calculate the imperial budget, also 
known as the Canons of the Ottoman State, without having the lux­
ury of centralized records. The most extreme measure, violently lev­
ied emergency taxes, repulsive to any bureaucrat, could permanently 
damage imperial legitimacy and did in fact lead to the depo sition of 
Sultan Mehmed IV in 1687. But before that, the calendar reform of 
1677 came in a year when the public treasury borrowed a whopping 
140 million akçe, roughly 160,000 English pounds, from the sultan. 
Not a single akçe was ever paid back. 
But how did the Ottoman Empire formulate and implement a 
new calendar when, apparently, it did not have the technologies or 
the institutions to do so? The entire Catholic Church and innume­
rable ambitious printers had propped up the proposed Gregorian 
 calendar reform after 1582, but the new Ottoman calendar had nei­
ther religious legitimacy nor the benefit of print. When the Ming 
 dynasty was considering calendar reform in the early sixteenth­ 
century, it could rely on the massive Astro­Calendric Bureau that 
printed and sent out millions of almanacs across the empire. In ad­
dition, China had hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats to enforce 
its temporal regime, compared to far less than 1,000 at the disposal of 
the Sultan. 
The answer was that the reform was implemented very slowly 
and with the help of a growing number of bureaucrats, who, one by 
one, demonstrated their astrological talents until the balance of au­
thority finally tipped in their favor in 1662.2 The astrology­account­
ing connection went all the way back to the early seventeenth cen­
tury. The same Ayn Ali who had calculated the imperial budget 
was, for example, also the author of the most popular version of the 
 Almanac of Sheik Vefa, which was part tax calendar and part natural 
2 Joel Shinder, “Career Line Formation in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, 1648–1750: A New 
 Perspective,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 16, no. 2/3 (1973): 
217–237.
220
B. Harun Küçük | An Empty Treasury
astrology.3 In 1662, Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed, who is often credited 
with creating a centralized financial bureaucracy, had in his winter 
camp in Belgrade no less than five heavenly practitioners who did 
the bookkeeping for the campaign and cast horoscopes for the siege 
of Neuhäusel. 
This group included Panagiotes Nikousios (d. 1673), the grand 
dragoman to the Imperial Treasury and an astrologer of remarkable 
skill, and I˙brahim of Szigetvar (fl. 1660), a tax registrar and the now­
well­known translator of Noël Durret’s Nouvelle theorie des planetes 
(1635). Fazıl Ahmed’s bureaucrats had proven their mettle by out­ 
calculating the sultan’s astrologer, Müneccimek Mehmed (d. 1668).4 
I˙shak Efendi, chief accountant in 1677 and one of the protagonists of 
reform, was a junior accountant at that winter camp. 
The best­known and most common artifacts of the new Ottoman 
fiscal calendar are the innumerable two­meter­long almanac scrolls 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a nod to the bureaucra­
tic faith that the Ottoman state would last forever.5 These calendars 
no longer contained the astrological annotations, pointing to a bu­
reaucratic rationality that prized long­term planning and admin­
istrative continuity over fortune and war, thus ensuring Ottoman 
longevity. The taming of chance created a clearer sense of the future, 
one with much less room for surprise.
3 B. Harun Küçük, “Early Modern Ottoman Science: A New Materialist Framework,” Journal 
of Early Modern History 21 (2017): 407–419.
4 Georges Koutzakiotis, Attendre la fin du monde au XVIIe siècle: Le messie juif et le grand 
drogman (Paris: 2014).
5 Monika Dahncke, “Eine Osmanische Pergamentrolle,” Mitteilungen aus dem Museum für 




At some point in our training in history of science, we have all come 
across Newton’s ink drawing of a prism experiment in a room, his 
diagram of the “philosopher’s stone,” or that disconcerting figure of 
an eyeball with a bodkin thrust into its underside—the one to which 
Derek Gjerston felt compelled to add, “The reader is urged not to 
 replicate this experiment.” 1 Perhaps less well known is the fact that 
Newton drew when he read, as he did with Robert Hooke’s Micro-
graphia (1665). His manuscript notes, better known to Newton schol-
ars interested in his early work on fluxions, include a pen drawing 
of the figure of frozen urine and snowflakes copied from scheme VIII 
of Hooke’s book. The first line of Newton’s note reads, 
The Ice on ye surface of frozen Urin is insipid, & branched from a 
center (a) with six branches (of various lengths from ¼ inch to 4 
foot) and from those proceeded others in ye same angles of 60 
degrees, like herring bones and feathers.
In Micrographia, Hooke described the figure as branching out of 
“centre (a)” at the start of the section on frozen urine (88); the taste of 
the frozen urine as “insipid,” and the analogy with feathers is men-
tioned toward the end (90); the herringbone pattern is mentioned in 
the next section on figures of snow (92). Newton thus did not copy 
out Hooke’s words verbatim as he read but rather read through 
chunks of text and then made notes. Hooke, taking into account the 
thickness of the branches, had pointed out that the angles between 
the branches were “very neer” but a little less than 60 degrees (89), 
while Newton jotted down “the same angles of 60 degrees” without 
qualification. Hooke described (88) the size of these figures as “no big-
ger than a two-pence, others so bigg, that I have by measure found 
one of its stems or branches above four foot long,” which Newton 
reduced to “from ¼ inch to 4 foot.”
When Newton copied out the image of Hooke’s frozen urine, he 
copied out only the lettering, “a” to indicate the center, from which 
six branches issued, three of them showing knots in the middle sec-
tion of the branch (as in Hooke’s scheme), which Hooke described in 
1 John Fauvel et al., eds., Let Newton Be! (Oxford: 1988), 87, 156, 35.
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packed in geometric shapes (85f. scheme VII) into dotted patterns. 
 After all, this is Isaac Newton, whose mathematical acumen is not in 
doubt, while Hooke was writing for a nonspecialist audience: the 
king. But it seems worth emphasizing that Newton still thought it 
worthwhile to copy out some of the figures from Micrographia and 
that this is not the only example where he bothered to do so. Images 
could capture variety better than textual description, and the act of 
drawing must have helped him to grasp the images and thus dis-
pense with copying out lettering or the accompanying textual 
 description. Hooke said of the figure of the frozen urine, “The exact-
ness and curiosity of the figuration of these branches, was in every 
particular so transcendent, that I judge it almost impossible for 
 human art to imitate” (90). Newton concurred: “A most admirably 
 curious figure.”
More than half a century ago, Newton’s reading notes for Micro-
graphia were published as an example of his “strange habit” of note 
taking, and while the edition included all the diagrams and notations 
found in the other parts of the manuscript, the drawings in Newton’s 
reading notes were not included. As the editors explained, “We have 
omitted the sketches which Newton made from Hooke’s figures and 
to which he occasionally refers in lettered points.” 2 This omission 
may have been a financial decision on the part of Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, but it may also represent the historiogra phical preoccupa-
tions of the time.
We are no longer surprised that Newton took reading notes and 
that such reading notes could include images. Raine Daston inci-
sively pointed us to the usefulness of reading practices in tackling 
assumptions held about the universality of scientific texts. It is in no 
small part due to her example and encouragement that the threshold 
for surprises in history of science has advanced—curiously, admira-
bly and irrevocably so.
2 A. Rubert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, eds., Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton: 
A Selection from the Portsmouth Collection in the University Library, Cambridge  
(Cambridge: 1962), 397, 400.
the text using the keyed letters. Having drawn the knots, Newton 
presumably didn’t need to mark them in the figure for himself. New-
ton filled in part of the figure (as Hooke had done) to indicate how 
smaller branches stemmed progressively from the main branches. In 
denoting these branches and their relationships with each other, 
Hooke used the letterings ab, ac, ad, qm, st, and so on, and rather cum-
bersomely described them as “lateral,” “collateral,” “subcollateral,” 
and “latero-subcollateral” (89). Newton required no further lettering 
for his grasp of the different levels of branching and instead called 
them “secondary, tertiany, quartany, quintanay etc.” Noting that each 
branch was parallel to the penultimate branch out of which it grew, 
Newton called the latter a “grandfather” stem, which neatly encapsu-
lated Hooke’s point described in six lines of text. Newton’s hand-
drawn figure, however, seems to emphasize more the herringbone or 
feather-like pattern, rather than the strong parallel lines visible in 
Hooke’s image. Newton summarized Hooke’s next section about fig-
ures of snow in a line, saying that a large variety within the six-
branched pattern could be observed in figures of snow. While the 
“figured flakes” of snow were randomly arranged at the top of scheme 
VIII in Micrographia, Newton rearranged them in a row, perhaps in 
some order of increasing complexity.
The economy with which Newton parsed this section of the text 
and the images of Micrographia may not surprise us. He did some-
thing similar at the top of the same page by reducing Hooke’s circles 
Isaac Newton’s reading notes and drawings from Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1665).  
Cambridge University Library, MS Add. 3958, fol. 2v. Copyright © Cambridge University 
Library (CC BY-NC 3.0).
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eternal truths shared by all peoples across all times. He attributed 
this “metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality,” which he consid-
ered “immemorial and universal,” to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.3 But 
the German polymath had borrowed the idea from the Vatican librar-
ian Agostino Steuco’s 1540 book De perenni philosophia. At the dawn 
of modernity, the Renaissance theologian did not proclaim a break 
with the past as the Protestant reformers did when seceding from 
the Roman Church. At a time when Europeans began to encounter 
more and more ethnic groups unlike themselves, Steuco explained 
the corruption of the divine wisdom, in which men in paradise had 
still participated, by the human race’s scattering into all parts of the 
world. But, in principle, all people, including pagans and Protestants, 
continued to have access to the same original wisdom.4 Half a millen-
nium later, when Vedanta yoga began to seep into Huxley’s Holly-
wood, the British intellectual sought to reconstruct the transhis-
torical and transcultural core of all religions in the form of an 
anthological potpourri, including mystical thinkers from many dif-
ferent traditions that ranged from Hinduism and Sufism to Christian-
ity and Taoism while ignoring Confucianism and Judaism.5 His 1953 
mescaline experience suggested to Huxley that the drug provided a 
shortcut to the mystical experience as the “highest factor” shared by 
all spiritual traditions: it temporarily impaired “the cerebral reduc-
ing valve” that filtered out biologically useless perceptions but also 
prevented the finite human mind from communing with the cosmic 
Mind at Large.6 
To this day, Huxley’s perennial philosophy has left its mark on 
the psychedelic intelligentsia but also on neuroscientific and clinical 
research with hallucinogenic drugs, from so-called gating paradigms 
to psilocybin-assisted psychotherapy for end-of-life anxiety in termi-
3 Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (London: 1974), vii.
4 Charles Schmitt, “Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” Journal of  
the History of Ideas 27, no. 4 (1966): 505–532; Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia 
Perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early 
Modern Thought (Dordrecht: 2004), 428–434.
5 Johannes Bronkhorst, “The Perennial Philosophy and the Law of Karma,” in  
Aldous Huxley between East and West, ed. C. C. Barfoot (Amsterdam: 2001), 175–189.
6 Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (London: 1954), 26.
As Odd as Kangaroos
Nicolas Langlitz
Psychedelics opened the Wunderkammern of the scientific mind. At 
a time when God had long lost the spontaneity that made for the un-
expected in the established order of things, the Euro-American dis-
covery of mescaline, psilocybin, and ayahuasca—drugs that Native 
Americans had long used in shamanic ceremonies—confronted an-
thropologists, botanists, pharmacologists, psychiatrists, and other 
scholars with vast inner worlds that bordered on the preternatural. 
Shouts of surprise resound through this literature. The English phy-
sician Havelock Ellis expressed his amazement in the face of an “arti-
ficial paradise” he had stumbled upon after eating peyote buttons.1 
Perpetually new kinds of imagery appeared in his field of vision, 
sometimes a dull, somber richness of color, sometimes glitter and 
sparkle, once a startling rain of gold, glowing effects, as of jewels, fi-
brous structures, as of insect wings, objects made of exquisite porce-
lain, and exotic architectural forms resembling Maori buildings and 
the carved wooden balconies of nineteenth-century Cairo. Through-
out the twentieth century, such gasps of amazement would continue 
to set many serious scholars on the track to an intellectual demi-
monde filled with the curiosities and wonders that their colleagues 
had come to sneer at.
In his address to the Parapsychology Foundation’s 1954 annual 
symposium, Aldous Huxley suggested that both mescaline and hyp-
nosis could serve as vessels to cross the ocean between the Old World 
of personal consciousness and the uncharted New Worlds where “the 
naturalist of the mind” could gather his data on “all sorts of creatures 
at least as odd as kangaroos […] as they go about their mysterious 
business.” 2 These antipodes of the mind were not just psycholo-
gically but also ontologically different. For the exotic beings popu-
lating this terra incognita similar to the heavens and fairylands of 
folklore and religion “exist ‘out there,’” the writer maintained.
Huxley amalgamated this modernist appetite for the new with a 
rearticulation of the Neoplatonic philosophia perennis, assuming 
1 Havelock Ellis, “Mescal: A New Artificial Paradise,”Contemporary Review 73 (1898):  
132–133.
2 Aldous Huxley, “The Far Continents of the Mind (1954),” in Moksha: Writings on Psyched-
elics and the Visionary Experience, 1931–1963 (London: 1980), 58.
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nal cancer patients.7 When psychedelic research blossomed in the 
underground after the prohibition of the late 1960s, the former indus-
trial chemist Alexander Shulgin invented about 200 new compounds 
in a shack on his farm in Lafayette, California. He tested each sub-
stance in a series of self-experiments, learning especially from those 
bewildering and sometimes dangerous trips when he experienced 
effects that diverged from the expected structure/activity relation-
ship.8 Following Huxley’s idea that psychedelics opened the “doors of 
perception,” he suggested, “different drugs open different doors.” 9 
One day, he ingested 500 mg of mescaline and hit upon the very core 
of perennialism: “Funny, I’d forgotten that what comes to you when 
you take a psychedelic is not always a revelation of something new 
and startling; you’re more liable to find yourself reminded of simple 
things you know and forgot you knew—a seeing them freshly—old, 
basic truths that long ago became clichés, so you stopped paying 
 attention to them.” 10 This sense of surprise by the always-already 
known exemplifies the very tension between the psychonautic ex-
ploration of new frontiers and the perennialist anamnesis of eter-
nal verities that has animated psychedelia since the mid-twentieth 
century.
7 Nicolas Langlitz, Neuropsychedelia: The Revival of Hallucinogen Research since the 
Decade of the Brain (Berkeley, CA: 2012); Nicolas Langlitz and Anne Kirstine Hermann, 
“Der Tod, in anderem Licht betrachtet,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung,  
July 22, 2012.
8 Alexander Shulgin and Ann Shulgin, PIHKAL: A Chemical Love Story (Berkeley, CA: 1991), 
341.
9 Alexander Shulgin and Ann Shulgin, TIHKAL: The Continuation (Berkeley, CA: 1997), xxvi.
10 Shulgin and Shulgin, PIHKAL, 262.
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Der Lesekasten
Philipp N. Lehmann
In one vignette of his Berliner Kindheit, Walter Benjamin describes a 
didactic device called a Lesekasten, a box full of small wooden tiles 
printed with the letters of the alphabet that could be ordered into 
different combinations on the slender rails of the open lid. Since its 
invention by the teacher and pedagogical innovator Johann Peter 
Hundeiker (1751–1836) in the late eighteenth century, the “reading 
box” had become one of the most widely used educational tools of 
literacy training in German primary schools. When Benjamin shared 
his personal recollection of handling and arranging the wooden tiles 
as a child, he also described what must have been a shared collective 
childhood memory—or at least a shared glimmer of recollection—
among many of his contemporaries.
For Benjamin, however, the Lesekasten was more than one 
a mong a wide range of common childhood objects. It was the instru-
ment that formed enduring habits and abilities in him— the “Lesen 
und Schreiben” that would become one of the central activities of 
his life. The Lesekasten thus becomes a bridge between the child and 
the adult Benjamin, albeit a bridge that can no longer be walked 
across. Recollecting the tactile sensation of manipulating the tiles, 
Benjamin senses a feeling of loss. The hand that once moved the tiles 
to arrange them hesitantly into words “kann diesen Griff noch träu-
men, aber nie mehr erwachen, um ihn wirklich zu vollziehen.”
The hand’s inability to awake and replicate the uncertain Griff of 
the preliterate child contains all of Benjamin’s longing and nostalgia 
for a childhood lost irrevocably. But beyond this wistfulness, Benja-
min’s reflections also speak to the nature of learning in general and, 
more to the point, the difficulties—or even the impossibilities—of 
unlearning and relearning. The last few lines of the vignette leave 
the Lesekasten behind and venture even deeper into early-childhood 
development: “So kann ich davon träumen, wie ich einmal das Gehen 
lernte. Doch das hilft mir nichts. Nun kann ich gehen; gehen lernen 
nicht mehr.”
Benjamin’s conclusion here is absolute and unconditional: once 
we have learned, we may recall glimpses of the process of learning, 
but we will not be able to go back to a state that antecedes the expe-
rience of learning; nor can we replicate the learning process in either 
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Brian and the Air Pump
Daryn Lehoux
The 2014 BBC Two television program The Human Universe ran a seg-
ment in which host Brian Cox visited NASA’s Space Power Facility 
outside Sandusky, Ohio, in order to run a simple experiment. The 
crew hoisted a bowling ball and a clump of feathers up to a height 
and then released them, with entirely predictable results. But a sec-
ond run of the same experiment changed a single one of the vari-
ables: it removed all the air from the massive chamber. In this second 
experiment, the bowling ball and the feathers, in the absence of a 
resistant medium, fell in exactly the same time and struck the tar-
get  together. Although this outcome should be expected in a post- 
Galilean  universe, the observers in the video—filmmakers, NASA 
tech nicians, and spectators alike—universally expressed both sur-
prise and delight at the outcome. My question is this: What, precisely, 
is surprising about an experiment that produces entirely predictable 
results? When everyone in the room and everyone watching at home 
knew—absolutely knew—what would inevitably happen under the 
vacuum’s test conditions, what is it that still manages to trigger sur-
prise at the result? 1
The clip is at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E43-CfukEgs.2  
(Take a minute now, it’s fantastic.)
To begin, there are three moments in particular that I would like  
to highlight in the video.
(1) [2:36] 
“We are go for drop.”
1 I find it particularly astounding since I would expect many of the crew to have seen  
the experiment as performed on the actual moon by the Apollo 15 crew in 1971.  
See “Apollo 15 Hammer and Feather Drop,” YouTube video, 1:22, posted by “Stop And 
Think,” April 27, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4_rceVPVSY. I note that  
the Apollo crew is unfazed. Perhaps astronauts are a different breed of human.  
Many thanks to Jay Foster here and throughout.
2 BBC Two, “Brian Cox Visits the World’s Biggest Vacuum Chamber—Human Universe: 
 Episode 4 Preview—BBC Two,” YouTube video, 4:41, posted by “BBC,” October 24, 2014. 
The images on p. 234 and 235 are stills from this video, at minute 2:52 (release) and  
ca. 3:24 (landing).
its original or any alternative form. This is not an outlandish con-
clusion, and it may even seem intuitive. It is almost impossible to 
will ourselves back into a state of ignorance and, what may be even 
more difficult, back into a state before the acquisition of a particular 
ability or piece of knowledge has impacted other parts of our activi-
ties and our thinking. While learning enriches, it also erases.
Despite the apparent impossibility, unlearning and relearning 
may be among the most important (if rare) skills of any scholar and, 
in particular, the historian. To avoid going down ever-narrower paths 
of specialization and fragmentary history, to avoid seeing the cur-
rent path as the only feasible one, the historian has to be unafraid to 
go back to the drawing board, to tackle the big issues and topics 
anew, from alternative perspectives, with different time frames, and 
with new methods and collaborations. Without forgetting what has 
come before, the historian has to unlearn the prevailing ways to 
think and write in order to relearn to think and write in ways that 
open new avenues for research, pose new questions, and point to-
ward new answers. It is only then that the reader will experience 
that moment of wonder and surprise, which is ultimately nothing 
other than the recognition that some authors do come close to 
achieving the impossible. These authors, rare as they may be, allow 
us all to believe that we may, after all, be able to learn to walk, to 
read, and to write all over again.
234 235
It’s amazing just how seriously everyone takes the experiment. They 
do a countdown! Yes, it makes for good television, but this is also a 
NASA control room. I suspect this is just how they do everything. On 
the other hand, keep in mind how big the machine is that they are 
working—how much power does it take to remove 800,000 cubic feet 
of air from a (now highly depressurized) chamber? Look at the size of 
that thing. Just two grams of matter by the end—this amazes me.
(2) [2:52] 
Watch the feathers as they are released in the vacuum. The barbs ac-
tually move—on semiplume feathers these structures are so sensi-
tive as to show us what pure inertia looks like. Lovely. But then some-
thing strange happens. Is it just me, or does the clump of feathers 
actually spread as it falls? (Compare their relative spreads at 3:00 and 
3:15.) How much resistance could a few molecules of air offer? Could 
it be due to gravitation to the massive walls of the chamber?? What, I 
want to shout at my screen, could possibly be causing that?!? 
(3) [3:24] 
Technician 1:  They came down exactly the same. Wow!
Brian Cox:  Look, look, look. Look how they hit. Right there.
 [Laughs delightedly]
Technician 2:  Holy Mackerel!!
Brian Cox:  Exactly. Exactly the same.
Technician 2:  Feathers don’t move. Nothin’.
Brian Cox:  Look at [vocal fry] thaaat. That’s just … brilli-ant.
I will let this section speak for itself about the vanishing line be-
tween surprise, wonder, and awe. It makes for fascinating viewing. 
Again: everything in the vacuum chamber happened exactly as every-
one knew it would.
But now a question: Does the video prove Galileo at the expense 
of old Aristotle? My first history-of-science teacher said that our in-
stincts about physics were fundamentally Aristotelian—he was 
wrong, but it got me thinking. It is a commonplace to characterize 
Aristotle’s law of falling bodies thus: 
(L1) The speed of fall is proportional to a body’s weight.
Where many accounts still miss the point, though, is that weight is 
only one variable for Aristotle. The medium also matters.
At the same time, however, Aristotle doesn’t actually have a lot to 
say on the relationship between weight and speed of fall. He occa-
sionally says something vague about weight, speed, and “proportion-
ality,” but in only two passages does he say that speed and weight 
are, to be specific, inversely proportional:
(L1a) For two bodies, the times of fall from the same height will 
have the inverse proportion that their weights have. (De caelo 
273b32.)
What is assumed throughout is that everything happens in the same 
medium. Turn to the Physics, and we get a second law: 
(L2) The speeds of a body through two different media are in-
versely proportional to the densities of the media. (215b1 ff.)
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And the relative densities of the two media at the NASA facility are: 
30t : 2g (of air) : : 30,000,000 : 2
So, both bodies should fall 15 million times faster in the vacuum than 
they did in the air. Their relative speeds due to (estimated) weight 
give us 7000 g : 100 g, or 70 : 1. Now, in the air, the bowling ball takes 
two seconds to reach target, whereas the feathers take more like nine 
(Aristotle’s in trouble!). In the vacuum of space, 15,000,000 times thin-
ner than the air, Aristotle should, following (L2), expect their fall 
times to be
Bowling ball: 0.000 000 13 sec.
Feathers: 0.000 000 6 sec.
This is a difference of just 47 ten-millionths of a second—nowhere 
near enough to be detectible by the eye. The conclusion? Aristotle 
should have expected the bowling ball and the feathers to hit the 
target together over this distance. And now our suspicions are raised. 
We note that the BBC never shows that fall in real time; even the 
technicians are only ever shown watching in slow motion.3 So who 
knows whether this didn’t happen exactly as Aristotle might have 
predicted? And I bet the real-time version of feathers falling in a 
 vacuum was even more delightful than what the BBC showed us. Too 
bad for television tropes and dramatic music, I suppose.
Epilogue: a blue-sky wish. Look at the ceiling shot at 3:54. They did 
their experiment from merely partway up. Shouldn’t someone go 
back and try it from the tippy top? Maybe we don’t know everything 
about what would happen after all. (Those spreading feathers are 
still bothering me.)
3 There is a quick glimpse of what looks like real time at 4:15–17, but if you pay attention 
you can see that chicanery is afoot! Watch the barbs on the feathers: this is a reuse of 
the slow-motion nonvacuum shot from 1:40 (oh, BBC!). Can we really trust that 4:16–17  
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The Dog Days of Summer
Elaine Leong
The day was swelteringly hot. Emerging from the oven-like tunnels 
of the London underground, I slowly meandered toward the cool 
rooms of the British Library. We were indeed, as Renaissance physi-
cians and astrologers would say, in the midst of the “dog days of the 
summer,” when Sirius reigned high. The heat of the sun, combined 
with the humidity, felt oppressive to the body and mind. No wonder 
early modern writers warned against bloodletting, the taking of 
physic, sex, and so much more. As I entered the welcoming doors of 
the library, I thought to mysel, Surely this is the perfect place for a 
day like this. After all, libraries are for archival work and not the ac-
tivities forbidden by Renaissance physicians. And archival work, 
mostly, is not so taxing on one’s body.
Seated in 135, my favorite spot, I “unboxed” my first manuscript. 
The brown leather-bound notebook was unassuming. It was one of 
the many notebooks created by various members of the Brockman 
family at Beachborough, Kent. Opening the volume, I began to read 
through pages of personal and rental accounts, interspersed with 
dance tunes. And then, per my usual practice, I flipped the book up-
side down. And it was here that things began to get interesting. The 
page was headed “Whelpes by Bonny bitche whelped the last day 
of  Aprill 1606.” 1 Four curious entries followed, each describing in 
 detail the puppies (white, tawny, motley, and spotted on their ears, 
backs, and rumps) and the name of the person who adopted the dog, 
perhaps receiving the animal as a gift. 
The entries continued. Damsell had a litter of nine puppies on 
the May 6, 1606. Blouse gave birth to a litter of three puppies on the 
May 20. A few months later, in August, the Brockmans gained another 
three puppies by Tomboy and Roller. After a long fall and winter 
break, additional puppies were born in June 1607. Over that summer, 
the kennels welcomed (and said good-bye) to 21 additions. The spring 
and summer of 1608 saw similar movements in and out of the ken-
nels with the arrival of another 10 puppies. Contrary to contempo-
rary advice that spring is the best time to breed animals, the Brock-
1 British Library, Additional Manuscript 45206, fol. 38v. The records can be found at  
34v–38v.  
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tion where mothers often passed on characteristics to their offspring, 
authors encouraged breeders to select “Fair Bitches … strong, and 
well-proportioned in all Parts, with great and large Ribs and Flanks.” 4 
Little is said about her partner in coupling. 
The Brockmans might show more curiosity than some in con-
structing their dog-breeding practices, but, of course, domestic ani-
mal breeding is not an unfamiliar topic to historians of science. Me-
dieval (and earlier) hunting and husbandry manuals often offer 
advice, and we might draw a line (though indirect) to well-known 
episodes such as Charles Darwin’s study of pigeon breeding, de-
scribed by some as an “intensive research program.” Would the Brock-
mans’ activities in their kennels also qualify for such a designation?
As I returned the manuscript to the librarian, I reflected a little on 
the Brockmans’ “puppy records,” if we can call them that. The note-
book containing this information is one of dozens of domestic man-
uscripts discovered in a boarding school in the 1930s and subse-
quently donated by Phyllis Brockman to the British Museum (in that 
sense, my encounter was only one of a number of surprising unbox-
ings in the life story of the object). The Brockman manuscripts offer 
a glimpse into the minutiae of the everyday from French exercise 
books to sketch books to diaries of the grand tour to recipe collec-
tions. And certainly the “puppy records” belong to the everyday in 
more ways than one. The conclusion of each entry with the name of 
the puppy’s new owner highlights that the records acted as accounts 
of the Brockmans’ social obligations and networks, constructed 
through animal gifts. This was not only about observation of the quo-
tidian but also about meticulous notation of social knowledge. 
One final thought about dogs, whelps, and the summer. Like so 
many things in the early modern everyday, there is a recipe involved. 
For those whose dogs might be shy in the act, a remedy made of garlic 
and castorum would move things right along.5 Though, as one should 
definitely avoid welcoming puppies in the dead of winter, one as-
sumes that this remedy was not intended for the dog days of summer.
4 Richard Blome, The Gentlemans Recreation in Two Parts (London: 1686), 69. 
5 Blome, The Gentlemans Recreation, 70.
mans certainly did not shy away from timing the births to the height 
of summer.2 
Over the three-year run of data, the Brockmans’ attitudes toward 
record keeping (and perhaps dog breeding) changed gears ever so 
slightly. The initial entries functioned much like a ledger of gifts and 
obligations, noting on whom each puppy (from which mother) was 
bestowed. Starting in 1607, the Brockmans began keeping more de-
tailed records, carefully detailing not just the parents of each litter 
but also the appearance of each puppy. In 1607, they mated Rock-
wood with Ladie, Bonnie, and Flower and Roller with Damesell and 
Tomboy. In 1608, they both retained particular pairings—Damsell 
with Roller and Ladie with Rockwood—and tried new parent pair-
ings, each time observing and describing the resulting puppies in 
minute detail. For example, the September 20, 1608, entry for “Whelpes 
by  Bonnye & Swilbowbe” reads as follows: 
1. Tawney pyde dog, with the right eare red 
the left eare halfe white halfe redd, with motely spotts  
in the whyte, with a Tawney spott on the left lippe,  
and with twoe Tawney twelvepeny spottes on the forhead,  
and with other Tawney spottes kept by Thomas Harrison. 
2. whyte Bytch with Tawney eares, a Tawney  
spott about the middle of the backe; and a Tawney  
spott on the Rumpe, kept by Thomas Pelham.3
It is clear that the Brockmans were engaged in structured practices 
of animal breeding, consciously experimenting with mating pairs 
and observing resemblances between parent and offspring. In choos-
ing to breed their own hounds, they participated in a common con-
temporary pastime. Hunting manuals of the period were filled with 
instructions on breeding hounds but tended to offer advice on the 
right season for coupling and whelping and on strategies for raising-
whelps to adulthood. In line with contemporary notions of genera-
2 On contemporary advice, see, e.g., George Gascoigne, The Noble Art of Venerie  
or Hunting (London: 1575), ch. 8: “Of the Seasons in Which It Is Best to have young 
 Whelpes, and How You May Best Governe Them.”
3 British Library, Additional Manuscript 45206, fol. 34v. 
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Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien, Austria.
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 perhaps nowhere more so than in his treatment of the penis. The 
boy-turned-fetishist who can never accept that his mother hasn’t got 
one; the girl- turned-bluestocking who likewise can’t accept she 
hasn’t one either: both are iconic figures in the Freudian oeuvre, op-
timistic fantasists unable to accept the “fact” of female castration.
But what was at first unexpected could become routine, con-
scripted into theory that was startling only to the uninitiated. Freud 
retained his capacity for astonishment to the end, but his theorizing 
increasingly fixed individuals into exemplary narratives, casting 
them as fated to drearily reenact by now familiar roles. That the boy 
would want to murder his father so as to sexually possess his mother 
might shock and dismay the laity attending Freud’s “Introductory 
Lectures” in 1916 and 1917, but to him and his like-minded colleagues 
the Oedipus complex had by then achieved the status of shibboleth, 
fealty to which usefully discriminated between friend and foe. More 
and more, it would be no matter for surprise that, for example, the 
mother remains the boy’s love object or that the girl reproaches her 
mother for depriving her of “the only proper genital.” 3 Freud’s pen-
chant for issuing ex cathedra dicta, applicable to everyone and every 
situation, only drew the net of inevitability tighter. “A dream is the 
fulfilment of a wish,” without exception (even if the wish was only to 
prove Freud’s theory wrong).4 His own experience of being in love 
with his mother became “a universal event in early childhood.” 5 And, 
famously, anatomy became inescapable destiny, at least for the girl. 
Fate overwhelmed serendipity.
Freud’s certainties calcified into inflexible dogma in the hands of 
the émigré Viennese ego psychologists who installed themselves 
at the center of the American analytic establishment in the postwar 
years. With system replacing spontaneity, the mysteries of the un-
conscious that had delighted Freud (think here of his Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious, published in 1905) were minimized as 
the ego—its structure and functions, “equilibrium and harmony”—
3 Freud, “Female Sexuality (1931),” in SE, 21:221–244. 
4 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE, vols. 4 and 5. 
5 Freud to Fliess, October 15, 1897.
Bewildered Observation
Elizabeth Lunbeck
The notion, taken from cybernetics, that “the less probable a mes-
sage, the more information it contains,” served as a guiding precept 
to post–World War Two psychoanalysts seeking an alternative to the 
linearity and predictability foundational to their discipline. Setting 
spontaneity and surprise against the compulsion to repeat, authen-
ticity and the real against “as-if” construals of the psychoanalytic re-
lationship, and the accidental and fortuitous against the fatalism of 
the analytic mainstream, they proposed that unbidden thoughts and 
perceptions and unformulated experience offered a way into the 
 patient’s unconscious—a relational, democratic, and decidedly not 
royal road. 
What interests me here is the need to reinscribe spontaneity and 
surprise into the analytic encounter. Freud was himself a connois-
seur of the unexpected. Indeed, the unanticipated finding figured 
centrally in his autobiographical narrative. Years after the fact he 
characterized himself as surprised, in the 1880s, to discover that the 
hysteric’s symptoms disappeared once he’d led her back to the trau-
matic scene that had provoked them, a discovery foundational to his 
nascent clinical science. From this followed, in 1897, the horrified 
 realization that so many hysterics meant so many guilty, perverted 
 fathers, a reckoning at once surprising and inconceivable that 
snuffed out his dreams of “eternal fame,” dependent as they were on 
whether hysteria “would come out right.” 1 Receptivity to the unex-
pected also figured centrally in his recommendations on technique. 
In 1912, he counseled his colleagues to enter the clinical setting with 
a mind open to spontaneity, “free from any presuppositions” and 
ready “to be taken by surprise” by what the patient had to offer: “the 
most successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, 
without any purpose in view.” 2 Finally, bewildered observation ac-
companied by fervent disavowal was central to Freudian theory, 
1 Letter from Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, September 21, 1897, in The Complete Letters of 
 Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson 
(Cambridge, MA: 1985). 
2 Sigmund Freud, “Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-analysis (1912),” in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud [hereafter 
SE], ed. James Strachey (London: 1953–1974), 12:109–120. 
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reaching for “something more” than predictable interpretation 
twigged that cybernetics, as well as field theory and dynamic sys-
tems theory, could lend the imprimatur of science to their endeavors, 
allowing them to legitimately celebrate moments of improvisation, 
creativity, and authenticity between analyst and analysand and to 
break decisively with ego psychology’s linear maturational teleo-
logy.8 Somewhat improbably, then, the science of cybernetics served 
as a vehicle for recouping some of the artful play, spontaneity, and 
surprise that characterized Freud’s work and that had been drilled 
out of it in the interest of sterile systemization.
8 For an example, see Gary Taerk, “Moments of Spontaneity and Surprise: The Nonlinear 
Road to Something More,” Psychoanalytic Inquiry 22 (2002): 728–739. 
assumed a more central role. Notably, in 1945 no less an exemplar of 
Viennese orthodoxy than Anna Freud characterized the ego’s func-
tioning as “as accurate and reliable as a mechanical apparatus.” 6 Ego 
psychologists held that only a strictly enforced orthodoxy of by-the-
book technique would yield the patient (and analyst) the autono-
mous and well-adjusted ego, in conflict-free harmony with “external 
reality,” that was treatment’s Holy Grail. Analysis was a hard slog 
(“working through” being the watchword), governed by emotional 
abstinence and the refusal of all gratifications. Cast as objective, neu-
tral, and scientific by its adherents, this forbidding technique, in the 
estimation of one particularly sharp contemporaneous critic, sacri-
ficed the analyst’s humanity at the altar of “schematic perfection,” 
treating patients as if surgically anesthetized, comatose, or even 
 cadaverous and making of the analyst a “robotlike” figure more ma-
chine than fellow human possessed of “warmth, decency, reliability” 
and so on.7 Psychoanalytic treatment had become so rule bound and 
predictable by the 1960s that glimpses of the analyst’s individuality 
could occasion astonishment, and, relatedly, the question of whether 
Freud was actually a Freudian could be seriously debated.
The reclamation of an alternative, vigorously suppressed ana-
lytic tradition by the Viennese-born, Chicago-based analyst Heinz 
 Kohut in the 1960s and 1970s offered analysts one way out of ego 
psychology’s many dead ends. So, too, did the freedom offered by 
the  new theory of cybernetics, which some analysts configured as 
 another escape route. The equation of mind and machine that seemed 
so apt—signifying cool certainty—to Anna Freud and that discom-
fited our contemporaneous critic had first to be recast in a dec ades-
long project that saw its emotional logic inverted. Now, spontane ity 
and “the opposite of business as usual” could be aligned with, not 
against, the machine, cast as roughly analogous to the feedback loops 
of  cybernetics. Analysts impatient with ego psychology’s fixities and 
6 Anna Freud, “Indications for Child Analysis,” Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 1 (1945): 
127–149. 
7 On egopsychology, see Robert Wallerstein, “The Growth and Transformation of American 
Ego Psychology,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 50 (2002): 135–168; 
critic: Leo Stone, The Psychoanalytic Situation (New York: 1961). 
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rectam atque Eclipticæ parallelam dispositæ videbantur, ac cæteris 
magnitudine paribus splendidiores.’ Sed inter mirabilia innumerabi-
lia iam perspicillo elata, tres stellulae novae initio fortasse minorae 
erant, etiamsi Eclipticae parallelae. Die octava tamen, ‘nescio quo 
fato ductus, ad inspectionem eandem reversus essem’ stellularum. 
Attonitus quidem hac nocte erat, quod ‘erant enim tres Stellulae occi-
dentales omnes, a Iove atque inter se, quam superiori nocte, vicinio-
res.’ Primum haesitavit, utrum contra omnia tabella repperisset  Iovis 
orientalior—id est, dubitavit intelligentiam suam philo sophorumque, 
quae dixit Iovem plus quam decem dies ab occidentalior esse, magis 
quam aspectum caeli noscere. Diebus decima et undecima tandem 
intellexit, ‘apparentem commutationem, non in Iove, sed in Stellis 
adnotatis repositam esse.’
Die decimatertia habuit, verbis J. L. Heilbronis, ‘another stupe fy-
ing surprise,’ cum ‘primum a me quatuor conspectae fuerunt Stellu-
lae’ (erat cum in dies intellegeret significationem motionum stella-
rum Ioviarum quod Galileus coeperat observationes suas lingua 
Latina scribere et non Italiana). Galileus intellexerat stellulas circum 
Iovem vagare; neque Telluri neque Soli solum centrum universi con-
versionum licuisse. Galileo hypothese Copernicenso iam convicto, 
hoc repertum nihilominus numquam expectatum erat.
Experientiae Galilei perspicillo nobis ostendunt admirationem 
scientiis duobus modis venire. Primum est admiratio repens improvi-
saque (montes cavitatesque Lunae exempli gratia), cuius significatio 
statim perspicua est. Est tamen admiratio quoque gravitatis modo 
comprehensae multum post adspectandum cogitationemque (quod 
stellulae non stellae sed satellites Iovis erant). Forsitan mihi liceat, 
has admirationem ociorem vel lentiorem appelare. Oportet discipu-
las discipulosque hodie utrasque admirationes experiri. 
Admiratio ocior quidem facilior est discipulis ostendere. Non 
modo perspicillum sed etiam microscopum occasionem praebet ad-
mirandi (et opportunius cum diurnam). Dulcissimum est, puellae aut 
puero assidere, ut simul per microscopum ista ‘animalcula’ Leeuwen-
hoek spectat. Attoniti semper sunt; attoniti, mundo invisibile invista-
toque subito exsiliente, attoniti, tota arte in corporibus talibus minu-
tis ostensa. Talis admiratio erat Leeuwenhoek ipsi: ‘I saw to my great 
De admiratione
Opusculum admirabilia spectacula vetustiora pandens, 
discrimenque novum proponens
Abigail Lustig
Mirabile est, cum primum discipula discipulusve per perspicillum 
aut microscopum spectat, admirationem amoremque novum repe-
riendi videre flagrantem, hac admiratione ipsa persimile admirationi 
Galilei et Leeuwenhoek ipsorum cum primum per organum specta-
vissent. Hic sensus, haec facultas admirationis, vel potentissimus est 
omnium Scientiae potestatum – sed vero in nostris ludis nimium rare 
doctus. Discipuli quidem saepe attoniti sunt cum audiunt philo-
sophos attonitos posse.
Galileus perspicillo iterum atque iterum admiratione replebatur. 
In figuris celebribus Siderei Nuncii Lunae cavitatem magnam imita-
tus est in medio, Sole illuminatem, quam ‘non nisi aliqua cum admi-
ratione adnotavi’—etiamsi nulla cavitas istiusmodi, admiratione Ga-
lilei sola ficta, exstat, et quae, si exstitisset, spectabilis non modo 
perspicillo sed etiam oculo libero esset.
Perspicillum Galileum ad reperiendum duxit miraculi necopini 
vel maximi historiae scientarum. ‘Die itaque septima Ianuarii,’ 
scripsit, ‘instantis anni millesimi sexcentesimi decimi, hora … noctis 
prima, cum cælestia sidera per Perspicillum spectarem ... tres [Iovi] 
adstare Stellulas, exiguas quidem, veruntamen clarissimas, cognovi; 
quae, licet e numero inerrantium a me crederentur ... nonnullam ta-
men intulerunt admirationem, eo quod secundum exactam lineam 
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admiration such moving instruments all over the Body within, that 
not one of a thousand would be perswaded to believe, that in such a 
contemptible Insect there is so much to be seen.’ Saepe nihilem dies 
multas volunt discipuli nisi per organum spectare illumque novum 
mundum scrutari. 
Admiratio autem lentior difficilior est ostendere atque docere, et 
discipulis est difficillima intelligendi. Galileus non statim gravitem 
observationem suarum satellitum Iovis agnovit—neque agnoscere 
potuisset. Necesse erat series multarum observationum, intentione 
factarum, et, magis etiam, cogitatio assidua. Prima nocte erant illae 
stellulae modo. Sequentes noctes solae ei significationem inferre 
 potuerunt, et menti volenti modo. Natura erat, quae miraculum finxe-
rat (quod quidem semper exstiterat), sed hoc sensus admirationis 
lente modo gradibusque creabatur, ut scripsit Galileus ipse, ‘ambigui-
tatem in admirationem permutans.’ Intellegere atque admirari admi-
rationem lentiorem gignunt iuncti, id quod voluptas vel maxima 
scientarum est. 
(Philosophi novissimi fortasse quaerent utrum haec admiratio in 
rebus Naturae gignatur an in acto intelligendi, hoc modo discrimi-
nem novum creantes. Immo discriminem vero creant, ubi non exsi-
stare oportet. Factum intelligendi quidem miraculum plane aperiat, 
sed creator solus non potest.)
Discipuli discipulaeque saepius credunt omnias scientias iam in-
ventas esse et nulla eis permanere. Librum Naturae pensunt exsi-
stere, non quidem illum librum Galilei, mathematicis scriptum, sine 
quibus mundus non intellegi possit, quem librum legere vix incepi-
mus et qui infinitus est, sed magis credunt commentarium scriptum 
esse simplicum sicut sese in ludo legere. Hic liber, ut opinio fert, iam 
integralis perfectusque est, omnibus responsis cognitis magistris 
suis—atque illa responsa ad examinationes dumtaxat memoria com-
prehenda sunt. 
Ludus magnus novas investigationes inveniendi saepius deest. 
Hanc voluptatem tum discipulis apportare tempus egit et consultum, 
eis opportunitatem dare intelligendam et admirandam. Necesse 
 quoque est ut propensi sint ipsi animis commutari. Cum pictor, quae 
petit, res videre cum sunt, ut admirationem spectatoris creet novis 
 pic turis suis, tum oportet philosophum Naturae praebere sensum cu-
riositatis fortiorem quam ‘ego’.
Necesse est discipulis quoque ut frustrentur. Nam voluptas intel-
ligendi tanta commoda est, quantus conatus expenditur. Qui mira-
culum necopinum intellexit, se putare possit, cum Galileo, doctissi-
mum vero, nam illi periti scientarum bene sciunt responsum vel 
frequentissimum Naturae ‘erras’ esse, nam cum admiratione est enim 
frustratio prope complexa. Ad admirationem ociorem opus est qui-
dem nonnihil praeparationis, ad admirationem lentiorem autem 
nihil possit sine consuetudine cogitationis attentionisque et tempus 
multum, omnia quae fructus addunt conatui. Admiratio numquam 
vilis philosophis emitur, at gaudia sempiterna donabit. 
Gratias J. L. Heilbroni et K. Murray et S. Leleu consiliis ago.
Galileus Galileus, Sidereus Nuncius. Venetiis, MDCX.  
J. L. Heilbron, Galileo. Oxon., MMXII. 
Antonius van Leeuwenhoek, ‘Part of Two Letters from Mr. Antony van Leeuwenhoek, F.R.S., 
concerning Worms pretended to be taken from the Teeth.’ Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc., v. XXII  
(anni MDCC et MDCCI), dcxxxv–dcxlii. 
On Surprise
A tiny work laying out some older marvels worthy  
of admiration and proposing a novel distinction
It is wonderful to see, when a student looks for the first time through 
the telescope or the microscope, surprise, wonder, astonishment (the 
Latin admiratio encompasses all of these), and a new love for discov-
ery flame up, this wonder being just like the surprise of Galileo or 
Leeuwenhoek themselves when they first looked through their in-
struments. This feeling, this capacity for surprise, is perhaps the 
most powerful of all the powers science has—but is rarely taught in 
school.  Students are often astonished, indeed, when they hear that 
scientists can be  surprised.
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verse. Galileo was already a convinced Copernican, but this discovery 
was nevertheless entirely unexpected.
Galileo’s experiences with the telescope show that surprise can 
come in two ways in science. The first is the quick and unforeseen 
surprise (the mountains and craters on the moon, for example), 
whose significance is immediately apparent. There is, however, also 
a kind of surprise whose importance is only understood after much 
observation and thinking (that the little stars were not stars but sat-
ellites of Jupiter). Perhaps I may be permitted to call these fast sur-
prises and slow surprises. Students today should have the opportu-
nity to experience both.
Fast surprises are, of course, easier to share with students. Not 
only the telescope but also the microscope works well to inspire sur-
prise (and more conveniently, since it can be used during the day). It 
is delightful to sit next to a girl or boy who is first looking through 
the microscope at Leeuwenhoek’s “animal cula.” They are always as-
tonished: astonished, at the invisible, unexplored world that sud-
denly jumps out at them; astonished, at the intricacy and detail re-
vealed in such minute bodies. Leeuwenhoek felt such marvel himself: 
“I saw to my great admiration such moving instruments all over the 
Body within, that not one of a thousand would be perswaded to be-
lieve, that in such a contemptible Insect there is so much to be seen.“ 
Often students want to do nothing in class for days afterward except 
look through the microscope and explore this brand-new world.
Slow surprise, however, is harder to show and to teach and is 
very difficult for pupils to understand. Galileo did not immediately 
recognize the importance of his observation of Jupiter’s satellites—
nor could he have recognized it. Only a series of observations, made 
according to a plan, made this possible, and, even more importantly, 
careful thought. The first night, they were just little stars. Only the 
following nights could bring home their significance to him, and 
only to a willing and ready mind. It was nature that had arranged the 
surprise (which, indeed, had always existed), but this sensation of 
surprise was created only slowly and stepwise, as Galileo himself 
wrote, with “doubt transforming into wonder.” Understanding and 
Galileo was filled with admiratio over and over by the telescope. In 
the famous figure of the moon in the Starry Messenger, he drew a 
great crater in the middle, illuminated by the sun, which “I remarked 
upon not otherwise than with surprise”—although no such crater, 
which was created only by Galileo’s own astonishment, exists, and 
which, if it did exist, would be visible not only with the telescope but 
also to the naked eye.
The telescope led Galileo to perhaps the greatest surprise in the 
history of science. “On the seventh day of January, 1610,” he wrote, “in 
the first hour of the … night, when I was looking through the Tele-
scope at the constellations, I noticed three little Stars next to Jupiter, 
very small, but very bright; which were believed at the time by me to 
belong to the number of the fixed stars. … Nevertheless, they caused 
no little wonder, because they seemed to be in a straight line and to 
be parallel to the ecliptic, and they were each equal in brightness to 
the others” (translations mine). But among the innumerable marvels 
he had already found with the telescope, three new little stars were 
at the beginning perhaps minor, even if aligned with the ecliptic. On 
the eighth, however, “led by I know not what fate, I had come back to 
the same observation” of the little stars. On this night, Galileo was 
astonished, because “the three little stars were now all west of Jupi-
ter, and closer to each other than they had been the previous night.” 
At first he wondered whether, contrary to all the astronomical tables, 
Jupiter had exited retrograde—that is, he doubted his own under-
standing and that of other scholars, which said that Jupiter was more 
than ten days from turning back east—rather than believe in what 
he saw in the sky. It was only on the tenth and eleventh that he at 
last understood that “the apparent movement was not in Jupiter but 
in the stars I had observed.”
On the thirteenth he had, in the words of J. L. Heilbron, “another 
stupefying surprise,” when “first four little stars were seen by me” (it 
was, in fact, as from one day to the next he understood the signifi-
cance of Jupiter’s stars’ motions, that  Galileo switched to taking his 
notes in Latin rather than Italian). Galileo had understood that the 
little stars were going around Jupiter; it was thus not possible that 
either the earth or the sun was the sole center of motion in the uni-
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marveling  create slow surprise together, which is perhaps the great-
est pleasure in  science.
(There are, perhaps, modern scholars who may ask whether this 
surprise is engendered in the phenomena of nature or in the act of 
understanding them, thereby creating a new distinction. But they 
are making a distinction where none such need exist. The act of 
 understanding of course makes the surprise apparent but cannot be 
its sole creator.)
Pupils often believe that all of science has already been discov-
ered and that nothing is left for them. They believe that there is a 
Book of Nature, not indeed that book of Galileo’s, written in mathe-
matics, without which we cannot understand the world and which 
we have barely begun to read, but rather they think it is a textbook 
like the ones they read for school. This book, they think, is already 
entire and finished, and the teachers already know all the answers—
and all they have to do is memorize them for the tests.
The great game of devising new investigations is too often miss-
ing for them. Bringing this pleasure to students, however, takes time 
and planning, to give them the chance both to understand and to 
marvel. It is also necessary that they themselves accept that they 
must be able to change their minds. Just as a painter, who tries to see 
things as they are so that she can create a sense of wonder in the 
viewer with new pictures of the world, so also the scientist has to 
cultivate a sense of curiosity stronger than her sense of self.
It is also necessary that students be frustrated and fail, for the 
pleasure of understanding is in proportion to the effort expended. 
She who understands the meaning of a surprise may think herself, 
along with Galileo, very clever indeed—for experienced scientists 
know very well that nature’s most frequent answer to our questions 
is, “You’ve got it wrong”; and surprise is tightly bound up with fail-
ure. One must have no little preparation to be ready for a fast sur-
prise, but no slow surprise can ever happen without the cultivated 
habits of thinking, attention, and time, which all add enjoyment to 
the endeavor. Surprise is never sold cheap to scientists, but it will 
give eternal pleasure.
Excitement, Déjà Vu, Boredom
Christoph Lüthy
Not only in private life but also in the domain of science, we encoun-
ter the classical sequence of emotions that goes from initial surprise 
to bored indifference. An illustrious example is the public response 
to Antoni van Leeuwenhoek’s reports on microscopic life. Contempo-
raries were at first enthralled by his news, but after an unending se-
quence of nearly identical announcements, they began to respond 
with yawns. The tale is known but not often told well. It starts with 
a 1673 letter of introduction in which Dutch anatomist Renier de 
Graaf presented fellow countryman, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, to the 
Royal Society: draper, haberdasher, city hall chamberlain, land sur-
veyor, and assessor of wine in the city of Delft. “Leeuwenhoek hath 
lately contrived Microscopes excelling those that have been hitherto 
made by Eustachio Divini and others,” de Graaf explained.1 And, in-
deed, Leeuwenhoek’s microscopes were very powerful. 
At the time, all compound microscopes suffered from chromatic 
aberration: behaving like multiple prisms, they produced blurry im-
ages. Leeuwenhoek’s solution was a single-lens microscop, composed 
of a minuscule glass bead inserted between two small metal sheets. 
The magnifying power of these beads was impressive, but given their 
short focal length, Leeuwenhoek literally had to press the micro-
scope into his eye, trying to avoid his lashes. Had he not been ex-
tremely myopic, the instruments he made would have been of no use 
to him. In fact, only about 1 percent of users are able to recognize 
anything through the extant exemplars, and even fewer can do so 
without feeling acute pain. Even Leeuwenhoek reported that at 
times, in the act of observation, “I break into a sweat.” 2
De Graaf’s recommendation letter initiated a relationship be-
tween Leeuwenhoek and the Royal Society that was to last for a full 
50 years. More than half of Leeuwenhoek’s roughly 300 scientific let-
ters were addressed to the Royal Society, which elected him a  fellow 
1 Letter of Regnerus (Renier) de Graaf to the Royal Society, April 28, 1673, in Alle de brieven 
van Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, vol. 1, 1673–1676, ed. Commissie van Nederlandsche 
 geleerden (Amsterdam: 1939–1999), 30.
2 Letter of Antoni van Leeuwenhoek to Henry Oldenburg, October 9, 1676, in Brieven, vol. 2, 
1676–1679, 80–81. 
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in 1680—a rare honor for a Dutch artisan who had, as he himself con-
fessed, “not been brought up in language or arts.” 3
In the days when Leeuwenhoek started to report his findings to 
the Royal Society, the adepts of then fashionable mechanical philos-
ophy were imagining a world of invisibly small material particles, 
corpuscles or atoms, which possessed shapes and movements such 
that the visible phenomena of the physical world could be deduced 
from them. Microscopists eagerly participated in this enterprise. 
When, for example, René Descartes imagined screwlike corpuscles as 
an explanation for magnetism, microscopists like Henry Power tried 
to find them; Nathanael Highmore actually reported that he had ob-
served them swarming about. Very much in keeping with these 
 expectations, microscopists, including Leeuwenhoek in his earliest 
letters, sought and found corpuscular structures: “cells,” “pores,” 
“bladders,” “utricles,” and “globules” were everywhere. 
But Leeuwenhoek’s story soon developed in an unexpected direc-
tion. As he studied liquids—infusions, and later murky pond waters, 
rain water, spermatic liquids—in search of particles that might ex-
plain their respective properties, Leeuwenhoek saw under strong 
magnification, for the first time in 1674, minuscule forms of life. Ini-
tially, he mentioned these “animalcules” only in passing, as some-
thing he had noticed while looking for more important things. But as 
these little creatures popped up everywhere, Leeuwenhoek began to 
pay attention, sending dozens of letters over almost five decades 
in which he described them in great detail. Nineteenth-century bio-
logists, who with their achromatic lenses had overcome the limi-
tations that had previously hampered microscopic research, hailed 
Leeuwenhoek as the first to have seen bacteria, unicellular algae, 
flagellates, and spermatozoa. These attributions are both correct and 
false. They are correct in the following sense: among the types of an-
imalcules that Leeuwenhoek found in 1683 in the tartar of teeth—his 
own, his wife’s, and their daughter’s—whose tiny shapes he asked 
Abraham de Blois to engrave (figure), a modern bacteriologist would 
3 Letter of Antoni van Leeuwenhoek to Henry Oldenburg, October 15, 1673,  
in Brieven, 1:43.
recognize Selenomonas sputigena (B), Pseudomonas spec. (E), Lepto-
thrix buccalis (F), and Spirillum (G).
But these claims are also false, because what Leeuwenhoek saw 
and reported on were “little animals,” not “bacteria” or “protozoa.” 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether one can claim a discovery if it is given 
no distinctive name, assigned to no taxonomic place, or given no 
function or explanatory role. “Our” bacteria fulfill important func-
tions in myriad respects pertaining to health and disease; Leeuwen-
hoek’s not only served no purpose but did not even constitute a 
264 265
Christoph Lüthy | Excitement, Déjà Vu, BoredomChristoph Lüthy | Excitement, Déjà Vu, Boredom
 separate kind, for he viewed them as the offspring of what to us are 
“protozoa.” What for us are different species of bacteria, protozoa, 
algae, or flagellates, for Leeuwenhoek, all belonged to that endless 
stream of minuscule life; both he and Robert Hooke, who concurred 
with him, reckoned that “millions of millions might be contained in 
one drop of water.” 4 Admittedly, this infinity of life forms enchanted 
the monadologically minded Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who fa mous-
ly remarked, “I prefer a Leeuwenhoek who tells me what he sees to a 
Cartesian who tells me what he thinks.” 5 On the other hand, it stirred 
critics of microscopy like Jonathan Swift to laughter: “So, Nat’ralists 
observe, a Flea / Hath smaller Fleas that on him prey, / And these have 
smaller Fleas to bite ’em, / And so proceed ad infinitum.” 6 
Whether it was applause or laughter that was elicited by the un-
ending descent of animalcules into unknown depths of invisibility, 
there was no call for further research. Neither Leibniz nor Swift 
needed additional observations or a taxonomy to make their points. 
Nor, for that matter, could Leeuwenhoek have offered anything be-
yond stating that his animalcules were everywhere, had a variety of 
appearances, and engaged in curious movements to and fro. 
Despite its sponsorship of pan-European microscopical research, 
even the Royal Society was quickly bored by Leeuwenhoek’s ubiqui-
tous animalcules and tried to steer his research elsewhere. In fact, 
microscopy as a whole started to look stale. Surely, if the strongest 
available magnification produced ever new life forms, it was useless 
to seek any longer for the ultimate constituents of matter or life. En-
thusiasm for the microscope, which had reached its peak in the 1660s, 
gave way to a sense of disenchantment. In 1692, Robert Hooke 
lamented that microscopical studies “are now reduced almost to a 
4 Robert Hooke, comments on a letter of October 5, 1677, by Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, 
 published under the title “Microscopium: Or, Some New Discoveries Made with and 
 Concerning Microscopies,” in Lectures and Collections Made by Robert Hooke (London: 
1678), 83.
5 Letter of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Christiaan Huygens of May 2, 1691, in Oeuvres 
complètes de Christiaan Huygens, ed. Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen 
(The Hague: 1888–1950), 10:52. 
6 Jonathan Swift, “On Poetry: A Rhapsody” (1733), in The Poems of Jonathan Swift,  
ed. Harold Williams (Oxford: 1937), 2:639–659, lines 337–340.
single Votary, which is Mr. Leeuwenhoek.” 7 According to bibliometric 
analyses, between 1685 and 1723 Leeuwenhoek’s published letters ac-
counted for a full three-quarters of all microscopical studies. 
To be sure, Leeuwenhoek died a famous man. And yet, it is telling 
that in remembering his achievements, the Royal Society only men-
tioned one type of “little animals”: “that famous Discovery of the 
 Animalcula in semine masculino, which has given a perfectly new 
Turn to the Theory of Generation.” 8 Their innumerable siblings in 
other liquids had failed to cause any “new Turn.” They had provoked 
initial astonishment but, because of their apparent uselessness, were 
soon forgotten, invoked only occasionally by the parson who, in his 
Sunday sermon, wished to provide an example of God’s incompre-
hensible subtlety.
7 Robert Hooke, “Discourse Concerning Telescopes and Microscopes,” in Philosophical 
Experiments and Observations of the Late Eminent Dr. Robert Hooke, ed. William 
 Derham (London: 1726), 261.
8 From Martin Folkes’s obituary for Leeuwenhoek, in Philosophical Transactions 23, 
no. 380 (November/December 1723): 449.
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Anything You Change Can Make  
a Difference
Harro Maas
In May 2010, my former student Andrej Svorencˇík and I organized a 
witness seminar to document and examine the history of laboratory 
experimentation in economics. We invited a mix of 12 economists, 
some of whom were surprised by the invitation, as they did not and 
do not perceive themselves as experimental eco nomists, and some of 
whom considered their participation self-evident, such as the late Re-
inhard Selten, Vernon Smith, or Al Roth. As is typical for a male-domi-
nated discipline like economics, we had only one female economist 
at the table, Elizabeth (Betsy) Hoffman, who had started her career as 
an economic historian only to become infected by the “experimental 
bug” after taking Charlie Plott’s course in experimental economics at 
Caltech in the early 1970s, a course that was at the time considered 
the “hottest thing in town.” 
Plott taught that course in a master-apprentice fashion. He asked 
students to choose a topic they considered fit for an experiment and 
then worked with each student individually to tailor and narrow the 
initial question to manageable proportions; only then did he trust 
them sufficiently to actually perform the experiment. In quite a few 
cases this led to joint journal publications. Hoffman remembered a 
famous experiment, in which experimental subjects—students, 
housewives, staff, basically anyone who wanted to earn some easy 
money—were spread out across the building after hours to partici-
pate in a market experiment aimed at testing the efficiency of differ-
ent market pricing rules. Seated in separate offices, after hearing the 
blast of a horn, subjects were supposed to start trading by phone. In 
those days, technology was such that telephone communication got 
jammed up very quickly, and participants simply decided to take the 
offer from whomever they managed to get on the phone. The pub-
lished article argued that it was the pricing rules that made the dif-
ference, but participants such as Hoffman wondered afterward 
whether it was the pricing rules or the communication technology 
that explained the different outcomes.
Indeed, for Hoffman, the potential instability of test environ-
ments became a matter of lifelong concern. At the witness seminar, 
Charlie Plott gave some other down-to-earth examples of why exper-
iments could fail. In market experiments where subjects were sup-
posed to buy and sell, they might buy but forget to sell; they might 
read tables from left to right where the experimenter intended them 
to be read from top to bottom; or they might simply forget to watch 
the screen. Philosophers nicely classify such issues under the Duhem-
Quine problem, but classifying issues does not solve them in prac-
tice. Prompted by the witness seminar’s moderator, Chris Starmer, 
Hoffman explained her concerns.
 I have always taken the approach that anything you change can 
make a difference. If you change experimenters, if you change 
location, and if you are going to—so if I am going to do—trying to 
replicate an experiment or do a variation on an experiment. Since 
I have moved a lot, I have a lot of experience with this. My view 
has always been that you have to be sure that your new subject 
pool and your new collaborators can get the same results as the 
previous subject pool and the previous collaborators. I always 
had a set of experiments that I would insist on replicating at the 
new place.1
When asked for details, Hoffman further explained that when she 
moved from Northwestern to Purdue and her regular coauthor Mat-
thew Spitzer, moved to USC, in order to rule out any influence of the 
experimenter on the results, they would run half of the experiments 
at Purdue and half of the experiments at USC and then trade places 
and run the other half. The experiments she used to establish a trust-
worthy baseline were the ultimatum and the dictator game, a choice 
that spurred a lively discussion between the participants of the wit-
ness seminar, because these two seemingly innocuous games con-
tinue to produce outcomes that some experimentalists considered 
“just notoriously unstable.” In both games, a proposer is endowed 
with a sum of money (tokens) from which she can offer an amount to 
a receiver, who can either accept or refuse, and who can punish the 
proposer (or not, as in the dictator game) if the offer is considered too 
1 This and all following quotations are from: Andrej Svorencˇík and Harro Maas, The 
Making of Experimental Economics: Witness Seminar on the Emergence of a Field 
 (Dordrecht: 2016), 130–133.
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low. Typically, proposers offer more than the theoretical minimum 
(one token), and receivers refuse what they should accept (that very 
one token). But that seems to be about the only stable fact in such 
games. 
The specific rules of the game as well as small changes in its 
wording and framing all matter substantially to the outcome. If sub-
jects are told to donate to a charity, they give everything away. Do 
subjects feel it is their own money or the experimenter’s money from 
which they are supposed to make an offer? This was a question about 
which our seminar participants had “no idea, what the full implica-
tions” might be. Vernon Smith suspected that “almost certainly, for 
many experiments, it will make no difference at all, but if you have 
got one counter example where it makes all the difference, you have 
got to ask: ‘Whoops, how far does that go?’” 
Not only the auxiliaries but in fact everything about such experi-
ments was up for grabs. Neither rules nor procedures could guaran-
tee stable outcomes from experiments that were inherently unsta-
ble. “Things like that” brought Smith back to Betsy Hoffman’s initial 
point about experiments, “and it is a  really good starting point be-




À la fin du XIXe siècle, les tentatives d’étudier les rêves en laboratoire 
sont encore à leurs débuts. Les travaux du philosophe norvégien John 
Mourly Vold sont à considérer comme le premier projet systématique 
de mettre en place un régime expérimental pour l’étude du corps rê-
vant.1 Ses recherches personnelles menées tournent autour d’un pro-
blème précis : il s’agit d’articuler les postures et les mouvements du 
corps pendant le sommeil avec l’activité onirique. Afin d’établir une 
causalité directe entre les positions du corps pendant le sommeil et 
la production d’images oniriques, il transforme son lit et par la suite 
celui de ses collaborateurs en un dispositif susceptible d’exercer des 
stimuli durables sur les parties du corps. C’est son approche qui lui 
dicte la forme de son grand ouvrage Über den Traum : Mourly Vold 
l’organise suivant les parties et membres du corps sur lesquels 
portent ses séries d’expériences allant des pieds au corps entier. Le 
mouvement de la marche joue un rôle capital dans les rêves expéri-
mentaux du philosophe norvégien : le stimulus exercé sur la jambe 
ou sur la plante des pieds produit presque toujours une illusion de 
mouvement dans le rêve, soit que le rêveur lui-même se croie danser 
ou courir, soit qu’il perçoive ces mouvements chez une autre per-
sonne ou un animal 2.
Le dispositif expérimental de Mourly Vold s’élargit à une étude 
de masse à laquelle participent ses propres étudiants, des professeurs 
et élèves d’école de deux sexes. À l’instar de la psychologie expéri-
mentale telle qu’elle s’organise à partir du laboratoire de Wilhelm 
Wundt à Leipzig, les étudiants sont les meilleurs collaborateurs : non 
seulement ils doivent être des « bons rêveurs », mais aussi des « bons 
sujets », donc instruits et honnêtes à la fois, pour assurer l’objectivité 
des résultats recueillis.
C’est à la fin de son ouvrage, fort volumineux, où son lecteur 
tombe sur la surprise. En raisonnant sur des expériences dans les-
1 John Mourly Vold (1850–1907) avait obtenu un doctorat en philosophie et enseignait 
comme professeur à l’Université de Christiania (aujourd’hui Oslo) à partir de 1890 jusqu’à 
sa mort. Pour des références plus détaillées, je me permets de renvoyer à Andreas 
Mayer, « Des rêves et des jambes : le problème du corps rêvant », Romantisme 178, no. 4 
(2017): 75–85.
2 John Mourly Vold, Über den Traum. Experimental-psychologische Untersuchungen,  
2 tomes, éd. Otto Klemm (Leipzig : 1910–1912).
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d’un côté, la sexualité du rêveur apparaît sous une forme purement 
physiologique, de l’autre, elle la dépasse de façon inattendue par une 
féminisation qui met le rêveur dans la peau d’une sorcière.
Cette ambiguïté n’échappera pas à Freud et à ses disciples. Dans 
la quatrième édition de la Traumdeutung (1914), Freud revient sur 
Mourly Vold, en affirmant que la production expérimentale de sti-
quels le professeur attachait plusieurs bûches à son dos, action qui 
déclenchait des rêves de vol ou de suspension, il se rend à l’évidence 
que le motif de ces rêves se trouve dans une force qui est « sans doute 
de nature sexuelle  ». Et il n’hésite pas à donner en latin plusieurs 
 détails sur ses érections et pollutions nocturnes. Cette discussion est 
le seul moment où il lie ses propres expériences à un exemple histo-
rique, à savoir les « hallucinations des sorcières » se rendant au sab-
bat nocturne. Dans une page de médecine rétrospective qui fait 
 exception dans son ouvrage, le philosophe livre une explication de 
ces rêves ou hallucinations qui réduit le voyage imaginaire de ces 
femmes, selon lui pour la plupart atteinte d’hystérie, à leurs sensa-
tions corporelles et notamment à la « vibration érotique » accompa-
gnée d’un sentiment de réalité et d’orgueil pendant la nuit.
Le rêve de vol porte l’expérimentateur onirique donc sur un ter-
rain qui dépasse le cadre restreint de son champ d’investigation. De-
puis l’Antiquité ce genre de rêves est considéré comme relevant d’un 
phénomène collectif que l’on retrouve dans une même culture chez 
différentes personnes ou même dans différentes cultures à des 
époques différentes. Dans sa version diabolique, ce rêve se rapporte à 
une image stéréotypée que Carlo Ginzburg, dans sa grande étude 
comparative sur le sabbat des sorcières, qualifie de « formation cultu-
relle de compromis 3 ». Ajoutons que cette image culturelle se forge 
lors du XIXe siècle aussi à travers une littérature et une iconographie 
médicale, telle qu’elle émerge dans le sillage de la clinique des mala-
dies nerveuses de Jean-Martin Charcot.4 L’explication de l’expérience 
collective des femmes accusées de sorcellerie en termes d’halluci-
nations et de contagion par imitation ancre l’image stéréotypée du 
sabbat dans la sensibilité du corps de la femme hystérique, entière-
ment soumise à des dispositifs et mesures physiologiques. Les idées 
avancées par Mourly Vold sur la nature sexuelle de ses propres expé-
riences de rêves de vol s’articulent ainsi sous une forme ambiguë  : 
3 Carlo Ginzburg, Le Sabbat des sorcières, trad. Monique Aymard (Paris : 1992), 37.
4 Ainsi, Charles Richet dénomme en 1880 les femmes hystériques de la Salpêtrière les 
« démoniaques d’aujourd’hui » et l’aliéniste D.-M. Bourneville se livre dans sa « Biblio-
thèque diabolique » à la republication d’ouvrages historiques traitant de la possession 
diabolique et de la sorcellerie comme d’autant de cas de médecine rétrospective.
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Embarrassed Mastery
J. Andrew Mendelsohn
“Le fait d’Omdurman” was a gem of a fact, one of many collected in 
the quarantine laboratories of Egypt. Two soldiers in garrison, hence 
of known health and environment, suddenly dead of cholera in April 
1914: no cases could be found nearby, no contacts tested positive. 
Then there was the “Russian pilgrim on his way from Djeddah,” 
seized with cholera: typical lesions at autopsy, “no trace” of vibrios. 
Or the postman struck “one fine morning” in 1916 by cholera at its 
most textbook—relentless vomiting, profuse diarrhea, pronounced 
cyanosis (turning blue) of the face, cramps, aphonia, hypothermia—
except that he recovered in one day and intensive microscopy found 
no vibrios. Or the five immigrants from Anvers succumbing to those 
same symptoms upon arrival in New York. Vibrios: nonspecific. Au-
topsy verdict: phosphoric acid poisoning. Trying for order in the  quar-
antine laboratory of Alexandria only made it more a Wunderkammer, 
as in the devilish collection of sera confectionné from 31 typical chol-
era cases yet testing into an “almost  complete absence of groups,” an 
“individual autonomy,” the director shook his head, even as he went 
on running microbial traffic control in the world’s epidemiological 
entrepôt before global air travel: the Egyptian ports and cities that 
funneled the Hadjj from Africa and the Indian Ocean to and from 
Mecca every year.1 A modern laboratory for  mastering disease was 
also a premodern cabinet of curiosities. That’s the argument here in 
a nutshell—and a Petri dish. 
We are as far from premodern virtuosi as we can get while still 
collecting microscopical surprises; as though not far at all from those 
illustrated in Hooke’s Micrographia, Leeuwenhoek’s reports “met 
verwonderingh” of identical globules in the bile of rabbits and cows, 
or from the millions of intricate creatures in a drop of water, which 
John Ray compared to the rare miniatures of art “beheld with admi-
ration, … treasured up” by “the Curious.” 2 Both premodern cabinet 
and technoscientific laboratory accumulated observations made and 
1 Rapport du directeur du laboratoire du Conseil sanitaire maritime et quarantenaire 
d’Alexandrie à M. le président de ce Conseil (1919), 1–2, 4, 7.
2 Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, The Collected Letters (Amsterdam: 1939–1989), 1:174–175 
 (October 19, 1674), 2:254–255 (October 5, 1677); Ray quoted in Lorraine Daston and 
 Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750 (New York: 2001), 314.
muli somatiques est susceptible de provoquer des images oniriques 
d’une grande diversité, position déjà défendue en 1900 ; les protocoles 
détaillés et méticuleux du philosophe norvégien ne seraient que 
d’une « infime utilité » pour la compréhension du corps rêvant. Or, 
dans la discussion des rêves typiques, l’interprétation sexuelle des 
rêves de vol et de suspension en l’air avancée par le philosophe 
 norvégien, ce Traumexperimentator, « qui est un homme tout ce qu’il 
y a de sérieux, et à vrai dire hostile à toute espèce d’interprétation », 
surprend Freud, qui ne peut y lire qu’une confirmation inespérée de 
sa propre théorie 5.
Force est de constater que la surprise débouchera sur une articu-
lation orthodoxe dans le milieu psychanalytique, mais elle donnera 
aussi lieu à d’autres lectures et figures expérimentales plutôt in-
attendues. Dans son premier « essai philosophique et littéraire », le 
jeune Henri Michaux part du couple Freud/Mourly Vold pour célé-
brer« l’intelligence de la jambe » qui semble entièrement désarticu-
lée par  rapport à « l’homme total » 6. Selon l’écrivain belge, le « mor-
ceau d’homme  » éveillé opère en suivant une logique de l’absurde 
pendant que «  l’homme total » sommeille. La signification sexuelle 
des rêves, cheval de bataille des psychanalystes, est sobrement 
 rapportée à l’évidence d’un « morceau homme sexuel » combattant 
le « bloc homme public » dont le compromis serait le symbolisme. Les 
apports de la « sciences des rêves » se trouvent ainsi retranscrits dans 
un langage aphoristique censé indiquer les traits essentiels du rêve, 
à savoir son caractère fantastique, absurde, insensible et chaotique. 
Le défi, désormais, est à la fois poétique et expérimental : comment 
écrire le corps rêvant « en style morceau d’homme, en style rêve 7 » ?
5 Sigmund Freud, L’interprétation du rêve, trad. J.-P. Lefebvre (Paris : 2010), 437 (ajouté  
en 1914). Le néologisme « Traumexperimentator » lancé par Freud a ici une connotation 
quelque peu railleuse.
6 Henri Michaux, « Les rêves et la jambe », Œuvres complètes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade 
(Paris : 1999), 1:18 et suiv.
7 Michaux, « Les rêves et la jambe », 24.
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plicable into the explained. Winning and losing, strength and weak-
ness, laws of nature and “individual autonomy” went hand in hand. 
Anomalous rabbits did not vanish with a wave of Jastrow’s pen 
into the gestalt-switch of paradigm shift or get neatly lost in trans-
lation into an actor network. They were treasured up. Modern or pre-
modern, this was far from the singular surprise of discovery; far, too, 
from the unexpected in investigative pathways (F. L. Holmes) or the 
creativity of experimental systems (H. J. Rheinberger). Their produc-
tive unpredictabilities did not accrue. Such accumulation is unlikely 
to happen everywhere in science, not even in natural history, where 
iterative confrontation with possible novelty became annotative 
and additive; Linnaeus’ copies of his books interleaved with blank 
pages ready to place whatever came next, monuments to an open yet 
unsurprisable system.
Cabinets of things made curious by their exception to what na-
ture does most of the time or what most people can do with a chisel 
or paintbrush; anomaly accumulating within paradigms and becom-
ing part of normal science; embarrassing facts and their continual 
generation and preservation woven into technoscience: what these 
share is collective experience of disjunction (not private notebook 
surprise), created by shifts in human organization on a grand scale, 
ever since the emergence of “new worlds” heavenly, microscopic, ex-
otic. Across centuries and sensibilities runs a history of recurrent 
openness to anomaly, indefinitely prolonged, rather than an age of 
wonder turning to disenchantment. 
There may be more under the sun—and in dark larders and bright 
bureau—than strange facts and Gradgrind ones, customs and laws of 
nature, miscellanea curiosa and scientific disciplines, delighted vir-
tuosi and disenchanted technicians. Global technosciences like those 
of bacteria or electromagnetism, building up technical systems yet 
also kicking up the sparks of novel effects,5 could tolerate and even 
cultivate the unexpected; the laboratory master of quarantine, an 
amasser of its faits embarrassants.
5 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Bal-
timore: 1983); Jed Z. Buchwald, The Creation of Scientific Effects: Heinrich Hertz and Elec-
tric Waves (Chicago: 1994).
specimens seen with a gasp. “Almost incredible,” one investigator 
had exclaimed in 1891 of the days, weeks, months that a rabbit and 
the deadly bacilli injected into it had gone on living together. Know-
ing about the rabbit did not keep another from finding his analogous 
human case “not a little surprising.” Still another, knowing neither, 
narrated the “surprise” with which he showed hospital colleagues a 
similar “anomalous fact.” 3 Throughout its growth from a few labora-
tories to a global system, the technoscience that bore no resemblance 
to Leeuwenhoek’s letters and wonders was nonetheless in a state of 
recurring amazement—at infection without disease, disease without 
infection, and varieties of each that would not match.
Anomaly accumulated within a paradigm yet precipitated no cri-
sis and even became part of normal science. Bacteriology both exem-
plifies and contradicts Thomas Kuhn’s model. It belonged to the mod-
el’s genealogy via Kuhn’s reading of the “thought styles” and “thought 
collectives” that had become visible to bacteriologist Ludwik Fleck 
through the same long growth of anomaly displayed in the quaran-
tine and hospital laboratory reports quoted above. Even more genea-
logical of STS models, through the work of Bruno Latour, bacteriology 
built the world of its own validity and success—domesticating ac-
tants (microbes), making the laboratory an obligatory passage point, 
translating interests and aligning forces to build and maintain net-
works, winning trials of strength (against spontaneous generation), 
extending the Archimedean lever of the laboratory to turn farms into 
theaters of proof, making the immutable mobiles and metrology by 
which universals exist through the circulation of particulars (which-
ever navy’s volt you could get in Sinai ports in 1919, you could defi-
nitely get Berlin sera).4 Yet bacteriology thereby also built the world 
of its surprises and limitations, built the unknown into the inter-
stices of the known, what it could not do into what it could, the inex-
3 Sources quoted in J. Andrew Mendelsohn, Cultures of Bacteriology: Formation and Trans-
formation of a Science in France and Germany, 1870–1914 (PhD diss., Princeton Univer-
sity, 1996), ch. 8.
4 Joseph O’Connell, “Metrology: The Creation of Universality by the Circulation of Particu-
lars,” Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 129–173.
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Swit zerland of stupendous height but never before those “round the 
bosom of which the clouds were almost continually rolling.” Here 
were palms, tall and graceful Arecas on the shores, so regular they 
might have been planted by design. Such picturesque observations 
on natural bounty weave through the account of his days on the 
 island—ripe dates from Yemen, the fresh milk of coconuts, and the 
finest pome granates he had ever seen. His remarks on the island’s 
people are less certain. Surprise breaks through the calm surface of 
the telling. 
Hinzuan had been colonized by Arabs, who represented a peak of 
civilizational achievement for European Orientalists. The king of the 
island was a black man but of Arabian politeness. He had Arabs in his 
train and views on the benefits of trade, “which could hardly have 
been expected from a petty African chief, and which if he had been 
sovereign of Yemen, might have been expanded into rational projects 
proportioned to the extent of his dominions.” Jones was among a 
 people who could not read English. Yet Alwi, second cousin to the 
king, perused the opening of an Arabic manuscript and explained it 
in English “more accurately than could have been expected.” Alwi 
astonished with his questions about the independence of America, 
the power and resources of England, France, and Spain, and the char-
acter and strength of the Russian and Ottoman armies. 
An intrepid Arab, it was said, had had the courage and address to 
establish a form of government on the island. That government, bad 
in itself (a violent oligarchy), was administered with advantage to the 
original inhabitants. Or was it? The theft of a pair of blue Morocco 
slippers from the Crocodile by Alwi’s son-in-law “proves, that no 
 principle of honour is instilled by education into the gentry of this 
island.” Alwi himself was knowledgeable but equivocal. On remark-
ing that it was unlawful to paint with henna or tell lies during Rama-
dan, he was asked by Jones whether both were lawful the rest of the 
year. “Lies were innocent, if no man was injured by them,” he replied. 
Jones heard from Alwi, though, how he had personally rescued 
the captain and crew of a wrecked European ship from slavery to an 
African prince, and having “supported them at his own expence, en-
abled them to build another vessel, in which they sailed to Hinzuan, 
Knowing the Orient
Minakshi Menon
To SURPRI’SE v. a. [Surpris, French, from Surprendre]
1 To take unawares; to fall upon unexpectedly.
2 To astonish by something wonderful.
3 To confuse or perplex by something sudden.
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 1755
Hinzuan, an island in the Indian Ocean, surprised Sir William Jones 
on his way to India. It came upon him unexpectedly although he had 
prepared himself for it. On Monday, July 28, 1783, after two months 
aboard the ship Crocodile, there it was.
 It was the sun rising in full splendour on the isle of Mayata (as 
the seamen call it) which we had joyfully distinguished the prece-
ding afternoon by the height of its peak, and which now appea-
red at no great distance from the windows of our cabin; while 
Hinzuan, for which we had so long panted, was plainly discer-
nible a-head, where its high lands presented themselves with re-
markable boldness.1
For Britons traveling east, Hinzuan was their first experience of the 
Orient. Jones, though, had made a career of experiencing the Orient 
through reading. The structure of its languages was familiar to his 
eye and spoke to him of the truths of its nature. Hinzuan exceeded 
the grasp of that reading and changed its affect. Pleasure turned 
to perplexity. 
Remarks on the Island of Hinzuan or Johanna opens with a com-
fortable proposition, in the traditions of conjectural history, on the 
historical development of societies: the slow approach to civiliza-
tion  made by a small community with many natural advantages but 
few means of improving them. Jones invites his readers to contem-
plate the sylvan verdure of the island, whose natural diversity would 
have failed the best pencil. He had known mountains in Wales and 
1 William Jones, “Remarks on the Island of Hinzuan or Johanna,” Asiatick Researches, 5th 
ed. (London: 1807), 2:77–107, here 77–78. The quotations that follow are from this essay 
and are to be found (in order of appearance) at pages 79, 101–102, 78, 103, 103, 107, and 
106. The modern name of Hinzuan is Anjouan. It forms part of the Union of the Comoros, 
a sovereign archipelago island nation off the eastern coast of Africa. 
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Galápagos
Erika Lorraine Milam
In 1981 Kurt Vonnegut and his second wife, Jill Krementz, stepped 
foot  on the Galápagos Islands. “Of course I was fascinated by the 
 island’s natural life,” he reported. “I spent as much time there as 
Charles Darwin did—two weeks.” He added, “We had advantages that 
Darwin didn’t have. Our guides all had graduate degrees in biology. 
We had motorboats to move us around the islands more easily than 
rowboats could when Darwin visited the Galapagos in the 1830’s. 
And, most important, we knew Darwin’s theory of evolution.” 1 
 Vonnegut had another benefit, too: an extensive familiarity with the 
popular writings of Stephen Jay Gould.2 Thanks to Gould, Vonnegut 
saw in evolution an intriguing, playful capriciousness. 
Soon after returning, Vonnegut gave a lecture in New York City at 
the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. (According to its advertising ma-
terials, the cathedral is the length of six blue whales.) He spoke about 
the strange creatures he had seen on the Galápagos Islands—espe-
cially the blue-footed boobies, who in courtship iteratively and sol-
emnly raised each beautiful, bright foot to show their mates. He 
thought about the millions of years needed to create such natural 
intricacies, a span of time vast to us but a mere wink of Nature’s eye. 
However long it had taken for nature to craft humans, he feared we 
were running out of time. Death itself was old, he noted, but the scale 
of our destructive capacity threatened our very existence as a spe-
cies. The previous night, Vonnegut told the gathered crowd, he had 
dreamed of meeting the descendants of humanity in 1.000 years. In 
his dream, he asked these survivors how humanity had managed to 
survive for so long. Their reply? “By preferring life over death for 
themselves and others at every opportunity, even at the expense of 
being dishonored.” 3
Three years later, Vonnegut published a longer reflection on 
what would be required for humanity to survive for a million years 
1 Lorrie Moore, “How Humans Got Flippers and Beaks,” New York Times, October 6,  
1985: A7. 
2 Stephen Jay Gould, “The Misnamed, Mistreated, and Misunderstood Irish Elk,” Natural 
History 82, no. 3 (1973): 10–19.
3 Kurt Vonnegut, “Fates Worse Than Death,” North American Review 267, no. 4 (1982): 46–49. 
and departed thence for Europe or India.” Perhaps the black man 
could not be further improved. His generosity represented the outer-
most limit of his development: “I hope that neither an expectation of 
treasures, nor of any other advantage, will ever induce an European 
power to violate the first principles of justice by assuming the sover-
eignty of Hinzuan, which cannot answer a better purpose than that 
of supplying our fleets with seasonable refreshment.” 
Knowledge produced through reading was beginning to acquire 
a geography. The surprise that accompanied it, like its offspring 
 wonder, limned cultural boundaries between the domestic and the 
exotic, between the West and the Orient, which disarrayed certitudes 
about the stages of human progress. “All of these boundaries were 
electric, thrilling those who approached them with strong passions: 
to run up against any of these limits was necessarily to challenge the 
assumptions that ruled ordinary life.” 2 Jones’s life in India was wit-
ness to the truth of this statement. Darkening surprise would colour 
the Oriental quotidian. It would move him from the declaration of 
love with which he greeted two visitors from Yemen to Hinzuan, to a 
description of the shock of borrowing money from a black man: “it 
was like touching a snake or the South American eel.” 3
2 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750  
(New York: 1998), 20. 
3 William Jones to John Macpherson, February 27, 1786, in The Letters of Sir William Jones, 
ed. Garland Cannon (Oxford: 1970), 2:694.
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and titled it Galápagos.4 In Vonnegut’s fantasy, an ill-fated celebrity 
cruise to the renowned islands stranded a handful of lost souls on 
the entirely fictional Santa Rosalia. At the same time, civilization col-
lapsed as a result of growing economic inequality around the world. 
Also, a voracious strain of bacteria consumed human egg cells and 
rendered all but a handful of women infertile. This remarkable con-
fluence of events marooned a small group of people who became 
 humanity’s sole future progenitors. The members of this genetic 
 bottleneck were rich, poor, likeable, insufferable, and ethnically di-
verse. Vonnegut took great care in establishing the random circum-
stances that had led each individual to a place on Bahía de Darwin, 
human ity’s new ark. 
Humanity’s sleek, furry future as “innocent fisherfolk,” descend-
ed from this small band of fellow travelers, was greatly speeded up 
by the opportune presence of one female child born to this new 
 population. An unpredictable consequence of her grandmother’s ex-
posure to nuclear radiation after the American government had 
 detonated two atomic bombs in Japan, Akiko’s fine dark pelt of fur 
protected her from the sun and kept her warm in the water. She rep-
resented a punctuated leap in humanity’s destiny, a fate sealed by 
her many furry children. As Vonnegut painstakingly showed, evolu-
tion depended on accidental preservation. Yet he suggested, too, that 
our aquatic future would have come eventually, the gradual result of 
natural selection favoring humans with keen fishing skills and small 
brains. Akiko merely spurred things along. 
Shortly after its publication, Gould read Galápagos quickly, over 
one weekend. He wrote to Vonnegut the following Monday, praising 
his novel as “beautifully accurate” in its depiction of evolution’s 
quirkiness and punctuated progress. Vonnegut replied immediately, 
admitting that Gould had been constantly on his mind as he wrote.5 
Like Gould, he sought to undermine sociobiological arguments that 
4 Kurt Vonnegut, Galápagos (New York: 1985).
5 Letter from Stephen Jay Gould to Jill Krementz and Kurt Vonnegut, October 7, 1985, 
Box 111, Folder 6; letter from Kurt Vonnegut to Stephen Jay Gould, October 10, 1985, 
Box 698, Folder 3; M1437 Stephen Jay Gould Papers, 1899–2004, Department of Special 
 Collections & University Archives, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California. 
implied the most successful members of society had attained their 
positions because they were smarter or more attractive. In Galápa-
gos, no one survived because they were more fit than their neigh-
bors; they survived thanks to sheer chance.
Vonnegut’s wry account of humanity’s foibles additionally pos-
ited that our most flamboyant characteristic was also our most dan-
gerous: our three-kilogram brains. If evolution could cure us of our 
self-destructiveness, Vonnegut appeared to ask, would that be worth 
sacrificing the creativity that had allowed Beethoven to write his 
Ninth Symphony? There is no satisfying answer in Galápagos, but 
throughout the novel its narrator repeatedly compared human brains 
to the massive antlers of the extinct Irish elk. (Despite its name, it 
was neither Irish nor an elk.) Biologists had long blamed the disap-
pearance of this massive deer on the size of its antlers, and Vonnegut 
followed suit, using the metaphor to invoke human brains as respon-
sible for our own potential demise. Yet if Vonnegut really had read 
Gould as closely as he claimed, he likely knew that evolutionists 
no longer propagated this monocausal tale of the Irish elk’s extinc-
tion. Gould argued that the immense antlers of this deer were ideally 
suited for mating displays. Their extinction thus came not from self- 
destructive evolutionary trends but as a result of changes in  climate 
at the end of the ice ages. The metaphor between brawn and brains 
in the novel then quickly breaks down. This opens the  possibility 
that, for Vonnegut, humanity might not have been as doomed as 
the narrator—already reconciled to humanity’s fate as fisherfolk—
insisted. 
In Galápagos, Vonnegut’s depiction of the interconnectedness of 
life, with its random connections and intricate patterns, was thus 
both pessimistic and hopeful. He embraced chance and yearned for 
progress, crafting happenstance into evolutionary adventure. Vonne-
gut and Gould alike, by invoking disparate pasts and ima ginative 
 futures, each wrote hoping their words would defamiliarize the pres-
ent and challenge readers to be newly surprised by the world in 
which they live. Historians, in our braver moments, do the same.
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an outward expression of “grief, dejection, and despair.” As in man, 
so, too, in elephants, Darwin reasoned.1 
But the anecdote has had a rather sordid past in the annals of 
science and nowhere more than in the study of animal behavior. In 
the dogmatic days of behaviorism, the Columbia comparative psy-
chologist C. J. Warden wrote in 1928 a stinging criticism of what he 
described as the anecdotal school that followed in the footsteps of 
Darwin. Darwin’s extension of evolution by natural selection to in-
clude explanation of human mental and moral traits sent his follow-
ers in search of concrete evidence documenting animal behavior in 
an effort to prove the continuity between man and beast. This was all 
well and good. But, lacking firsthand observations, they appealed, 
much to Warden’s dismay, to the anecdote, long a staple in natural 
history writing. By the early twentieth century, scores of anecdotal 
collections had appeared in “which the tendency to humanize and 
eulogize the mental power of higher animals,” Warden exclaimed, 
“reached the ridiculous.” Even Teddy Roosevelt used his bully pulpit 
as president of the United States and reputation as a sportsman- 
naturalist to denounce what he saw as a plethora of tales being told 
about the mental life and behavior of wild animals that he regarded 
as false to Nature. Among Warden’s criticisms against the anecdote as 
evidence, one stands out. The anecdote, in Warden’s view, most often 
represented “highly selected and atypical behavior,” which, he ar-
gued, had little, if any, statistical validity.2
And there’s the rub. It is the chance encounter, the rare event, that 
often sparks one’s curiosity, captivates the attention, and sends one 
down a path of inquiry. When, in 1960, the young Jane Goodall saw a 
large male chimpanzee in the Gombe rainforest huddled over a ter-
mite nest, she paused to take notice. With binoculars, she watched as 
he broke off the twig from a plant, stripped it of its leaves, and poked 
it into one of the mound’s many passages. A few moments later, the 
chimp pulled out the twig coated with tasty termites and promptly 
1 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: 1872), 
166.
2 C. J. Warden, “The Development of Modern Comparative Psychology,” Quarterly Review  
of Biology 3 (1928): 491–492.
The Anecdote
Gregg Mitman
On October 10, 2003, Eleanor collapsed to the ground while walking 
in the semiarid savanna of Samburu National Reserve, a popular des-
tination for wildlife safari tours, located approximately six hours 
north by jeep from Nairobi. Within a few minutes, her companion, 
Grace, had successfully helped lift Eleanor back onto her feet. Shaken 
by the fall, Eleanor wobbled under the heavy weight of her body. 
Grace tried to nudge Eleanor along. But Eleanor fell again as she tried 
to walk. Grace appeared distraught as she tried in vain to get Eleanor 
back to her feet. As night fell, Grace stayed by Eleanor’s side. By morn-
ing,  Eleanor had died. Over the next few days, kin, distant relatives, 
and acquaintances came from the surrounding area to gather around 
and attend to Eleanor’s body. 
Eleanor was an elephant. Her death and the events that trans-
pired around it caught ethologist Iain Douglas-Hamilton by surprise. 
Her story is one of the most cited anecdotes among ethologists and 
animal rights activists as evidence of a widespread behavioral re-
sponse among elephants to suffering and death among their kind. 
Anecdotes abound in the history of animal behavior. The power 
of their telling lies in the element of surprise. Charles Darwin, him-
self, scoured far and wide for anecdotes of curious behaviors across 
the animal kingdom in gathering evidence for his work, The Expres-
sion of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Darwin was particularly 
fas cinated with an anecdote told by Sir James Emerson Tennent of 
his witnessing Indian elephants weeping upon being captured and 
bound in Ceylon. Eager to verify Tennent’s observations, Darwin 
made a number of trips to the London Zoological Gardens to inter-
view the keeper of Indian elephants, who confirmed that he had “sev-
eral times seen tears rolling down the face of the old female, when 
distressed by the removal of the young one.” A handful of trusted 
correspondents, the word of a knighted British politician and Fellow 
of the Royal Society, and the intimate knowledge of an animal keeper 
were enough for Darwin to transform Tennent’s anecdote into evi-
dence to support his claim that the distance between humans and 
animals was one of degree and not kind. Tears, Darwin argued, were 
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popped the morsels into his mouth. Goodall remarked with astonish-
ment and disbelief at what she observed. “I remem ber the day as viv-
idly as it was yesterday,” she recalls.3 Her ob ser vations of toolmaking 
among nonhuman primates swept the scientific community by 
storm. What began as an anecdote, after re peated ob ser vations, be-
came what the late paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould  regarded as one 
of the “Western world’s greatest scientific achievements.” 4 
Warden may have thought behaviorism had banished the anec-
dote from science forever. Yet few ethologists can resist its appeal. 
Over the last century, a new range of techniques has developed to 
shore up the anecdote in the study of animal behavior. The permu-
tations ethologists now perform to make the anecdote statistically 
respectable would dazzle even the most strident skeptics. In the case 
of Eleanor, GPS tracking of three females, each with different genetic 
relationships to her, permitted Iain Douglas-Hamilton and his team 
to statistically analyze the time each spent with her body. They 
hoped to ascertain whether the alleged compassion displayed was 
confined to Eleanor’s closest kin. It was not.5 
Surprise and wonder in coming to know the life of another or-
ganism have often drawn the curious observer into the world of sci-
ence. Should we be shocked at the continued reticence to jettison the 
anecdote and deny the emotional life of animals among contempo-
rary ethologists? After all, who can resist a good story? And it is story-
telling, which in its many forms has been animating the meaning 
making of humans for millennia, that might set our species apart 
from the rest of the animal world.
3 Robin McKie, “Chimps with Everything: Jane Goodall’s 50 Years in the Jungle,”  
Guardian, June 26, 2010.
4 Stephen Jay Gould, “Introduction,” in Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man,  
rev. ed.  (Boston: 1988), v.
5 Iain Douglas-Hamilton et al., “Behavioural Reactions of Elephants toward a Dying  
and Deceased Matriarch,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 100 (2006): 87–102.
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Philosophy Begins in Wonder
Glenn W. Most
In early Greek epic, words of the family θαῦμα (thauma) occur fairly 
often to denote a specific variety of joyous, overwhelmed surprise. 
Derived from θεάομαι (theaomai), a verb that means “to gaze upon” 
but also “to contemplate, to observe,” these terms indicate a raptur­
ous, astonished admiration: never for an unexpected outcome, or in­
deed for an event of any sort, but instead always for some entity, a 
person or an object. Almost always, the admiration is the result of 
a  sensory perception, originally sight, though with time this is 
 enlarged to include hearing. In most cases, the subjects who feel 
the surprise are one or more human beings, and the single, indeed 
singular, object that provokes it is divine in nature or origin or fab­
rication—or else monstrous. In any case, it far transcends ordinary 
humanity. 
Very often, the noun is combined with an epexegetic infinitive 
denoting sight—above all in the epic phrase θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι (thauma 
idesthai), “a wonder to look upon”— emphasizing that it is the visual 
impact of the astonishing object, which strikes its viewers once and 
then continues to affect them, that causes this effect. These terms 
denote the startled human recognition that there is a realm that 
 transcends humanity; it provokes neither consternation nor dread 
but a kind of hypnotized joy. While in some passages the astonish­
ment may imply a certain uncanniness or intractability, there is no 
implication of terror. But, by the same token, there is no cognitive 
component or effect to early epic θαῦμα: this wonder stupefies and 
exhilarates, but it does not teach.
So it is all the more surprising that Plato, in his aporetic dialogue 
about the definition of knowledge, the Theaetetus, shows Socrates 
prominently asserting an essential link between θαῦμα and phi­
losophy. Socrates and the young Theaetetus have been debating 
 Theaetetus’s first proposed definition of knowledge, that it is simply 
identical to sense perception, and Socrates has had little difficulty in 
enwrapping his inexperienced interlocutor in inextricable swaths 
of  objections and paradoxes. When Theaetetus announces that per­
plexities like Socrates’s last barrage of absurd consequences make 
him feel an extraordinary wonder (ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω, huperthuôs 
hôs thaumazô, 155c) and even dizziness, Socrates replies, “Theodorus 
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Plato’s greatest pupil, Aristotle, took up the link between wonder and 
philosophy that Plato had established, but in conspicuously reassert­
ing it, he gave it a characteristic twist. In the second chapter of the 
first book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle demonstrates by reference 
to the first philosophers that wisdom is not a practically productive 
science. 
 It is through wonder (τὸ θαυμάζειν, to thaumazein) that men 
now  begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering 
(θαυμάσαντες, thaumasantes) in the first place at obvious perple­
xities, and then by gradual progression raising questions about 
the greater matters too, e.g. about the changes of the moon and of 
the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. 
Now  he who wonders (θαυμάζων, thaumazôn) and is perplexed 
feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth­lover is in a sense a phi­
losopher, since myths are composed of wonders [θαυμασίων, 
thaumasiôn]); therefore if it was to escape ignorance that men 
studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for 
the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility. 
 (A.2 982b11–23, trans. H. Tredennick). 
Aristotle retains Plato’s interpretation of wonder as a dynamic im­
pulse that pulls men from ignorance of the world to awareness of 
their ignorance about it to a desire for knowledge of it to, finally, 
knowledge itself. But he universalizes wonder and the desire for 
knowledge beyond Plato’s tiny elite to all human beings. In the words 
of the very first sentence of the Metaphysics, “All men naturally desire 
knowledge” (A.1 980a22).
We may contrast this Greek view of the joyous wonder that leads 
to philosophical knowledge with another ancient tradition, one that 
likewise posits the recognition of human limits as the first step on 
the way to true wisdom—except that in this other tradition the rec­
ognition occurs under the sign not of joyous admiration but of sacred 
dread: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Proverbs 1:7, 
9:10, cf. 2:5, 15:33).
seems to have made quite a good guess about your natural disposi­
tion. For this feeling, to feel wonder (τὸ θαυμάζειν, to thaumazein), 
belongs especially to a philosopher, for there is no other beginning of 
philosophy than this, and the man who said that Iris was the child of 
Thaumas created quite a good genealogy” (155d). 
The genealogy asserted derives ultimately from Hesiod’s Theog-
ony (lines 265–266, 780), but it is doubtless Plato himself who invents 
the pseudo­etymological link between Thaumas and θαῦμα and who 
attributes a philosophical significance to the Hesiodic genealogy. 
We  can easily see, in phonic terms, why Socrates could associate 
Thaumas with θαῦμα; but why should Iris signify “philosophy”? Else­
where, Plato’s Socrates etymologizes the name of Iris as meaning “to 
speak” (from εἴρειν, eirein, “to speak”; Cratylus 408b), but this sense 
seems far too general to be of much help here. Instead of looking to 
the name of Iris, let us think instead of her function as the divine 
messenger who brings humans the announcements of the gods. If 
she is the mediator between gods and men, then, in Platonic terms, 
she can be seen as embodying the activity of philosophy itself: for 
philosophy is the insatiable human desire (philo­) for a divine wis­
dom (sophia) that belongs by right to the gods and that humans can 
never fully attain (Apology 20d–23c). 
So too, Eros is a philosopher (Symposium 204b), for Eros is neither 
a god nor a human but instead a daimôn, a being intermediate be­
tween gods and men who carries human things to the gods and di­
vine things to men (Symposium 202e–204c). And so Socrates can claim 
that he himself possesses an “erotic art” (Phaedrus 257a) or that 
he knows nothing about anything except eros (Symposium 177e). To 
be a philosopher is to feel dizzy, astonished by aporia—but also to be 
able to move beyond momentary stupefaction, in the direction of a 
better argument, a truer doctrine. Plato insists that not everyone is 
up to the challenge of this philosophical wonder: at the beginning of 
the dialogue, Socrates goes to great lengths to ascertain from Theo­
dorus that Theaetetus really has a natural aptitude for philosophy 
(143d–144b)—indeed, Theaetetus even has the very same snub nose 
and bulging eyes as Socrates does (143e).
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clearly descriptive as Baedeker.” 4 On the very first evening I was 
stunned by the accuracy with which Linnaeus had documented the 
local flora and fauna. Not only the endless variety of willow shrubs 
along the shores of Lule River but also the tiny black flies that pes­
tered us were readily recognizable from the terse descriptions and 
lifelike little drawings in his journal (see figure). The next morning, 
we  visited the imposing fourteenth­century church in Luleå Old 
Town. The procession statues that Linnaeus described—with their 
moveable limbs and eyes “weeping” from cupped heads filled with 
water—were sadly gone.5 But a small round hole in the wall next to 
the choir entrance, which Linnaeus had measured with a hilarious 
level of detail, was still patently there.6 We decided to set the stakes 
high and look for a pine tree that Linnaeus reported had been 
“marked with the yearly elevation of the water” of the Lule River in 
1667 and 1669. It was not difficult to find. When we stopped at a river 
islet once famous for its salmon fishery, Håkan asked an elderly local 
man about it. “Funny that you should ask,” he answered, “years ago, 
people came here all the way from London to see this tree.” 7 The pine 
stump that he showed us only bore a mark from 1758, but that was 
good enough. When we arrived in Stáloluokta—a village within 
 Padjelanta used by Sámi communities for fishing and pasturing rein­
deer during the summer—we were no longer surprised to recognize 
many of its features, like the architecture of the goahti in which our 
hosts treated us to cold­smoked arctic char and freshly baked flat 
bread.
Has Lapland been standing still, as traditional as it is remote? It 
is not standing still at all, as we witnessed when passing by window­
less “server farms” or groups of young refugees bent over their smart­
4 Florence Caddy, Through the Fields with Linnæus: A Chapter in Swedish History 
 (London: 1887), 1:170.
5 They seem to have been destroyed some time after 1832; see Barbro Flodin, Nederluleå 
kyrka, Norrbotten, Sveriges Kyrkor, Konsthistorisk Inventarium 223 (Borås: 1986), 116. 
6 This and the following quotation are from Carl Linnaeus, Lachesis Lapponica, or a Tour 
in Lapland, trans. Charles Troilius, ed. James Edward Smith (London: 1811), 1:240, 253. 
7 The company in question was in all likelihood the Linnean Society; see John R. Packham 
and Roland Moberg, In the Footsteps of Linnaeus, Lapland 1988: An Account of the Jour-
ney Organized in the Bicentenary Year of the Linnean Society of London (London: 1989).
Déjà Vu in Lapland
Staffan Müller-Wille
On May 22, 1732, a day before his 25th birthday, Carl Linnaeus left 
Uppsala to journey through Sweden’s northern regions. It would take 
him 55 days by foot, horseback, and boat to reach his ultimate desti­
nation, Lapland’s fell in Norrbotten. In June 2016, I boarded a plane at 
Arlanda airport near Uppsala to fly to Luleå, the capital of Norbotten 
on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. With me were James Prosek, an 
American artist, writer, and fly fisherman, and Kristof Zyskowski, an 
ornithologist from Yale’s Peabody Museum of Natural History. In Lu­
leå we were met by another writer, fly fisherman, and bird­hunter, 
this one the public relations strategist of the Swedish Lapland Visi­
tors Board, Håkan Stenlund. “Team Linnaeus” was now complete. We 
would spend the next four days retracing the leg of Linnaeus’s jour­
ney, which took him inland along the Lule River, through the market 
town Jokkmokk, and on from there to the former silver­mining out­
post of Kvikkjokk, where he finally ascended to what the Sámi call 
“the higher land,” or Padjelanta, now a national park. 
“Team Linnaeus” makes it sound as if we had a plan. With the 
likely exception of Håkan, none of us quite did. James wanted to 
come to terms with the hubris of Linnaeus, imposing order and 
names on a fluid nature that had already been given names from time 
immemorial.1 Kristof, among other things, saw the trip as an op­
portunity to extend his personal “life list” of observed bird species.2 
I had brought high­resolution images of the manuscript of Linnaeus’s 
 Lapland journal but was skeptical that anything mentioned therein 
would reveal itself simply and directly to the modern observer.3
I was wrong, and Florence Caddy (1837–1923), who had herself 
jour neyed through Sweden, was right: Linnaeus’s journals were “as 
1 See the article he wrote and illustrated for the New York Times (“A Botanist in Swedish 
Lapland,” May 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/travel/carl­linnaeus­swe­
dish­botanist­in­lapland.html).
2 For an image of a vocalizing adult Eurasian Golden Plover (Pluvialis apricaria [L.]) from 
Padjelanta, see Kristof’s webpage at the “The Internet Bird Collection,” accessed August 
13, 2017, http://www.hbw.com/ibc/u/21177. 
3 Images of Linnaeus’s original manuscript are available from the Linnean Society’s 
 Collections at www.linnean­online.org/165368. 
295294
Staffan Müller­Wille | Déjà Vu in Lapland
palities in Norrbotten for his Suecia Antiqua et Hodierna (1660–1716), 
a magnificent collection of drawings that was supposed “to show for­
eigners how many great and beautiful things are to be found in our 
fatherland.” 10
Linnaeus thus built on a long tradition of writing (and talking) 
about Lapland.11 In addition, he was never alone during his journey. 
In the old Luleå church, he wrote that “they showed me” the statues; 
the salmon migrating up Lule River “were said” to come all the way 
from the Atlantic, and Norwegian­style fishhooks found in the fish 
“were produced” to prove the point; on Padjelanta, finally, Linnaeus 
was accompanied by a Sámi guide, spoke of his “hosts” and himself as 
a “guest.” He spent a whole evening with “a Lapp who was citizen of 
both Sweden and Denmark, and gave me liquor, which I refused, but 
he made me swig, the same with tobacco.” The next day, he set out 
with two other Sámi in order to cross the mountains into Norway 
(during this time unified with Denmark), and at this point, his narra­
tive suddenly switches to the first­person plural. 12 
Just like ourselves, Linnaeus was on a guided tour through Lap­
land. Producing the same tokens and telling the same stories creates 
a feeling of having been there already, of being at home, wherever we 
are. Without that feeling, we would not be able to navigate the world 
or produce anything new and surprising about it.
10 Nils Hackzell, “Staden Luleå och dess gransocknar,” trans. Henrik Sundin (Norrbotten: 
1928), 33–62; Helmer Lagergren, “Luleå stad med omnejd i slutet av 1600­talet. En 
 beskrivning avsedd för Erik Dahlbergs sueciaverk” (Norrbotten: 1927), 51–69, on 51.
11 Lisbet Koerner, Linnaeus: Nature and Nation (Cambridge, MA: 1999), 62–63.
12 Carl Linnaeus, Iter Lapponicum. Lapplänska resa 1732, vol. 1, Dagboken, ed. Algot 
 Hellbom, Sigurd Fries, and Roger Jacobsson (Umeå: 2003), 83, 86, 103, 107. My translation.
phones. Linnaeus was not, as Caddy phrased it, “on a Robinson­
Crusoe­ like form of a Journey”; nor was Lapland, during his time, “one 
vast emptiness, like the rest of the world in the days of paradise.” 8 
Travelers from the South had reached the North long before Linnaeus, 
and northerners had likewise long been traveling to the South. The 
Lulean Nils Hackzell (1703–1755), for example, publicly  defended a 
“historical dissertation on the city of Luleå and its  adjacent parishes” 
at Uppsala University in 1731. It contains an  account of the proces­
sion statues that is strikingly similar to that of Linnaeus.9 Similar dis­
sertations were published on the cities and  hinterlands of Umeå, 
Piteå, and Torneå. They were all inspired by  seventeenth­century 
Gothicism and made liberal use of the many ma nuscript reports that 
Count Erik Dahlbergh (1625–1703) had commissioned from munici­
8 Caddy, Through the Fields, 169.
9 Nils Hackzell, Dissertatio historica de urbe Lula eique adjacentibus paroeciis  
(Uppsala: 1731), 26.
Insect drawings from Linnaeus’s Lapland journal. The upper drawing shows the longhorn 
beetle Monochamus sutor (L.), the lower, a black fly of the genus Simulium. The insects  
are life­sized, the lower drawing measuring ca. 4 mm in length. Carl Linnaeus, “Iter Lappo­
nicum” (1732), Linnean Society of London, Linnean Collections, call no. GB­110/LM/LP/TRV/ 
1/2/1. Reprinted with kind permission of the Linnean Society of London  (www.linnean.org).
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cycled parchment sheets. In addition to his own industrious pub­
lishing activity, he was a pioneer in the use of chemistry in the ser­
vice of philological and codicological studies.2 In Milan’s Biblioteca 
 Ambrosiana and other libraries across northern Italy, Mai studied 
many codices written on recycled parchment sheets, discovering 
 hidden texts. In 1819, he was appointed custos of the Vatican Library, 
where he immediately began a systematic survey of palimpsests. He 
usually published the new texts with critical notes, including, among 
others, perhaps his most important discovery: Cicero’s Republic 
(Vat. lat. 5757).
The criticism that Mai received from many scholars, frustrated 
by lack of access to his new finds and relegated to correcting his 
abundant mistakes, was perhaps justified by an unfortunate conse­
quence of his method, applied mostly on the pages of promising new 
discoveries. The iron component of his reagent, the Gallic ink, reacted 
with animal skin, oxidizing and effectively rusting the parchment, 
often making both the upper and lower scripts illegible and render­
ing the parchment dry, broken, and blackened. Because of such dam­
age, institutions including the Vatican Library eventually stopped 
authorizing ambitious requests from textual scholars who continued 
experimenting with chemical methods into the 1880s and 1890s.
Shortly after his appointment as prefect of the Vatican Library 
in 1895, Franz Ehrle, a German Jesuit scholar and the father of book 
conservation as an internationally accepted profession, paid special 
attention to the palimpsests treated with chemical reagents. At the 
international conference he convened at Sankt Gallen in 1898, Ehrle 
suggested the use of gelatin to stabilize and prevent the chemically 
treated parchment sheets from further deterioration. At the same 
time, he promoted document photography, a relatively new method 
at that time, as a useful conservation tool for the palimpsests and 
other significant, fragile, or damaged manuscripts. In 1906, for the 
2 Angelo Mai tried different recipes in Vat. gr. 19, as his own notes demonstrate, 
 “Idrosulfuro di potassa” (in left column) and “Galla” (in right column) on f. IIv,  
“Syruppo di potassa” on f. IIIr. See “Manuscript–Vat. gr. 19,“ Vatican Library, accessed 




Recently, 196 lines were discovered from a previously unknown com­
edy of the Athenian Menander (342–292 BC) in addition to 196 lines of 
his Dyskolos, both copied in the fourth century AD, each on a double 
parchment leaf. These leaves would be recycled twice. First, in the 
seventh or eighth century, they were overwritten with Nemesius 
of  Emesa’s (390 AD) renowned work On Human Nature; then, two 
 centuries later, in 886 the latest layer of texts, a collection of Chris­
tian sermons in Syriac, was copied over a massive collection of recy­
cled parchment sheets (Vat. sir. 623, pt. 2).1 In addition to other recy­
cled texts in Greek, Palestinian Aramaic, and Armenian, the same 
collection of Syriac sermons hid other writings of high significance 
for the history of science, for example, a Greek version of Ptolemy’s 
Handy Tables, an Arabic translation of Theon’s Small Commentary on 
Ptolemy’s latter work (a copy itself witnessing to the Arabic trans­
lation movement in Bagdad, which was the Abba¯sid capital in the 
ninth century), and a Syriac translation of Galen’s treatise On the 
Qualities of Simple Medicines completed between the seventh and 
ninth centuries. Although the number of similarly rich and exciting 
palimpsests is small, hundreds of textual fragments, long hidden, 
have been waiting to be uncovered and identified. For more than two 
centuries, this challenge has stimulated productive collaboration be­
tween cutting­edge science and philology.
Driven by the desire to uncover old and important texts, in the 
late eighteenth century scholars began to make major discoveries by 
experimenting with substances offered by chemists. From Wolfen­
büttel to Paris, from Milan to Verona and Rome, from London to 
 Oxford and Cambridge, textual scholars busied themselves with re­
vealing forgotten and unknown classical texts in palimpsests much 
as Poggio Bracciolini and his humanist colleagues had sought new 
texts in the fifteenth century. Among these scholars, Angelo Mai 
(1782–1854) gained prominence for the many significant discoveries 
he made using Gallic ink to remove the uppermost texts from re­
1 The abbreviation Vat. (Vaticanus) refers to manuscript collections within the Vatican 
Library, each distinguished by language such as sir. (Syriac), gr. (Greek), and lat. (Latin). 
The Arabic numeral identifies the individual manuscript within the respective collec­
tions.
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Baby Ruth
Christine von Oertzen
Baby Ruth was lying in her crib, making cheerful little sounds, when, 
accidently, she uttered a short, high caw. The infant instantly fell si­
lent, and “a ludicrous look and astonishment overspread her face.” 1 
This fleeting moment would have gone unnoticed in most babies’ 
lives, but in Ruth’s case, her aunt Milicent Shinn fixed it on paper. 
Shinn reckoned that the muscular sensation in the infant’s throat, in 
combination with the odd sound itself, must have sparked the ap­
pearance of a new emotion in the six­week­old; that emotion was 
“genuine surprise: a simple nerve shock, closely related to fright.”
These notes were jotted down in November 1890, at the heyday of 
what became known as the American child study movement. As one 
of the first women to graduate from Berkeley, Milicent Shinn had 
been on the lookout for opportunities to engage in scientific work 
compatible with her day job as an editor of a literary magazine and 
her duties at home. Inspired by Charles Darwin and William Preyer, 
she viewed her niece’s arrival as a unique chance to participate in a 
citizen science project avant la lèttre, unlocking the secrets of the 
evolving human mind, through minute, daily observations in the 
nursery. Quickly hooked, Shinn stuck to this project for years, amass­
ing the most comprehensive individual data set from a single infant’s 
development that would be produced for decades to come. In the 
 process, her family homestead in Niles, 30 miles south of San Fran­
cisco, came to resemble an observational habitat, where the  baby’s 
grandparents, as well as her mother and father, all supported Shinn’s 
scientific observational zeal. 
What fascinated me, when I discovered Shinn’s work and her 
 efforts to establish a network of at­home baby observers, was her 
 distinctive voice as a faithful observer, deliberate author, and loving 
aunt enchanted by the wonders of her niece’s evolving mind. With­
out formal training in psychology, physiology, or biology, Shinn 
found the challenges in collecting and interpreting her material al­
most insuperable. Over time, however, she developed a distinct and 
unerring style, realizing that her radically inductive method let her 
1 This and the following quotation are from Milicent Shinn, The Biography of a Baby 
(Cambridge: 1900), 86.
first time ever, the facsimile of an entire palimpsest (Vat. lat. 5750) 
was published despite its originally poor legibility.
Without entering the complex history of palimpsest photogra­
phy, my story ends with the great potential for the latest digital pho­
tography to reveal hidden texts. The basic challenge for the photogra­
phy of palimpsests is to bring the often hopelessly faint traces of a 
script into the spectrum of visibility to the human eye. This challeng­
ing process is made significantly more complex by prior conserva­
tion using gelatin, damage from chemical reagents, or biological or­
ganisms such as mould. Using mathematical algorithms, however, 
multispectral photography (also used in biological and aerial photog­
raphy) offers advantages for processing by combining sets of images 
captured with different wavelengths of light (natural, ultraviolet flu­
orescent, and infrared). This new alliance of natural scientific and 
philological methods continues to generate excitement and new dis­
coveries. Recently, in close collaboration with the image scientists 
Mike Toth and William Christens­Barry and palimpsest expert Jana 
Gruskova, I managed to decipher much of the preface to the Scythica, 
authored by Dexippus of Athens. In the style of Thucydides, the text 
gives an account of the first big wave of migration of Nordic peoples 
to southern Europe, which the author witnessed firsthand in the 
third century. His preface survives only in Vat. gr. 73, fol. 54r, an origi­
nal copy of Emperor Constantine VII’s (d. in 959) historical encyclo­
paedia (Excerpta Constantiniana), the work at the center of the re­
search project that brought me to the MPIWG and then to the Vatican.
Not only had Angelo Mai been unsuccessful in reading this page, 
but his chemical reagents had very nearly destroyed it. But by wash­
ing off the upper text of the fourteenth century, he had nevertheless 
unintentionally removed the major obstacle to deciphering the text 
beneath it; something that is now manageable via multispectral pho­
tography. From this new find, we learn how Dexippus defines his role 
as a historian able to anticipate how immediate moments will in­
fluence and change the distant future. Indeed, his very presentation 
technique would provide future readers with the sensation of par­
ticipating in crucial moments of a distant past.
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see things that professionally trained observers overlooked, misled 
as they were by theories based on the adult mind.2 Against common 
perception, Shinn claimed that interest and pleasure steered the 
course of each infant’s development in a unique way. And along with 
interest and pleasure, Shinn’s observations uncovered surprise as 
central to this process. 
When present at all, surprise had played merely an accidental 
role in other scientific baby diaries of the time and had, by and large, 
been only noticed in much older children. Introduced by Darwin as 
an emotion manifest in facial and bodily expressions rooted in deep 
evolutionary history, surprise was mainly regarded as an adaptive 
ability of heightened attention that enabled many organisms to react 
quickly in unexpected situations. In Shinn’s careful day­in and day­
out account of Baby Ruth’s development, however, the emotion be­
came apparent as one functionally linked to processes of cognition.
Ruth’s reaction in the crib had first seemed a singular event to 
Shinn. But the baby’s amazement developed into a “striking feature” 
when her visual attention expanded beyond fixation on faces. Her 
grandfather had the habit of playfully lifting Ruth above his head, 
and until the end of her third month, Ruth responded with delight. 
All at once, however, she displayed a completely different reaction, 
looking around silently, absorbed in the novel appearance of things. 
From up in the air, the baby inspected the familiar room for many 
minutes, fixing her gaze, in turn, on every single object within her 
field of vision. She would “then turn her head quickly, and examine 
another section; when this was done, she would fret till carried to 
another place, and there renew her inspection of the room in its 
changed aspect,—all this with an expression of surprise and eager­
ness, eyes wide and brows raised. … The habit was striking from the 
fourteenth week through the seventeenth, most of all in the fif­
teenth; it then declined, but would recur in a new room.” 3 
2 Milicent Shinn papers (Drafts 15th month, p. 8, rs), Bancroft Library, University of 
 California, Berkeley.
3 Milicent Shinn, Notes on the Development of a Child, vol. 1, 1893–1899  
(Berkeley, CA: 1909), 79–80.
Shinn’s findings, accomplished in at­home seclusion and published 
with much delay, went largely unnoticed. During the 1960s, more 
than 70 years later, the triad of surprise, pleasure, and interest made 
a comeback in research and theories of the infant mind, but without 
reference to her work. In the wake of Jean Piaget’s model of cognitive 
development, psychologists focused on the responses to rather than 
the occurrence of surprise. In so doing, they redefined the phenome­
non from an emotion unrelated to other behaviors to a sequence of 
events constituting a cognitive mechanism crucial for the progres­
sion of the infant mind from sensorimotor intelligence to  formal 
thought.4 Silvan Tomkins vividly described surprise as a  “resetting 
affect,” or “circuit breaker,” imposing an interruption through which 
attention is turned away all at once from one thing to another. He 
asserted that this pause had a clearing function, crucial for arriving 
at heightened attention, which in turn enabled interest, pleasure, 
and curiosity (or fear and distress), ultimately contributing to 
changes in human cognitive structures.5 Especially younger children 
and infants were thought to have a low threshold for surprise, as the 
novelty of the world startled them with such intensity and frequency, 
giving way to maturation and experience. 
Since the 1960s, models of cognitive structures as well as devices 
such as refined eye­tracking technologies have made it easier to de­
tect surprise behavior in very young children as a means of further 
unlocking the capacities of infant thinking. If, as developmental psy­
chologists following Piaget have put it, babies from very early on are 
“little scientists,” geared to learn and grow by surprise, then the most 
intriguing common feature in human nature may be the ability to 
see the world anew—ever and anon. Milicent Shinn, I believe, would 
have agreed wholeheartedly.
4 William R. Charlesworth, “The Role of Surprise in Cognitive Development,” in Studies  
in Cognitive Development, ed. D. Elkind and J. H. Flevell (New York and London: 1969), 
257–314, on 307.
5 Silvan Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, vol. 1,  The Positive Affects  
(New York: 1962), 506.
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salis.4 The naturalist gains close access to captives, but at the cost of 
removing them from their original environment.
Still, being a crack shot came to be a useful qualification for a 
field naturalist. That was one skill that recommended Charles Dar­
win as a naturalist and gentleman companion to Captain FitzRoy on 
HMS Beagle. In the published Ornithology of the Beagle, Darwin 
 referred many times to specimens he had shot or killed.5 A mid­nine­
teenth­century guide to collecting from the Smithsonian Institution 
recommend ed trapping or poisoning mammals if possible, but its list 
of collecting supplies included a “double­barreled gun and rifle” as 
well as “fine shot for small birds and mammals.” A similar recommen­
dation was made by the handbook of the Agassiz Association, an 
1880s publication intended for American high school boys and girls.6
Naturalists still surprise animals, but rarely with guns. The cam­
era trap was invented in the late nineteenth century by George 
 Shiras III, initially as a way to stalk animals outside hunting season. 
Shiras used hunting techniques to capture stunning images of often 
stunned animals.7 Sometimes he used the Ojibwa technique of jack­
lighting: attracting animals to a canoe with a flame in the front, then 
identifying them by the glow of their eyes. At other times he em­
ployed a tripwire to activate a camera shutter and magnesium flash. 
Like traditional trapping, successful camera trapping required an in­
timate knowled ge of animals’ habits in order to know where to set 
up the camera, flash, and trigger.
In their names, the camera trap and the photo safari reveal the 
venatic ancestry of techniques still used in zoology and nature films. 
Movie cameras, fiber optics, infrared sensors, and a host of other 
4 Mary Terrall, Catching nature in the act: Natural History in the Eighteenth Century 
 (Chicago and London: 2014).
5 Charles Darwin, ed., The Zoology of the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle, pt. 3, Birds (London: 
1839–1843).
6 Spencer Fullerton Baird, Directions for Collecting, Preserving and Transporting Speci-
mens of Natural History, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: 1859); Harlan H. Ballard, Hand-book of  
the St. Nicholas Agassiz Association (Lenox, MA: 1884).
7 George Shiras III, “Photographing Wild Game with Flashlight and Camera,” National 
 Geographic Magazine 17, no. 7 (1906): 367–423; Jean­Christophe Bailly, George Shiras:  
In the Heart of the Dark Night, ed. Sonia Voss (Paris: 2015).
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Some animals come to you. In minutes, with a white sheet and a 
flashlight, a lepidopterist can summon thousands of moths. Most are 
more elusive. Hares, wrote the English divine Edward Topsell, sleep 
during the day and eat at night, far from their burrows, perhaps “by 
secret instinct of nature, to conceale their forms and lodging places 
unknown.” 1 Anyone who has moved closer to get a good look at a 
bird, only to have the creature fly just too far away to identify, again 
and again, knows how skittish some wildlife can be. To study it, to 
catch nature in the act, the naturalist must take it unawares. The 
hunt reminds us that surprise is not only an emotion; it is also an act.
Hunting is, indeed, the paradigmatic form of taking nature by 
surprise. In times and places where zoology has emphasized anato­
mizing and classifying animals, the hunter and the fisher have been 
the naturalist’s chief allies. Those of us who love natural history must 
remember this fact—and remember that, in terms of the history of 
natural history, until very recently surprising animals for scientific 
purposes typically involved capturing or killing them. In the 1550s 
and 1560s, Ippolito Salviani visited the Roman fish market to find 
new species. A century and a quarter later, Nicolas Venette identified 
migratory restlessness in the behavior of caged nightingales.2
We can surprise nature in other ways. Confronted with elusive 
or concealed animals, the naturalist might take another tack: rear a 
creature from its egg or an immature form. Artists and naturalists 
who studied and depicted insects and other small creatures often 
raised captives: Clara de Bock, the widow of the Middelburgh artist 
Johannes Goedaert who published three books on insects’ metamor­
phoses, complained about the bug jars cluttering her home.3 The 
French academician René­Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur reared in­
sects in large numbers to increase his chances of being present at 
crucial moments, such as when a butterfly emerged from its chry­
1 Edward Topsell, The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes (London: 1607), 266.
2 Ippolito Salviani, Aquatilium animalium historiae, liber primus, cum eorundem formis, 
aere excusis (Rome: 1558); Tim R. Birkhead and Isabelle Charmantier, “Nicolas Venette’s 
Traité du rossignol (1697) and the Discovery of Migratory Restlessness,” Archives of Natu-
ral History 40, no. 1 (2013): 125–138.
3 Johannes Goedaert, Metamorphosis naturalis (Middelburgh: 1660–69), vol. 3.
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technical improvements have produced astounding images. But they 
have also contributed to a surprisingly quick shift in attitudes in the 
industrial West. Victorians protested cruelty to domestic animals, es­
pecially those of the working classes, but had few qualms about kill­
ing wild animals for sport or science. George Shiras initially turned to 
the camera as a way to hunt out of season. But he soon adopted the 
motto “Gun gives way to camera” and urged other hunters to trade 
their rifles and shotguns for camera, plate, and flash. Museums and 
zoos continued (and continue) to surprise animals to capture and kill 
them, but image and data capture has largely superseded creature 
capture in the worlds of scientific and amateur zoology. Concern for 
invertebrates came later, but as Peter Marren has noted, the butterfly 
collecting that had been a common practice from the eighteenth cen­
tury through his youth in postwar Britain went out of fashion over 
the course of the 1970s.8
The camera trap holds out the hope of surprising wildlife with­
out disturbing it. Henry Carey, an enthusiastic early promoter of the 
device, made that bold claim, but the owl that fell from a branch into 
a river and “swore like a trooper” after the flash fired or the bull 
moose that overturned Shiras’s canoe would have disagreed.9 They 
remind us that observing nature is an intervention and that when 
we set out to surprise nature, we ought to expect, in return, to be 
surprised ourselves.
8 Peter Marren, Rainbow Dust: Three Centuries of Butterfly Delight (Chicago: 2017).
9 Henry R. Carey, “Camera­Trapping: A Novel Device for Wild Animal Photography,” Journal 
of Mammalogy 7, no. 4 (1926): 278–81.
“Snowy Owl, White Fish River, Michigan,” by George Shiras III, National Geographic 
 Magazine, July 1906 (cropped). Image from the Biodiversity Heritage Library.  








                          L’admiration est une subite surprise de l’ame,  
                          qui fait qu’elle se porte à considerer avec  
                          attention les objects qui luy semblent rares &  
                          extraordinaires.  Ainsi elle est causée,  
                          premierement, par l’impression qu’on a dans  
                          le cerveau, qui represente l’object comme   
                          rare, & par consequent digne d’estre fort  
                          consideré; puis ensuite, par le mouvement  
                          des esprits, qui sont disposez par cette  
                          impression à tendre avec grande force vers  
                          l’endroit du cerveau où elle est, pour l’y 
fortifier & conserver….Ce qui n’empesche pas qu’elle n’ait beaucoup 
de force, à cause de la surprise, c’est à dire, de l’arrivement subit & 
inopiné de l’impression qui change le mouvement des esprits; 
laquelle surprise est propre et particulière à cette passion…. 
 
-Descartes, Les passions de l’ame, 2.70 and 2.72 


































…Weird idea.  I wonder 
where it came from. 
Checking out the Perseus 






So surprise is particular to wonder but is 
not itself either a passion or the impression 
made on the matter of the brain by the 
object of wonder.  It’s evanescent and 
abstract, more adverb than noun.  It 
connotes the force, suddenness, 
unexpectedness, and all-at-onceness with 
which that impression is received…	
 
…Must be postclassical.  Let’s 
check out Ducange’s 
Glossarium mediae et infimae 
latinitatis…. 
Hmmm… Strange.  Nothing under 
surprendo there.  Or under 
superprendo either.  What about 
surprehendo? Nada….  
HOLY S***! 







OK, get a grip…  There’s got to be some kind of story in this morass 
of redundant and circular references.  Let’s see… 
 
1. So, the Latin ancestor of “surprise” is postclassical!  First refer-
ences are to the law code of the Ripuarian Franks (sixth/seventh 
century), where “surprise” (as a verb, superprendere) means spatial 
encroachment. For example, if you encroach even a little 
(quantulumcunque) on your neighbor’s land, you have to pay a 
fine of 15 solidi, but if you actually invade someone else’s land, 
you have either to “swear with six”* that you have authorization 
from the king or pay a fine of 60 solidi.  There’s a related 
meaning in the law code of the Salian Franks: to bury a corpse 
in a grave that is already occupied.  So the generic definition is 
to take more (originally, space) than is legal or permitted. 
 
2. Then, by the thirteenth century, the meanings of “surprise” have 
ramified. The nominal form is now most common 
(supprisa/supprisia/ seurprisia/surprisia, sorprisia/seurprisia), and 
instead of land or space, we’re now talking mostly money.  
A “surprise” is an extraordinary tax, originally unsanctioned by 
custom but now accepted as legitimate, like the English “surtax”; 
you may be asked to pay both prises and surprises.  There’s still a 
strong whiff of excess or injustice about the word, however: this 
word cluster is associated with usurpation or oppressive rule 
maintained by violence or the threat of violence.  
 
3. Only in the fourteenth century do we find Latin usages suggestive 
of Descartes’s surprise.  In 1311 Philippe le Bel issued a cartulary 
referring to a new tax, imposed preter consuetudine, as a novitas 
vel supprisa.**  Ducange also records the introduction of a fancy 
new version of the verb superapprehendere, with a single witness: 
an agreement from somewhere (unspecified) in Tuscany in which 
an Italian individual (unspecified) promises not to seize and 
occupy church lands “unexpectedly” (improviso superapprehendere 
et occupare).  
 
But Descartes is, after all, writing in the vernacular, so let’s 
move on to medieval French, with the aid of Classiques 
Garner online, starting with Godefroy’s Dictionnaire de  
l’ancienne langue française (1888).  The first witnesses from the 
twelfth century: the noun surprise still mostly refers to taxation,  
though it’s nice to see a French source (1365) linking surprise  
 
 
* I had a hard time with the meaning of cum sex jurare (swear with six) because of a rookie 
mistake: I initially read sex as fex, which I now know is the singular of feces.  It turns out 
that swearing with six means that you find six legally eligible men willing to put their hands 
on a shrine or reliquary, one on top of another (uhm, not on a “fex”). You then put your hand 
on top of the pile and swear that you’re telling the truth. Apparently it’s one of the first 
references to the so-called Hantgemal.  Whatever that is. 
 
** For some reason this witness appears under superprisia.  
You may be 
overthinking 
this… 




and novalité, as in Philippe le Bel’s Latin cartulary.  In contrast, 
the various verbal forms of “surprise” the verb—sourprendre, 
seurprendre, sousprendre, sosprendre, souzprendre, suzprendre, 
soubprendre, sousprendre, souprendre, souspenre, and suprendre—
have broader, mostly negative associations, as in “to get a nasty 
surprise,” examples being illness, death, enemies, and unexpected 
guests.  Also, in a more elegiac vein, love, which is always depicted 
as bittersweet, as in Marie de France’s Eliduc (late twelfth century): 
“Lasse! Cum est mis quers suzpris/Par un hum d’altre pais.”  NB: Men 
get all kinds of surprises. Women’s are mostly amatory or sexual. 
 
So from the very first, in French, we’re in the world of (among other 
things) affect rather than merely struggles over territory. But how 
do we get from Marie’s heart in Eliduc to Descartes’s brain in the 
Passions of 1649?  Using Champier’s online Dictionnaires des XVIe et 
XVIIe siècles, bien sûr.  Robert Estienne’s Dictionnaire françoislatin 
of 1549 is still in the lexical world of the later Middle Ages.  
Surprendre means to take someone unawares by trickery or decep-
tion (active) or to be exposed in adultery or a lie (passive).  It’s 
adversarial, with connotations of injustice: to “surprise” is to exploit 
or oppress by violence or deception, preying on the weak, ignorant, 
or unready, often in relation to taxes and dues.  The most common 
synonym of surprinse is oppressio.   
 
By the early seventeenth century we’re edging toward the realm of 
Descartes’s admiration: alongside the many unpleasant surprises 
recorded in Jean Nicot’s Thresor de la langue francoyse (1606), we 
find the phrase surprins de ioye.  Even more resonant is the entry 
for surprendre in Randle Cotgrave’s French-to-English Dictionary of 
1611, where he defines surprinse as in the first instance “a surprisall, 
or suddaine taking; an assaulting, or comming vpon, a man ere he 
is aware.”  Turn that usage into a metaphor for cognition, and it 
has most of the ingredients of Descartes’s “subite surprise de l’ame.” 
And indeed the two principal dictionaries of the late seventeenth 
century take Descartes’s unconventional use of surprise on board: 
alongside the more conventional prendre à l’impourvu and 
decevoir, Pierre Richelet’s Dictionnaire françois (1680) (1) defines 
surprendre as étonner, and (2) imports this meaning into Richelet’s 
succinct definition of admirer: s’étonner, être surpris. Antoine 
Furetière’s posthumous Dictionnaire universel (1690) also links 
wonder and surprise, defining admirer as regarder avec 
estonnement quelque chose de surprenant, ou dont on ignore les 
causes.  
 
But which came first, Descartes’s egg or Richelet’s  
and Furetière’s chickens?  I’d say the egg … but I  
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The Gift from Serendip
Gianna Pomata
In 1557, a little book came out in Venice under the title Peregrinaggio 
di tre giovani figliuoli del re di Serendippo, per opera di M. Christo-
foro Armeno della persiana nell’italiana lingua trapportato. Almost 
nothing is known of this Cristoforo and his life, except for what he 
says himself in the dedication of his book to a Venetian nobleman. 
A  Christian from the Persian city of Tabriz, Cristoforo arrived in 
 Venice in 1554 and was the grateful recipient of the hospitality the 
city offered to poor foreigners. Wishing to give something in return 
for the courtesy received from the learned men of Venice, Cristoforo 
decided to translate a collection of Persian tales into their language 
with the hope of “giving them delight.” 1
The Peregrinaggio was the source of the concept of serendipity—
that “pretty bauble of a word” coined by Horace Walpole in 1754 to 
name the happy circumstance of “making discoveries, by accidents 
and sagacity, of things one was not in quest of.” 2 Much research has 
been devoted to the vicissitudes of the notion of serendipity in 
 Europe in the centuries after Cristoforo’s Peregrinaggio. Much less, 
in comparison, has been done to understand the cultural transfer 
from Persian to Italian performed by Cristoforo, its context, and 
its  sources. Recent scholarship, however, has identified the main 
source of the Peregrinaggio in the Hasht-Bihisht (The Eight Para-
dises, ca. 1302), a novella collection by the Indo-Persian Sufi poet Amir 
Khusrow.3 The Hasht-Bihisht, which has the distinction of being the 
first Persian work to be translated and printed in a European lan-
guage, is a masterpiece of Indo-Persian literature. Strangely enough, 
it has never been translated in its entirety into English or any other 
present-day European language. Except for Italian.4 Thanks to this 
serendipitous circumstance, I have been able to read it and compare 
it with Cristoforo’s work. What emerges from the comparison?
1 I quote from the modern edition: Cristoforo Armeno, Peregrinaggio di tre giovani 
 figliuoli del re di Serendippo, ed. and intro. Renzo Bragantini (Rome: 2000). 
2 “Pretty bauble of a word” is the expression used by Lorraine Daston, “Are You Having  
Fun Today? Review of The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity by Robert Merton and 
Elinor Barber,” London Review of Books 26, no. 18 (2004): 29. 
3 Sunil Sharma, Amir Khusrow: Poet of Sultans and Sufis (Oxford: 2005). 
4 Amir Khusrow, Le otto novelle del paradiso, trans. and postface by Angelo Michele 
 Piemontese (Messina: 1996). 
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becomes a separate male figure, endowed with a specific cognitive 
role: through him, news from all parts of the world can be collected 
and shared. 
In both The Eight Paradises and the Peregrinaggio, the therapeu-
tic journey is a travel through knowledge acquired from listening to 
tales. In both, the sequence of stories mimics the wandering of the 
inquisitive mind “all over the world, wherever there is an enigma, 
wherever the researcher finds some kind of stratagem,” to use 
 Khusrow’s own words.6 Serendipitous sagacity is a theme in both 
books, but in the Peregrinaggio it becomes the central theme.7 More-
over, and most importantly, the quality of the knowledge pursued is 
different. The art of detection practiced by the three princes is called 
by Khusrow “physiognomy”—the ancient Islamic art of fira¯sa 
whereby one can know hidden things from exterior signs.8 Cristo-
foro calls it arte dell’indovinare, astuzia e sottile avvedimento, and 
couples it, over and over again, with esperienza. 9 And therein, in this 
emphasis on experience, lies another significant difference between 
the two texts. The knowledge that Khusrow celebrates is the fira¯sa of 
mystical intuition, which was an important feature of Sufi culture. 
The knowledge highlighted by Cristoforo, in contrast, is another form 
of fira¯sa: it is that training in guesswork that comes from fare 
dell’arte l’esperienza.10 In other words, the knowledge pursued in 
The Eight Paradises is sapiential, that in the Peregrinaggio experien-
tial.11 By changing the frame narrative of Khusrow’s  stories, Cristo-
foro presented fira¯sa to his Italian readers as experience-based sagac-
6 Khusrow, Otto novelle, 210.
7 As noted by Piemontese, Postfazione, in Khusrow, Otto novelle, 153. 
8 Khusrow, Otto novelle, 38, 41. On the fira¯sa, see Youssef Mourad, La physiognomonie 
arabe et le “Kita¯b Al-Fira¯sa”de Fakhr Al-Dı¯n Al-Ra¯zı¯  (Paris: 1939). 
9 Armeno, Peregrinaggio, 25, 92, 97–98, 207.
10 Armeno, Peregrinaggio, 98. On the two aspects of the fira¯sa, see Toufic Fahd, “Fira¯sa,”  
in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: 2012). On the mystical acception of fira¯sa,  
see also Mourad, La physiognomonie arabe, 17, 34, 60–61. 
11 Bragantini, “Introduzione,” in Armeno, Peregrinaggio, xvii.
Both the Hasht-Bihisht and the Peregrinaggio present a sequence 
of tales embedded in a frame narrative, following a model that was 
typical of medieval and early modern novella collections East and 
West. But though the tales are, to a large extent, the same, the fram-
ing story is different. In the Hasht-Bihisht, the frame concerns the 
malady of King Bahram, a hero of Persian medieval legends. The mal-
ady is attributed to Bahram’s obsessive passion for hunting. To cure 
the king’s obsession, seven pavilions are built, each in a different 
color and each intended to be the residence of a beautiful maiden. 
Every day, the king is supposed to visit a different pavilion, to be en-
tertained in turn by each pavilion’s lady with a story. The storytelling 
is set in the context of sexual intimacy—a feast of the senses steeped 
in the brilliant polichromy of the pavilions-paradises.
The intent of the treatment (moving from pavilion to pavilion, 
from mistress to mistress, from tale to tale) is to wean the king from 
the hunter’s nomadism by luring him to some measure of settled life, 
its monotony tempered by the daily variation of residence, lover, and 
story. The frame narrative of The Eight Paradises centers on the 
 tensions involved in the transition from the nomadic to the seden-
tary state and the exciting yet dangerous lure of the hunt—a central 
theme in premodern Arabic poetry.5 
In Khusrow’s work, the three princes of Serendip appear only 
once, in the first novella: they are not part of the frame narrative. 
Cristoforo, in contrast, turned the tale of the three princes, with their 
uncanny ability to learn from clues, into the frame of his work. In the 
Peregrinaggio, the king’s melancholic disease is due not to his ob-
session with hunting but to the disappearance of his lover, Deliram, 
and the therapeutic strategy is devised by the three princes with 
the goal of finding her again. In addition to the pavilion’s ladies, they 
decide to recruit seven novellatori from as many cities, hoping 
they  will bring tidings of the lost Deliram. In The Eight Paradises, 
each tale is told by the pavilion’s lady, and storytelling is part of 
the king’s  sexual entertainment. In the Peregrinaggio, the storyteller 
5 Jaroslav Stetkevych, The Hunt in Arabic Poetry: From Heroic to Lyric to Metapoetic 
(Notre Dame, IN: 2016).
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ity rather than mystical wisdom, thus bringing an Eastern rivulet to 
the “broad river-bed” of Western empiricism.12
* * *
In the geographic imagination of the Middle Ages, in Christianity as 
in Islam, Serendip was the place where Adam fell from paradise and 
left his first footprint on earth.13 It was the place of the first clue, 
reminiscent of the prelapsarian condition, when knowledge and de-
light were one. A faint but discernible echo of that paradisal unity is 
in the act of storytelling, which remains the prototype of combining 
the search for knowledge with the giving and taking of delight. In the 
reminder of that unity, in a nutshell—the nut of the fairytales, which, 
when opened, discloses a whole world—lies the gift from Serendip. 
May the dear friend, to whom this nutshell essay is dedicated, long 
enjoy serendipity in her quest for knowledge.
12 I borrow the expression “broad river-bed of empiricism” from Daston, “Are You Having 
Fun Today?,” 30. 
13 Giovanni de’ Marignolli, Chronicon Bohemorum: Relatio, in Sinica Franciscana, vol. 1, 
 Itinera et relationes fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV, ed. A. van den Wyngaert 
 (Florence: 1929), 535. See also André Miquel, La geographie humaine du monde 
 musulman jusqu’au milieu du 11e siècle (Paris: 1975), 2:78.
Eureka, Overflowing
Theodore M. Porter
Although science of late has had no great success in managing its 
public relations, almost anyone can appreciate a narrative of science 
structured as a sequence of discoveries. Surprise fits well into such 
stories, even if it is not obligatory. It may, like chance, favor the 
 prepared mind. Historians and philosophers of science have been 
more leery of any focus on discovery. Thomas Kuhn argued in a well-
known essay that discovery, so simple in appearance, is complexly 
structured and difficult to isolate. He instanced the discovery of oxy-
gen, a famous episode of contested priority. A moment’s thought 
makes it clear that merely filling a jar with this gas, which Antoine- 
Laurent Lavoisier described at first as especially pure air, cannot suf-
fice. Even the recognition of its special chemical properties may fall 
short. Joseph Priestley’s jars were filled with “dephlogisticated air,” 
which escaped with the smoke during combustion and suffocated 
the little animals forced to breathe it. Soon afterward, Lavoisier came 
closer to our conceptions, explaining combustion and calcination as 
the chemical combination of this elemental gas, vital for life, with 
carbon or iron. However, the name he gave it, oxygen, implied that its 
defining characteristic was as a principle of acidity. The role of sur-
prise in this story, we should add, depended on the disposition of the 
chemist. Lavoisier, who planned everything meticulously, despised 
surprises, quite in contrast to Priestley, who presented himself as in-
curably curious and utterly fallible.1
Natural history, offering so many strange and wonderful forms 
and mechanisms, seems an exemplary field for scientific surprise. Ex-
perimentation, too, has a record of confounding and delighting. Yet 
even mathematics shows promise. Archimedes’s excitement when 
(as the story goes) he first realized that he could measure any volume 
by the water it displaced, and in this way determine the density of an 
irregular object such as a crown, seems to qualify it as a surprising 
discovery. Two millennia later, Francis Galton recounted a eureka 
moment in his autobiography: he was rambling on the grounds of 
1 Thomas Kuhn, “The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery,” in The Essential 
 Tension (Chicago: 1977), 165–177; Charles Gillispie, “The Rationalization of Matter,”  
in The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton, NJ: 1960), ch. 6.
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ing up of a topic to wider domains and at the same time as a research 
initiative, once prosaic, now capable of enchanting me with ironies 
or paradoxes made visible by looking at science from closer to the 
ground. In contrast to stirring visions of shiny new interpretations, 
none of which ever seem to go anywhere, the revelation that comes 
a year or more into a project is always-already linked to a concrete 
problem linked up with sources. These surprises go beyond what I 
had been able to imagine. Tracking the unexpected source is now no 
renunciation but pure seduction. The dull and dry is borne away by 
irrepressible laughter.
That sense of discovery initiates the happiest months of research, 
when opportunities seem to open in every direction, and everything 
I read leads on to further novelties. Of course it can’t last. Eventually 
the work has to be confined within manageable bounds. The surprise, 
experienced initially as a gold mine (“Eureka” is the motto of Califor-
nia), now seems to depend on blasting deep pits with high-pressure 
hoses. Not only is there far more relevant material than anyone can 
possibly read. The historian is now challenged to assemble the pieces 
into something coherent, with each sentence leading to another and 
each chapter building on its predecessor. It is a problem not merely 
of presentation to uninstructed readers but of sifting out for myself 
of those engaging tidbits that do not advance the narrative. Although 
some of the “discoveries” in a book arise as revelations, much of it 
involves an almost endless process of drawing back in the hope of 
finding some way to advance. I often am surprised by a satisfying 
argument that finally forces its way to the surface in the fifth draft. 
And then, after a book leaves my hands, a curiously different book 
from the one I thought I wrote takes form in the reactions of readers. 
Once in a while I am startled by an impression that these readers 
may be right.
Naworth Castle in Cumberland when, seeking refuge from a shower, 
he suddenly grasped that the laws of heredity should be expressed in 
statistical units, deviations from an average. This idea “flashed across 
me,” he explains, “in a reddish recess in the rock. I forgot everything 
else for a moment in my great delight.” 2 Yet Galton’s cloudburst did 
not come from out of the blue. He had been brooding. 
It may be easier to historicize what people say about surprise 
than surprise itself. There is a long tradition of moral arguments for 
science as a submission to facts, which keep us honest. Lorraine 
 Daston has often recited Michael Faraday’s line evoking so many 
 appealing thoughts and theories, silently crushed by scientific self- 
criticism. Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science, from which she quotes, 
invoked Faraday’s thought in a section on the imagination, which he 
described as indispensable for science, even if it could not be allowed 
to run wild. Criticism, playing the role of natural selection, enabled 
the creative aesthetic sense to stimulate science without overwhelm-
ing it.3 This seems reasonable enough. Bursts of inspiration may have 
to be sacrificed on reflection, often with regret; yet can we get by 
without them? Surprise creates opportunity, whether by disrupting 
familiar expectations or by opening a new path. 
Kuhn insisted on a structure of discovery. Can scientific surprise, 
which seems so personal and unregulated, be given a structure, and 
would a theory of the mental spark enhance our historical sense of 
science? The question is too hard. I will instead proceed with a few 
reflections on moments of unexpected realizations in the work of 
history. Each of my four books thus far shifted away from an original 
plan and left it smelling stale. In every case, there was a recognizable 
moment when I perceived how the research might expand into do-
mains less trodden by historians of science, yet with some relation 
still to familiar forms of academic science. I experience it as an open-
2 Francis Galton, Memories of My Life, 3rd ed. (London: 1909), 300.
3 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, “The Image of Objectivity,” Representations 40 (1992): 
81–128; page 118 and footnote 78 quote Faraday’s line from Karl Pearson, The Grammar  
of Science (London: 1892), 38, possibly Raine’s first use of this line. The original source is 
Faraday’s lecture “Observations on Mental Education,” presented at the Royal Institu-
tion on May 6, 1854, with Prince Albert, that German wellspring (according to Lytton 
 Strachey) of earnest Victorianism, in attendance.
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Knowledge and (Dis)belief
Jamil Ragep
In the interwar years of 1918 to 1939, a diplomat manqué and a Vien-
nese psychologist decided to vent their frustration with what the 
world had become, and the imagined catastrophes to come, by writ-
ing a book denouncing the person they perceived to be the father of 
these calamities: Thomas Woodrow Wilson. The diplomat was Wil-
liam C. Bullitt, who had become disillusioned with Wilson’s efforts at 
Versailles and had resigned (or was dismissed) in 1919. The psycholo-
gist was Sigmund Freud. The book was essentially completed in 1932, 
but because of Bullitt’s desire not to jeopardize his career, publica-
tion did not occur until late in 1966.
The book’s publication set off a firestorm. Anna Freud insisted 
her father could not have written such an ill-tempered book, a senti-
ment echoed by Eric Erikson and Richard Hofstadter in the New York 
Review of Books. Others, such as historian A. J. P. Taylor, used it as a 
bludgeon against Freud and psychoanalysis. As it turned out, an ex-
amination of Bullitt’s papers left no doubt that Freud had been an 
active and equal collaborator.
A few months after the book appeared, my teenage self was going 
through the Freud shelves at the Toledo Public Library, determined to 
read everything he wrote (or at least what was translated). I thus 
came to peruse Freud and Bullitt’s Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty- 
Eighth President of the United States, completely innocent of the 
controversy and history outlined above. I was appalled; whatever 
Wilson’s faults (and they were many), he certainly didn’t deserve the 
inane analyses on offer. The book caused a crisis: how could a great 
scientist and humanist, liberator of our innermost secrets and 
thoughts, be driven to write a work based on what were clearly polit-
ical motives. Later, Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon provided a 
partial answer: if ideology could make one acquiesce in one’s own 
execution, it could certainly drive us to fashion truth as we saw fit. 
Science and its history seemed to provide a way out of the many 
pitfalls of ideological belief: here was a subject that was about unvar-
nished and transcendent truth, that was the closest we could come to 
our true, rational selves. Years later, I found myself happily studying 
the history of mathematics and astronomy of premodern Islam with 
a mentor who shared and encouraged my devotion to the rationality 
and objectivity of science. But a tsunami of counterarguments to this 
Panglossian optimism was heading our way; science might not be so 
Weltanschauung-frei as I imagined. And my own research began to 
uncover ways in which social and religious currents could influence 
and affect scientific change. 
I first became aware of this when studying the eminent religious 
scholar Abu¯ H. a¯mid al-Ghaza¯lı¯  (d. 1111) and realized that his criticisms 
of Aristotle and Ibn Sı¯na¯ (Avicenna) were not only cogent but in some 
ways rather “modern” in opening up alternatives to Peripatetic phys-
ics. Most scholars had emphasized what they perceived as Ghaza¯lı¯ ’s 
antirationality and its implications for the decline of Islamic science, 
but I and others found that his views opened up interesting avenues. 
The culmination came with one Alı¯  Qushjı¯  (d. 1474), the son of the 
falconer at the court of Timerlane’s grandson in Samarqand. Unlike 
Ghaza¯lı¯ , Qushjı¯  was a working scientist whose roots were in the an-
cient Alexandrian tradition of the mathematical savants:  Euclid, Pto-
lemy, and their siblings. But like Ghaza¯lı¯ , and unlike the Alexandri-
ans, Qushjı¯  was also committed to the Abrahamic God, the “volitional 
Omnipotent” of Islamic theology, who was not bound by the rules of 
Greek physis or physics. But how could one be a “scientist” studying 
an orderly universe when one also believes in a God who can upend 
that order at any time? 
Qushjı¯ ’s solution was to evoke the venerable “pots and pans” ar-
gument that “after leaving a house the pots and pans inside do not 
turn into human scholars who take to investigating the sciences of 
theology and geometry, despite the fact that the volitional Omni-
potent might make it thus in virtue of His will.” Lying beneath this 
assertion is a vast array of arguments and counterarguments regard-
ing God and His creation, His omnipotence and will, and the human 
 capacity to understand them. Qushjı¯ , drawing on several centuries of 
Islamic philosophy and theology, was able to base his ontology and 
epistemology on a kind of provisional knowledge: some things are 
beyond question (such as geometrical theorems), but others, such as 
the nature of the celestial orbs, remain known only tentatively. But 
where there is a correspondence between our mental constructs and 
external reality, there is also a sense of wonder that God could give us 
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the ability to attain knowledge of the order underlying the universe. 
Yes, He could change it. But our direct experience, whether with pots 
and pans or observing the celestial spectacle, somehow allows us to 
believe that a loving God has provided us with an objective reality, 
called nafs al-amr, that contains both our correctly construed mental 
constructs and external reality. Shades of Popper’s Third World.
But this is still belief. And so, what happens to capitalized 
 Knowl edge and Truth? Qushjı¯  could live with provisional knowledge. 
But could I? Many years after my first encounters with Qushjı¯ , Raine 
Daston invited me to participate in a research project called “Knowl-
edge and Belief.” Both in formal groups and over long, hearty meals 
in the evenings, my youthful optimism that Truth could win out over 
the ideological commitments of a Freud or a Rubashov gave way to 
an acknowledgment that my own knowledge was underlain by be-
lief. But like Qushjı¯ , my belief was (hopefully) based on evidence and 
a shared human experience that belied my pots and pans turning 
into scholars. During the last few decades, we have witnessed the 
catastrophes caused by ideologies based on fanciful beliefs and alter-
native facts, ideologies far more dangerous than the psychoanalyti-
cal malpractice involving Little Tommy Wilson. For this nonbelieving 
Muslim, the antidote was in the writings of a fifteenth-century be-
liever. No one could have been more surprised.
Making Manuscripts Confess
Sally P. Ragep
I take great comfort these days in reading medieval Islamic scien-
tific manuscripts. The black-on-white confessions from the pens (or 
mouths) of authors, copyists, marginalia commentators, and others 
(re)affirm a respect for the written word and remind me of a com mon 
humanity of ideas expressed over time and place. The Islamic Scien-
tific Manuscripts Initiative (ISMI) has given me a wonderful opportu-
nity to examine hundreds of texts in the exact mathematical sciences 
and be privy to the hearts and minds of scholars past. Some two de-
cades ago, Jamil Ragep and I, working in the trenches of research li-
braries worldwide, conceived of a database; our modest aim then was 
simply to manage (i.e., not lose) the valuable material we were amass-
ing that was sandwiched within worn bindings of  Arabic, Persian, 
Turkish, and other codices. We proudly watched our baby mature 
over the years, with much of its nourishment and support coming 
from its godmother, Raine Daston, and our MPIWG IT family. 
One major perk of the ISMI collaborative has been to look beyond 
the offerings of a few individual texts and manuscripts, interesting 
in themselves but often unrepresentative of the tradition as a whole, 
and to view Islamic science as a social endeavor, not just the idiosyn-
cratic outpourings of a few heroic individuals. Now, one would as-
sume that any scientific tradition that stretched over well-nigh a mil-
lennium would be viewed as more than a series of solitary ventures; 
but, surprisingly, the insistence that the fate of Islamic science ulti-
mately rested with a handful of talented, disconnected, and obvi-
ously financially resilient individuals still has currency. I’m not sure 
how adherents of this stance reconcile it with the tens of thousands 
of extant scientific manuscripts located in repositories worldwide; 
left unanswered are lingering questions as to who authored, read, 
and copied these works. Personal accounts affirm that scores of stu-
dents showed up on the doorsteps of the madrasas and observatories 
of Mara¯gha, Samarqand, Constantinople (and countless less show-
cased locales, such as Bursa, Konya, Merv, and Tabriz) with prior 
training in the mathematical sciences, this well beyond a rudimen-
tary level. Patronage is often dealt as a trump card to explain (or ex-
plain away) bouts of scientific flourishing; Islamic science becomes 
like Brigadoon, appearing miraculously every century or so. But 
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though patrons may pay for buildings, instruments, and salaries, 
they still can’t conjure scientists out of thin air. 
Having access to a large pool of extant Islamic scientific treatises 
via ISMI—something inconceivable in a predigital era—has afforded 
us a means toward understanding the transmission of scientific 
knowledge within Islamic lands, both diachronically and synchron-
ically. This has led to a number of surprises. 
One is how deeply rooted is the tradition of scientific education 
within Islamic societies. Another surprise is its depth, evidenced by a 
plethora of original compositions as well as commentaries, super-
commentaries, and glosses composed to elucidate the original com-
positions. (In the fifteenth century alone, there were almost 500 new 
astronomical works.) Countless readership, ownership, and copyist 
notes are embedded in the folios of these works. For astronomy, as 
for other disciplines, a standardized technical vocabulary develops, 
attesting to the ability to communicate over geography and centu-
ries. Commonplace are unattributed references, puns, quotations—
even whole passages—to unnamed works and authors (predecessors 
and contemporaries alike) with the expectation that any reader 
worth his salt will recognize them. That so many astronomical works 
survived through numerous tumultuous upheavals (including the 
Timurid and Mongol invasions) is testimony to the tradition’s tenac-
ity; and this persistence highlights how swiftly texts found safe ha-
vens, most likely assisted by well-established scholarly pipelines that 
disseminated scientific knowledge throughout vast lands. 
That the mathematical sciences were taught in Islamic religious 
institutions on a regular basis is only surprising given the standard 
narrative. If one depends solely on Islamic biographical dictionaries, 
where there is rarely an indication of where teachers taught scien-
tific texts, one might well conclude that their study was banished to 
private homes, backrooms, or elsewhere. On the other hand, manu-
scripts may contain locales, including religious institutions (and 
ISMI has allowed us to document them), but detecting these demands 
a careful read of each text, a painstaking and time-consuming task 
indeed. Another consideration often overlooked is the discussion of 
scientific theories (and even the inclusion of sample passages from 
scientific texts) in other disciplines such as theological works, which 
of course were studied in Islamic religious institutions. Finally, the 
governmental sanctioning of scientific teaching in religious institu-
tions is something that is easy to document. It is known that once 
the Ottomans appeared on the scene, theoretical astronomical works 
were officially taught within their madrasas, and these institutions 
were dispersed throughout three continents from the fifteenth to the 
twentieth centuries. 
Islamic historical encyclopedias provide lists of specific titles of 
scientific treatises ranked according to designated levels of profi-
ciency (categorized as beginner, intermediate, or advanced). It is not 
surprising that modern researchers have paid most attention to a se-
lect few advanced works in that these tend to deal with more seduc-
tively complex and sophisticated aspects of theoretical astronomy, 
such as planetary theory and modeling. But consequently, other sci-
entific treatises have been overlooked, characterized as derivative 
and uncreative. Relegated to a nonunique status (a dime a dozen), it’s 
not uncommon for a library catalogue to describe yet another copy 
as “même ouvrage,” “dasselbe werk,” or collectively as “etc.” 
That a text’s value has often been depreciated because of its large 
number of copies (in some cases hundreds), and its worth often 
judged without even a quick perusal, is shameful. As a consequence, 
the extensive pedagogical careers of so many of these texts (in one 
case inspiring over 60 derivatives spanning seven centuries) has 
been ignored. Left buried in each copy is a treasure trove of goodies 
awaiting discovery beyond the rainbow of the text. Downplayed is 
that collectively these copies evidence a tradition of an Islamic scien-
tific public. Overlooked is that this commentary tradition was being 
used to introduce new ideas and teaching methods, including those 
that would later come from European sources. So not surprisingly, 
attention must be paid. But surprising is that little did we know de-
cades back that our database journey would become a quest to right 
this unrightable wrong. For among impossible dreams, this is such 
stuff as research dreams are made of.
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Poison in the Archives
Alisha Rankin
The tiny town of Neuenstein in southwest Germany, population 
6,500, is not a place you would expect to find either a beautiful castle 
or a valuable trove of documents. But it has both at once: a marvel­
ous  archive housed in an impressive Renaissance palace, a former 
residence of the counts of Hohenlohe. I spent a glorious week at the 
 Hohenlohe Zentralarchiv (HZA) Neuenstein in the cold January of 
2006 while writing my first book on noblewomen­healers. The HZA 
Neuenstein had several manuscript recipe collections owned by a se­
ries of local countesses. I was very pleased with what I found, if not 
exactly overwhelmed. Like any good archive rat, I had done my cata­
logue research ahead of time and had a decent idea of the holdings. 
Still, the manuscripts had some fascinating idiosyncrasies and excit­
ing connections to texts and individuals in other parts of Germany. 
All in all, I viewed it as a successful archive trip and well worth the 
trek out to Neuenstein. 
Then came the surprise. I was the only person working in the ar­
chive that week, and the archivist had been very helpful throughout: 
letting me take photographs and helping me find the sources I sought. 
On my last day, as I was paging through a manuscript, he approached 
me. “If you’re interested in the history of medicine in the sixteenth 
century,” he said, “you may want to take a look at an unusual file we 
have. It’s a case in which a criminal was used to test poison.” I had a 
train to catch and was short on time, but it sounded too good to pass 
up. The file contained records of a criminal trial for theft, accounts of 
the accused thief’s confession under torture, and several letters be­
tween the court and Count Wolfgang II of Hohenlohe discussing the 
possibility of using the prisoner to test an antidote to poison that his 
mother had recently purchased. I knew that Count Wolfgang was fa­
mous for his interest in alchemy, and his mother Anna was one of the 
women I had come to study. I desperately wanted to examine the file 
more closely, but I had to get to the train station. In one last act of 
kindness, the archivist made a copy of the documents for me.
Back in my study in Cambridge, England, where I lived at the 
time, I examined the file more carefully. The documents described 
the arrest and criminal trial in December 1580 of a horse thief named 
Wendel Tümler, who then became caught up in the experimental 
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 interests of Count Wolfgang. Rather than hang the criminal as ex­
pected, the count wished to use him to test a new antidote to poison 
called Silesian terra sigillata. Count Wolfgang claimed he had decided 
such a trial was worthwhile after reading a “Hessian document” that 
described a previous test of the same antidote on poisoned dogs. 
My heart started beating faster: I had come across a manuscript in 
 Heidelberg that included a four­page description of an extensive trial 
using poison on dogs, conducted by the Landgrave Wilhelm  IV of 
Hesse­Kassel in 1580. In the Hohenlohe file, Count Wolfgang appeared 
to accept the results of this test and wished to see whether the anti­
dote also worked on humans. In a third source, a printed text, I found 
descriptions of both the Hessian and Hohenlohe poison trials, as well 
a third trial on dogs in Jülich. I realized that I had accidentally stum­
bled on the foundation of my next book. I began digging further into 
German poison antidotes and drew out a rough outline for a book on 
wonder drugs in the German­speaking world.
A second surprise came after I had moved to Tufts. When I told 
my PhD advisor, Katy Park, about my new project, she remarked that 
she had seen a sixteenth­century account of a poison trial on a con­
demned criminal in the Archivio di Stato in Florence, which sounded 
remarkably similar to the Tümler case. A year or so later, Bruce Moran 
recommended that I take a look at the famous herbal written by the 
Italian physician Pietro Andrea Mattioli because “there’s poison all 
over his book.” I took his advice—and I found two accounts of anti­
dote tests on condemned criminals, one directed by Pope Clement VII 
in 1524. Suddenly, the German book I had imagined took on European 
proportions. The more I looked, the more cases I found of attempts to 
test poison antidotes, often on condemned criminals. My book (which 
I am still finishing) unexpectedly became pan­European, and then 
global, as I found accounts of poison trials in drug treatises from the 
New World and Portuguese India.
And that is how my interest in early modern German women 
healers led me to very unexpected places, thanks to that archivist in 
the HZA Neuenstein and to Katy and Bruce. The historical phenome­
non I found—the poison trial—astonished and fascinated me with 
the richness and complexity of discussions about religious, ethical, 
Entrance to the archive, castle Hohenlohe Neuenstein, Germany.  
Photo: Alisha Rankin.
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Exceedingly Remarkable
Joan Richards
Augustus De Morgan was a very cautious man who did not make 
statements he could not substantiate. But when he ventured into 
logic in the mid­1840s, he found himself in territory unfamiliar 
enough that it could be difficult to be sure he was on solid ground. 
When his first foray into the subject provoked an accusation of pla­
giarism from the Scottish philosopher William Hamilton, De Morgan 
defended his honor to the point of a duel. But then he found a posi­
tive message as well. That he and Hamilton had each, independently, 
seen the need to expand the number of Aristotelian propositions 
from four to eight struck him as “exceedingly remarkable.” 1 His sur­
prise at this unexpected agreement supported De Morgan for a life­
time of logical exploration.
De Morgan was bracingly clear about the central importance of 
syllogistic logic to all human thinking: “All that is called reasoning, 
and which cannot be made syllogistic, is not reasoning at all; and all 
which cannot easily be made syllogistic is obscure.” 2 His project was 
to open up Aristotle’s and Kant’s formal logic so that it would be ade­
quate to this expansive vision. His challenge lay in explaining how a 
study that focused on language could be anything but empty. In the 
second chapter of Formal Logic he addressed this problem by ex­
plaining that language and words are our essential portal to the real 
world around us. We think with them. 
De Morgan grounded this view of language as central in a form of 
the Cartesian cogito ergo sum: “That our minds, souls, or thinking 
powers (use what name we may) exist, is the thing of all others of 
which we are most certain, each for himself.” 3 The advantage of this 
starting point was the certainty of the knowledge it generated; the 
disadvantage was that if a man “should affirm the whole creation to 
be a dream of his own mind, he would be absolutely unanswerable.” 
De Morgan found his way out of the trap of this “dreaming man” with 
1 Augustus De Morgan, “On the Symbols of Logic, the Theory of the Syllogism, and in Parti­
cular of the Copula, and Application of the Theory of Probabilities to Some Questions of 
Evidence,” in Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society (1850): 99.
2 [Augustus De Morgan], Penny Cyclopedia, s. v. “Syllogism.”
3 This and all following quotations from Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic: Or the 
 Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (London: 1847), 28–31.
and experimental concerns and the human­animal divide in drug 
tests. But although I did not expect a visit to a remote German ar­
chive to start me on a journey through pan­European sources in mul­
tiple languages, it should come as no surprise that helpful archivists 
and supportive mentors and colleagues set me on my way. It just 
goes to show how much the lonely historian relies on the help of 
others.
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the help of other people. What distinguishes the dreaming from a 
waking man is that “different [waking] minds receive impressions at 
the same time, which their power of communication enables them to 
know are similar.” As soon as this happens, all are forced to admit 
that “there must be a somewhat independent of those minds, which 
thus acts upon them all at once, and without any choice of their own. 
This somewhat is what we call an external object.” In this construc­
tion, it was the “power of communication,” that is language, that 
 allowed De Morgan’s “sentients” to share their experiences with one 
another; this was the key to establishing the real existence of the 
external world. 
Even as De Morgan thus answered the challenge of those who 
found the study of logic to be empty because it focused on language, 
he faced another question: What is the nature of this “somewhat”? 
What is the true nature of the world we speak of to one another? In 
response, he turned to the work of George Berkeley, who maintained 
“that our impressions of matter are only impressions, communicated 
by the Creator without any intervening cause of communication.” 
From this Berkelian point of view, the experiences that united all 
sentient beings, the “somewhat” that constituted external reality, 
were ideas beamed directly into their minds from a common God.
De Morgan recognized that there was no definitive way to estab­
lish the truth of the Berkelian vision, and he surrounded all of his 
written references to it with caveats. However, his commitment to 
it  comes out in a series of carefully crafted, but never published, 
 images, which he carefully bound into his personal copy of Formal 
Logic. The climax of the series is a sketch of the relations among his 
eight propositions—symbolized with parentheses and dots—in the 
logical system that he had developed. The result at first glance may 
look three dimensional, but on closer examination is not. The result 
is a figure that from a Euclidean point of view may appear troubled, 
haunting, and strange, but it is an image of logical, as opposed to 
geometrical, space. De Morgan was supported in his rendering of it 
by the agreement about propositions that he and Hamilton had so 
unexpectedly and unpleasantly stumbled upon a few years earlier.
De Morgan’s personal copy of Formal Logic, reproduced with permission of 
the Archives of the Senate House Library, University of London, MS776/1­2.
337336
Joan Richards | Exceedingly Remarkable
De Morgan found this final image suggestive enough that he drew it 
twice. The first is a straightforward diagram that contains just the 
propositions with a line between them that reflects their relation­
ship to one another. The second is the same with the addition of 
two  little sketches: the heart­shaped face of a calmly alert, super­
natural being and an image of the kind of lively human scene a  father 
of seven might be confronting daily. Because of these crude images, 
this one might seem to be the least serious of the drawings De Mor­
gan bound into his book, but it was more than a passing doodle. It is 
the only image that he labeled—“Table of Propositions and Syl lo­
gisms in the system which admits contrary terms”—and dated—Feb­
ruary 22, 1853—and signed, with a flourish. With this  titling, De Mor­
gan marked his doodled image as the culmination of months of 
logical thought. 
In De Morgan’s final picture, logic framed the relation between 
God and his reasoning creatures. His little pictures turned his dia­
gram of propositional relations into a Berkelian image in which logic 
encompassed both human experience and the divine mind. With it, 
De Morgan had created a divinely saturated logical alternative to the 
geometrical space of Newton’s external world.
The Art of Expectation
Robert J. Richards
When working on a book about Charles Darwin’s theory of mind and 
behavior, I got a very pleasant surprise—of a kind I’ve never quite 
experienced again.1 I knew that Darwin’s theory of moral judgment, 
as he worked it out in the Descent of Man, depended on a notion of 
community selection—natural selection operating on early, proto­
human groups, essentially removing the “proto” from the equation. 
The problem that initially arose for Darwin was threatening: How 
could altruistic instincts be naturally selected, since moral behavior 
usually gives the advantage to the recipient and not to the individual 
exercising the trait. I also knew that Darwin drew his model of com­
munity selection from his theory of the evolution of the social in­
sects, especially ants and bees. In On the Origin of Species, he had 
argued that natural selection worked on the entire ant nest or bee­
hive. This application of natural selection would explain how soldier 
ants and bees might have developed their peculiar instincts to de­
fend the colony even at the cost of their lives. Beehives, for instance, 
that by chance had more aggressive workers would have the advan­
tage over those that had fewer such workers, and over the course of 
thousands of generations, the defensive instincts of the workers, 
now transformed into soldiers, would be honed to such a degree that 
only a honey­mad bear might brave a theft. 
The historiographic issue had pushed me back to Darwin’s theory 
of the evolution of the social insects. I knew that Darwin, at some 
point in his theorizing, must have recognized that the problem was 
even more general than that of the solider bees’ self­sacrificing be­
havior. It had been well established in the literature of the period 
that worker ants and bees were neuters; they could leave no progeny 
to inherit any instincts or special anatomical traits. In On the Origin 
of  Species, Darwin admitted that the problem of the “wonderful 
 instincts” of social insects—for example, “slave­making” behavior in 
certain species of ant—was “sufficient to overthrow my whole the­
ory.” 2 Prior to having arrived at his solution, he had explained in­
1 Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and 
Behavior (Chicago: 1987).
2 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: 1859), 207.
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dis covery: “Therefore I say grant reason to any animal with social & 
sexual instincts … he must have conscience—this is capital view.” 4
Likewise for the historian, a slight advance in the narrative sur­
prises and glues one to the chair. Even small advances must, after all, 
be surprises, since each advance begins in the dark. A conjecture is 
made blindly, which either works or doesn’t; if it works, then it’s re­
tained, and forward movement now has a new base. Often enough, 
the happy surprise turns sour as one senses the presumed advance is 
sliding off into empty air. As I write this sentence, the words come, 
but not always the right ones, and I must keep pounding the delete 
key. It’s a Darwinian situation. In the terrain of the mind, a word 
comes skittering forth and is tested against the environment of 
words already printed and vaguely against the pile of words, one 
hopes, yet to come. The tentative word may not last, or perhaps it 
weakly survives only to be undone by later words. When the word 
appears to work in its conceptual environment, it elicits, at least 
from this writer, a small surprise and a momentary uplift. For the 
historian, however, some further art is required. He or she must 
shape the cumbersome object in a modulated way, to convey to the 
reader the series of small surprises that will result in a revelation of 
greater consequence. The artistic task is to formulate sentences that 
carry both semantic meaning and the music of swelling expectation. 
Often enough, in this writer’s experience, his words have the rhyth­
mic quality of the sound of an L train taking a corner in Chicago.
4 Charles Darwin, Notebook N (MS 2–3), in Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844,  
ed. Paul Barrett et al. (Ithaca, NY: 1987), 564.
stincts in Lamarckian fashion, conceiving them as the result of inher­
ited habit. Only gradually did he seek to apply natural selection in 
their account. 
At some point, the problems must have forcefully struck him. 
Natural selection gives the individual an advantage because of a for­
tuitous trait, which then might be passed to progeny. But altruistic 
behavior favored the recipient of the behavior, not the individual 
 expressing it; and, even more deadly, neuter soldiers can leave no 
offspring to inherit such traits. Then one day while sifting through 
Darwin’s manuscripts at Cambridge University Library, I came across 
four pages written in pen and dated June 1848.3 In this manuscript, 
Darwin outlined the difficulties exactly and tried several solutions. 
Among the solutions was the one he adopted in Origin, but in the 
man uscript, he couldn’t make it work: by chance all the instincts 
 exhibited by workers in the hive would need to vary simultaneously 
in the same direction, or so he believed; yet this ran counter to “all 
analogy.” Later Darwin sorted out the difficulty, though mostly by 
ignoring it. But here, then, in the manuscript was Darwin’s clear rec­
ognition that I assumed had to exist—and I found it. I was happily 
surprised by this discovery. In my book, I used the manuscript as a 
pivot point, from which I could show how Darwin arrived at a solu­
tion to the evolution of moral behavior, a solution that many biolo­
gists and philosophers still accept. It has not been my fortune, how­
ever, to make a historiographic discovery of this kind again. The 
event, though, has led me to think more generally about discovery in 
history, both by the scientist and by the historian of science.
Looked at more finely, each advance by a scientist in a project—
for example, Darwin’s recognizing the similarity between traits of 
social insects and traits of early human groups—is a discovery, a 
happy surprise. For the richly imaginative scientist, like Darwin, the 
surprise might come with little woops of delight. In his N Notebook, 
when he began to construct a theory of conscience that joined 
reason with instinct, he caught himself in the exuberant flush of 
3 DAR 73, “Darwin Manuscripts,” Cambridge University Library.
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Daniel Rosenberg
There are many kinds of surprise. Some things come out of the blue. 
Others are a matter of degree. Some are combinatorial: they put 
 familiar elements together in new ways. This last sort of surprise was 
explored in a kind of Manhattan project in 1933. That year, two de­
cades before he achieved fame for innovations in information pro­
cessing at IBM, Hans Peter Luhn filed patent for a cocktail recipe 
guide.1 (Fig. 1a) 
In his career, Luhn would earn more than 80 patents, often clev­
er remixes of prior art. His 1929 Lunometer, which measured thread 
count, was a marvel of simplicity. A clear acrylic stick printed with 
fine lines, when laid on fabric, produced a moiré pattern that pointed 
to a thread­count number on the device’s edge. The optical effect was 
well known; Luhn’s insight was to use it as a calculator. His 1958 
 Keyword­in­Context index, toasted in academia and industry, imple­
mented a concordance system first developed by thirteenth­ century 
French Dominican Hugh of Saint­Cher; yet its application in punch­
card computing was both novel and effective.2 
Though it didn’t seem so important at the time, US Patent 2,011,722 
proved a base for Luhn’s later work.3 Its function was simple: you 
 select ingredients; it tells you what you can make. On receiving his 
patent in 1935, after the repeal of Prohibition, Luhn renamed it the 
Cocktail Oracle and gave it a good slogan: “What you’ll get with what 
you’ve got.” 4 
Tempting as it is to see the Oracle as a diversion for Luhn, his 
choice of the cocktail as an experimental problem was not frivolous. 
Because of the formality of its conventions, it offered a neat articu­
lation of a combinatorial—or mixological—information system.
1 Hans P. Luhn. Recipe guide. US Patent 2,011,722, filed September 16, 1933, and issued 
August 20, 1935.
2 Daniel Rosenberg, “An Archive of Words,” in Science in the Archives: Pasts, Presents, 
Futures, ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago: 2017), 271–310.
3 H. P. Luhn, H. P. Luhn: Pioneer of Information Science: Selected Works,  
ed. Claire K. Schultz (New York: 1968).
4 A copy of the Cocktail Oracle is preserved by H. P. Luhn’s son, Christopher Luhn.  
I am grateful for his assistance. 
In cooking, there are many variables: cocktail mixing distills these 
to just a handful of elements and moves, each significant.5 Substitute 
scotch for rye and a Manhattan becomes a Rob Roy. Swap the olive in 
a Martini for a cocktail onion and you have a Gibson. In the cocktail, 
distinction is achieved with minimal difference, as in the formula 
“shaken, not stirred.” 
The standard Martini requires three ingredients: gin, vermouth, 
olive. The less vermouth, the drier the Martini. The atomizer has long 
been a popular tool of vermouth minimization, but over the years 
enthusiastic dipsophiles have raised the bar higher.6 Surrealist Luis 
Buñuel kept his vermouth corked, only “allowing a ray of sunlight to 
shine through a bottle of Noilly Prat before it hits the bottle of gin.” 7 
In 1966, the American Standards Association, tongue in cheek, pro­
posed electric light as a reliable alternative.8 (Fig. 1b)
Luhn’s Oracle was a simple device, a stack of acrylic cards printed 
with a four­by­eight grid, fastened by a spindle. The “ingredient 
cards” that made up the deck looked like irregular checkerboards. 
Some squares were transparent. Others were “blackouts.” The bottom 
“key card” gave 32 cocktail names. An opaque square on the ingredi­
ent card obscured the name of any cocktail that required that ingre­
dient. As the user selected ingredients—gin, vermouth, and so on—
and removed those cards from the deck, cocktail names were 
revealed.
In his patent application, Luhn touted the broad applicability of 
the “optical coincidence” principle: “It is obvious that there are pos­
sible modifications without departing from the spirit of the inven­
tion. For example, it is applicable to any recipes for mixing drinks, to 
recipes for food, to chemical formulae, or to any code by which it is 
5 On structure in the culinary recipe, see Luce Giard, “The Rules of the Art,” in Michel de 
Certeau, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayol, The Practice of Everyday Life, vol. 2, Living and 
Cooking, trans. Timothy J. Tomasik (Minneapolis: 1998), 215–222.
6 Lowell Edmunds, Martini, Straight Up: The Classic American Cocktail (Baltimore: 1998), 
90.
7 Luis Buñuel, My Last Sigh: The Autobiography of Luis Bunuel, trans. Abigail Israel (New 
York: 2013), 44. 
8 American Standards Association, Safety Code and Requirements for Dry Martinis (New 
York: 1966).
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Grenadine If not, pretend you have it and use  
 any other fruit syrup
Lemons  You really should have these
Limes Pretend you have them and use lemons
Oranges  You can’t fake this flavor …  
 try pineapple juice
Mint If not fresh, forget it and weep
Sugar Bachelors! Watch this item!
Eggs Get ’em young and healthy
Bitters Ground nutmeg and cloves will do  
 in a pinch
Soda Watch for the bubbles
Bacardi This is not a soft drink
Gin What! No gin?
Rye Good old rye!
Scotch Don’t be stingy with this one
Vermouth, French Frenchmen can’t be wrong!
Vermouth, Ital. Be sure you know the difference
Wry humor notwithstanding, Luhn’s recipe guide deserves its place 
in the history of information technology. In this respect, the stan­
dard history is not wrong but too dilute. The experiments that pro­
duced US patent 2,011,722 stirred Luhn’s interest in information de­
sign. From the Oracle came the scanner and an allegory of invention, 
with a twist.desired to ascertain readily different combinations resulting from 
various designated components.” It was to the third of these, chemi­
cal formulae, that Luhn applied the principle again at IBM in the 
1940s in the photo­electric “Luhn Scanner.”
Luhn might well have written his original patent around chem­
ical formulae, but then we would have missed out on his spirited 
way of mixing ideas, not to mention his Bronx Cocktail, Golden Fizz, 
New Deal Cocktail, and Rye Cobbler, as well as his old­fashioned de­
scriptions and how­to’s. For a taste, here are ingredients and descrip­
tions from Luhn’s deck:
Fig. 1a (left): Hans P. Luhn, Recipe Guide. US Patent 2,011,722. Fig. 1b (right): Radiation Mixing 
Method from American Standards Association, Safety Code and Requirements  
for Dry Martinis, 1966.
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Connaître, s’estimer, rire 
Sophie Roux
Descartes fait de l’admiration la première des passions et insiste sur 
sa spécificité. Les autres passions se rapportent à ce qui est bon ou 
mauvais pour nous ; elle précède toute évaluation, étant suscitée par 
la surprise que provoque le rare ou l’extraordinaire. Le désir excepté, 
les passions vont par paires (amour­haine, joie­tristesse, etc.) ; elle n’a 
pas de contraire. Elles s’accompagnent de mouvements du sang et du 
cœur  ; elle touche seulement le cerveau. Indifférente au bien et au 
mal, cantonnée au cerveau, l’admiration est la passion cognitive par 
excellence. Aussi faut­il n’en avoir ni trop, ni trop peu. Les curieux en 
ont trop, leur attention ne se fixant pas assez longtemps pour 
connaître  ; les hébétés, en ayant trop peu, prêtent attention seule­
ment au déjà connu. Ainsi, l’admiration a trouvé sa place en tant que 
passion cognitive dans Wonders and the Order of Nature.1
Mais l’admiration ne serait pas la première des passions s’il s’agis­
sait seulement de modérer les excès des savants. Son développement 
principal est la générosité, qui est la clef de toute vertu. L’estime de 
soi étant l’admiration de sa propre grandeur, la générosité est une 
estime de soi bien fondée, car elle porte sur ce qu’il y a de plus grand 
en nous, notre liberté de bien agir. Mais, si l’admiration est suscitée 
par le rare et l’extraordinaire, d’où vient que nous admirons notre li­
berté ? Notre liberté n’est pas rare : nous sommes libres et la généro­
sité consiste à le savoir. Mais elle est extraordinaire : elle nous fait en 
quelque façon ressembler à Dieu. Une deuxième face de l’admiration 
apparaît : la générosité consistant à estimer notre liberté, c’est la pas­
sion morale par excellence.2 
La troisième face de l’admiration cartésienne est l’effet qu’elle 
produit sur le corps. Étant purement cérébrale, elle ne cause par elle­
même aucun mouvement corporel ; toutefois, la surprise qui la carac­
térise a la force d’augmenter d’autres passions. Ainsi, combinée avec 
un peu de joie et, parfois, avec un peu de haine, elle fait affluer du 
sang dans le poumon et en chasse l’air présent, ce qui provoque le 
1 René Descartes, Passions de l’âme, II, 53, 70–78, in Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles  
Adam et Paul Tannery, nouv. ed., 11 vols. (Paris: 1964–1974) (par la suite AT), 11:373,  
380–386;  Lorraine Daston et Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750  
(New York : 1998), 13, 302, 308, 311, 316–317, 320.
2 Descartes, Passions de l’âme, III, 149–153, 160, in AT, 11:443–446, 451–453. 
rire.3 Les philosophes avaient depuis longtemps lié l’admiration et le 
désir de connaître, mais aussi vu dans notre liberté le ressort de la 
vertu. L’association de l’admiration et du rire est plus énigmatique. 
Un peu d’histoire peut l’éclairer.
Avant la Renaissance, trois émotions avaient été associées au 
rire  : le mépris de l’indigne (Aristote, Cicéron, Quintilien), l’admira­
tion pour le nouveau (Ish. a¯q ibn ‘Imra¯n et Avicenne), la joie en face du 
plaisant enfin (Jean Louis Vivès).4 Jouant avec ces références, les 
 médecins du milieu du xvie siècle discutèrent du lien entre l’admi­
ration et le rire. Constatant que nous avons trois réactions face au 
nouveau, l’admiration, qui suspend l’âme, l’extase, lorsque cette nou­
veauté est immense, le rire enfin, Girolamo Fracastor lia l’admiration 
et le rire. L’inattendu suscite l’admiration, l’admiration, la joie, et la 
joie, le rire ; plus précisément, l’admiration et la joie provoquent deux 
efforts contraires, l’un de suspension, l’autre d’expansion, qui com­
posent le rire.5 François Valeriole contesta le lien de l’admiration et 
du rire  : on admire sans rire des phénomènes météorologiques ex­
traordinaires ; on rit devant des bébés sans les admirer ; bref, l’admi­
ration porte, contrairement au rire, sur de grandes choses.6 Enfin, 
François Vallès défendit Fracastor. Aux contre­exemples de Valeriole, 
il répondit qu’admiration et joie doivent être petites pour causer le 
rire : plus grandes, elles conduisent à l’extase. Surtout, si le rire expri­
mait la seule joie, il ne serait pas le propre de l’être humain, les bêtes 
aussi étant joyeuses ; mais nous comprenons qu’il le soit s’il résulte 
non seulement de la joie (passion de la partie animale de notre âme 
pour le plaisant), mais de l’admiration (passion de la partie ration­
nelle de notre âme pour le nouveau).7
3 Descartes, Passions de l’âme, II, 72–73, III, 124–127, 178, 197, in AT, 11:381–383, 419–422, 465, 
476. Voir également AT, 4:305, 409–410.
4 Jean Louis Vivès, De anima et vita libri tres (1538) (Zürich : 1563), lib. III, 211–214. 
5 Girolamo Fracastor, De sympathia et antipathia rerum liber unus (Venise : 1546), cap. 20, 
23–26.
6 François Valeriole, De enarrationum medicinalium libri sex (Lyon : 1554), lib. III, Enar. 9, 
217–219.
7 François Vallès, Controversiarum medicarum et philosophicarum libri decem (1556) 
(Lyon : 1591), lib. V, cap. 9, 596–603.
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Cette controverse médicale eut un écho durable. Francisco Suàrez 
prend le parti de Fracastor et de Vallès et soutient que le rire naît 
d’une sympathie entre la faculté vitale et la faculté rationnelle de 
l’âme, la joie étant l’acte de la première, l’admiration l’acte de la se­
conde 8. Laurent Joubert défend au contraire la thèse de Valeriole que 
le rire est indépendant de l’admiration, et ajoute qu’il suppose un cer­
tain dégoût.9 Les Conimbres examinent l’admiration et le rire pour 
réfuter l’objection que la division entre appétit intellectif et appétit 
sensitif ne suffit pas. Ils rattachent la première à l’appétit intellectif 
et expliquent, après Thomas d’Aquin, pourquoi elle cause de la joie 
alors qu’elle naît d’une certaine ignorance. Ils font du second un effet 
tantôt de la joie, tantôt du contentement, ce qui est dire qu’il dépend 
tantôt de la partie supérieure de l’âme, tantôt de sa partie inférieur.10 
Adrien de Montluc argumente pied à pied pour défendre la thèse de 
Fracastor et Vallès contre celle de Valeriole.11 Marin Cureau de la 
Chambre réfute tour à tour les opinions de ceux qui associent le rire 
à la joie, à l’admiration, ou aux deux à la fois, pour défendre l’idée 
originale que le rire est une passion sociale.12 L’enjeu de ces discus­
sions était de donner une description du rire, mais aussi de le situer 
dans l’économie des facultés. Il est lié à l’admiration, non seulement 
parce que la surprise provoque le rire, mais parce que, étant le propre 
de l’être humain, il devait être la manifestation d’une faculté propre­
ment humaine.
Descartes connaissait cette controverse : il évoque le rire « sardo­
nien », c’est­à­dire le rire purement corporel, et l’illustre par une anec­
dote empruntée à Vivès.13 En faisant du rire le mouvement corporel 
que suscite un peu d’admiration, de joie et de haine, il se rangeait 
8 Francisco Suàrez, Partis secundae summae theologiae tomus alter … de anima (1572), 
1621, lib. V, cap. 5, 11–13, on 213.
9 Laurent Joubert, Traité du ris (Paris : 1579), 16, 163–166, 238.
10 Conimbres, Commentarii … in tres libros de anima (Lyon : 1600), In III, cap. 13, Quaest. I, 
art. 5–6, 478–481.
11 Adrien de Montluc, » Discours académique du ris «, in Les jeux de l’inconnu (Paris : 1630), 
7–25.
12 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Les charactères des passions (Paris : 1642), 168, 183–198.
13 Descartes, Passions de l’âme, II, 127, in AT, 11: 422, et AT, 4:410.
dans le camp de ceux avaient considéré que, le rire étant le propre 
de l’être humain, sa genèse supposait l’intervention de la partie ra­
tionnelle de l’âme. Cependant, contrairement à eux, Descartes ne di­
visait pas l’âme en parties. Ainsi le rire se trouva­t­il associé à la pas­





The reader observes as the flier prepares. A steep ascent, a momen-
tary pause, then a sudden launch on a silken thread, which, when 
coiled and gathered together, acts like a balloon for floating through 
the air.
When Gilbert White included this observation in his Natural His-
tory of Selborne (1789), he could have called the flier a balloonist.1 
Four years previously, he had witnessed the earliest Montgolfier 
flight undertaken in England. The great balloon, appearing in the sky 
no larger than a tea-urn, had passed over the small parish of Selborne 
and left White in a state of awe and exhilaration.2 White understood 
this aeronautic feat. Just a month earlier, his nephew Edmund and a 
companion had made a model balloon out of paper and supplied the 
“buoyant air” by burning a cotton plug of wool soaked with spirits of 
wine. The experiment failed outdoors, but in the vicarage belonging 
to Edmund’s maternal uncle, despite the propensity of the paper to 
catch fire, the mini-Montgolfier soared up the stairwell and rested 
against the ceiling until the fuel was exhausted. White thought this 
“small exhibition explained the whole balloon affair very well.” 3 
But White had not seen a Montgolfier when he observed the flier 
that shot away on a silken thread. Nonetheless, he recognized that 
the wingless creature, a tiny spider that had run up his open book 
before launching itself from the top of the page, must, like the hot-air 
balloon, possess a locomotive power. He was sure of this because the 
spider had gone off at considerable velocity in a room where the air 
was still and with no assistance from White’s breath.
This observation caused White to wonder at the locomotive 
 pow er of spiders, but it was not presented as a wonder. As he pointed 
out, the phenomenon of spiders ballooning had been noted by  Martin 
Lister a century earlier.4 Instead, White’s observation of his minia-
1 Gilbert White, The Natural History and Antiquities of Selborne (London: 1789), Letter 23 
to Daines Barrington, June 8, 1775.
2 Rashleigh Holt-White, The Life and Letters of Gilbert White of Selborne, 2 vols.  
(London: 1901), 2:135–136.
3 Entry for September 1, 1784, in The Journals of Gilbert White, 1751–1793, ed. Francesca 
Greenoak, 3 vols. (London: 1986–1989), 3:52.
4 Anne Marie Roos, Web of Nature: Martin Lister (1639–1712), the First Arachnologist 
 (Leiden and Boston: 2011), 105–107.
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tion of surprise: that fleeting suspension of rationality at encounter-
ing the unexpected. Surprise itself does not last; it is only the states 
of mind it gives rise to, such as fear or wonder, that are sustained. 
This is apparent in White’s 1775 account of the 1741 shower, where 
his rational discourse is twice interrupted by the wondrous spectacle 
of falling gossamer flakes twinkling in the sun. According to Joseph 
Addison, the most surprising events are the most memorable.6 
In his Natural History, White supposed that the shower was a 
consequence of both spiders and gossamer threads becoming entan-
gled in dew, rising up into the atmosphere through evaporation, and 
the spiders thickening their webs in the air until they were heavy 
enough to fall back to earth. But understanding why this should hap-
pen on one particularly fine autumn day was, he confessed, a matter 
beyond his skill. Despite his rational discourse, White himself contin-
ued to associate the gossamer shower with surprise because it was 
something he experienced only once. “Every thing that is new or un-
common raises a Pleasure in the Imagination,” Addison claimed, “be-
cause it fills the Soul with an agreeable Surprise, gratifies its Curios-
ity, and gives it an Idea of which it was not before possest.” 7 For 
White, the gossamer shower was not just an arresting sight but the 
moment he became possessed of the idea of the interconnectedness 
of natural occurrences. When, a few years later, observing nature 
 became his pleasure, it no longer took a gossamer shower to excite 
his attention: it was the ordinary, regular workings of nature that 
would continually surprise his soul.
6 Christopher R. Miller, Surprise: The Poetics of the Unexpected from Milton to Austen 
(Ithaca, NY, and London: 2015), 24.
7 Joseph Addison, “The Pleasures of the Imagination,“ The Spectator no. 412 (June 23, 1712).
ture flier served as a rational end point to a memory of wonder in-
volving several registers of surprise. 
The events of September 21, 1741, were so wondrous and rare that 
they remained vivid in White’s recollection almost 34 years later. On 
that day, White, an Oxford undergraduate at home in Selborne for the 
vacation, had set out with his dogs before daybreak to hunt game 
birds. As dawn broke, he saw that the ground was thickly matted 
with cobweb. This seemingly most delicate of substances—gossa-
mer—immediately revealed its hidden strength. As the dogs com-
menced the hunt, noses to the ground, the strong, sticky web covered 
their eyes. Thus surprised and blinded, they lay down to scrape the 
webs from their faces with their front paws. With his dogs “hood-
winked,” White returned home musing on the “oddness of the occur-
rence.” But the perfect autumn day was just starting its series of sur-
prises.
From nine in the morning to the close of the day, the inhabitants 
of Selborne experienced a continuous shower of large “flakes or rags” 
of cobweb. As the flakes twinkled in the sun they drew the attention 
of even the “most incurious.” Past observers of the phenomenon had 
also been hoodwinked by gossamer, believing it to be the substance 
of clouds or the finest goose down, even that it represented bits of 
the Virgin Mary’s winding sheet that fell to earth during her Assump-
tion.5 By 1775, White was confident that nobody doubted that the 
flakes were produced by swarms of small spiders; instead, what 
needed explanation was the shower itself. He reported that a learned 
observer (his father, John White) imagined that the gossamer had 
been blown, like thistledown, from an elevated meadow, before fall-
ing on the fields below. To test this conjecture, White senior had rid-
den to the top of a hill, which he thought would raise him above the 
shower, only to discover “to his great astonishment” that the flakes 
descended in the same manner as on the lower ground. 
White described the gossamer shower through a series of re-
sponses ranging from confusion and astonishment to intellectual 
curiosity, all of which reflect aspects of the brief, involuntary emo-
5 Peter Marren and Richard Mabey, Bugs Britannica (London: 2010), 111.
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it) “an affected importance annexed to an insignificant discovery.” 3 
“Eureka” appears in comic poems such as Alexander Thomson’s 
 mock-epic Whist (1792) and Peter Pindar’s Sir Joseph Banks and the 
Emperor of Morocco (1788). The magnitude of the discoveries “Eu-
reka” had come to represent is evident in Henry Fielding’s Joseph 
 Andrews (1742), when Mr. Adams hits upon a method of paying a bill 
despite his traveling party’s funds having been stolen. The word also 
had associations with Freemasonry, which traced its heritage back to 
ancient mathematical wisdom. 
The toxic combination of naked enthusiasm and pedantry con-
tinued to render “Eureka” an unlikely candidate for regular use in 
the Romantic era. Yet it does crop up in Lord Byron’s Childe Harold’s 
Pilgrimage (1812–1818), though only to refer to a sighting of ruins 
which prove to be a mirage. The word makes a rare positive appear-
ance in the mathematical diary of the 19-year-old Carl Frederick 
Gauss, who in 1796 wrote, “EYPHKA. N = Δ + Δ + Δ,” recording his solu-
tion of the triangular case of Fermat’s polygonal number theorem.4 
Satisfying though this result was, it had perhaps simply taken a frus-
tratingly long time to work out. 
How did “Eureka” gain its celebrity? To understand this, we need 
to look to the emerging culture of reporting inventions associated 
with the Industrial Revolution. By the 1830s in England, “Eureka” 
makes occasional appearances as a byword for novelty: a railway 
 engine, a brand of hairbrush, a machine for making Latin verses, an 
offhand mention in a review of a biography of the chemist Humphry 
Davy.5 In America, with its optimistic focus on progress, the word 
was somewhat more widely employed. When New Yorkers first saw 
daguerreotypes in 1839, they immediately imagined that the inven-
tor “must have exclaimed in the language of the philosopher of 
old—‘eureka—eureka!’” 6 A steamship was named Eureka in 1840, and 
3 David Evans Macdonnel, “Heureka,” in A Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd ed. (London: 1799).
4 G. Waldo Dunnington, with additional material by Jeremy Gray and Fritz-Egbert Dohse, 
Carl Friedrich Gauss: Titan of Science (1955; rprt. New York: 2004), 471.
5 The Times, October 27, 1838, 5; The Times, July 23, 1843, 10; The Times, June 19, 1845;  
“Life of Sir Humphry Davy,” Journal of the Royal Institution 1 (1831): 347–360, on 360.
6 “The Daguerrotype,” The New-Yorker, December 14, 1839, 205.
Eureka!
Jim Secord
The most common expression of scientific surprise is “Eureka” 
(Εύρηκα). The colorful story associated with the word, told by Vitru-
vius about Archimedes two centuries after the latter’s death, has had 
a fascinating career. Archimedes, asked by the king of Syracuse to 
de termine if a golden crown was mixed with silver, found the an swer 
while bathing. Archimedes realized that an object’s volume (and 
hence the crown’s density) could be measured by the water it dis-
placed. Leaping out of the bath for joy, he ran naked through the 
streets shouting, “Eureka, Eureka”—I have found it, I have found it!
That is just about all anyone knows about the history of the word. 
It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that “Eure-
ka” began to be used in something close to the way that it is today. 
Before then, to think of discoveries in science as involving “Eureka” 
or “Aha” moments was unusual.1 After Vitruvius’s work became wide-
ly known among the learned in the fifteenth century, the “Eureka” 
story featured in accounts of the eccentricities of learned men. In 
rare cases, Εύρηκα (always in Greek) signaled devotion to the great 
master of antiquity. In recalling his discovery of the “milky veins” 
(the lymphatics of the thorax) in 1622, Gaspare Aselli recalled telling 
the learned men nearby, “I say with Archimedes: Eureka, and at the 
same time I invite them to the spectacle of such an unusual thing.” 
Christiaan Huygens’s notes are emblazoned with the word in capital 
letters. A bemused assistant recalled how Isaac Newton “turn’d him-
self about, run up ye stairs like another Archimedes, with an εύρηκα, 
fall to write on his desk standing, without giving himself the leisure 
to draw a chair to sit down on.” 2
By the eighteenth century, references to Eureka often had this 
kind of satiric connotation, recognizing (as a standard dictionary put 
1 The trend is clear in Google Ngram Viewer for “Eureka.”
2 Aselli is quoted and translated in Gianna Pomata, “Praxis Historialis: The Uses of Histo-
ria in Early Modern Medicine,” in Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe,  
ed. G. Pomata and N. G. Siraisi (Cambridge, MA: 2005), 104–146, on 119; for Huygens, see 
Michael S. Mahoney, “Christian Huygens: The Measurement of Time and of Longitude at 
Sea,” in Studies on Christiaan Huygens, ed. H. J. M. Bos et al. (Lisse: 1980), 234–270; and for 
Newton, see David Brewster, Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac 
Newton (Edinburgh: 1855), 2:26.
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It is no coincidence, then, that scientific discovery is today often 
thought to proceed by what early-twentieth-century psychologists 
began to call “Eureka moments.” 9 That way of thinking, like so much 
of the framework still used to understand the workings of science, 
has its origins in a culture of marketing, commerce, and journalism 
that began to emerge in the nineteenth century. “Eureka” has be-
come an advertisement for science: in books, museum displays, 
hands-on science galleries, television documentaries, and internet 
sites. 
Yet, in a sense, the surprise invoked by “Eureka” is of a limited 
and even predictable sort; after all, Archimedes knew what he was 
looking for. We might do better to follow Isaac Asimov’s apocryphal 
dictum: “The most exciting phrase in science, the one that heralds 
new discoveries, is not ‘Eureka’ (I found it!) but ‘That’s funny…’ ” 10
9 Théodule-Armand Ribot, Essai sur l’imagination créatrice (Paris: 1900), 252.
10 Garson O’Toole, “The Most Exciting Phrase in Science Is Not ‘Eureka!’ but ‘That’s 
Funny …’” Quote Investigator, last modified March 2, 2015, accessed August 21, 2017,  
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/03/02/eureka-funny.
six years later a journal appeared as Eureka: A Record of Mechanism, 
Inventions, Patents, Science and News. These were occasional refer-
ences, although characteristic of a growing faith in progress and the 
power of individual genius. Edgar Allan Poe recognized the trend by 
calling his cosmological prose-poem Eureka.
What made “Eureka” a commonplace was gold. From March 1848, 
the same month in which Poe’s speculations appeared, reports began 
to leak out that the precious metal had been found in California. 
 Although these never mention Archimedes or his bath, the connec-
tion was made late in 1849 by Major Robert Selden Garnett of the 
United States Army, who was in California from his native Virginia. 
Garnett had learned Greek at the Norfolk Academy and had studied 
engineering and drawing both there and at West Point.7 Clearly a dev-
otee of Archimedes, he designed a state seal featuring the motto “Eu-
reka” above a seated Minerva overlooking San Francisco Bay.8 Califor-
nia was henceforth the “Eureka” state, and subsequent findings of 
gold (as in Australia) were indelibly coupled with the word.
The linking of “Eureka” to the century’s greatest public sensation 
provided a wealth of positive associations that advertisers, journal-
ists, inventors, and scientists were eager to exploit. “Eureka” became 
a keyword of the second industrial revolution, in which scientific 
and technical innovations went hand in hand—a name for oil wells, 
mines, engines, guns, household appliances, and clothing. “Eureka” 
also became retrospectively associated with a range of historic scien-
tific insights, from Newton’s apple to Louis Pasteur’s discovery of 
left- and right-handed crystals in the tartrates. Such accounts were 
part of a conception of discovery that emerged with the mass cir-
culation of print, a notion of epiphany and distracted genius that 
matched the Archimedean template. 
7 Arthur M. Bergeron Jr., “Robert S. Garnett (1819–1861),” Encyclopedia Virginia, Virginia 
Foundation for the Humanities, last modified June 20, 2014, accessed August 21, 2017, 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Garnett_Robert_S_1819–1861. For the Norfolk 
 Academy curriculum, see A. J. Morrison, The Beginnings of Public Education in Virginia, 
1776–1860 (Richmond: 1917), 140.
8 John Ross Browne, Report of the Debates in the Convention of California (Washington, 
DC: 1850), 303–304.
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It was purely by accident, though, that I stumbled on a document 
that changed my career: while I was carrying a stack of yellowed ma-
nila folders crammed with miscellaneous papers, a thin sheet of pa-
per slipped free and floated gently to the floor. It was a letter typed on 
old-fashioned blue airmail paper, and I glanced at it as I picked it up.
The letter was from Stephen Jay Gould, my father’s graduate men-
tor at Harvard, who, as even I knew, was one of the most important 
evolutionary theorists of the late twentieth century. It was written 
in what I would come to learn was Gould’s characteristic prose style 
(it began “the Procrustean dimensions of this air-letter assure that 
the reply will be neither Nietzschean nor Joycean”). It was dated April 
1971 (a year before I was born) and was Gould’s response to learning, 
while on sabbatical in Oxford, that my father, a young PhD student, 
was considering transferring to UC Santa Barbara—in part because 
the Cambridge winters were long and cold! 
I had never known about this decision that might have changed 
both of our lives, but it was Gould’s argument for staying that caught 
my attention. While he conceded that “there’s probably more joy in 
California,” the case he made for staying was worded as prophecy: 
“There’s a revolution going on in ecology and biogeography,” he 
wrote, and “the next great innovator in paleoecology will be the 
man  [!] who successfully learns to understand this revolution and 
transfer its insights into paleontology.” Gould strongly implied that 
my father had a choice between sunny California and being part of a 
major intellectual transformation. He stayed at Harvard.
But now I was curious about what Gould meant about this pre-
dicted “revolution” and whether my father did indeed play a part in 
it. I was too far along on my dissertation (on seventeenth-century 
mathematics) to change topics, but I held onto the letter until I had 
taken my first job, where I had some money to travel for research. 
And so my first real archive trip was to the library of the APS to look 
at my father’s papers in more detail, where I found all kinds of evi-
dence that indicated that he had, indeed, been in the center of a re-
markable period of intellectual ferment in paleontology. In the pro-
cess, I also discovered both the joy of archival research and a latent 
fascination with evolutionary biology. I immediately turned my 
An Unexpected Letter
David Sepkoski
On May 1, 1999, I learned of the sudden death of my father, J. John 
“Jack” Sepkoski, Jr. A professor of paleontology at the University of 
Chicago, he was a leading practitioner of an approach to the study of 
evolutionary patterns via quantitative analysis of data from the fos-
sil record. Within a day I was back in Chicago, having the surreal ex-
perience of being interviewed over the phone for his New York Times 
obituary.
I knew very little about my father’s career, actually. Although 
growing up I often interacted with his students and colleagues, I had 
only a vague awareness that he worked with fossils and, more myste-
riously, with computers. At the time of his death I was a PhD student 
in history of science, but I had never read any of his scientific articles 
or asked him about the details of his research. Busy with my own 
 interests, I suppose I always assumed I had plenty of time for that 
in the future.
It was with a mixture of pride and regret, then, that I began to 
realize—as newspaper obituaries and testimonials from colleagues 
came out—that he had been part of an important scientific move-
ment that changed the way we understand the history of life. To 
oversimplify somewhat, he and colleagues demonstrated that much 
of the pattern of life’s history has been determined by chance events: 
major episodes of mass extinction caused by unpredictable events 
like the asteroid impact that wiped out the dinosaurs (and many 
other groups) 65 million years ago. As mammals we ourselves are the 
direct beneficiaries of one of the major surprises in the history of life.
And then came the second surprise. In the summer of 2001, I was 
asked by my father’s colleagues to help figure out what to do with 
all  of the materials in his office. By chance I knew an archivist at 
the American Philosophical Society (APS), who agreed to go through 
the office with me to decide what was worth saving. In truth, I had 
never visited an archive before, and so the weekend we spent sort-
ing through filing cabinets and cardboard boxes was my first experi-
ence actually handling historical documents. Of course I couldn’t 
 resist pausing now and again to read a letter or flip through an old 
notebook.
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A Promenade 
Elena Serrano
Consider Goya’s oil painting Spring (The Flower Girls) from 1786.1 
Dressed as a Spanish lady, the absentminded Flora pauses her prom-
enade to receive the floral gift of a maja. Meanwhile, a peasant has 
tiptoed up behind her. Hiding there, he holds up a rabbit, a symbol of 
spring, that will startle her when she turns her head. Goya vividly 
depicts the peasant’s delight—sparkling eyes, red cheeks—in anti-
cipating Flora’s surprise. With a naughty smile and a finger about to 
cross his lips, the peasant asks the maja, and the viewer, to keep 
quiet, all thus becoming gleeful coconspirators, excitedly awaiting 
Flora’s reaction to the unexpected.
Here I will focus on the “collective performance of surprise,” 
which greatly depended on watching and being watched, in this case 
in what was perhaps the most fashionable site for promenading in 
late-eighteenth-century Spain: the gardens of El Capricho (The Ca-
price). In doing so, I will highlight how astonishment, gender, and 
knowledge grew together in the garden.
In 1783, the Duchess of Benavente bought a rural property on the 
outskirts of Madrid. She designed most of its 150 hectares in the 
 Anglo-Chinese style (also called picturesque)—a supposedly English 
invention that stood in stark contrast with the grand geometrical 
French style. A novelty in Spain (except for the royal gardens in Aran-
juez), Anglo-Chinese gardens were distinguished not only by ser-
pentine tracks, irregular topography, and babbling brooks but espe-
cially  by their follies: theatrical settings strategically placed here 
and there. The duchess’s guests might unexpectedly bump into a tiny 
chapel (with a real hermit), a two-floor cottage in the Petit  Trianon 
style, a neoclassical apiary (housing 80 beehives that could be seen 
through glass walls), a navigable channel leading by gondola from a 
Chinese quay to a dancing pavilion, a hydraulic machine, a temple of 
Venus (featuring Bacchus instead), and a column (with Saturn eating 
his son at the top). 
1 “Las floreras o la Primavera,” Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, Museo Nacional del Prado, 
accessed September 3, 2018, https://www.museodelprado.es/coleccion/obra-de-arte/las-
floreras-o-la-primavera/a7d9b670-77a0-43bb-b97e-aa04a04711d6.
 attention away from the history of mathematics (in truth, I needed 
little encouragement) and haven’t looked back since.
The chance discovery of Gould’s letter was the start of my real career 
as a historian, but it was also the beginning of a long conversation 
with my father that I wish I had been able to have while he was still 
alive. In the process, I have learned about my own history and about 
the nature of history itself. After all, what makes history different 
from, say, physics is that the stories we tell (unlike the story of an 
atom or a projectile in flight) are contingent on chance or unpredict-
able events. As my father’s mentor Stephen Jay Gould put it when 
discussing the history of life, contingency is “no more nor less than 
the essence of history.” And the essence of contingency is surprise!
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A promenade through the picturesque garden was carefully designed 
to inspire a “mouvement admiratif de l’amé,” as Denis Diderot de-
fined surprise. This could vary from the “slightest emotion of plea-
sure” to  agitation or terror. Designing an Anglo-Chinese garden re-
quired follies—and though catalogues offered models for the perfect 
eremite- house or Chinese pavilion, it was the owner who ultimately 
created the garden’s character. Smells, colors, sounds, even place-
ment of the morning or evening light were all carefully considered to 
create unforgettable sensual experiences. In The Caprice, amazement 
was a collaborative effort that included an expert in theater scener-
ies (maestro tramoyista) and Goya himself. In addition to staid pasto-
ral scenes, the duchess bought four shocking works by Goya that in-
cluded witches and allusions to the Inquisition (pinturas de brujas). 
She also purchased the first exemplars of his Los Caprichos, a collec-
tion of engravings that used unexpected visual metaphors to cri ti-
cize the Spanish upper classes and clerical behavior. Bound in an 
 album, Goya’s work resided in the duchess’s library for visitors to leaf 
through. 
Sensual experiences were laden with the moral and political. In 
Spring, Goya played with the symbolic and the quotidian: surprise 
intermingled with visual metaphors, literary references, and politi-
cal agendas. The two-floor cottage in The Caprice, for instance, was 
customized with a figure of an old woman spinning. The cottage 
 became the symbol of the ideal peasant house in accordance with 
actual policies promoted by the enlightened circles of Madrid. In 
 order to stop rural migration toward urban textile production, re-
formers proposed to return this work to rural women. Moreover, 
from 1787 onward the duchess herself promoted spinning and other 
textile production among Madrid’s poor women through the wom-
en’s branch of the Madrid Economic Society. 
Scholars have acknowledged the toing and froing between liter-
ary and real worlds, always inspiring and reinforcing one another. A 
promenade through The Caprice afforded upper-class female visitors 
the opportunity not only to play at farming but also to reenact the 
“woman philosopher,” a successful literary character. Consider, for 
example, the apiary. Transparent beehives and other instruments of 
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observation were widely used by literary and real characters alike 
for admiring the “wonders of nature.” In the Spectacle de la nature, 
for instance, the translation of which was freshly edited to much ac-
claim in Spain during the 1770s, the Countess of Jonval’s country 
house was the setting for her attentive observation of nature. As a 
fictional country house, The Caprice was home to fruit trees and tree 
nurseries, a silkworm breeding ground, greenhouses, exotic vegeta-
bles, and various agronomic experiments, to mention but a few. Sit-
ting in the apiary, female observers of the hustle and bustle of bees 
might recall and perhaps reenact not only the countess’s study of 
insects but also her enlightened conversation—always brightened 
with philosophical and religious reflections—with the other guests 
in the room. Yet the beehives were placed in a surprising setting: to 
observe the bees, visitors sat in a luxurious hall decorated with Ital-
ian marble floors and columns with Corinthian golden capitals. One 
can only speculate if the intention was to invoke the lesson of Man-
deville’s Fable of Bees: private vices such as desire for material goods 
could drive the wealth of society and bring public benefit. 
In fact, it was widely thought that fashion-driven feminine be-
havior could have certain benefits. Mulling over the duchess’s Ca-
price, the secretary of the powerful Royal Academy of Fine Arts 
 (Academia de bellas artes) concluded that for the prosperity of the 
country the best imaginable fashion among aristocratic women 
would be a vogue for country houses. Who but the landed gentry 
could afford to lose an entire harvest in an experimental garden, 
breed new species, invest in novelties? Thus, he pleaded, “May God 
grant that the elite gentlewomen bring about, for the benefit of their 
fatherland, that which has not been conceded to men.” 2 The joyful, 
sensual, collective performance of surprise in The Caprice was in fact 
serious feminine business.
2 Antonio Ponz, Viaje de España, 18 vols. (Madrid: 1772–1794), 13:773, preface: “y acaso 
tendrá Dios dispuesto que las grandes Señoras efectúen en beneficio de su patria lo que 
no ha sido concedido a tantos hombres.”
Upper London
Sally Shuttleworth
In his work on The Emotions and the Will, nineteenth-century psy-
chologist Alexander Bain discussed the “emotions of the intellect,” 
and those flashes of identification that can illuminate work in both 
the arts and the sciences when things lying apart are seen to be 
linked, and “we are arrested, startled, and excited into a pleasing 
wonderment.” 1 Such modes of “pleasurable surprise,” he argues, vary 
with subject matter, from the sense of enlarged power that can ac-
company major scientific discoveries to the vaguer yearnings for in-
creased insights, which can lead to a scholar’s experience of “elation 
of mind” or “intellectual bliss.” Intellectual bliss is probably too ex-
treme a state to associate with the Upper Reading Room of the Bodle-
ian Library or the perusal of nineteenth-century scientific journals, 
but startlement and excitement do capture the sensations I experi-
enced on opening up the first volume of the Asclepiad (1884–1895),2 
a  little known periodical that had the distinction of being penned 
entirely by one man, medical researcher and public health reformer 
Benjamin Ward Richardson (1828–1896).
The pleasures of reading scientific periodicals are decidedly 
mixed: there can be the tedium of toiling through endless tables but 
also the excitement of the unexpected. In this case what the volume 
appeared to offer was a microcosm of nineteenth-century medical 
research, in its practical and cultural contexts, bringing together in 
unexpected ways diverse aspects of Victorian culture and medicine. 
The famous general periodicals of the Victorian age, such as the Fort-
nightly Review or the Nineteenth Century, are renowned for their 
interdisciplinary subject mix, with literature, politics, and science 
intermingling in their pages. Medical periodicals by the later century, 
however, were more focused and constrained. Not so the Asclepiad, 
which carries an extraordinary range and mixture of material, from 
an account of the reinterment of the remains of William Harvey (in-
stigated by Richardson) to an article on aneurism of the coeliac axis; 
1 Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed. (London: 1880), ch. 12,  
“Emotions of Intellect,” 215–219.
2 Benjamin Ward Richardson, ed., The Asclepiad: A Book of Original Research and Obser-
vation in the Science, Art, and Literature of Medicine, Preventive and Curative 1 (1894). 
All references in the essay will be to this volume.
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and from studies of the possibilities of living in a “factitious atmo-
sphere,” as shown by Henry Fleuss’s invention of a diving suit, to in-
structions on how to maintain the temporary preservation of post- 
mortem specimens. Richardson also published the first of his series 
of medical biographies, starting interestingly with William Gilbert, 
the sixteenth-century physician and author of De magnete who Rich-
ardson labels “The First Electrician.” These biographies were subse-
quently collected as Disciples of Aesculapius (1900), making a signifi-
cant, if idiosyncratic, contribution to the early historiography of 
medicine. 
Richardson’s own work was consistently at the interface of med-
icine, science, and technology, and one can track these intersections 
in the essays (which draw on his work over the previous two de-
cades): his accounts, for example, of his lectures at the Royal Poly-
technic Institution using the great induction coil to measure the 
 effects of electricity on the body or, in another version of testing 
the limits of the body, the series of measurements he conducted on 
the American “professional pedestrian” Edward Payson Weston, who 
walked a startling 5.000 miles in 100 days (resting, of course, on Sun-
days) and delivered a lecture at the end of each day, without showing 
(or so it was reported) any visible signs of fatigue. Richardson was 
constantly testing, pushing to see how far physiological, and indeed 
psychological, life could be analyzed and measured. In “Felicity as a 
Sanitary Research,” he takes Joseph Priestley (not Jeremy Bentham) 
as his guide, in an analysis of all the material, social, environmental, 
and physiological conditions necessary for felicity, offering a call to 
arms to all his fellow physicians to lead the political battles against 
slum housing, appalling factory conditions, and environmental pol-
lution. Detailed analysis is mixed with stern missionary fervor: “Can 
we, scientifically, connect health with happiness? If we cannot we 
had better never have been born.” 
Richardson rose to international fame in 1875 with a lecture on 
his vision of “Hygeia,” an ideal city of health. In this issue of the 
 Asclepiad, he turns his attention to a call for plans for the reconstruc-
tion of the city of London. His essay, “Upper London,” is a visionary 
delight: the roof tops of London are to be leveled, so that they can be 
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turned into a series of green walkways or terraces, rather like those 
springing up in our own cities in recent years: “charged with flowers 
and trailing evergreens, they would be the empyrean gardens of the 
great city.” There would also be connecting bridges, so that those on 
foot or on “light noiseless vehicles, like tricycles” could move easily 
and freely across the city, in a pollution-free environment: such de-
velopments, he suggests, would lead to the purification of the air 
since houses would install the smoke-consuming furnaces designed 
by Sir Spencer Wells (surgeon to Queen Victoria’s household and 
 famous for his ovarian surgery, but also a very active sanitary cam-
paigner). The bridges between the houses would also carry electric 
cables and street lights: “Imagine the metropolis turned into a fairy 
land by this adventure of science into the domain of art, and art re-
ciprocating the idea with all her rich resources, and we see in our 
mind’s eye what our children, when we are all of us gone, may really 
see, and perhaps thank us for proposing for their benefit.” 
Richardson captures the romance of science but also the idealism 
and sense of responsibility to the future that lay behind so many 
public health campaigns in the Victorian era. He notes, in conclusion, 
that he writes without expectation that his plan will be accom-
plished in his lifetime but “forseeing it as a necessity and a practical-
ity in the times to come.” When Richardson died, one obituary noted 
that he was the most best-known medical man in England; yet he has 
largely slipped through the nets of history of science, appearing only 
in occasional footnotes. That call to the readers of the future reso-
nates, however, across the years, eliciting those flashes of identifica-
tion identified by Bain that lie at the heart of intellectual pleasure 
and excitement and also, dare I say it, responsibility.
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The Joy of Invention
Otto Sibum
In the early 1830s, Moritz Hermann Jacobi wrote in his diary that his 
recent invention was “eine Erfindung, die mir viel Spaß macht, weil 
sie die Not erzeugte.” Indeed, he was about to construct an electro-
magnetic machine in which magnetic force directly induced a rota-
tional mechanical force. He wrapped metal wire around cylindrical 
bars of soft iron. Sixteen bars of equal size were produced; eight of 
these were mounted at equal distance in a circle on a wooden frame. 
The other eight bars were positioned opposite to the fixed bars but 
mounted on an axle so that they were able to rotate. A battery pro-
vided the necessary electric current running through the bent wire. 
The electric current produced in this way effected a magnetic force, 
which interacted with the field created by the bars positioned oppo-
site. If the magnetic forces were of the same kind, they would repel 
each other, and the rotating part of the machine would move. 
 By means of an ingenious method of connecting the different 
circuits and installing a control mechanism called the “commuta tor,” 
the magnetic poles were periodically reversed, and a continuous ro-
tation of the bars was possible. This “commutator” was made of a 
copper disc with wooden sections inserted at regular intervals on its 
edge. Four of these discs were mounted on the rotating axis. The con-
ducting and nonconducting sections of the discs allowed the rever-
sal of the magnetic poles that made the coils spin. It was the center-
piece of the whole setup. And, after long and stressful trials, much to 
his surprise, it worked fantastically: “I have advanced, after all my 
experiments, that magnetism is a force, acting like universal gravita-
tion, purely as some function of space. ... The reversion of the poles 
being brought about instantly, there would thus be an infinitely ac-
celerating velocity. But a system, moveable on an axis and capable 
of having continued circular motion is the only one which could be 
 susceptible of such a velocity.” 1
Machines had fascinated Moritz Jacobi since his student days. 
The son of a wealthy Jewish merchant family in Potsdam, he had ini-
1 Moritz Hermann Jacobi, “On the Application of Electro-magnetism to the Moving of 
Machines,” in The Annals of Electricity, Magnetism, & Chemistry and Guardian of Experi-
mental Science, vol. 1, October 1836 to October 1837, ed. W. Sturgeon, trans. J. H. Lang 
 (London: 1837), 408–415, 419–444.
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order to do something very different than what [these agents] 
wanted to do according to their sensuous state of being, that 
their blind actions become efficient [zweckmäßig], the contrary 
to one’s self: reasonable behaviour of nature, laws, in their exter-
nal state of being. … Here the driving force [Trieb] steps back 
fully from work. He [man] lets nature score oneself, observes 
calmly and governs the whole easily: List.3
Jacobi’s electromagnetic machine embodies this way of thinking. His 
remark about the commutator, “eine Erfindung, die mir viel Spaß 
macht, weil die Not sie erzeugt hat,” now makes much more sense. 
Being in “Not” did not mean to be in a miserable situation, in de-
spair  at the hopelessness of that situation, in need of help—no, it 
meant to catch the necessity, “die Not-wendigkeit,” of turning around 
the physical constraints that nature provided in such a way that the 
natural force does something very different from what this agent is 
meant to do due to its natural state of being. In the flow of the event, 
man, this observing intelligence, chooses and arranges just those 
natural elements that suffice to achieve the envisaged goal. The re-
sult was far beyond Jacobi’s expectations. It was a surprise, indeed, 
and even fun.
3 G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie II. Die Vorlesungen von 1805/06, ed. J. Hoffmeister 
(Leipzig: 1931).
tially followed his parents’ wishes and studied civil engineering as 
part of Kameralistik in Berlin and Göttingen, finishing a degree in 
architecture. Between 1825 and 1832, he worked as a Prussian civil 
servant, translated civil engineering books, and finally became a civil 
engineer (Baumeister) in Königsberg, where his younger brother Carl 
Gustav Jakob Jacobi had been professor of mathematics since 1827. 
But he did not stay for long. Already by 1835 Moritz Jacobi had been 
elected professor of civil engineering (Zivilbaukunst) at the Russian 
University of Dorpat.
For Jacobi, every exact investigation of nature based on instru-
mentation was a human intervention.
If [man’s] emancipation from nature is to be achieved through 
work, then work, in its universal meaning, first consists, if not in 
overcoming the fixed categories of time and space, then at least 
in voluntarily, that is, freely shaping their mutual designations. … 
I do want to point out that in man’s desire to turn nature into one 
of his organs also lays the principle of the machines which man 
puts between himself and nature and which should be seen first 
as a [means of] emancipation from material work, furnishing 
him with the ability and the leisure to concern himself with 
higher pursuits and finally to rise to the spiritual level.2
Work and machines played a crucial role in his analysis of the human 
emancipation from nature. Human intelligence had compelled natu-
ral forces to behave in such a way that they performed work by them-
selves. Through his ingenious device, nature’s blind actions (agency) 
had been transformed into purposeful actions through human cun-
ning (List). Here Jacobi seems to argue in tune with the Hegelian 
mode of reasoning.
One has to put one’s own activity into the tool, i. e. to make it self- 
acting. This happens in the following way … that nature’s own 
activity, the elasticity of a watch spring, water, wind gets used in 
2 Moritz Hermann Jacobi, “Von der eigentlichen Bedeutung des Luxus und der Mode” 
(unpublished lecture manuscript, undated [possibly 1835]), St. Petersburg Academy  
of Sciences Archive, fond 187/op.1/dele 330, St. Petersburg. 
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An Excellent Salve for Burns
Pamela Smith and Xiaomeng Liu *
An anonymous resident of sixteenth-century Toulouse, perhaps a 
goldsmith or foundry worker, set down in writing a remarkable ver-
nacular compilation of practical recipes for diverse art and technical 
objects. Based on both firsthand experience and hearsay from other 
workshops, most objects would have fit nicely into a Kunstkammer. 
The instructions in the manuscript’s 962 entries introduce a delight-
fully eclectic range of expertise, encompassing metalcasting and col-
oring, pigmentmaking and drawing, imitation gemmaking, cannon- 
casting, treegrafting, landsurveying, papier-mâché masks, and even 
the composition of “monstrous” preserved animals like winged rats. 
Amid this cabinet of human artifice, we also find a burn salve  recipe—
or is it a prayer?—through which spirit is materialized in an  ointment.
Against burns, excellent 
Heat linseed oil on a light fire, without letting it boil and simmer, 
but once it is hot put in a quarter as much of the newest wax you 
can. After all this has melted, let it cool. And once it begins to cur-
dle, stir continuously with a new wooden spatula for as long as it 
takes you to say 9 pater nosters, and while you say them, wash 
this composition with holy water, stirring all the while. Having 
said the first 9 pater nosters, pour out the first water and put in 
new, and wash and stir the composition for the time it takes you 
to say 8 pater nosters, and the 3rd time for as long as 7, and thus 
successively you will add new water, doing the same as above, 
until the last and single pater noster of nine. Then you shall have 
a soft white ointment, with which you shall smear the burn for 9 
days. But do not apply it any longer, since it would cause an over-
growth of flesh. You shall dress your burn twice a day, and each 
time you shall wash your face with water and wine mixed to-
gether, a little tepid, not rubbing but so to say pressing with wet 
linen, and you shall wipe it similarly with fine linen. And then 
apply the ointment, over which you can put ivy leaves. This 
causes hair to regrow and leaves no scar. I was taught this by a 
powder maker who had almost completely burnt himself but 
showed no sign of burns (BnF, Ms. Fr. 640, fol. 103r).
Projective Geometry
Skúli Sigurdsson
Skúli Sigurdsson, Projective Geometry in the Kitchen (2018). 
Konstruktion eines nicht kippenden Küchenwagens,  
wenn die Bremsen – wie hier abgebildet – an den richtigen 
Punkten angebracht wären.
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(Latin being appropriate to a literate sixteenth-century Catholic), “Pa-
ter Noster, qui es in caelis, sanctificetur nomen tuum; adveniat reg-
num tuum; fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo, et in terra. Panem nos-
trum  supersubstantialem da nobis hodie; et dimitte nobis debita 
nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris; et ne nos inducas 
in tentationem; Sed libera nos a malo. Amen.” To our surprise, the 
mixture immediately transformed, becoming whiter, creamier, and 
lighter with each washing, increasing in volume about five times by 
the end of 45 paternosters.
The anonymous author-practitioner of Fr. 640 claimed he learned 
the recipe from a “Pouldrier,” a gunpowder maker. Gunpowder mak-
ing was dangerous work; this maker apparently sustained disfigur-
ing burns of which the author-practitioner saw no trace. Such a salve 
recipe is perhaps unremarkable—in modern chemical terms, it is an 
emulsion, commonly employed today to make lotions and ointments. 
The surprise revealed by reconstructing this recipe (as opposed 
to  simply reading it) was that the process of mixing [holy] water 
while repeating paternosters caused a tangible “purification” and 
“inspiriting” of the raw materials. Our reconstruction was of course 
inauthentic; we could not capture the spiritual significance of the 
process—we didn’t even use holy water—but, even so, the material 
transformation converged with and made tangible the spiritual pro-
cess. Was this the secret that healed the gunpowder maker’s burns?
* Xiaomeng Liu, a student in the Making and Knowing Lab in spring 2017, wrote an 
 annotation on this entry for the digital critical edition of Ms. Fr. 640 being prepared  
by the Making and Knowing Project.
Oil-based salves and ointments were widely employed in early mod-
ern Europe to cure wounds and relieve swellings and joint pain. 
 Linseed oil and wax are the basis of this salve, both common in cook-
ing, lighting, and all types of industrial processes. Versatile and use-
ful materials, they appear in multiple recipes in the manuscript—
mostly for artistic rather than medical purposes. Linseed oil was not 
usual in medicinal preparations, whereas wax had many healing 
properties, often deriving from anagogical power, being compared 
to the light and humanity of Christ: its malleability a metaphor for 
the Creator’s handwork.
For the salve, one part wax was melted in three parts hot linseed 
oil, then the mixture washed several times in holy water, the process 
being timed, as was common in craft procedures, by reciting the 
 paternoster. Like wax candles and other material objects—known as 
sacramentals—that played a role in devotional practices, holy water 
was a bridge between material and spiritual realms, sometimes being 
used as a cure-all or to expel evil spirits. The burn salve requires nine 
iterations of mixing holy water with the salve while reciting the 
 paternoster, nine times at first, then decreasing incrementally by 
one, 45 times in all. Nine was a significant, sometimes magical num-
ber, connected to the Trinity, conveying perfection, and defining the 
norm for human gestation. The white ointment that results is to be 
applied to a burn twice a day for nine days, no less, no more. The final 
covering of ivy leaves makes the beard grow back—a regeneration 
engendered by this evergreen plant?
The symbols and rituals are obvious, but what did this salve look 
like? Only recreating the recipe can make this clear. Our reconstruc-
tion in the Making and Knowing Lab (www.makingandknowing.org) 
revealed that bringing the burn salve into physical being turned out 
to be a surprising process of spiritual materialization. 
We heated the one part new yellow beeswax to four parts yellow 
linseed oil somewhat higher than the melting point of beeswax to 
about 85°C. On cooling, the mixture began to “curdle,” as noted in the 
recipe. As we did not have time to order holy water on Amazon.com, 
distilled water sufficed. With some skepticism, we added the water to 
the curdling mixture. The lab intern, Ludovic Touzé Peiffer, intoned 
381380
Marianne Sommer | African Apemen? Really?
 Indeed, experts were so little prepared that they mostly dismissed 
the first Australopithecus remains (the Taung Child) as an unimport-
ant ape. It took decades of hard work, additional bones, and some-
times aggressive negotiations to change the minds of anthropo l-
ogists worldwide.2
For British geologist William Sollas, among other scientists, the 
development of instruments for precise measurement and numerical 
comparison was required before he could be properly taken aback by 
the importance of African apemen. Sollas also suspected other forces 
at play in the controversy. In 1936, Robert Broom, writing from the 
institute of paleontology and physical anthropology at the Transvaal 
Museum, had submitted a description of an adult australopithecine 
fossil from near Pretoria and identified it as a “missing link.” Sollas 
was upset about the fact that Broom’s piece had not yet appeared in 
Nature, while the journal had published opinions of  negators such as 
the great British trio of Grafton Elliot Smith, Arthur Smith Woodward, 
and Arthur Keith.
Sollas wrote to Broom, “I am surprised that your Taungs has not 
yet appeared in Nature. … Keith may be keeping things back. Keith 
has great influence on this Scotch periodical. In submitting things I 
wonder if whether they appear or not depends on personal consider-
ations.” Sollas was particularly angry that the “British oracle” of pa-
leoanthropology voiced his strong opinions through the press and 
did not shy away from open controversy on this platform: “ Sir Arthur 
Keith … is indeed the most arrant humbug and artful climber in the 
anthropological world. You will probably have read his communica-
tion in “Nature” by the time you read this. I am truly astonished. He 
makes the rashest statements in the face of evidence. Never quotes 
an author but to misrepresent him, generalises on single observa-
tions, and indeed there is scarcely a single crime in which he is not 
adept. Journalism, my dear boy, journalism pure and simple, and 
2 Marianne Sommer, Bones and Ochre: The Curious Afterlife of the Red Lady of Paviland 
(Cambridge, MA: 2007), pt. 2.
African Apemen? Really?
Marianne Sommer
Of all researchers, one might think that paleoanthropologists are 
among those most often surprised. After all, hardly a day passes with-
out news of the discovery of a curious new hominin; who else, in 
their daily work, can expect to stumble upon once-living “hobbits”? 
Indeed, particularly in popular accounts, fossil hunters often report 
that their discoveries “were a stunning surprise.” 1 However, when 
we peek into the history of the field, things appear to be somewhat 
different. It seems, rather, that paleoanthropologists can be aston-
ishingly resistant to the unexpected. Let me outline what I mean 
 using the example of the discovery of australopithecines, which was 
closely related to debates about the geographical origin of what was 
then referred to as the hominid line.
When paleoanthropology came of age in the early twentieth cen-
tury, many scientists were of the opinion that the hominid origin 
was somewhere in “the east.” This view was supported by biogeo-
graphical reasoning and especially by the discovery of Pithecanthro-
pus erectus (today Homo erectus) in Java: here were the remains of a 
being that, while smallbrained, had already walked erect. The anat-
omy of the find was not, however, in accord with the theory that the 
expansion of the brain preceded the appearance of other human hall-
marks. But, for some, the discovery fulfilled Ernst Haeckel’s proph-
ecy: Haeckel had assumed that Pithecanthropi or Pithecanthropi 
alali had once roamed an eastern cradle of humankind. 
That humankind had its beginnings in the east was not a new 
conjecture, even in the natural history of Haeckel’s time. But for 
 Haeckel and others working within a racial-anthropological frame-
work, this was less associated with the biblical narrative than with 
a preference for Asia—in Haeckel’s case especially India—over “the 
dark continent.” It did not, therefore, come as a surprise that the 
 Pithecanthropus find corroborated Asian origins. Too much of a sur-
prise would, on the contrary, have been the discovery of African 
 apemen, which was claimed by Raymond Dart, head of the anato-
mical institute at Witwatersrand University in South Africa, in 1924. 
1 Donald C. Johanson and A. Edy Maitland, Lucy: The Beginning of Humankind (New York, 
London, Toronto, Sidney: 1981), 231.
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that the amount of evidence in the end indeed could “astonish the 
world.” 5 As a happy (first) ending of the australopithecine story, 
Broom’s book Finding the Missing Link appeared in 1950 and Le Gros 
Clark’s The Fossil Evidence for Human Evolution in 1955, both of 
which advocated the important role of the australopithecines in 
hominid evolution.6 It might therefore come as a surprise that, as a 
survey of British museumgoers reveals, even today a part of the pub-
lic has problems accepting Africa as “their birthplace.” 7 
5 Robert Broom and Gerrit Willem Hendrik Schepers, The South African Fossil Ape-man: 
The Autralopithecinae (Transvaal Museum, Pretoria: 1946), 143.
6 Marianne Sommer, Evolutionäre Anthropologie zur Einführung (Hamburg: 2015),  
115–123.
7 Monique Scott, “‘We Grew Up and Moved On’: Visitors to the British Museums Consider 
Their ‘Cradle of Mankind,’” in Envisioning the Past: Archaeology and the Image,  
ed. Sam Smiles and Stephanie Moser (Oxford: 2005).
backed by all the journalists, poor dears. He has gone up like a rocket, 
and will come down like the stick.” 3
However, with an increasing number of fossil specimens, Keith 
eventually agreed that Broom had found what he had thought impos-
sible: an anthropoid with human dentition. Nonetheless, while one 
could be astounded by what seemed the grossest unscientific behav-
ior, it was more difficult to allow amazement in the presence of 
strong theoretical stances. The British expert in primate phylogeny, 
Wilfird Le Gros Clark of Oxford University, still subsumed the aus-
tralopithecines under the fossil remains of African anthropoid apes 
in his Early Forerunners of Man (1934). He positioned himself against 
the stochastic view of evolution advocated by the selectionists and 
followed others in the assumption of evolutionary trends pro-
grammed into the germplasm that would lead the evolution of re-
lated forms into similar directions. Even at the risk of vitalism, Le 
Gros Clark thought orthogenesis preferable over pure contingency as 
shaper of primate evolution. Within a model of parallel evolution, 
the humanlike traits of Australopithecus could be explained without 
inference to a relatively close phylogenetic relation.
However, during the Second World War, Broom started a volumi-
nous correspondence with Keith and Le Gros Clark despite the slow 
mail service. Broom sent Le Gros Clark information on all the latest 
discoveries and casts of the apeman material to the effect that the 
latter became his mouthpiece at British scientific meetings. At the 
first Pan-African Congress on Prehistory in Nairobi in 1947, Le Gros 
Clark presented the insights gained from his studies of the australo-
pithecine material during a short visit to South Africa: “The general 
conclusion was reached that the Australopithecinae must at least be 
regarded as having a fairly close relationship to the ancestral stock 
which gave rise to the Hominidae.” 4 The resemblances had become 
too numerous and detailed to be explained by parallel evolution, so 
3 Sollas to Broom in May and July 1925, in G. H. Findlay, Dr Robert Broom, F.R.S., 
 Palaeontologist and Physician / 1866–1951. A Biography, Appreciation and Bibliography 
(Cape Town: 1972), 53.
4 Wilfrid Le Gros Clark, “Pan-African Congress on Prehistory: Human Palaeontological 
 Section,” Man 47 (1947): 101.
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Ézéchiel Spanheim, envoy of the elector of Brandenburg, described 
the king’s role as being to “fixer en quelque sorte l’humeur volage et 
indiscrète des courtisans.” 3 Versailles was a hydraulic device not un-
like the body itself, where the artful management of fluid economies 
allowed the exercise of power.
The palace’s springs were moved by a series of experts. Early on 
in Louis XIV’s reign, the surprise makers were among the many Ital-
ians arriving at court with Cardinal Mazarin: actors, marionettists 
like the Briocci family from Bologna, acrobats like Filippo del Campo, 
known as Cardelin, cooks like Vicenzo Pronti. These individuals spe-
cialized in different skills of spectacle and illusion. It is perhaps hard 
to imagine nowadays that marionettes and acting could have caused 
genuine fear among early modern European populations, but these 
simulacra of life were held by many to be witchcraft; until the eigh-
teenth century, for example, actors could not be buried in hallowed 
ground. Excelling at the mastery of the body, actors also commanded 
a series of increasingly elaborate mechanical skills, brought to court 
in the so-called machine plays featuring automata, stage lighting and 
explosions, or special effects like moving scenery, thunderclaps, 
gods, or ships. As time went by and these well-known figures died, 
Louis did not replace them. Instead, he co-opted their technical 
 expertise for Versailles: its elaborate waterworks, menagerie, hall of 
mirrors, and fireworks displays were all, as numerous historians 
have noted, parts of an attempt at éblouissement, a project for amaz-
ing, amusing, and shocking the humans present. Unlike touring per-
formers or artisans who moved between courts seeking patronage, 
Versailles was wholly within the French king’s control. Siphoning off 
the skills of his clients—their ability to produce complex visual, me-
chanical, and emotional effects—he used these to keep his courtiers 
and visiting ambassadors in a perpetual state of “surprise”: enter-
tained, awed, and confused in equal measure. This new kind of sur-
prise was a conquest from within. Courtly spectacle was character-
ized by lights and mirrors, by displays at which the brilliant variety 
of material goods was such that “the eyes could hardly bear their 
3 Ézéchiel Spanheim, Relation de la cour de France en 1690 (Paris: 1882), 3–4.
Son et Lumière
Emma C. Spary
In early modern French history, the term “surprise” was often asso-
ciated with violence: in politics, it meant the capture of a territory or 
throne by force of arms. In the 1694 edition of the Dictionnaire de 
l’Académie françoise, the first example of its proper usage was “Il 
s’est rendu maistre de cette Place par surprise.” When the court 
preacher Bossuet lamented the death of Madame, the king’s sister, he 
remarked that death could come as a “great and terrible” surprise for 
the residents of the enchanted palace of Versailles, isolated from the 
less comfortable realities of life in the city and surrounded by won-
ders. Surprise here was used less in the sense of shocking news than 
in that of a blow or buffet from fate, a reminder of mortality: “il faut 
des coups de surprise à nos coeurs enchantés de l’amour du monde.” 1
It could be argued that Versailles was the crucible of an import-
ant transformation in surprise. Whereas at first the word had re-
ferred to power captured from an unready foe, in the grounds of the 
king’s new château, to which the court definitively removed in 1685, 
it came to denote intriguing or perplexing experiences: a way to keep 
courtiers distracted, off balance. In this sense surprise was the very 
essence of Versailles, from the waterjets that soaked  unsuspecting 
 vis itors perambulating the gardens to the dazzling spectacles of light 
and sound orchestrated by high-ranking household servants. The fa-
mous fountains were designed by the very same engineers who made 
the cannon with which the king captured city after city across Eu-
rope. Even eating was an endless play of artifice; courtly cuisine was 
centered on disguise. Voltaire was critical: “As for the cooks, I can’t 
bear the essence of ham, nor the surfeit of morels, mushrooms, pep-
per and nutmeg, with which they disguise dishes that are very 
healthy in themselves.” 2 Courtly delights were part of a program of 
defeating or rather deflecting noble opposition, an attempt to pre-
vent any resurgence of frondisme. If you like, Versailles was a gigan-
tic machine of the passions, with the monarch as puppetmaster. 
1 Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, “Oraison funebre de Henriette-Anne d’Angleterre, duchesse 
d’Orléans,” Recueil des Oraisons funebres (Lyon: 1780), 58.
2 On culinary disguise, see Béatrix Saule, “Tables royales à Versailles, 1682–1789,” in 
 Versailles et les tables royales en Europe XVIIème–XIXème siècles, ed. Jean-Pierre 
 Babelon (Paris: 1993), 41–68.
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sparkling diversity.” 4 Onlookers were deliberately dazzled, over-
whelmed, and kept guessing: What was artifice and what reality?
Yet in the early eighteenth century, surprise became a more 
 suspect enterprise. It now generically referred to any “unexpected 
object” or sudden emotional shock, but for critics of the Crown its 
political undertones remained apparent. Fénelon, tutor to the king’s 
grandson, the duc de Bourgogne, who died before inheriting the 
throne, turned the barrels back onto Louis XIV himself. In Télémaque, 
an idealized account of good rule by a prince who spends an entire 
lifetime waiting for his father’s return, Fénelon acerbically remarked 
that “les meilleurs rois étaient malheureux en ce qu’ils … faisaient 
souvent, par la surprise des flatteurs, les maux qu’ils ne voulaient 
pas.” 5 Many at court were anxious about the ability of certain indi-
viduals, particularly mistresses, to exercise covert (or more obvious) 
power over the king’s decisions. The notion that one would yield to, 
or be seduced by, superficial brilliance was already troubling by the 
reign of Louis XV, great-grandson to the Sun King, when the comte de 
Caylus described surprise as “toujours le premier mouvement des 
sots.” 6 Concerns about the optical superficiality of high society, the 
ease with which its attention could be commanded by dazzle and 
 illusion, echoed across the remaining decades of the Old Regime. 
The  mathematician Henri Decremps specialized in disclosing the 
 hidden mechanism of magical spectacles “dont le charme consiste … 
dans l’erreur & le mensonge.” 7 For in reality, there was insufficient 
water power to run all the fountains at Versailles simultaneously: 
the king had to write and rewrite itineraries around the gardens for 
 ambassadors to ensure they were properly surprised. The power of 
Versailles lay in these carefully stage-managed illusions where ad-
vanced technology encountered disciplined bodies.
4 Mercure Galant 2 (1700): 187.
5 François Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, Les aventures de Télémaque fils d’Ulysse 
(Tours: 1851), 59.
6 Anne Claude de Tubières-Grimoard de Pestels de Lévis, comte de Caylus, Œuvres badines 
complettes (Amsterdam: 1787), 9:262.
7 Henri Decremps, La magie blanche dévoilée ou explication des tours surprennants 
(Paris: 1784), x.
Jean Lepautre, “Cinquiéme journée. Feu d’artifice sur le Canal de Versailles,” 1674.  
Bibliothèque nationale de France, Département estampes et photographie,  





Like a tsunami or a volcanic eruption, AIDS appeared unexpectedly, 
an unknown that seriously challenged taken-for-granted realities. 
The twentieth century’s two world wars, though unimaginably bru-
tal and devastating, had their logic; they fit predictably into histori-
cal patterns. AIDS did not.
It is well known how AIDS surprised the medical profession, how 
its humanitarian image, cultivated through invincible antibiotic 
mag ic bullets, lay in tatters. Public health and epidemiology were 
 revealed to be little more than Cinderella subjects. Shocking at the 
time, too, was that victims of AIDS did not behave as was expected. 
Their untreatable suffering and inevitable death could not be paci-
fied by the promises of orthodox medicine.
In the then rising neoliberal regimes where older rhetoric, per-
ceptions, and metaphors of sociability, civic trust, and power were 
being reworked by new consumer-driven global market models 
based on individual performance and self-fashioning, AIDS exploded 
like a star shell. It provoked a reaction to traditional values, while at 
the same time exposing the bankruptcy, not just of sexual freedom, 
but also of the new ideals of a neoliberal “fractured society” and its 
emergent operating values—above all, individual choice and desire. 
As  the literary critic Susan Sontag soon realized, the homophobic 
 reaction to AIDS victims, their demonization as morally depraved 
threats to heterosexual family life and politics, was also a wider re-
action to the new market-driven consumerist model of governance, 
in which people felt their conventional social identities becoming 
atomized.
Yet, less well-known is how the surprise of AIDS shook the world 
of academia. Cutting-edge scholars in the sociology, philosophy, and 
history of medicine and science in particular had been confidently 
critiquing the production of scientific knowledge, arguing that it was 
a sociocultural construction, a process shot through with political, 
economic, and cultural considerations. Scientific truth was no longer 
seen as timeless, objective, or universal. This was a view shored up in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s by social-constructionists and post-
structuralists, the latter considering all of human reality through the 
lens of language and its theory. As Michel Foucault and others taught, 
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with scientific medicine based on reason and its virtues; indeed, it 
exposed them as myth. Neither could I approach the surprise of 
French pox in an older sense of a motivational force driving rational 
scientific medicine, for now the idea of modernity as the ostensible 
spark that ignited the motor of progress was also regarded as part of 
the mythmaking. AIDS, as well as my debut into academia, was some-
what beyond “surprise.”
But another option emerged: the practice and epistemology of 
surprise. It was a diversion of sorts from the radical relativism of the 
“linguistic turn” and essentialism of sociocultural constructionism. 
In this fast-growing area of scholarship, surprise and related human 
passions such as wonder, puzzlement, and marvel were transformed 
from external motivational forces in the production of scientific 
knowledge into forces inherent within the epistemic preoccupations 
of early modern scientific practitioners. In this revision, surprise and 
wonder became emblematic epistemic virtues as intrinsic to the 
practice of medicine and science in the early modern period as rea-
son and rationality became in modernity. Passions like surprise be-
came productive forces in the very making of knowledge about early 
modern diseases. The surprise of the French pox did not undermine 
traditional early modern medical thought and practice, I came to 
 argue. It strengthened them. Early modern contemporaries were far 
from being paralyzed by the surprise attack of the French pox, as 
earlier scholarship had argued. In fact, they appropriated and under-
stood the unknown disease precisely through the very uttering that 
they were surprised by it.
As in early modernity, so in late modernity. Surprising? Looking 
back, was I, too, not also complicit in the taming of AIDS? 
the human body and diseases were not what they seemed but rather 
a complicated discursive construct of power and knowledge. The 
very experience of disease was therefore not transparent, “true,” or 
“real” but an ever-shifting fabrication. While earlier generations of 
scholars had hoped to cut through the veil of language, to penetrate 
its ideologies and metaphors, and thus get at what disease “really” 
was, poststructuralists undermined the realist search.
The AIDS crisis posed serious intellectual problems to this think-
ing. How was one to answer the voice of the realist from the back of 
the conference room: “Are you telling me my child/partner/lover/
friend is dying of a sociocultural or linguistic construction?”
It was a question hard to answer, far easier to avoid. Some histo-
rians did so by focusing on the sociocultural impact of AIDS, draw ing 
ready analogies with earlier epidemics, notably plague and venereal 
disease. Others, who were already thinking that social relativism and 
linguistic reductionism had gone too far, sought to strengthen their 
hand. Didn’t people in the past feel pain, suffering, birth, or death as 
something “real”? Even those who embraced the crisis of AIDS in 
postmodernist terms, those who wrote that it provided an “object les-
son in the binary hierarchies of language,” were forced to pull back. 
Some came to wonder whether certain realities—such as AIDS—
needed to be brutally essentialized in a postmodern world that too 
easily fragmented and isolated the sorts of experiences which could 
not be fit into the consumerist market model.1
As a PhD student in the 1990s, launching into an investigation of 
the sixteenth-century French pox (one of the first fatal “surprise” 
 epidemics that hit Europe), I was not fully aware of how AIDS had 
attenuated the discussion of disease. I only knew that certain meth-
odological routes could no longer be safely traveled. Among them 
was framing disease in terms only of social-cultural reactions, for 
these frames ultimately depended upon a conception of disease as 
timeless and universal, an ahistorical assumption equal to that of ret-
rospective diagnosis. All scholars agreed—and they agreed on little 
else—that AIDS had unveiled the limits of modernist obsessions 
1 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, MA: 2011), 162.
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in his 1999 work Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie, the term Saga-
zität is the translation of the Greek ἀγχινοία, which contains at its 
root νοῦς: the faculty of intuitive insight. Other than this, little is 
known about the background of Kant’s idea. Sagacity is so little con-
sidered that you can still write the English Wikipedia entry on it if 
you would like to: the term appears, but the page is blank. The Ger-
man entry on Scharfsinn claims that Sagazität is just Scharfsinn, but 
when it comes to Kant and his predecessors, the topic treated is a 
broader one, namely “wit” (Witz). For Kant, Witz is the ability to com-
pare, relate, and connect things that appear to be different. In Zedler’s 
Universal-Lexicon, Scharfsinnigkeit is rendered as a translation not 
of sagacitas but of perspicacitas. 
However, what interests me here is a different problem. What 
 sagacious scientists know, and how they come to know it, must be 
surprising to those who do not have the power of sagacity. If you 
simply either have this power or you don’t, if you can only display it 
but not teach it, then untalented others cannot but marvel at the in-
novative processes and products of sagacious scientists. Or perhaps 
they think that it is all pretence. Kant, oddly, does not enter into this 
issue. He simply takes for granted that some scientists possess the 
power, much as exceptional inventors possess what he calls “origi-
nality.” However, in his lectures on logic, Kant warns against blindly 
trusting or following great exemplary minds. 
History of science becomes pragmatic if one simply observes 
how scholarship is related to human reason, progress, and the 
things that impede it. It has been noted that great examples re-
tard the sciences for a while, because everyone follows the model 
and none strive for originality. This happened with Aristotle, 
Leibniz, [Des]Cartes, and Newton.2
When scientists focus too exclusively on “great examples” like 
 Newton, there is the risk that they emulate these models mechani-
cally and thus obstruct progress. A “pragmatic” history of science 
could help out here, since it tries to study the general conditions that 
2 Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Academy Edition, 24:492.
A Kantian Puzzle
Thomas Sturm
Kant’s 1798 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View disturbs 
preconceptions about the philosopher. This book resulted from lec-
tures he gave on the “science of man” (Wissenschaft vom Menschen) 
during the very cold Königsberg winters between 1772–1773 and 
1795–1796. It is, for Kant, unusually popular in style and content and 
indeed attracted more students than any of his other courses. Tech-
nical philosophical terminology and argumentation are reduced to 
a minimum. Instead, Kant the anthropologist observes, reflects, and 
jokes about all things human: many human beings are unhappy since 
they cannot “abstract” (a young man is unable to propose to a lovely 
lady because he cannot ignore a spot on her face); we all play roles in 
society (the priest appears to be serious in public, though with his 
children he plays as any parent does); courtiers mimic the behavior 
of the rulers they wish to please, losing all individual character; if a 
horse had self-consciousness, we would dismount and regard it as 
member of society; there might be intelligent beings on other plan-
ets  who are, unlike ourselves, unable to lie, always speaking their 
minds without any inhibition whatsoever. 
Science does not escape Kant’s attention either, but not science 
viewed from a transcendental perspective, with its a priori founda-
tions scrutinized and systematized. Rather, under the heading of spe-
cial “talents” of cognitive power, Kant looks at scientists themselves, 
their mental capacities and practices.1 For instance, what mental 
powers must a researcher of nature possess to make a significant dis-
covery? Mere luck cannot do the job, and neither can the “logic of the 
schools.” Francis Bacon’s Organon is recommended as a toolkit for 
making discoveries by means of experiment. But Kant also remarks 
that some researchers possess a special gift or “talent,” namely “sa-
gacity” (Sagazität or Nachforschungsgabe), a natural disposition that 
cannot be explained by rules. 
Scientists in possession of this gift find paths to new knowledge 
as if they were guided by a divining stick (Wünschelrute). They can 
sniff out (auswittern) the right direction to go; they cannot teach this 
intuitive talent but only show it to others. As Reinhard Brandt notes 
1 Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Akademieausgabe, 7:223–225.
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Chaos and Order
Claudia Swan
Collecting is at once a form of madness and a calling to order. The 
impulse to amass, to arrange, to hold and behold the sort of array that 
qualifies as a collection often defies the strictures and the structures 
that hold such assemblages together. Wunderkammern exemplify 
this in several respects, beginning with the etymological: chambers 
of mirabilia are containers for fantasy and repositories for the ex-
ceptional. The vast assortment of objects housed in early modern 
 collections often adhered to general categories (crystal vessels, 
aquat ic animals, resins and gums, antiquities, ivory lathework, ar-
mor), but the overall impression of inventories and other records is 
pretty  chaotic. Were the stringent categories (inscriptions) that Sam-
uel Quiccheberg devised ever actually enforced? 1 It comes as a relief 
when collectors attest to the challenge of containment and order, as 
did Ulisse Aldrovandi in 1595, when he enumerated the contents of 
his collection, which he immodestly called “the eighth wonder of 
the world.”
Today in my microcosm can be seen more than 18,000 different 
things, including 7,000 plants in fifteen volumes, dried and 
pasted, more than 3,000 of which are painted “al vivo” … in four-
teen armoires, my so-called Pinacotheca. I also have sixty-six 
chests, divided into 4,500 boxes, where there are 7,000 subteran-
nean items, with various fruits, gums, and other very beautiful 
things from the Indies, marked with their names, so that they 
can be found.2 
Thank goodness for containers and labels. His microcosm, like many 
others, is a world on the verge of order. 
Many descriptions of collections fall back on numbers; in light of 
the numbers, words fail. This is markedly so in the case of collections 
of works on paper, where thousands of prints and drawings were 
1 Samuel Quiccheberg, The First Treatise on Museums. Samuel Quiccheberg’s 
 Inscriptiones, 1565, trans. Mark Meadow and Bruce Robertson (Los Angeles: 2013). 
2 Ulisse Aldrovandi, Trattato naturale dell’utilità et eccellenza della lettura dell’historia 
naturale, Biblioteca Universitaria de Bologna, ms. Aldrovandi 21, IV, c. 53v. See Lucia 
 Tongiorgi Tomasi, ed., Immagine e natura: L’immagine naturalistica nei codici e libri  
a stampa delle Biblioteche Estense e Universitaria, exh. cat. (Modena: 1984), 131.
further or impede such progress. Scientists should “strive for origi-
nality”: for example, they should relate things that have hitherto 
been treated as unrelated or invent instruments that open new paths 
for discovery. These claims are in line with another of Kant’s famous 
maxims that we must learn to think for ourselves. But, if scientists 
can strive for originality, then it must be possible to improve one’s 
own given disposition to originality and, consequently, also one’s 
 sagacity.
If and insofar as improvement and learning are possible, this 
could in turn reduce the surprise or lack of understanding that oth-
ers experience when faced with the processes and products of sa-
gacity. But this is problematic: Kant cannot have it both ways, de-
claring sagacity to be an immutable power that cannot be taught, 
while also claiming that we can intentionally improve it. Some Kant 
scholars—those who are trained in what Lorraine Daston has called 
the truly hard science, namely philology—will point out here that I 
used a logic lecture, produced by a student of Kant’s, against a text 
published by Kant himself, namely the Anthropology. So, one might 
throw the problem out. Even so, it exists: still today, we tend to think 
of the emergence of certain discoveries as difficult to explain, be-
cause, in some cases at least, they seem to be built on tacit abilities. 
But we also reject the view that some products of scientific research 
are the result of a mysterious process that we cannot understand or 
teach. The puzzling topic of sagacity requires further clarification 
and  reflection by historians and philosophers of science.
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artist. “A book full of sketches by Rembrandt” is followed by “a book 
of wood prints by Lucas van Leijden” and numerous others contain-
ing works by Netherlandish and Italian artists—Pieter Bruegel, Hen-
drick Goltzius, Raphael, and several others. Item no. 199 “A [book] 
with drawings by the foremost masters of the entire world” supports 
what the rest of the list implies: Rembrandt belonged to and collected 
a canonical microcosm.3
Today, large private and institutional collections of prints and 
drawings are organized by artist—and many of the artists Rembrandt 
collected still form the backbone of collections of early modern 
graphic art. Standard curatorial and academic art historical taxon-
omy adheres to era and geographical region, with artists’ names 
or  specific media serving as more particular references. Scholars of 
the graphic arts who consult institutional collections are accus-
tomed, therefore, to translating their interests into the categories 
born of centuries of collecting in the shadow of the canon. At times 
this can result in chance encounters, sidelong glances at works one 
has not requested but that are stored (as all well-kept freestanding 
prints and drawings are, in acid-free boxes) alongside works one 
has—where alphabetical ordering and available space do not coin-
cide and artists share storage space. A request to view works by a 
given artist may elicit others whose surnames begin with the same 
or similar letters, depending on the girth of a given artist’s work and 
the size of the boxes in which her work is stored. Every time this 
happens, a feeling of surprise is inevitable—but getting this close to 
curatorial housekeeping also feels mildly illicit.
The canon of identified artists exercises a firm grip on curatorial 
practices and scholarly expectations alike, and it is therefore un sur-
prising that this canon is exercised in times of crisis. Generally, when 
works are selected for preservation from destruction, it is also ac-
cording to the order or criteria of recognition/fame and value. When 
U-boats approached the East Coast of the United States, 15,000 prized 
works in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and addi-
3 Bob van den Boogert, ed., Rembrandt’s Treasures, exh. cat. (Amsterdam: 1999), “Appendix 
to Rembrandt’s Inventory.”
kept in hundreds of albums. The Amsterdam lawyer Laurens van der 
Hem, for example, compiled an extraordinary atlas that, at his death 
in 1678, consisted of over 20,000 prints and drawings in 192 albums 
and portfolios. Rembrandt, whose collection was described in a no-
tarial document drawn up during bankruptcy proceedings in 1656, 
owned numerous kunstboecken, or albums that contained prints 
and drawings of all sorts—most organized by medium and name of 
Joris Hoefnagel, Animalia Volatilia et Amphibia (Aier), plate LVI, watercolor and gouache 
with gold leaf on vellum, ca. 1575–1580, 14.3 × 18.4 cm. National Gallery of Art, gift of  
Mrs. Lessing J. Rosenwald. Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Washington.
401400
Claudia Swan | Chaos and Order
Purple on the Ruffles
Mary Terrall
Surprise is transient, by definition, but its echoes survive in memory 
and in writing. It often crops up at pivotal moments in narratives of 
eighteenth-century scientific investigations. For naturalists, surpris-
ing occurrences might have sparked a systematic investigation in 
the field or in the laboratory; at other times, an experiment or test 
offered up its own surprises. At a remove of centuries, the historian 
can vicariously experience these reactions filtered through the me-
dium of ink on paper and occasionally finds herself surprised by the 
naturalists as well as the objects of their attention. 
For my short excursion into the realm of unexpected observa-
tions, I turn not to an earthshaking surprise like Galileo’s moons or 
Leeuwenhoek’s animalcules but to a rather mundane, if colorful, oc-
currence of the sort that punctuated the daily efforts of naturalists.11 
The scene plays out on the Atlantic coast in Poitou, in the autumn of 
1710, where the consummate observer René-Antoine Ferchault de 
Réaumur explored the tidepools not far from his provincial estate. 
Enjoying the ocean air on his annual vacation from the demands of 
the scientific and academic life in Paris, Réaumur was looking for a 
particular kind of sea snail, a common whelk known as Buccinum. 
The previous year, his colleague Bernard de Jussieu had brought a 
specimen from these same shores into the academy’s meeting room, 
where he produced a striking purple color from liquid squeezed from 
the mollusks. The academicians watched the color develop from pale 
yellow to an intense purple, a color they interpreted as comparable 
to the purple dye made in ancient times from the murex, another 
species of shellfish. Réaumur wanted to further investigate the phys-
ics of the gradual color change and hence found himself scanning 
the shore for whelks. He found plenty of them, but he also noticed 
masses of unidentified tiny bodies nearby, tightly attached to the 
rocks. Were they eggs, or perhaps seeds? Though quite familiar with 
1 This account and all citations are taken from R.-A. F. de Réaumur, “Découverte d’une 
 nouvelle teinture de pourpre et diverses expériences pour la comparer avec celle que  
les anciens tiraient de quelques espèces de coquillages que nous trouvons sur nos côtes 
de l’océan,” Mémoires de l’Académie royale des sciences 1711 (Paris: 1730), 166–196, on 
169–174.
tional works from other local collections were moved under cover of 
night to a stately home outside Philadelphia—Whitemarsh Hall. The 
director of the Museum of the City of New York, who did not 
 participate, referred to the repurposed mansion as a “monument hys-
terique.” 4 None of this is especially surprising, although it might lead 
us to ask whether any effort to preserve physical objects from de-
struction is a form of madness—as mad perhaps as collecting to be-
gin with. 
The order of things inside the Print and Drawings Study Room of 
the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, largely adheres to con-
vention. Works are stored in acid-free boxes arranged according to 
century, country, and surname. It came, therefore, as a surprise to 
learn that a number of additional boxes are grouped under the non- 
arthistorical rubric “WW III.” These boxes, labeled in the same calli-
graphic lettering as the others, contain works selected for pre ser-
vation should the unthinkable occur. They number fewer than 100 
(in a collection of over 100,000 items), and the selection is said to be 
subject to regular curatorial review. Surprisingly, the works ear-
marked for preservation in these boxes are neither the priciest nor 
the most famous. They include a spectacular drawing by Rubens 
of  Pan recumbent, a self-portrait by Rembrandt, a drawing by the 
Nether landish artist Hans Bol of skaters on ice, an early example of 
engraving, and four volumes of exquisite watercolors by Joris Hoef-
nagel, The Four Elements (figure).5 Unlike works preserved during 
World War II, each of these is unlikely to be familiar to more than a 
few scholars each. These are not representative but rather wholly 
unique works. This alternate canon is a vivid reminder that the rela-
tionship between chaos and order—here, the threat of annihilation 
informs judgment—animates collection practices far and wide, past 
and present.
4 Calvin Tomkins, “Merchants and Masterpieces: The Story of the Metropolitan Museum  
of Art (1970),” in Historical Perspectives on Preventive Conservation, ed. Sarah Staniforth 
(Los Angeles: 2013), 155–157, on 157.
5 Ned Martel, “Curator Andrew Robison Decides What Goes into National Gallery’s 
 Emergency Box,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2011.
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the local marine life, he did not recognize these structures, each one 
shaped like “an elliptical spheroid, or an elongated ball.” 
On closer examination, the tiny bodies contained a fluid that 
seemed similar to the Buccinum fluid demonstrated by Jussieu. Per-
haps this liquid, squeezed from the mysterious little balls, would also 
produce color? “In truth, a conjecture could hardly be more tenuously 
founded, but the experiment necessary to enlighten myself on this 
point was simple as could be.” He plucked some from the rocks where 
they clung, and “using the first cloth (linge), and the least colored, 
available to me at that moment, I squeezed their juice onto the man-
chettes of my shirt.” (These are the ruffled ends, often embellished 
with lace, of a gentlemen’s shirt sleeves.) He could see a pale smear 
on the linen, with a bit of unremarkable yellow in some places, but 
otherwise no color. Then other things caught his eye, and he thought 
no more of his conjecture until, some minutes later, he glanced “by 
chance” at the ruffle: “I was struck by a pleasant surprise: I saw a very 
beautiful purple color just where the grains had been crushed.” Sur-
prised but hardly immobilized, he quickly gathered up more of the 
gelatinous grains, careful to choose those with no evident color, and 
crushed them onto clean sections of his shirt sleeves. Sure enough, as 
he watched, the color appeared and deepened to purple over the 
course of two or three minutes. 
Réaumur emphasized that he had unexpectedly discovered “a 
new purple dye that I was not looking for.” Reading his retrospective 
account, I was myself surprised at the casual way he used the ruffles 
on his sleeves to test the slimy substance. A handkerchief seems a 
more likely candidate. We might expect a servant to be involved—
there were certainly servants present, ready to carry specimens and 
seawater back to the house. Was their linen perhaps not white 
enough to serve as test material? Was this simply a spontaneous ges-
ture? In any case, it was the start of a long series of experiments.
“You can well imagine that the curiosity natural to those who 
love physics did not permit me to leave it at that.” Enlisting the ser-
vants to help with gathering a large quantity of the little “grains” 
before the tide came in, he took them back to his study, where he 
crushed them and applied the liquid to clean pieces of linen. “I was 
nearly as surprised as I had been the first time I saw the purple color 
appear when, having regarded my linen cloths for a very long time, 
there was no change in their color at all.” Indoors, he could not repro-
duce the color change he had seen on the shore. Later on, he noticed 
small spots of reddish purple on the wall near the window where the 
liquid had splashed. By moving the soaked cloths to different loca-
tions he was able to get the color to appear, and eventually con-
cluded—another surprise—that the movement of air over the sur-
face initiated the color change. “Who would ever have guessed that a 
little more or less air circulation could have produced such an effect 
so quickly?” Ultimately, to cut a rather long story short, he inter-
preted this result in terms of the agitation of the air acting on the 
arrangement of the particles of the liquid. By the end of a long chain 
of experiments, including various chemical tests, the various unex-
pected effects had been tamed into reproducible results and even a 
mechanical explanation of sorts.
I should not perhaps have been surprised to find Réaumur smear-
ing snail eggs, or whatever they were, onto the gathered ruffle of his 
fine linen shirt. (He mentioned that the color never did come out, 
even after repeated launderings.) The image of the genteel naturalist 
experimenting on his linen is an engaging one, and the narrative de-
ployed the circumstances and his own surprise to good rhetorical 
effect. It served not only as the engine driving his subsequent inves-
tigation but also as the dramatic crux of the discovery narrative.
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Problem VI
Viktoria Tkaczyk
Washington Allston (1779–1843) is celebrated for being the first Amer-
ican-born Symbolist painter, essayist, and poet. His symbolist style 
avant la lettre characterizes the second half of his career, when he 
left the United States, toured through Europe, resided in London for 
a decade, and finally settled in Cambridgeport, Massachusetts. All-
ston’s opulently colored and highly expressive oil paintings of this 
period are rich in references to the old masters and in biblical and 
literary motifs. Among them is his most sophisticated work of art, 
The Dead Man Restored to Life by Touching the Bones of the Prophet 
Elisha (1811–1814) and the incomplete Belshazzar’s Feast (1817–1843).
But let us turn to the artist’s early years at Harvard College, where 
he obtained a classical education and searched for new horizons. 
During his first years at college, Allston—the offspring of a planta-
tion family from Brook Green Domain near Georgetown, South Caro-
lina—mostly filled his letters, notebooks, and manuscripts with 
drawings that recall the style of pictorial satirist William Hogarth. A 
series of four of such brown pen-and-ink sketches, produced between 
1797 and 1799, is preserved in Harvard’s Fogg Museum and was re-
cently considered for the exhibition The Philosophy Chamber: Art 
and Science in Harvard’s Teaching Cabinet, 1766–1820 at the Harvard 
Art Museums. The series of caricatures illustrates problems in geom-
etry. One of them, “Problem VI,” shows the problem of finding the 
height of an accessible object from a rising ground. Following math-
ematical rules, Allston gives an example and solves the problem cor-
rectly. Interspersed between his calculations, we find the sketch of a 
land surveyor who appears to be agreeably surprised by what he sees 
through his telescope. He is standing unsteadily on the shoulders of 
a woman. What exactly, the drawing seems to inquire, is a rising 
ground? A grassy hill, a tree, or something that keeps rising, moving, 
or turning—the earth? What can an observer additionally see from a 
constantly moving position? Inaccessible, faraway objects? New con-
tinents? New worlds?
That surprises arise from changes in position, especially if those 
positions—or both positions and targets—keep moving, has long 
since become a truism. Probably the most famous case in point is 
Galileo Galilei, who suggested to his readers in one of his renowned 
Washington Allston, “Mensuration, Problem VI,” ca. 1797–1799, ink on paper.  
Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University, Washington Allston Trust.
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thought experiments that they imagine having themselves shut up 
“in the main cabin below decks on some large ship, and have with 
you some flies, butterflies, and other small flying animals.” Is there 
any difference, Galileo asked, between observing the creatures’ flight 
when the ship continues its progress and when it stands still, and if 
there is a difference, then for whom? For centuries, Galileo’s vessel 
and other famous vehicles have been passing up and down the high-
ways and byways of the history of science: Think of a train that trav-
els at the speed of light (Einstein)! Imagine the sound of a police car’s 
siren as it overtakes its quarry (Mach)! Neither sound, nor time, nor 
space, nor gravity, nor the shoulders of giants, nor truth, nor even the 
histories of science themselves remain stable. Time and again, terra 
firma seems worth trading in for surprise. Going back to Allston’s 
sketch, the “problem” might just be to ask whose shoulders have to 
bear the weight of those attempts to gain new perspectives.
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The Nice Ones Are Sometimes  
the Worst
John Tresch
I tried to warn the editors of this collection—on no less authority 
than Adam Smith’s—that they are playing a dangerous game. In its 
substance and delivery, this volume takes monstrous chances with 
the well-being of its recipient.
Smith’s unpublished History of Astronomy was actually a trea-
tise on the sentiments’ relation to knowledge.1 He opened with “sur-
prise”, whose consequences could be deadly. He cited an anecdote 
from Livy: “a Roman lady,” who believed her son killed in battle, “was 
sitting alone bemoaning her misfortunes” when that same son, hav-
ing escaped his captors, “came suddenly into the room to her.” In a 
horrible irony of maternal affection, she cried out “and  expired in-
stantly in a transport of joy.” 
For Smith, the nicer the surprise, the greater the risk. Unhappy 
surprises are more tame: “Let us suppose the contrary of this to have 
happened, and that in the midst of domestic festivity and mirth, he 
had suddenly fallen dead at her feet, is it likely that the effects would 
have been equally violent? I imagine not.” Since Smith describes phi-
losophy “as one of those arts which address themselves to the imagi-
nation,” his last three words carry weight. 
Smith attributed the difference between fatal joy and survivable 
sadness to the rhythm and trajectory of each. Surprise involves a 
change between what is expected and what occurs, with a corre-
sponding internal alteration: “Grief comes on slowly and gradually, 
nor ever rises at once to that height of agony to which it is increased 
after a little time. But joy comes rushing upon us all at once like a 
torrent.” This sudden change is “more violent and apt to have more 
fatal effects, than that which is occasioned by a Surprise of grief.” 
The account may seem odd—indeed, surprising—yet for Smith 
its truth was confirmed by common sense: “Most men who can take 
the trouble to recollect, will find that they have heard of more people 
who died or became distracted with sudden joy, than with sudden 
1 Adam Smith, “The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries, Illustrated 
by the History of Astronomy,” in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence 
of Adam Smith, vol. 3: Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce, 
and I. S. Ross (Oxford: 1983), 33–105.
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good, his work on the passions was a visible intervention. He offered 
a venerable balm: “Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains 
which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to intro-
duce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to 
allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, when it sur-
veys the great revolutions of the universe, to that tone of tranquility 
and composure, which is both most agreeable in itself, and most suit-
able to its nature.” Smith saw polytheism as the offspring of imagina-
tion run wild, of philosophizing without tranquility.
For Auguste Comte, who embraced Smith’s analysis, fetishism—
belief in the intelligence and benevolence of natural objects—pre-
ceded polytheism. Yet both forms of religion always existed along-
side their more patient sibling, philosophy (or positive science).3 
Comte envisaged a future return to fetishism as a way of encourag-
ing “altruistic” emotions, yet under the authority of a new science, 
sociology, administered by society’s natural directors: historians of 
science, of course.
Someone once said that philosophy begins in wonder. But for 
wonder to have a chance, it needs a safe place to play. According to 
Smith, when “subsistence ceases to be precarious, the curiosity of 
mankind is increased, and their fears are diminished. The leisure 
which they then enjoy renders them more attentive to the appear-
ances of nature, more observant of her smallest irregularities, and 
more desirous to know what is the chain which links them all to-
gether.” From Smith’s analysis, it appears that the ideal conditions 
for cultivating such sentiments and weaving such chains would be a 
quiet place, with books, conversation, and large windows, under a 
benevolent and wise director—and not too far from the U-Bahn. The 
fewer surprises coming in, the more surprising the work going out 
(though with minimal fatalities, we hope).
If these words are being read, however, I rest assured. My hyper-
bolic fears were unfounded. Happily—on the matter of happy sur-
prises, at least—Smith was wrong. 
3 Georges Canguilhem, “Histoire des religions et histoire des sciences dans la théorie  
du fétichisme chez Auguste Comte,” in Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
(Paris: 1994), 81–98.
grief.” On reflection, I can’t say I know of more people extinguished 
by happy surprise than by sudden sorrow. But the eighteenth was a 
sensitive century. 
Surprise is often a prelude to the second sentiment Smith exam-
ines, wonder, which arises from unusual, singular things that con-
found established categories, or “small irregularities” in a familiar 
chain of events. The two sentiments form a chain of their own: “When 
one accustomed object appears after another, which it does not usu-
ally follow … we start and are surprised at feeling it there, and then 
wonder how it came there.” Such irregularities stop the fancy, which 
moves always ahead toward what is expected; they open “a gap” in 
our anticipation, forcing us to wonder, in a mental “oscillation” as-
tutely diagnosed as “a nasty hybrid of seasickness and toothache.” 2
As with joyful surprise, too much wonder can end badly. We see 
this with both astronauts and cardsharps. A man somehow trans-
ported to another planet, “where nature was governed by laws quite 
different,” or the observer of a card game whose rules she could not 
decipher would suffer “confusion and giddiness,” which if prolonged 
would end “in lunacy and distraction.” 
But even if they don’t kill you or drive you mad, surprise and 
wonder—and their close kin, admiration—might make a pagan out 
of you (or worse, a Cartesian). Smith imagines a savage “overawed” by 
“comets, eclipses, thunder, lightning, and other meteors,” who there-
fore “views them with a reverence that approaches to fear.” Con-
fronted with such grandeur, the imagination rushes in to provide a 
“bridge” between was expected and what arrives; this need is “the 
origin of Polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition which ascribes 
all the irregular events of nature to the favour or displeasure of in-
telligent, though invisible beings, to gods, daemons, witches, genii, 
fairies.” It is also what led “Des Cartes” to postulate “invisible efflu-
via” between bodies.
Notwithstanding Smith’s own later belief in an “intelligent, 
though invisible” hand, guiding selfish actors toward the common 
2 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750  
(New York: 1998), 327.
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two as I supposed.” 1 Another highly skilled field man, Vernon Bailey 
of the US Biological Survey, astonished his colleague E. W. Nelson by 
failing to find as many elk in the northern part of Yellowstone as had 
been found at Jackson Hole. Nelson wondered if Bailey had “over-
looked some elk” and asked him to make sure he was counting them 
all, “so that it can not be claimed that an imperfect job has been 
done.” 2 At countless other field sites, still less fortunate field scien-
tists and naturalists found very little or even nothing in the geolog-
ical formations, environmental conditions, and topographical set-
tings where they expected better, based on their advance planning.
But disappointment was not just a matter of failures of cognitive 
preparation—of unsuccessful mental roaming over the landscape or 
of insufficient consultation of maps and other kinds of preexisting 
stores of knowledge to predict when and where to go. It was also, in 
practical terms, about justifying investments of time and resources. 
Fieldwork cost money and devoured the precious time of trained per-
sonnel. While mid-nineteenth-century exploring expeditions were 
often open-ended and opportunistic—especially when accompany-
ing military campaigns or Pacific railroad surveys—a few decades 
later nearly all fieldwork was carefully planned to maximize returns 
on time invested and money spent on supplies, railway fare, meals, 
hotels, camping equipment, horses, and instruments. In this context, 
too, “surprise” often meant that the payoffs in collecting, observing, 
or mapping failed to meet expectations. S. F. Emmons of the US Geo-
logical Survey’s Colorado Division reported in the mid-1880s that 
“two or three months” anticipated for finishing a map of the Denver 
Basin were insufficient due in part to “unexpected complication in 
the structure,” which made it impossible to complete the fieldwork 
in the time allotted.3 In the annals of field science, unexpectedly low 
returns on investment of time and money in fieldwork were at least 
as common as surprisingly rich discoveries.
1 Earl Douglass, Diary 25, December 14, 1909, Earl Douglass Papers, University of Utah.
2 E. W. Nelson to Vernon Bailey, March 31, 1916, Vernon Bailey Papers, American Heritage 
Center, Laramie, Wyoming.
3 “Report of Mr. S. F. Emmons,” Annual Report of the United States Geological Survey 7 
(1885–1886): 92.
Disappointment in the Field
Jeremy Vetter
Not everyone likes surprises. Consider, for example, naturalists and 
scientists in the field. Following the nineteenth-century rise of the 
laboratory to prominence, the field was increasingly thought of as 
the messy, complex world outside its walls. One might imagine, given 
the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the natural worlds 
studied by field scientists, that the field would be a wonderland of 
new discoveries. However, in looking more closely at the wide range 
of primary source notes that I have gathered from published and ar-
chival sources from the interior American West during the railroad 
era, what I have found is a far more ambivalent—even anxious—rela-
tionship with the unexpected. Indeed, for many field scientists, sur-
prise was more often synonymous with disappointment.
Why should this be? It seems to me that the key was how field 
scientists responded to the messy conditions of the field, which  often 
turned the unexpected to disappointment. In a world of epistemi-
cally ascendant labs, anyone wishing to justify time and expense for 
fieldwork endeavored to show that they had some idea what they 
were looking for—that they were not engaged in the proverbial fish-
ing expedition. This meant knowing about what was likely to be 
found in advance, even if the exact details remained uncertain: 
Which geological formations were most promising for rich fossil re-
mains? Which local environments were likely to be fertile ground for 
collecting plants and animals? Where could the natural world be in-
vestigated most profitably, so as to make fieldwork worthwhile, not 
only to its practitioners but to potential critics in labs and museums? 
In this context a “surprise” meant, in many cases, that something 
was not found, even though it was anticipated. In a word, disappoint-
ment.
Even those who built their careers in the field could be disap-
pointed, such as the Carnegie Museum paleontologist Earl Douglass, 
best known for leading on-site excavation of rich fossil deposits in 
Utah, which later became the centerpiece of Dinosaur National Park. 
On a “day to be remembered” in 1909, when his field crew “took down 
the first really big specimen,” Douglass nevertheless expressed “sur-
prise” to find “only one series of the vertebrae of the neck instead of 
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Terrifying Clouds
Marga Vicedo
“Attention, if sudden and close, graduates into surprise; and this 
 in to  astonishment; and this into stupefied amazement. The latter 
frame of mind is closely akin to terror.” So wrote Charles Darwin in 
“Surprise—Astonishment—Fear—Horror,” chapter 12 of his 1872 book 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.1 Dar win’s con-
nection of surprise to fear is startling. But Darwin knew a thing or 
two about the anxiety provoked by nature’s bewildering  variety and 
variability.
One of the ways that humans try to contain the terror brought 
about by the unexpected is through classifications. Over the centu-
ries, we have devised a variety of categories to organize flowers, 
 animals, faces, stars, and dreams. We have also constructed typo-
logies of causes, explanations, and predictions. And then we’ve built 
systems to organize our knowledge about the furniture of the world 
in catalogues, libraries, archives, and databases. 
Lorraine Daston has illuminated the changing ways in which 
 surprises have attracted attention, inspired astonishment, and pro-
voked fear.2 Consider her work on attempts to classify even the epit-
ome of nature’s fuzziness: clouds. As she notes, clouds had served as 
metaphors of mutability for centuries and thus did not seem to be 
objects about which scientists could establish reliable generaliza-
tions. But she shows how cloud watchers standardized nomencla-
ture and learned “to see in unison.” Slowly the giant cotton balls of 
our infancy were put into boxes: “Nimbus, cirrus, cumulus.” Then, 
scientists created cloud atlases thanks to what Daston calls “remark-
able exercises in collectively willed ontology, in ways of seeing, pars-
ing, and naming nature made global by international collaboration.” 3
Now, let me introduce you to a very different “feat of ontological 
creativity,” another way of using clouds for containing the poten-
tially terrifying surprises of our world. 
1 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1998 [1872]), 278. 
2 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750  
(New York: Zone Books, 1998).
3 Lorraine Daston, “Cloud Physiognomy,” Representations 135 (2016): 52, 45, 53.
Finally, a third kind of failure of expectation evident in fieldwork 
may not have been tied to disappointment, but it too transcended 
the simple positive novelties of field discovery. This was when field 
researchers received incredulous responses from lay people because 
their scientific perspective challenged popular beliefs about the nat-
ural world. The secretary of agriculture declared in 1889 that careful 
work by his statistics division in the Rocky Mountain region would 
“surprise the Eastern States with new views” of what was regarded 
as part of a “Great American Desert.” 4 Likewise, two Bureau of Soils 
field researchers found that farmers near Billings, Montana, were 
“not a little surprised” at their chemically informed expertise on al-
kali soils.5 Carefully collected field data on climate or soil conditions 
thus might challenge popular assumptions that were based on more 
limited or partial experience, failing to confirm what lay people ex-
pected, desired, or feared.
It is true that one can also find examples of welcome mismatches 
of reality and expectation. Earl Douglass once rejoiced at an “unex-
pected upward turn of the neck” of a fossil dinosaur, which “saved 
perhaps $500 to $1000 in work and shortened the time” his team 
would have to spend excavating the specimen.6 Even with the best 
cognitive preparation and investment of resources, some things 
truly were astounding, bringing unexpected delight. But for field sci-
entists who systematically prepared for fieldwork, and who carefully 
budgeted their time and expenses, surprises could bring disappoint-
ment as easily as joy.
4 J. M. Rusk, “Report of the Secretary of Agriculture,” First Report of the Secretary of 
 Agriculture (1889): 15.
5 Charles A. Jensen and N. P. Neill, “Soil Survey of the Billings Area, Montana,” Field 
 Operations of the Bureau of Soils 4 (1902): 683.
6 E. Douglass to D. Stewart, October 12, 1909, Earl Douglass Papers, Carnegie Museum  
of Natural History.
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At 12 years of age, a girl invented the following system:
Sun with clear sky: 4 doors
Sun with 1 cloud: 3 doors
Sun with 2 clouds: 2 doors
Sun with 3 clouds: 1 door
Sun with 4 clouds: 0 doors
The system includes 29 kinds of days, depending on the presence of 
clouds and the position of the sun. In summer, she calls “dayhigh” a 
day with high sun and no clouds. In winter, “daynothing” refers to a 
clear sky. The system classifies not only days but also the affective 
consequences of the state of the sky on the classifier: the sun brings 
happiness to her days, while any cloud will ruin her mood. When she 
gets up, the girl rushes to look at the sky. Terrifying surprises are 
 always possible. A day could be a “dayhighdarkcloud.” Despondency, 
sadness, and despair will follow. Over the years, she establishes di-
verse relationships within her system. The different types of days 
correlate with numbers, flavors, and gum wrappers. For her, num-
ber  3 is “rainbow-colored when cloud has color outside looks like 
rainbow and white inside.” 4 
Because of its affective connotations, the system also helps to 
organize and evaluate other experiences in the girl’s life. She assigns 
four doors and no clouds to hard rock music because it brings her 
such intense pleasure that she needs to put four doors in between 
her and the sound to make it bearable. She allocates two clouds and 
two doors to classical music. For her evening meal, she measures the 
green juice she pours in her green cup. The amount of juice she’ll 
drink depends on the clouds in the sky that day.
The unique character of this system reveals the remarkable 
mind of the person who elaborated it. Jessica is autistic. And, as her 
mother put it, “She is the center of her universe.” 5 But neurologist 
Oliver Sacks reminds us that Jessica’s system, though idiosyncratic, 
4 Clara Claiborne Park, Exiting Nirvana: A Daughter’s Life with Autism (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 2001), 82.
5 Clara Park, in Oliver Sacks’s documentary “Rage for Order” (part of his BBC series  
The Mind Traveller, Rosetta Pictures for the BBC, directed by Christopher Rawlence).
brings “to mind the elaborate, pseudoscientific systems of numerol-
ogy and astrology.” 6 Indeed, we too have looked to the skies for guid-
ance and have tried to find meaning in the stars.
Is there meaning in Jessica’s system? Her father, physicist David 
Park, and mathematician Philip Youderian analyzed it and pointed 
out the gap that separates her “from the rest of us.” 7 They discovered 
that Jessica’s “obsession” with systems helps her to bring clarity but 
also excitement into her life: “One need not go beyond her wide 
swings of emotion as the sun came and went, or the trembling excite-
ment with which she filled her glass in the evening, to see that Elly 
[Jessica] found her own ways to live a life as rich in excitement and 
6 Oliver Sacks, “Foreword,” in Park, Exiting Nirvana, xi.
7 David Park and Philip Youderian. “Light and Number: Ordering Principles in the World of 
an Autistic Child,” Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia 4 (1974): 321.
Jessica’s clouds-doors system, spring 1970. Clara Claiborne Park, Exiting Nirvana:  
A Daughter’s Life with Autism (Boston: 2001), 75.
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Rapture, Hope, Wonder
Fernando Vidal
Horror and terror, as Lorraine Daston has shown, long accompanied 
wonder. Triggered by gross violations of the natural order, these “pas-
sions of incredulity” were also “passions of the unnatural.” 1 Whether 
supra, contra, or praeter naturam, miracles always are phenomena 
of that sort. Nonetheless, since they confirm the existence of a divine 
cause, they strike with wonder and amazement, not with terror and 
horror. Does this render them unexpected surprises? What are the 
cognitive and epistemic ingredients of witnessing such an event? A 
Miracle of Saint Joseph of Cupertino, painted around 1750 by  Placido 
Costanzi (ca. 1702–1759), a successful artist from Naples active in 
Rome, offers the occasion to briefly explore these questions.2 The 
painting, illustrative of the emotional piety and cultivation of won-
der that characterized Counter-Reformation religiosity, was commis-
sioned by the Colonna family for a chapel dedicated to Joseph in the 
church of Santi Apostoli on the occasion of his beatification. 
Although the Conventual Franciscan Joseph of Cupertino (1603–
1663) performed so many miracles that his life was a “miracle the-
ater,” his iconography principally shows him during the spectacular 
ecstatic flights that made him famous. Costanzi’s painting is unusual 
in combining a miracle with the saint in midair. Suspicious of  Joseph’s 
feats, the Inquisition sent him for surveillance to Assisi. It was there 
that the depicted miracle took place; yet it was not among the ones 
approved for Joseph’s beatification. Asked to cure the young  lunatic 
Baldassare Rossi, Joseph placed his hand on the patient’s head, told 
him to commend himself to God and the Virgin Mary, and then, “non 
sine ingenti circumstantium stupore,” grabbed the boy’s hair and 
rose in the air with his “usual scream, Oh!” When they “returned to 
1 Lorraine Daston, “Wonder and the Ends of Inquiry,” The Point, 2014, https://thepointmag.
com/2014/examined-life/wonder-ends-inquiry.
2 See Maria Antonia Nocco, catalogue entry no. 61, in Visioni ed estasi: Capolavori dell’arte 
europea tra Seicento e Settecento, ed. Giovanni Morello (Milan: 2003). The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art owns an oil sketch of Costanzi’s painting: http://www.metmuseum.org/
art/collection/search/724811.
happiness as any of us have found.” 8 However, looking for what sets 
her apart, I believe they also found what unites Jessica with “the rest 
of us.” 
For sure, her principles of classification are not our principles. 
Jessica’s system is exceptional, not only in its uniqueness but in dis-
pensing with the basic goal of scientific systematizers: to fix refer-
ents in order to enable communication, comparison, and thus agree-
ment or debate. Organized around subjective affects, Jessica’s system 
cannot be the basis for scientific knowledge today. As Daston and 
Peter Galison have shown, in an effort to “hold subjectivity at bay” 
the modern scientific ideal of objectivity requires emotional detach-
ment.9 In its uniqueness, Jessica’s system reminds us of the great 
 variety of human experiences and the intricate ways of the human 
mind. But it also reveals that her intentions are the same as those 
that Daston told us guided the makers of cloud atlases: “to discover 
order in apparent chaos.” 10 Thus, Jessica’s system teaches us that con-
taining surprises is not only a goal for apothecaries, cosmologists, 
archivists, and naturalists. It seems to be a universal human desire as 
well, a deep, basic need of the human mind. 
We all search for principles to order our universes, to assuage the 
terror of chaotic realities. Like Jessica, we too get up every morning 
and look through the window, wondering how many clouds the day 
may bring. It is exciting, and terrifying, to live in a world full of sur-
prises.
8 Park and Youderian, “Light and Number,” 322.
9 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: 2007), 17.
10 Daston, “Cloud Physiognomy,” 48.
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earth,” Joseph simply said, “Sta allegremente Cavalier,” and bid the 
boy go home, healed and praising God. 3 
Surrounded by witnesses in awe, Joseph and Baldassare are de-
picted as leaving or returning; either way, they are portrayed in the 
“most pregnant” moment, which alone leaves free play to the imagi-
nation and from which, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing argued in Laokoon 
(1766), the preceding and subsequent moments are comprehensible. 
The picture gives an impression of aloofness and stiffness that seems 
to run counter to the circumstances, but which actually derives from 
the rules that shape the image and the emotional and cognitive dy-
namics of the represented action.
As in much seventeenth- and eighteenth-century art, the chief 
 semiotic scaffolding of the painting is a strictly codified eloquentia 
corporis.4 Bodily positions, hand gestures, and facial expressions con-
tribute to a pictorial choreography that operates as a rhetorical de-
vice; postures and attitudes enunciate the passions of the soul. The 
passions that dominate in A Miracle are rapture, hope, and wonder—
and surprise binds them together. To understand how, we may rely 
on Charles Le Brun’s influential 1688 lecture on expression.5 The lec-
ture is noteworthy for its use of René Descartes’s Les Passions de 
l’âme (1649) to rationalize visual codes and aesthetic norms that re-
mained current well into the eighteenth century and still framed 
Costanzi’s representational practice.6
The facial expressions of the two female figures on the right and 
the priest behind them most clearly render the sentiment of hope. 
According to Descartes, the hoping soul is convinced that its desires 
will be realized; it fears frustration, yet can also incline toward assur-
3 I here draw on Domenico Bernino, Vita del venerabile padre Fr. Giuseppe da Copertino …
(Venice: 1726), 504 and 74, and Acta Sanctorum Septembris (Antwerp: 1755), September 18, 
5:1022.
4 Nicole Rouillé, Peindre et dire les passions: La gestuelle baroque aux XVIIe et  
XVIIIe siècles (Paris: 2007).
5 Charles Le Brun, Conférence de Monsieur le Brun … sur l’Expression generale & particu­
liere (Amsterdam and Paris: E. 1698). I here draw on the initial “Conference tenue en 
 l’Academie royale de peinture et sculpture” (1–24) and the subsequent iconographic 
 discussion (beginning with Admiration on a new page 1).
6 Jennifer Montagu, The Expression of the Passions: The Origin and Influence of Charles 
Le Brun’s Conférence sur l’expression génerale et particulière (New Haven, CT: 1994). 
Placido Costanzi, A Miracle of Saint Joseph of Cupertino, ca. 1750, oil on 
canvas, 250 × 175 cm. Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Antica, Palazzo Barberini, 
Rome, inv. 2422.
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wonder “only produces a suspension of movement,” which allows 
the soul to consider attentively the object of interest. We may now 
understand the paradoxical motionlessness of Costanzi’s painting as 
the skillful articulation of wonder as a species of surprise and as a 
pictorial reminder that, in knowledge as in belief, only those who are 
prepared for such passions are able to experience them.7
7 With thanks to Mechthild Fend, Tatiana Senkevitch, and Claudia Swan for their friendly 
art-historical guidance.
ance. Hence the resulting immobility. As Le Brun notes, since the en-
tire body is “suspended” between fear and confidence, the move-
ments of esperence (sic) “are more internal than external” and do not 
give rise to marked expressions. 
In a miracle, hope, wonder, and joy are moments in the realiza-
tion of desire. While the miracle is being accomplished, wonder (as 
the French admiration should be translated in this context) holds 
sway. Surprise, however, towers so much above all other passions 
that Baldassare’s entire body mimics Cesare Ripa’s emblem for ma­
raviglia (surprise, un certo stupore di animo), which entered his Ico­
nologia in the second edition (1603). Moreover, in Le Brun’s Cartesian 
system, wonder is a kind of surprise, and rapture a kind of wonder. 
Descartes does not discuss rapture, but the state is vital for reli-
gious art. Le Brun writes that rapture (ravissement) is wonder caused 
by an object, such as God’s power, which is beyond the reach of the 
soul’s cognitive capacities. (Constanzi visualizes that power as a 
softly radiant cloud accompanying Joseph’s flight.) That is why, in 
rapture, the body takes over—though mainly to produce the fixed-
ness of the ecstatic gaze. Indeed, says Le Brun, “intent on discovering 
what the soul cannot know,” the eyes stay turned toward heaven. 
This has a physiological cause. Wonder is a surprise that leads the 
soul to consider the objects that strike it as “rare and extraordinary.” 
Such surprise (Descartes conjectures about étonnement) directs the 
“spirits,” the fluids that animate body and mind, to the cerebral loca-
tion where the impression of the surprising object is situated, and 
this prevents them from flowing toward the muscles: “Ce qui fait que 
le corps demeure immobile comme une statue.” With a painter’s sen-
sibility and perhaps echoing seventeenth-century discussions on the 
apparent contradiction of trying to render movement in painting, Le 
Brun writes, “Le corps devient immobile.”
In addition to depicting a great concatenation of passions by way 
of remarkably static bodies, Costanzi inscribes wonder in the two 
men on the left and the more distant onlookers. Le Brun maintains 
that in a state of wonderment, “the heart feels the least agitation,” 
the face undergoes hardly any change, the gaze remains focused 





Die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftshistorikerin Anneliese Maier 
(1905–1971) formulierte im März 1954 in ihrer „Denkschrift“ für eine 
geplante aber nicht realisierte Abteilung für Philosophie- und Wis -
senschaftsgeschichte an der Bibliotheca Hertziana (MPI) in Rom ein 
Credo:
Bei mediävistischen Untersuchungen kommt immer etwas her-
aus, und fast immer etwas Interessantes und Überraschendes, 
wenn auch nicht immer gerade das, was man gesucht und erhofft 
hat. Man muss mitnehmen, was sich bietet und was das hand-
schriftliche Material an Entdeckungen schenken will.1
Diese Einsicht basierte auf ihrer über 25-jährigen Erfahrung als 
 Wissenschaftshistorikerin und gilt nicht nur für Forschungen zu 
mittel alterlichen Handschriften. Es gehört zur Logik der Archive, 
dass man nicht immer gerade das Gesuchte findet. Konsultiert man 
jedoch Aktenordner, die auf den ersten Blick und laut Findbuch 
 wenig mit der eigenen Fragestellung zu tun haben, bekommt man, 
mit etwas Finderglück, Entdeckungen geschenkt. In meinem Beitrag 
möchte ich drei Beispiele aus der Mathematik- bzw. Wissenschafts-
geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert skizzieren. Die Beispiele zeigen, dass 
Archiv- Bestände, die unter „Vermischtes“ abgelegt waren, für Über-
raschungen gut sind.
Das erste Beispiel stammt aus dem Projekt zur Geschichte der 
Berliner Universität, der späteren Humboldt-Universität, zwischen 
1945 und 1961. Die Quellenlage für die Jahre bis 1951 war erstaunlich 
schlecht. Aber es gab einen Ordner „Vermischtes“ im Archiv der HU, 
„Bestand Verwaltungsdir. 1950, Abt. III, Allg. Verwaltung, 1947–1950, 
Sgn. 39“, der viele nicht paginierte Blätter enthielt. Mit den Erfahrun-
gen früherer Archiv-Recherchen ging ich sorgsam Blatt für Blatt 
durch und fand etwas Unerwartetes: den Durchschlag eines Briefes 
vom Stellvertreter des Brigadegenerals der US Army Frank L. Howley 
1 A. Maier, 12.3.1954, in Archiv MPG, II, 1A, PA A. Maier, Bd. 1, S. 4 (Abschrift). Vgl. Annette 
Vogt, „Anneliese Maier (1905–1971) zwischen der Bibliotheca Hertziana und dem Campo 
Santo Teutonico,“ in Orte der Zuflucht und personeller Netzwerke. Der Campo Santo 
 Teutonico und der Vatikan 1933–1955, hgg. Matheus, Michael und Stefan Heid  
(Freiburg i. Br., Basel, Wien: 2015), 94–122.
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kammer, verfügte über größere Spielräume als Universität oder TH. 
Nicht zuletzt deshalb wurde 1929 vorgeschlagen, ein Institut für Sta-
tistik zu gründen, das an der Handels-Hochschule angesiedelt und 
auch für die Studenten der Berliner Universität und der TH zugäng-
lich sein sollte. Im Archiv der HU, wo sich das Archiv der Han-
dels-Hochschule befindet, weil sie 1946 Bestandteil der neuen Wirt-
schaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät wurde,3 sind das „Memorandum“ 
zur Gründung des Instituts und weitere Schreiben überliefert, aber 
keine Dokumente, warum es nicht zu der Gründung gekommen war. 
Akten der Industrie- und Handelskammer, der „Obrigkeit“ der Han-
dels-Hochschule, sind im Landesarchiv Berlin aufbewahrt. In dem 
umfangreichen Bestand sind zwei Bände (jeweils unpaginiert) die 
mit „Vermischtes“ betitelt werden könnten: ein Band „Institut für 
Wirtschaftsstatistik“ und ein Band „Interakademisches Institut“.4 
Hier fand sich die Erklärung, warum es nicht zum geplanten Institut 
für Statistik gekommen war. Zu den Fundstücken gehörte der Brief 
des Kurators der Handels-Hochschule, Fritz Demuth (1876–1965), an 
den Mathematiker Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz (1868–1931) im Mai 1930 
mit der streng vertraulichen Bitte um eine Stellungnahme zu dem 
geplanten Institut sowie die Aktennotiz der Antwort v. Bortkiewicz’, 
dass er und sein Kollege Rudolf Meerwarth (1883–1946) vom Preußi-
schen Statistischen Landesamt die Einrichtung eines solchen Insti-
tuts „nicht für erwünscht erachte(n)“.5 Die Handels-Hochschule hatte 
sich außerdem bei der Frage des künftigen Direktors dieses Instituts 
für R. Meerwarth und gegen Ernst Wagemann (1884–1956), Präsident 
des Statistischen Reichsamtes und Autor des Memorandums, ent-
schieden.6
3 Archiv HU, WHB Nr. 529 (24.10.1929–8.10.1930).
4 LA Berlin, A Rep. 200-02-03, Nr. 194 (Januar–Dezember 1929) und LA Berlin, A Rep. 200-02-03, 
Nr. 82 (1929–1930).
5 Vgl. Brief F. Demuth an L. v. Bortkiewicz, 3.5.1930, und Aktennotiz von F. Demuth, 5.5.1930, 
in Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 200-02-03, Nr. 82, unpaginiert. Vgl. Wolfgang K. Haerdle und 
Annette Vogt, „B. Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz – Statistician, Economist and a European 
Intellectual,“ International Statistical Review 83, no. 1 (2015): 17–35.
6 Vgl. Briefe von Franz Eulenburg an F. Demuth, 20.6.1930 und 28.6.1930, in LA Berlin,  
A Rep. 200-02-03, Nr. 82, unpaginiert. Franz Eulenburg (1867–1943) war zu dieser Zeit 
 Rektor der Handel-Hochschule Berlin.
(1903–1993), gez. von Babcook, an den Oberbürgermeister von Berlin- 
West, Ernst Reuter (1889–1953), vom 25. April 1949.
In dem Brief ging es um die Erlaubnis der US-Militärregierung, 
die in Dahlem gelegenen Gebäude und Institute für die Belange der 
Freien Universität zu nutzen, und den Hinweis, dass mit der Nutzung 
der Gebäude, die juristisch der Humboldt-Universität im sowje ti-
schen Sektor gehörten, keine Übertragung von Eigentumsrechten 
verbunden war („3. Diese Genehmigung ist nicht als Übertragung 
 eines Rechtstitels auszulegen.“). Dieser kleine Fund zeigte ein inter-
essantes Detail zur Geschichte der feindlichen Schwestern-Univer-
sitäten FU und HU während des Kalten Krieges. Die FU plagte min-
destens eine so große Raumnot wie die HU. Gleichsam vor der Tür 
standen mehrere relativ unbeschädigte Institutsgebäude in Dahlem, 
mit Apparaten und Mitarbeitern, die allerdings der HU gehörten 
bzw. unterstanden. Nun erlaubten die Amerikaner in dem Schreiben 
dem Magistrat in Berlin-West, diese Institute in ihre Verwaltung zu 
übernehmen. Ausdrücklich ging es nur um die Verwaltung. Wie die 
Kopie des Briefes an die HU gelangte, ist unklar, von dem Wissen, das 
darin enthalten war, machten die offiziellen Stellen der HU bei der 
Aus einandersetzung mit der FU keinen Gebrauch, weder vor noch 
nach 1989.2
Die beiden anderen Beispiele gehören zu meinem Forschungs-
projekt zur Geschichte der Statistik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Für 
die Entwicklung der Statistik in Berlin spielte die 1906 gegründete 
Berliner Handels-Hochschule (ab 1936 Wirtschafts-Hochschule) eine 
besondere Rolle. Hier wurden innovative Lehrangebote früher als an 
der Universität oder der Technischen Hochschule angeboten, und die 
Hochschule, gegründet und finanziert von den Berliner Kaufleuten, 
den Aeltesten der Kaufmannschaft bzw. der Industrie- und Handels-
2 Vgl. Brief Brigadegeneral Frank L. Howley, gez. von Babcook, an den Oberbürgermeister 
von Berlin, Ernst Reuter, 25.4.1949, in Archiv HU, Bestand „Verwaltungsdir. 1950, Abt. III, 
Allg. Verwaltung“, 1947–1950, Sgn. 39, unpaginiert; Colonel Babcook war der Stellvertreter 
von General Howley; publiziert in Annette Vogt, „Vom Wiederaufbau der Berliner Uni-
versität bis zum Universitäts-Jubiläum 1960,“ in Geschichte der Universität Unter den 
Linden, Bd. 3, Sozialistisches Experiment und Erneuerung in der Demokratie – die 
 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1945–2010, ed. Heinz-Elmar Tenorth (Berlin: 2012),  
125–250, bes. 181–192.
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10 Jahre später erfolgte unter NS-Bedingungen die Gründung eines 
„interakademischen“ Instituts, des „Berliner Hochschulinstituts für 
Versicherungs-Wissenschaft an der Wirtschaftshochschule“, offen 
für Studenten der Universität, der TH und der Wirtschafts-Hoch-
schule. An der Handels-Hochschule hatte Alfred Manes (1877–1963), 
einer der Begründer der modernen Versicherungswissenschaft, bis 
zu seiner Vertreibung 1933 ein entsprechendes Institut geleitet. Im 
Landesarchiv Berlin gibt es den Ordner „Vermischtes: Sachliche Ange-
legenheiten, Räume etc., Personalien und Allgemeines“, in dem sich 
Dokumente zur Anstellung von Mitarbeitern in dem am 19. Januar 
1939 eröffneten Institut befinden.7 Zum Institut für Versicherungs- 
Wissenschaft gehörte eine kleine mathematische Abteilung unter 
Alfred Klose (1895–1953), Nachfolger des von den Nazis vertriebenen 
Richard von Mises (1883–1953). Bei A. Klose hatte 1939 der ehemals 
russische, nun staatenlose Wassilij (Wassily) Höffding (Hoeffding) 
(1914–1991) promoviert, den er 1940 als wissenschaftliche Hilfs kraft 
einstellte.8 Wassily Hoeffding, der nach der Kapitulation NS-Deutsch-
lands in die USA emigrierte, arbeitete von 1947 bis zu  seiner Emeritie-
rung 1979 an der University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill und wurde 
ein international anerkannter Statistiker, einer der Begründer der 
„nonparametric statistics“, „the science of analyzing data without 
making unnecessarily restrictive assumptions about their origin.“ 9
Die Beispiele zeigen, „man muss mitnehmen, was sich bietet“ und 
in  Archiven nicht nur die Akten-Bestände einsehen, die einen un-
mittelbaren Bezug zur Forschungsfrage haben, denn in den Ord nern 
„Vermischtes“ bekommt man manchmal schöne Entdeckungen ge-
schenkt.
7 LA Berlin, Rep. 200-02-03, Nr. 237.
8 Vgl. „Einstellungsregistratur“ 23.12.1940, in Landesarchiv Berlin, Rep. 200-02-03, Nr. 237, 
unpaginiert.
9 Nicholas I. Fisher und Willem R. van Zwet, „Wassily Hoeffding (1914–1991)” in National 
Academy of Sciences: Biographical Memoirs (Washington, DC: 2005), 86:2–21, auf 3.
In the Freiberg Mines 
Andre Wakefield
It must have been the fall of 1996. I had already spent a remarkable 
summer in Berlin hanging around the onetime Czechoslovakian Em-
bassy in former East Germany, a Cold War spaceship building perched 
near the edge of no-man’s-land, now housing the brand-new Max 
Planck Institute for the History of Science. Berlin was chaotic then, 
with cranes on every horizon singing the promises of many futures. 
Imagine my shock when I headed directly from Berlin to Göttingen 
that fall. Where Berlin was raucous, Göttingen was predictable. Not 
that predictability is always a bad thing. It’s often good for research, 
when you know that you can retrieve a certain book or that the li-
brary and archives will open at a certain hour. And so it was in Göttin-
gen, which welcomed me with its signature and not unpleasant mix 
of boredom and anticipation, something I regularly experienced as I 
sat comfortably ensconced in my little pinewood Kabine in the Göt-
tingen State and University Library (SUB), daydreaming about Berlin 
techno bunkers, surrounded by the smells of old vellum and fine pa-
per, overlooking the far end of Weender Strasse, and reading endless 
heaps of cameralist literature from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
Cameralist texts, if you read enough of them, start to feel a little 
like Göttingen: comfortable and predictable. You notice patterns. The 
writers articulate the same thoughts, about the same things. You 
have your responsible Hausväter, your happy and industrious Volk, 
your good princes, and your thriving farms. It was a strange wonder-
land I lived in during those halcyon days of 1996. That happy world of 
eighteenth-century cameralists seemed reflected all around, inside 
my well-ordered little Kabine, itself situated inside a well-ordered 
 library. Even the Mensa felt cameralist, with its abundant and af-
fordable Eintopf and Knödel. Albion Small, my University of Chicago 
predecessor, seemed prescient at that time, having seen in those 
early cameralists the harbingers of a well-ordered future.1 Not only 
that, but my dissertation proposal had it all figured out: I would “re-
construct the Cameralist dream of a unified science of order,” Fou-
cauldian style. I would read some books, visit some archives, bang 
1 Albion Small, The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity (Chicago: 1909). 
432 433
Andre Wakefield | In the Freiberg Mines Andre Wakefield | In the Freiberg Mines 
cameralist texts had ignored, that what I had been reading was but 
one side of a much richer and deeper story. It was, as Walpole might 
have said, a moment of accidental sagacity. 
Hans Hofmann had a big booming Saxon voice, both underground 
and in the archive, which could be a little jarring if you were used to 
the vibe in the Library of Congress or in my Kabine in Göttingen. 
“Glückauf Herr Wakefield!” he used to bellow, when I came in for the 
morning’s research, as if we were part of a miner’s crew. When we did 
head underground, it blew my mind. Not here the well-ordered shafts 
and adits of camerlist imaginings. Instead, a dizzying array of mark-
ings, dead ends, crawl spaces, flooded adits, and rotting timbers. As 
we walked, ducked and eventually crawled from the mine shafts of 
the nineteenth century all the way back to their sixteenth-century 
predecessors, the tunnels and shafts narrowed and constricted as if 
you were being squeezed by the sheer weight of time. My stupid as-
sumptions, gleaned from reading too many books, and then confla-
tion of those textual descriptions with some kind of imagined lived 
reality rapidly fell away. In their place came new questions. How did 
the mine foremen possibly exercise oversight down here? How could 
a Berghauptmann, perched safely above ground in his Kammer, re-
ally hope to organize and arrange every facet of work? Neat Fou-
cauldian frameworks came crashing down. Those questions eventu-
ally led me to abandon the strictures and structure of my original 
thesis altogether. It was a liberating day; it made me rethink not only 
how I would write about the topic but also how I approached history.
out some chapters. After a year of quality time in that cozy Kabine, it 
would all but write itself. Kein problem. 
Imagine my surprise and dismay as that plan slowly crumbled 
during that fall and winter. As I kept reading, my well-ordered pro-
posal came to seem more of an impediment than a support. It boxed 
me in. I was stuck, with nothing new or interesting to say. And that 
cozy Kabine in the SUB started to lose its luster, feeling more like a 
cell than a refuge. 
We all discover what we expect to find, but it is harder and more 
rewarding to seek unanticipated things. The former teaches us what 
we already know; the latter makes for interesting history. In that 
sense, my theme is not so much about surprise in the history of sci-
ence as it is about serendipity. Horace Walpole coined the word in 
1754.2 Unlike surprise, which takes one unawares and off guard, 
 serendipity is something you can cultivate and encourage. One can 
develop a talent for serendipitous discoveries. It is something that 
the best historians do—whether it involves a certain kind of open-
ness, a gift for following hunches, or a talent for seeing unorthodox 
connections.
Kant famously wrote that Hume had awoken him from his dog-
matic slumber.3 My case was much less grandiose or dramatic: let’s 
just say that miner-archivist Hans Hofmann flat-out woke me up 
when I arrived in Freiberg early in 1997. After wallowing in my 
self-constructed cameralist mess in that Göttingen Kabine, I headed 
to the little mining town of Freiberg, in Sachsen, on a hunch. One of 
the patterns I had noted in those hundreds of cameralist texts was 
simple: mines everywhere. But there was very little written about 
them in the secondary literature. Soon enough, Hofmann had con-
vinced me to don an old East German army uniform and go spelunk-
ing in the mines under Freiberg. It was there that I became acutely 
aware of my limitations, of how much more there was to interpret 
and understand; it was there that I first got a glimmer of a world that 
2 Horace Walpole, cited in Robert Friedel, “Serendipity Is No Accident,” Kenyon Review 23, 
no. 2 (2001): 36–47.
3 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield 
(Cambridge: 1997), 10. 
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The best surprises spark curiosity, joy, and (if one is the owner of a 
clever terrier) pride. But when we chase after the surprise, we find 
that as soon as we grasp it and pull it close enough to scrutinize it, 
it  vanishes, and with it evaporate all the pleasurable feelings it 
brought. The extraordinary, properly viewed, reveals itself to be or-
dinary af ter all. So it goes, at least, in the model of surprise in which 
surprise is a balloon and science a struck match. James dutifully 
plays bubble burster through most of the Principles. In place of sur-
prise and its constant companion, wonder, James swaps in their 
 supposed opposite: knowledge. We are surprised, James notes, when 
our bodies respond with reflex action when presented with a mental 
or visual stimulus: “It is just cause for wonder, as our chapter on 
 Instinct has shown us, that such bodily consequences should follow 
such mental antecedents.” But wonder yields to understanding: “We 
explain the mystery tant bien que mal by our evolutionary theories, 
saying that lucky variations and heredity have generally brought it 
about that this particular pair of terms should have grown into a 
 uniform sequence.”
Understanding’s tendency to snuff out surprise has ramifications 
for ordinary life, James saw. Wisdom and professional accomplish-
ment were yoked to a world-weary wonderlessness worthy of Eccle-
siastes because surprise, along with the other emotions, was gov-
erned by a general principle: “They blunt themselves by repetition 
more rapidly than any other sort of feeling,” James proclaimed. 
The oftener we meet an object, the more definitely we think and 
behave about it; and the less is the organic perturbation to which 
it gives rise. The first time we saw it we could perhaps neither act 
nor think at all, and had no reaction but organic perturbation. 
The emotions of startled surprise, wonder, or curiosity were the 
result. Now we look on with absolutely no emotion. This ten-
dency to economy in the nerve-paths through which our sensa-
tions and ideas discharge, is the basis of all growth in efficiency, 
readiness, and skill. Where would the general, the surgeon, the 
presiding chairman, be, if their nerve-currents kept running 
down into their viscera, instead of keeping up amid their convo-
lutions? But what they gain for practice by this law, they lose, it 
Just Cause for Wonder
Cecelia Watson
The Principles of Psychology is as much a performance as it is a book. 
The hero of the drama is the Good Conventional Scientist, and the 
actor starring in that role is William James. Despite detesting 
“brass-instrument” psychology, James dutifully produced and repro-
duced experiments and (so he claimed) avoided explanations that 
veered too close to the “metaphysical.” “I have kept close to the point 
of view of natural science throughout the book,” James promises pi-
ously.1 (Some readers, returning to this line after reading the entire 
book, might admire how judiciously chosen is the word “close.”)
Part of this act of willing himself strictly scientific is James’s atti-
tude toward surprise. Surprise is the emotion that results from a mis-
take or misperception. We are surprised when our knowledge is in-
adequate. We become unsurprised when we hit upon the right theory 
and articulate a law. Accordingly, most accounts of “surprises” in 
the Principles are stories of errors in perception or judgment. Consider, 
for instance, the man surprised by his terrier’s apparent ingenuity. 
A friend of the writer gave as a proof of the almost human intelli-
gence of his dog that he took him one day down to his boat on the 
shore, but found the boat full of dirt and water. He remembered 
that the sponge was up at the house, a third of a mile distant; but, 
disliking to go back himself, he made various gestures of wiping 
out the boat and so forth, saying to his terrier, “Sponge, sponge; 
go fetch the sponge.” But he had little expectation of a result, 
since the dog had never received the slightest training with the 
boat or the sponge. Nevertheless, off he trotted to the house, and, 
to his owner’s great surprise and admiration, brought the sponge 
in his jaws. Sagacious as this was, it required nothing but ordi-
nary contiguous association of ideas. The terrier was only excep-
tional in the minuteness of his spontaneous observation. … If the 
reader will take the trouble to analyze the best dog and elephant 
stories he knows, he will find that, in most cases, this simple 
contiguous calling up of one whole by another is quite sufficient 
to explain the phenomena.
1 For all citations see William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: 1950), 1:v; 
2:349; 2:494–495; 2:475–476; 2:502.
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must be confessed, for feeling. For the world-worn and expe-
rienced man, the sense of pleasure which he gets from the free 
and powerful flow of thoughts, overcoming obstacles as they 
arise, is the only compensation for that freshness of the heart 
which he once enjoyed.
There is some pleasure in accomplishment, then; but accomplish-
ment, as it is described in this passage, precludes surprise. (James, 
ever fretful about the perils of professionalizing, perhaps spoke from 
painful experience.) 
But the reader damned to discouragement by one passage in the 
Principles can be almost assured of finding salvation on some other, 
contradictory page of the book. Buried in a seemingly mundane pas-
sage about lifting boxes with unknown contents, James offers an al-
ternate conception of the relationship between advancing knowl-
edge and surprise: “Surprise can only come from getting a sensation 
which differs from the one we expect. But the truth is that when we 
know the objects well, the very slightest difference from the ex-
pected weight will surprise us, or at least attract our notice.” Here, 
there is hope that surprise might signal something more sophisti-
cated than naive mistake or mere absence of knowledge. The kind of 
surprise James describes in this passage arises from deep knowledge. 
A surprise, in this understanding of it, is both a source of pleasurable 
emotion and a new piece of knowledge. It may after all be the mark 
of the truly probing and generous thinker that she finds the line be-
tween surprise and knowledge faint and sees, all around her, just 
cause for wonder. 
Perfect Color
Kelley Wilder
At the other end of the rope my lab partner flexed her wrist up and 
down, and then, with more force, her forearm from the elbow. I did 
the same, awkwardly, against her rhythm, up and down until a single 
wave emerged from our competing waves. “Congratulations,” said 
the teacher, “you’ve created a standing wave.” At 15, it didn’t interest 
me much. If only he’d told us then that color photography could be 
made out of these waves alone, I’d have paid more attention. 
While the 1839 articles and reports about the invention of photo-
graphy were hyperbolic in their praise and incredulity of the new 
image-making automaton, that single elusive element of full, natu-
ral color hovered in the background. It seemed churlish to ask the 
 daguerreotype and photogenic drawing to be even more perfect. 
And yet, there were rumours. Hushed reports of Louis Daguerre’s first 
 attempts to fix the image of the camera obscura with phosphorous 
were accompanied by Edmond Becquerel’s astounding modification 
of the Daguerreotype and publications on full-color photographs in 
1848. But Becquerel’s heliochromes were still susceptible to light. 
Shrouded in near darkness, they were viewed by the light of a single 
candle at the 1855 Exposition Universelle in Paris. Today, the last re-
maining plates are kept in the dark, rarely available for inspection. 
Mystery and secrecy, darkness and caution surrounded the full-color 
photograph.
So much more thrilling, then, was Gabriel Lippmann’s announce-
ment on the February 2, 1891, that he had fixed the color spectrum 
permanently on a photographic plate of his own devising. In the tiny 
4 × 4 cm square (later 6.5 × 9 cm) the panchromatic emulsion recorded 
spectra, or blue skies, green foliage, and beds of red flowers, but only 
for the observer looking at the correct angle. Look at the wrong angle 
and the colors change, or a darkness covers the plate. Imagine the 
sensation. A small block sits on your table in the archive. It is covered 
in a rough, off-white cloth, with a hinged opening and a tab to pull it. 
You pull back the door and look, cocking your head first one way, 
then another. Then suddenly, perhaps in the bottom corner, you 
catch a flash of red. You move, but too quickly, it is lost. You move 
again, and this time, blue appears in the upper left-hand side. Finally, 
after adjusting your eye and your body to gather together these inci-
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dent rays, blocks of color emerge. Shapes eventually resolve into Ver-
sailles and its gardens (George Eastman Museum) on what looks like 
a sunny day, in perfect color. The light from a nineteenth century sun 
never looked brighter. 
Lippmann’s foray into Fourier mathematics, optics, and the re-
solving power of ultra-fine emulsions did not go unnoticed. His 
 research galvanized similar-minded experimenters across Europe. 
Among the most famous of these are the Lumière brothers, August 
and Louis. Not only did the Lumière factory produce some of the fin-
est emulsions in Europe, they were already deeply involved with the 
scientific establishment, altering photography almost beyond recog-
nition in order to supply scientists with designer photographic 
plates. Louis Lumière was able to replicate the Lippmann plates and 
create a portrait in 1893 by improving the speed of the plates. It was 
the same laboratory that would later develop the commercially suc-
cessful Autochrome plate and released it to market in 1907, albeit 
 colored by a very different method.
The Lippmann plates depended on the agency of light in a way 
that recalled the sense of early wonder and disbelief in photography 
itself. In 1844, William Henry Fox Talbot, on finding some misunder-
standing about the manufacture of the images in Pencil of Nature, 
inserted a “Notice to Readers” in the fascicles. It read “The plates of 
the present work are impressed by the agency of Light alone, without 
any aid from the artist’s pencil. They are the sun- pictures themselves, 
and not, as some persons have imagined, engrav ings in imitation.” 
Lippmann plates, with their promise of perfect color, were never 
commercially viable for color photography. But they brought about a 





In his unfinished masterpiece Vom Kriege, the Prussian military the-
orist Carl von Clausewitz wrote that, in war, “surprise lies at the root 
of all operations without exception.” 1 In 1812, he had resigned his 
post with the Prussian military to assist Tsar Alexander I’s effort to 
halt Napoleon’s eastward march. Clausewitz observed as the once-
mighty French armies were dissipated and reversed by a combi-
nation of Russian tactics and unforgiving Russian territory. Years 
later, writing his book at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he described 
the experience of approaching the firing line, where “shot is falling 
like hail, and the thunder of our own guns adds to the din. The air is 
filled with hissing bullets that sound like a sharp crack if they pass 
close to one’s head.” Muskets and cannons had increased the lethal 
reach of infantry and artillery, but they had not altered war’s tradi-
tional rhythms. Soldiers still met on the field of battle, commanded 
by generals who plotted their advances and retreats. Napoleon’s 
 misfortune convinced Clausewitz that defensive campaigns were 
 superior to the offense, because “it is easier to hold ground than to 
take it.” The advantage of surprise, he concluded, belonged as much 
to defense as to attack.
On July, 16, 1945, an explosion generated by splitting  plutonium 
atoms shattered the predawn darkness over a southern New Mexican 
desert known as the Jornada del Muerto—the journey of the dead 
man. Three weeks later, the world learned what one such explosion, 
delivered by surprise, could wreak on an entire city and its people. 
“The pattern of the use of atomic weapons was set at Hiroshima,” 
said J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had directed the scientific project 
that made the weapons a reality. “They are weapons of aggression, of 
surprise and of terror. If they are ever used again, it may well be by 
the thousands, or perhaps by the tens of thousands.” 2 The pacifist 
philosopher Bertrand Russell agreed. “If war comes,” he wrote in 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 1976), 
198. The book was first published posthumously, in three German volumes, between  
1832 and 1834. For the following citations in this paragraph, see ibid., 113 and 357. 
2 “J. Robert Oppenheimer, ‘Address to the American Philosophical Society, 16 November 
1945,’” American Rhetoric, last modified November 12, 2017, accessed April 11, 2018, 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/robertoppenheimeratomicbomb.htm.
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Early warning radars of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, near Anderson, 
Alaska. Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/item/ak0486).
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ploiting any vulnerability. In a series of influential studies, he argued 
relentlessly that US nuclear forces needed better protection, the bet-
ter to ride out an attack and retaliate. If America’s best guarantee of 
security wasn’t intelligence, then it was deterrence.6
The view of deterrence held by most strategic thinkers was this: 
that beginning or averting nuclear war would come down to a deci-
sion, to strike or not. Yet, what if the verge of war were less like leap-
ing into the pool or staying out and more like inching along its slip-
6 For an unclassified summary of these findings and arguments, see Albert Wohlstetter, 
“The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (1959): 211–234.
1946, “it will begin with a surprise attack in the style of Pearl Harbor. 
The aggressor will hope for a knock-out blow so severe as to make 
retaliation impossible.” 3 
Physicists soon discovered that by fusing light atomic nuclei to-
gether, rather than cleaving heavy ones apart, they could boost ex-
plosive yields by a factor of 1,000 or more and make warheads por-
table enough to travel on rockets to the other side of the globe in 30 
minutes. Dwight Eisenhower stood before the United Nations in De-
cember 1953 and warned that merely possessing nuclear weapons 
was “no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and 
toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.” 4 
As the Cold War deepened, the president was not alone in fearing a 
nuclear Pearl Harbor.
December 7, 1941: the template of military surprise in the Ameri-
can imagination. Many believed it had been a preventable disaster. 
In 1940, US cryptanalysts had cracked the code protecting secret com-
munications between Tokyo and its foreign embassies, and radio 
traffic provided a decent picture of the whereabouts of the Japanese 
fleet. Still, American military and political leaders had been unpre-
pared. To most analysts, Pearl Harbor was a stunning failure of intel-
ligence analysis. But not to everyone. At the offices of the RAND Cor-
poration in the early 1950s, Roberta Wohlstetter began to dig into the 
available documents. In her judgment, the positive signals of an im-
minent attack were mingled with disconfirming evidence and ambi-
ent noise. Anticipation was theory laden: without a prior belief that 
the Japanese were likely to strike, the data alone would never have 
revealed it.5 This disturbing thought shaped the work of Roberta’s 
husband, Albert, who joined RAND’s economics division in 1951. He 
developed the theory that the Soviet Union was hell-bent on ex-
3 Bertrand Russell, “The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (October 1, 1946): 19–21, on 19.
4 “Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 
470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953,” Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, accessed April 11, 2018, https://www.iaea.org/about/his-
tory/atoms-for-peace-speech.
5 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: 1962).
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Don’t Look Now
Catherine Wilson
The miracles of the Old and New Testament encompassed a number 
of good surprises and a few bad ones. Eve’s openness to a new taste 
experience and to acquiring knowledge and wisdom brought about 
the worst surprise of all: expulsion from the Garden, hard labor, pain, 
and death. Thereafter, Christian tradition offered further warnings 
against sampling the sensory world and investigating the unknown. 
It was not that more bad surprises might follow but rather that mak-
ing amends for that original curiosity came through obedience to 
God and the mercy of God’s grace; everything else was not only not 
necessary but a hindrance. St.  Augustine, who admitted to being 
interested in women, music, animals, pictures, food, perfumes, and 
 ingenious products of human manufacture, strongly condemned 
 curiosity in Book 10 of his Confessions.1 John Calvin cited St. Paul in 
condemning “intruding into those things which he hath not seen” 
and “foolish curiosity in the investigation of things that are obscure, 
and even hidden from and transcending our mind.” 2 The nature and 
composition of eternally burning hellfire is a topic “left to the dispu-
tations of foolish curiosity.” 3
English sermons published between 1650 and 1700 contain many 
references to curiosity, all unfavorable. The term appears in a distinc-
tive semantic field accompanied by the terms “conceit,” “pride,” “van-
ity,” “ostentation,” “impertinence,” “anger,” “covetousness,” “idle-
ness,” “drunkenness,” and “gluttony.” Curiosity is wanton, sinful, 
saucy, and useless. Woe to him who seeks to “satisfy” or “gratify” 
 curiosity. William Sherlock, in a sermon on “the danger of corrupting 
the faith by philosophy” reminds us that we do not need to know 
“how Corn, or Fruit, or Herbs grow” to be nourished by them, nor 
what the nature of matter is. Nor do we need to investigate how 
1 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. William Watts, 2 vols. (Cambridge: 1912), 165–175.
2 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, 
 Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, trans. T. H. L. Parker, ed. David W. Torrance and 
Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh and London: 1965), 339–340.
3 John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, and 
Thessalonians, trans. John Pringle (Edinburgh: 1851), 197.
pery ledge? This idea occurred to the economist-turned-strategist 
Thomas Schelling in early 1958. Neither superpower would deliber-
ately choose a war it knew to be suicidal, he thought; but each might 
fear surprise attack more than nuclear war itself. Fearful of being 
struck first, each would grow more likely to attack to beat the ene-
my’s first strike. In this nervous atmosphere, a technical glitch or a 
misinterpreted blip on a radar screen could unleash a mistaken retal-
iation, commencing a war that no one, strictly speaking, had chosen. 
In Schelling’s view, the solution to this conundrum was, fortunately, 
just as automatic. His model of “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack” 
bore an uncanny mathematical resemblance to the Keynesian macro-
economic models he had once analyzed as a graduate student. (The 
likeness was no accident.) Nuclear deterrence—much like aggregate 
employment, inflation, and the national income—would settle into a 
dynamic equilibrium. As long as each side could assure the other’s 
destruction, every minute of every day, the superpower nuclear con-
frontation would remain “stable.” 7
“War,” wrote Clausewitz, “is not merely an act of policy but a true 
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried 
on with other means.” 8 Armies clashed when violence had become 
the best, or only, way of securing the political aims of the state. For 
the Cold War superpowers, nuclear weapons ripped politics and po-
tential destruction cosmically out of alignment. Surprise, once a 
sharp instrument of statecraft, became an apocalyptic risk. Paradox-
ically, it also inspired the notion that the shadow of annihilation 
could be the guardian of stability. Analysts still cling to this idea, 
waking each day to find the world not yet aflame, filled with confi-
dence, or with troubled hope, that the unexpected will never happen. 
7 See esp. chs. 9 and 10 of Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
1960), 207–229 and 230–254.
8 Clausewitz, On War, 87.
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with philosophical subjects.7 The contrast between scripture’s abil-
ity to “Quicken Obedience” and its ability to “Satisfie our Curiosity” 
began to tilt toward the latter.8
As well as avoiding wading into points of theology and dogma—
and avoiding Thomas Hobbes, the materialist who mocked religion—
the  experimental philosophers mediated and reconciled. They cre-
ated a counter-rhetoric in which enquiry into obscure and hidden 
things was explicitly or implicitly praised and encouraged as a mor-
ally positive and useful trait, as leading to what Francis Bacon called 
the “improvement of man’s estate.” 9 They pretended that they were 
recovering epistemological capacities lost in the Fall, preparing for 
the Second Coming, all in a divinely approved manner. Yet there were 
threats—naturalism, mortalism—in the corpsuculo-mechanical phi-
losophy to which Boyle and his experimenting and observing associ-
ates subscribed. There was accordingly confrontation as well as com-
partmentalization, and Boyle, especially sensitive to these problems, 
oscillated between rapture and dejection over his scientific vocation. 
One significant advantage the experimentalists had in making 
their case was that admiration for the “curiously wrought,” for the 
products of human craftsmanship and care (cura), was too deeply 
rooted in human nature for Augustinian injunctions to have full 
 effect. The surprise presented by the newly invented telescope was 
a  pitted and dented moon which, for Galileo, demolished the very 
idea of the incorruptibility and superiority of the heavens.10 Had 
God really made it and set it up there, in the realm of angels? The 
telescope promised such unwelcome surprises that—according to 
legend and testimony—certain of the clergy refused even to look. 
But  the surprise presented by the microscope was the geometrical 
complexity, perfection, and intricacy of the microworld: the orna-
7 Robert Boyle, Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas Birch, 5 vols. (London: 
1744), 1: 10, 4, 142.
8 Robert Boyle, Some Motives and Incentives to the Love of God Pathetically Discours’d of, 
in a Letter to a Friend (London: 1659), 165.
9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: 1996).
10 Galileo Galilei, Sidereus Nuncius or the Sidereal Messenger, trans. and ed. Albert Van 
 Helden (Chicago: 1989), 41–49.
God can lack a cause or be everywhere at once.4 The Platonist John 
Norris declared to Lady Masham, “The Principal care and concern of 
Man both because of his own interest, and out of compliance with the 
Designs of God, ought to be to Live a good and regular Life, to 
 accomplish the Moral part of his Nature, to subdue his Passions, to 
 rectifie his Love, to study Purity of Heart and Life, in one word, to 
 perfect Holiness in the fear of God.” 5
People listened to such sermons every week for their entire lives 
and read the published versions. How could a scientific culture re-
quiring curious individuals, willing to invest time and resources, 
have emerged in this climate of hostility? Yet the journal books of the 
early Royal Society detail curiosity-driven and seemingly pointless 
investigations, offering a random selection of thoughts and visual 
presentations on clothes, varnish, shipping, trees, sulphur, the cha-
meleon, quicksilver. Robert Hooke’s Micrographia of 1665 was one of 
the most sought-after publications of its era. Evidently, populations 
as well as individual minds can compartmentalize. The theologians 
 fulminated, the experimentalists carried on with their work, and 
 ordinary human beings went on being interested in animals, pic-
tures, clothes, and romantic adventures, while probably wondering 
about real talking serpents, the Trinity, and whether a person could 
actually walk on water or rise from the dead.6  
Robert Boyle stands out as transforming, singlehandedly, the 
 semantic field of the term “curiosity.” Curiosity is deemed “just” and 
“worthy of a Rational Creature” and taken as a legitimate motive 
to action. The New Experiments of 1660 refer to Pascal’s “commend-
able curiosity” and his own nephew’s “inbred curiosity and love of 
ex perimental learning.” Boyle announces frequently his desire to 
“gratify” and “satisfy” his readers’ curiosity and to “entertain” them 
4 William Sherlock, The Danger of Corrupting the Faith by Philosophy: a Sermon Preach’d 
Before the Right Honble, the Lord Mayor and Court of Aldermen at Guildhall-Chappel on 
Sunday, April 25 (London: 1697), 21.
5 John Norris, Reflections Upon the Conduct of Human Life With Reference to the Study  
of Learning and Knowledge: in a Letter to the Excellent Lady, the Lady Masham  
(London: 1690), 124, 130–131.
6 Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfillment in Early Modern England  
(Oxford: 2009), 110–131, 198–225.
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Sauerstoffküsse
M. Norton Wise
There are some creations that embody in their very concept the idea 
of surprise. One of these is the landscape garden, or English land-
scape garden, in reference to its eighteenth-century roots. By con-
trast with the baroque style, called absolutist and epitomized by Ver-
sailles, the English style aimed to express naturalistic freedom in 
both nature and society. Nature’s own forms would replace geome-
try: no spherically clipped trees, no rectangular hedges, no sensual 
leveling. Diversity of color and texture would take priority over the 
line. Thus the gently winding path rather than the broad straight 
promenade figured as the hallmark of the landscape garden. 
Such a path might pass along a stream, itself meandering or tum-
bling over rocks; it might continue through shrubs or around tree 
groups, over a bridge, or up a hill. A strolling visitor would always 
have a sense of expectation, never knowing or predicting what might 
appear just around the next curve. Indeed, what might appear could 
be a completely unnatural folly: a statue of Venus, a Greek temple, or 
a Chinese pagoda, acting as an exotic contrast to trees and shrubs. 
These characteristic features of surprise in the landscape garden 
may suggest why for many years it has served me as a methodologi-
cal epitome or talisman for writing history, whether of science or of 
the garden itself (with Elaine Wise). Other aspects are less obvious. 
Paths never cross at right angles; they diverge as alternative choices 
that open up different perspectives, different vistas, either within 
the garden or onto a distant landscape. And there are no apparent 
boundaries. In the ideal of the country estate, looking out from the 
manor house, across the nearby pleasure ground, and into the sur-
rounding landscape, one has a sense of continual transition, from a 
domestic scene of flowerbeds and herbaceous borders to a meadow 
with occasional trees in the middle distance and on into the country-
side of forests and hills. Open vistas inspire the freedom to imagine, 
to invent, to wander unconstrained.
Of course, all of this sense of naturalistic freedom is in fact the 
product of carefully designed, excavated, planted, pruned, and nur-
tured artificiality. As in historical writing, the garden’s cultivated 
form assists its explorers in discovering the ordering ideas that assist 
mentation of insects, the lacy individuality of every snowflake. Here, 
there was a place for God’s care and majesty, in compensation for 
what astronomy had taken away. And here, as with Boyle’s colorful 
chemical experiments, luxury and beauty could be uncovered, re-
vealed, and enjoyed without drawing down accusations of venality 
and concupiscence; without shame. 
Scientific instruments, objects themselves so curiously wrought, 
drove and still drive the sciences, giving us new surprises.  In the 
early modern period, it was particularly the revelations of optical 
 instruments that both ruptured and mended that rift, never fully 
maintained nor fully closed, between theology and the interpre-
tation of nature.
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understanding. And it encourages humility in the face of nature’s 
 variety, maintaining the sense of expectation and surprise around 
the corner.
Another aspect of landscape gardens runs deeper and will bring 
me closer to a concrete example. Gardens themselves are historical 
objects. Their paths through history continually open up unantici-
pated vistas as they change in meaning with period and place. 
Imported from England to Prussian Berlin following the Wars of 
Lib eration from Napoleon, they took on a variety of forms over the 
nineteenth century. Beginning as scenes of royal display, they ac-
quired new identities with new contexts of ownership and purpose. 
One of the most surprising of those forms in the context of Berlin is 
the Volksgarten (garden of the people). It makes a striking contrast to 
the more famous gardens of the royal family centered around Pots-
dam, such as Sanssouci, Babelsberg, or the Pfaueninsel. No great 
fountains, no imposing follies in the form of statues and Chinese 
teahouses, and no profusion of exotic plants celebrate wealth and 
status in the Volksgarten. It emerged in Berlin only after 1840 in as-
sociation with Prussia’s late industrialization and the population ex-
plosion in the city. It was intended to provide a place of recuperation 
for the workers who now streamed in and out of the factories of the 
North and East beyond the walls of the city. In that local context, 
such basic conceptions as the difference between work time and 
one’s own time, or free time, took on a new and fervently defended 
significance for wage laborers. Free time, free air, and fresh air (Frei-
zeit, freie Luft, frische Luft) became closely identified with each other 
and with the winding paths and greenery of the Volksgarten. The 
children’s playground entered the garden for the first time. The his-
tory of the landscape garden, moving through this new time and 
 setting, quite surprisingly becomes a social history of industriali-
zation and class identity. 
One such Volksgarten is Humboldthain. Named in honor of the 
great explorer who opened up the landscape and vegetation of the 
Americas to European view, it also honored, in the view of the work-
ing classes, that singular member of the Prussian court whom they Layout of paths in a very small (15 acre) landscape garden. Gustav Mayer, Lehrbuch der 
schönen Gartenkunst (Berlin: 1860), plate 18.
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most clearly recognized as their hero. The new historical meaning of 
this people’s garden has been captured in an eloquent portrayal from 
1893. 
“Humboldthain is a wonderful creation” said Wilhelm Bölsche in 
a series of probing vignettes drawn to evoke the distinct character of 
different districts of Berlin, each possessing “almost its own linguis-
tic and ethnographic originality.” In Humboldthain he found “one of 
the most beautiful oases of the city.” But this oasis lay in the far north 
of Berlin, “where the sky is so grey,” painted with a dark brush by 
surrounding railroad lines, factories, smokestacks, and tenements. 
It is the sky of Berlin North, of the factory north, by day a smoke 
cloud and by night a reddish brown cloud of fire. … Whoever en-
ters behind these signs of the heavens, turns forever in the same 
spot, with thousands together trapped in the wheelwork of the 
machines, compressed, churned, mangled. 
Thus Humboldthain presented a distressing contrast. 
At many hours it is completely empty; the plants then rule alone. 
For them everything goes on; the colorfully blooming bushes and 
the broad exquisite meadows gleam in unfading party dress. … 
But noontime comes, and now the whistles of the factories shrill. 
Out of the airless factory rooms comes the humanity of Berlin 
North: hollow-faced workers who consume their lunch on the 
benches, grimy factory girls, tired schoolchildren trudging home. 
The contrast is bitter. Now there rolls by a ring-line train in its 
deep trench and hurls its smoke into the white scented clusters 
of the gold-green acacias. One feels somewhat faint in this so 
well-intended oasis, whose Sauerstoffküsse (kisses of oxygen) are 
profaned by hundreds of sooty chimney-snouts with the full bru-
tality of our big-city fight for existence. 1
Sauerstoffküsse: what an engaging surprise in the Volksgarten.
1 Wilhelm Bölsche, “Berlin nach der Windrose,” in Berliner Pflaster. Illustrierte Schilde-
rungen aus dem Berliner Leben, ed. M. Reymond and L. Manzel (Berlin: 1893), 265–288,  
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